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ABSTRACT
The Thesis is primarily an assessment of the performance of 
agricultural credit cooperatives in the Punjab, before and after its 
partition in 1947. The intrinsic principles of cooperation are traced 
to their European origin and examined critically. The manner in which 
the institution of cooperation was transferred to the United Punjab in 
the early twentieth century as an instrument of government social and 
economic policy is documented. The evolution of government sponsorship 
of cooperative credit provision as an instrument of development is 
traced in the Indian and Pakistan Punjabs with particular reference to 
a representative area of the Pakistan Punjab.
The particular conclusion of the thesis is that the growth in 
numbers of credit cooperatives, membership and deployment of working 
capital are only superficial signs of success. Underlying these 
measures is a very indifferent performance attributable to the fact 
that the cooperatives failed to satisfy the criteria based on the 
original Raiffeisen principles necessary for the establishment of 
autonomous self-help organisations. The institution of cooperation was 
justified by ill-conceived government policies towards credit 
provision, and the movement, with government acquiescence, became the 
uncontested preserve of rural elites who used the institution for their 
own personal ends. The stated objectives, either distributional 
(focussing help in reducing the indebtedness of the small farmers) or 
developmental (increasing agricultural production) were not realised. 
The case study in a representative part of the Pakistan Punjab
establishes how widespread were the irregularities in the formation of 
cooperatives, involving the complicity of the authorities.
The wider conclusion is that on the one hand the experience in 
the Punjab hardly amounts to a test of the appropriateness of the 
institution of cooperation as a development agent since it did not 
correspond to the basic principles of cooperation; on the other hand, 
the uniform poverty and divided and hierarchical social structure of 
rural Punjab may point to the greater appropriateness of some 
alternative institutional device to encourage development.
1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Economic development and institutional change go hand in hand; 
whether one is cause and the other effect is a complex issue. Release 
of the potential productivity gains of specialisation and employment of 
capital is associated with the emergence of organised markets and the 
use of money. In turn the necessary contractual obligations are 
supported by functional political and legal structures which 
simultaneously underpin institutions concerned with complementary 
educational, scientific and technological change. All these 
institutions perform different specialised functions but are mutually 
inter-linked.
Institutional innovation can circumvent obstacles to development 
and the diffusion of such innovations can speed up economic growth. 
Thus, particular institutions may come to be regarded as instruments of 
economic development. However, a particular institutional instrument 
of great importance in a particular society cannot be guaranteed to 
make the same contribution to economic development when transferred to 
a wholly different society.
The particular institution of cooperation is frequently regarded 
in many countries as an important instrument for economic, social and 
cultural development. Cooperatives are often created to improve the 
lot of persons of limited resources and opportunities as well as 
encouraging their spirit of initiative. They are promoted to increase 
personal and national capital resources by the encouragement of thrift, 
by elimination of usury and by the sound use of credit. The
2establishment of cooperatives may also contribute an increased measure 
of democratic control of economic activity and an equitable 
distribution of productivity gains.
The role of cooperatives as an instrument of development is 
particularly emphasized in policies towards subsistence agriculture. 
The effectiveness of cooperatives depends upon whether or not they can 
provide remedies for basic deficiencies encountered by the vast 
majority of the rural population. In principle these deficiencies 
occur in two areas which do have reciprocal links. Firstly, the target 
population is characterized by inadequate access to certain factors of 
production - land, capital and services relating to the procurement of 
production requisites, credit, marketing, advice and training. The 
remedying of this may be conceived as a 'traditional' function of 
cooperatives. Secondly, the target population has hardly any 
facilities for expressing, promoting and gaining acceptance of their 
specific interests. This requires the formation of pressure groups 
which can establish an adequate amount of 'countervailing power'. The 
development of the cooperative enables the relatively poor segment of 
the rural population to come together and work together in order to 
improve their social and economic conditions, remedying their political 
weakness.
Subsistence agriculture confronts a vicious circle: the poor
have no political influence at all, and because they have no political 
influence they remain poor or even cbecome poorer. To succeed in
cJo
specific struggles concerning the distribution of resources it is 
essential for the poor to have a certain amount of survival potential, 
though this is necessarily conditioned by their economic environment.
3They are unlikely to benefit from evolutionary development processes 
and depend instead on the government having a strong commitment to 
improve the social and economic conditions of the poor through specific 
interventions.
The relationship between the institution of cooperation and- 
government is an ambiguous one. Governments in many developing 
countries sponsor the initiation and development of cooperatives on 
account of the institution's supposed importance as an 'agent' of 
change and its close relationship with economic growth and development 
in a rural setting. However, government involvement in the 
administration of cooperatives causes a substantial degree of 
'officialization' and dilutes the expected autonomous character of 
cooperatives. Even if cooperatives emerge spontaneously, they may need 
active protection from the government at certain phases of their 
development. Against this, the desire of governments is more often than 
not to transfer an increasing amount of its responsibilities to the 
cooperatives, both for socio-political and economic reasons.
Particular problems for the development of cooperatives may be 
the result of the following dichotomy: on the one hand, cooperatives
are expected to develop as autonomous self-help organizations i.e. as 
their members' instruments for the promotion of their own economies 
(farms, business units/households) in accordance with the members' 
individual and group interests, aims and goals; on the other hand the 
governments use cooperatives as a vehicle to perform manifold tasks - 
which may or may not turn out to be in conflict with the members' 
interests - control their activities directly and use them as 
instruments for implementation of various agricultural policies and
4measures relating to their own conception of development. Consequently 
problems arise in reconciling the individual members' interests and the 
government's development-related goals, particularly in the 
cooperatives established at the primary level. There the reconciliation 
may not accord with the expectation of the government's cooperative 
development policy. Further, the government's policy generally 
emphasizes a strategy of 'top-down' development of cooperatives: yet 
there may be little response to the introduction of cooperatives at the 
grass-roots level. Cooperative models are imported - from capitalist 
or socialist countries - and in the local socio-cultural and political 
contexts can have the opposite effect to that originally intended: 
cooperatives become adulterated and more often than not the instruments 
of rural elites. Problems thus crop up in transferring models which 
have developed in materially different socio-cultural contexts, without 
thought for the necessary modifications to ensure the cooperatives' 
practical success in particular local rural contexts. An ill- 
considered transfer of an alien institution can therefore have 
problematic consequences in particular local situations.
The factors which constitute the cultural and socio-political 
environment are as important for the initiation and establishment of 
cooperatives as the purely economic environment: the framework of
conditions set or influenced by the government's policies have a 
particular influence on the performance of cooperatives.
The present inquiry is focused on the institution of cooperatives 
and studies performance of this institution in the Punjab and its 
impact on the rural society and economy. The study provides a critical 
analysis of the initiation, development, achievements and set-backs of
5the institution of cooperation in the province of the Punjab in United 
India before its division in 1947 into the present Indian and Pakistan 
Punjabs. It seeks to present a critical appraisal of the development 
of cooperation and cooperative provision of credit in the Indian and 
Pakistan Punjabs for the period 1947 through the 1980s by examining the 
structures of cooperative organizations, their operational performance 
as autonomous organizations in addition to making an analysis of 
particular aspects of governmental sponsorship of cooperative 
organization as an instrument of agricultural development.
The selection of the Punjab as the focus of study is based on two 
considerations. Firstly, the province of the Punjab was one of the 
most developed agricultural regions in United India and had provided 
leadership to other Indian states in agricultural advancement. 
Secondly, introduction of the cooperative movement to the Punjab by the 
then British Raj in India proved instrumental, in that a good number of 
cooperatives in different spheres of economic activity developed under 
the sponsorship of the government. The selection of the United Punjab 
for the present study was interesting as it provided a base for the 
comparative assessment of the role, accomplishments and set-backs of 
cooperatives both as a 'self-help1 autonomous institution and as an 
instrument of the government's agricultural development policy in the 
two post-partition Punjabs - the Indian and the Pakistan Punjabs.
A number of other considerations prompted the author to focus on 
the two Punjabs. Firstly, there is a certain degree of geographical 
uniformity in that their populations share a common heritage and the 
physical environments are similar. Secondly, in both the cases the 
respective governments had inherited the same 'cooperative model',
6transplanted by the British Raj into the United Punjab. The 
institutional ideology of cooperation in the two Punjabs in 1947 
therefore 'took-off’ from a common base - directed from above 
bureaucratically and, as it happens, lacking any indigenous 
ideological ferment to transform the local community or society at the 
grass-roots level. It was thus considered important to analyse the 
performance of cooperatives in the two Punjabs in order to establish 
the extent to which the historical antecedents of current cooperative 
policy bear the stamp of the British colonial administration. 
Secondly, the research aimed at analysing the role of the cooperative 
movement as a policy instrument for the promotion of agricultural 
expansion and as a vehicle for achieving the goals desired by their 
member participants in order to find out the similarities and 
differences, if any, in the development of cooperatives in the two 
Punjabs falling as they have done since 1947 in two contrasting 
political settings i.e. the states of India and Pakistan.
The need to examine cooperatives within a more comprehensive 
framework of institutional policy in the two Punjabs is the central 
theme of our research. A case study of the sampled cooperatives in a 
representative area of the Pakistan Punjab was undertaken to provide a 
critical examination of the actual functioning of cooperatives with a 
view to assessing their strengths and weaknesses. It must be 
emphasised that given the available financial resources, time 
constraints and due to political reasons there was no opportunity to 
draw a similar representative sample of the cooperatives from the 
Indian Punjab. The case study, restricted to a representative area of 
the Pakistan Punjab, was chosen to remedy the superficiality of earlier
7studies in the Punjab and to provide a detailed picture of the actual 
working of the cooperatives. Special care was taken in the selection 
of the representative area and the cases studied. They were identified 
with the help and advice of the staff of the Department of Cooperation 
and local experts. Efforts were made to select cases which were 
representative of the cooperatives in the Pakistan Punjab.
The research embodies more than the case study alone. It 
includes an analysis of studies of the available documentations - 
historical records on cooperatives, academic literature, government 
reports, investigations and policy statements, documents pertaining to 
national and local cooperatives and the analytical and empirical work 
of other social scientists who have investigated relevant aspects of 
cooperative development in the two Punjabs. In addition a systematic 
content analysis was made of the governmental data sources contained in 
the Annual Reports on the working of cooperatives, covering the period 
from 1904 to the 1980s. Given the existing constraints on research, it 
was not possible to propose a better methodological approach for the 
present work.
A general hypothesis of the research is that innovative 
institutions (e.g. cooperatives) intended to bring development and 
improve their members' socio-economic conditions are themselves 
conditioned by the socio-political milieu into which they are inserted 
and, as a consequence their achievements may not be in accord with 
their intentions. The field work seeks to describe the mechanisms by 
which this conditioning occurs and the effects it has on the 
functioning and objectives of the institution of cooperatives. In 
short this means a study of external linkages and support, the
8congruence or incongruence of cooperatives within the existing 
conditions, the diffusion of cooperatives and the role of dissent and 
factionalism in the cooperatives' development in the Indian and
Pakistan Punjabs.
Plan of work
The reasons for undertaking the present study have been provided 
in the preceding paragraphs. The study itself is arranged as follows:
Chapter 2 looks into some of the conceptual issues concerning
cooperatives. This chapter examines the evolution of cooperation in 
the form of an institutional structure. It seeks to present some 
analytical issues of significance relating to the structure, conduct 
and performance of cooperatives. An exploration in general terms of 
the potentials and limitations of cooperatives as a tool of development 
is provided and the attractions and problems of cooperatives for the 
state and small land-holder examined.
Chapter 3 seeks to delineate the need for working capital in
subsistence agriculture and looks at the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of the informal and institutional capital markets in 
providing working capital to subsistence farmers. The advantages and 
disadvantages of cooperatives as a channel of credit are examined.
Criteria for assessing the performance of agricultural credit societies 
are given.
Chapter 4 traces the course and direction of the historical
development of the institution of cooperative provision of credit in 
the province of the Punjab in United India and in the post-partition 
Indian and Pakistan Punjabs. The chapter seeks to present critical
9analysis of cooperative development by analysing and comparing the 
course of institutional development of cooperation in the undivided 
Punjab, and in the Indian and Pakistan Punjabs for the period, 1904-80.
Chapter 5 analyses in detail the performance of cooperatives - in 
particular the credit cooperatives - in their contrasting roles as 
potentially autonomous organizations and as an instrument of the 
government's agricultural development policy within the Pakistan 
Punjab. The organizational and operational aspects of cooperatives are 
analysed and achievements and problems of cooperatives critically 
examined.
Chapter 6 looks into similar organizational and operational 
aspects of cooperatives in the Indian Punjab and identifies their 
strengths and weaknesses. The major problems, similarities and 
differences in the evolution of cooperation and credit together with 
the effectiveness of cooperatives as instruments of governments 
agricultural development policy in the two Punjabs are critically 
examined.
Chapter 7 presents an analysis of the actual functioning of 
sampled cooperatives in a representative area of the Pakistan Punjab. 
The case study aims at a more detailed and critical appraisal of the 
working of the sampled cooperatives as 'autonomous self-help' 
organization and as a governmental vehicle to promote agricultural 
development, based on primary data: A critical evaluation of the
provision of interest-free mark-up credit by the cooperatives to the 
small farmers (land-holders of up to 12.5 acres) is made based on data 
from the official records of the sampled societies. In addition the 
analysis employs data generated by interviewing sampled members of the
10
societies. -The role of the selected cooperatives in promoting 
agricultural development is examined. The extent and nature of 
irregularities in the provision of government funds channelled through 
the cooperatives to the small farmers are identified.
Finally chapter 8 presents a summary and statement of' 
conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2
COOPERATIVES: IDEOLOGY. PRINCIPLES. AND PRACTICES
This chapter seeks to elaborate some analytical concepts in order 
to determine their significance for the structure, conduct and 
performance of cooperatives. The chapter is organized into four 
sections. Section I deals with the ideological aspects of cooperation. 
Section II is concerned with economic and social aspects of 
cooperatives. Section III covers issues concerning the effectiveness 
of cooperatives as an instrument of development. And, finally section 
IV concludes with a general review of the principal issues flagged in 
the chapter.
2.1 Ideological Base
The cooperative movement of 19th century appeared as a 
spontaneous response to the sudden changes in living conditions in both 
rural areas and urban centres associated with the Industrial 
revolution. It originated among humble workers who saw the cooperative 
movement as a possible response to their harsh living conditions 
recognizing as they did that a) capital was not the only source of 
riches b) even without capital there was scope to improve their living 
conditions by cooperating with each other c) instead of continuing to 
bear oppression passively, they could become active protagonists by 
working together in a new way.^
Several different conceptions have emerged in the process of 
evolution of cooperative thinking. For analytical purposes, they can 
be broadly placed in two major categories: the pragmatic and the
12
idealistic. In the first category may be placed the conception that 
the primary aim of cooperatives is to help improve the economic 
conditions of those who stand to lose if they individually face 
powerful interests and privileged competitors. Thus cooperation is not 
an instrument to transform capitalist system and replace it by some 
contrasting alternative. Instead, its distinctive institutional form 
is designed to mitigate inequalities and harshness of capitalistic 
system altering the distribution of its benefits in the process of 
making it more workable. The idealistic ideologists however conceived 
of cooperatives as an instrument to effect the transformation of the 
capitalist system. They held that cooperatives were fundamentally non- 
capitalistic and could co-exist with capitalism only at the risk of 
becoming capitalistic themselves.2
The idealistic ideologists of cooperation include amongst others, 
the socialists, the Utopians and the marxists; the Christian 
socialists; the builders of a cooperative commonwealth. The pragmatic 
view of cooperation was generally held by the 'pace-makers' who by 
establishing cooperatives wanted to provide effective competition 
thereby making the capitalistic system work better. In addition, we 
may include the economists and sociologists who took a more or less 
detached interest in cooperatives within the prevailing economic 
system.3
The pragmatic proponents of cooperation may further be divided 
into two groups: first the 'idealistic pragmatists' or those who
possessed a combination of idealism and practicality. They believed 
that if people joined together in cooperative spirit and action they 
could improve their economic conditions. However, their solution to
13
prevailing economic problems also reflected their ethical judgements, 
hope and vision that farmers, workers, and small businessmen should 
achieve better lives. At the same time they believed that cooperatives 
must be operated in an efficient business-like way within the existing 
system. The 'idealistic pragmatists' included amongst others the 
Rochdale Pioneers and Friedrich Raiffeisen. The second group, the 
'pure pragmatists' such as Herman Schulze who believed that a 
cooperative was an effective tool in a capitalistic world - in that as 
a distinctive institutional form the cooperative proved technically 
more efficient as compared with other capitalistic enterprises. 
Schultz did not believe in the relevance of ethical judgements and/or 
the moral regeneration of cooperative members. Economy was enough for 
him. But economy must be sound resting primarily upon self-help, 
production and thrift, he believed.4
Amongst the idealistic ideologists of cooperation, the utopian 
socialists had as an ideal the setting up of utopian communities in 
which a new way of life would at once make its members independent of 
their environment. Fourier wished to have 'phalansteres', those to be 
principally agricultural self-sufficient societies. Robert Owen 
believed in the perfectibility of human nature under conditions of good 
environment and wished to set up ideal communities, again self- 
sufficient. To this group may be added St. Simon with Buchez and Blanc 
who believed that once the excellence of cooperative or community life 
was shown, people would be led by reason to accept it universally. 5
It was the prevailing environment that led these socialists to 
dream of a kind of non-capitalistic self-sufficient community based on 
mutual aid and equality, which would give them a direct share in
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building up a new society, one radically new in its motivating ideal - 
that of the self-supporting community - and its aims; no small scale 
pooling of capital for profit, but for a society to give service to its 
members to secure drastic improvement in living conditions.
In practice, owenite and other utopian models failed utterly, 
either to reshape society or find accommodation with the emerging 
forces of industrialism.6
In contrast the Marxian socialists were first opposed to 
cooperatives. Karl Marx, however, allowed that cooperation was a 
"great social experiment because it proves that there can be large 
scale production of an advanced type without the supervision of the 
capitalists".7 Yet he would have none of the consumers' movement,, 
because any effort to raise wages for workers was destined to fail due 
to the iron law of wages. Real wages would in any case tend to sink 
to the subsistence level, so selling goods cheaply could not improve 
the conditions of workers.
From the marxist point of view there is a fundamental conflict 
between cooperation and state communism. The essence of the 
cooperative is ownership and control by members of the factor of 
production. Owners of property have little taste for violent
revolution; this is especially true of groups who control factories.
Under communism, however, many state or government enterprises 
were designated as 'cooperatives'. The communists often called these 
government enterprises 'cooperatives' in order to capitalize on the 
good name cooperatives earned in the free enterprise system. It may be 
noted that the cooperatives in the capitalistic system had earned some 
respect and admiration from the world before the communistic revolution
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in Russia in 1917. Therefore it was to the advantage of communists to 
try to capitalize on the reputation of cooperatives and use the term to 
characterize the collective efforts which were not truly cooperative 
but rather wholly state controlled and directed. In Russia, for 
instance, cooperation was used by the government from the very first 
year of socialist revolution, as a lever and as a driving belt for the 
socialist transformation of the country's economic life. And in order 
to serve this purpose, a radical, conversion of its activity, which 
originally received the impetus from capitalism, was necessary in both 
form and content.^
The Christian Socialists conceived cooperation somewhat a means 
to create a "Christian communal life based upon economic reforms with 
the help of associated activity carried on in a spirit of Christian 
love". Huber, for instance, believed that evil in the world resulted 
from defects of character, which stemmed from the "degrading pressures 
of poverty". He looked therefore to cooperative organizations to 
remove poverty. Moreover, when men worked for a common good rather 
than for self, "their own horizons would be enlarged and their 
character improved".9
Although ethical and religious considerations motivated the 
Christian Socialists, they did not believe that philanthropic and 
charitable acts would solve the problems of society, because they did 
not necessarily help the unfortunate back to self-support and self- 
respect. The cooperative movement, on the other hand, provided a 
system of 'self help' which removed poverty, improved character and 
eliminated evil. The Christian Socialists, in particular Huber, 
believed that cooperative associations were primarily designed to aid
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the workers, but he did not preclude membership embracing the small 
proprietor or even the wealthy landlord. Overall, he thought that no 
class lines should be drawn for eligibility to membership of such 
associations.  ^0
The Islamic faith similarly upholds the cooperative ideal. 
According to the 'Holy Quran', in contrast to the tenets of capitalism, 
wealth for the mere sake of wealth is opposed as a matter of faith. 
The provision of aid to economically weak persons is also part of the 
faith. Thus the essence of Islamic teaching lends strong support to 
the cooperative idea. The cooperative is looked upon a unifying 
institution to better the economic, social and political conditions of 
the whole community.^
Fundamentally, there is an explicit contrast between the view 
point of a capitalist and what the religious schools conceived as 
cooperation. A capitalist strives primarily for profit and the 
measures he adopts have nothing to do with such value judgements, 
though he must work within the law. As such, he may or may not be 
interested in improving the economic lot of people without any moral 
binding who tend to lose in the society without access to capital and 
other means of production.
Cooperatives, on the other hand may render at least four valuable 
services to the capitalistic system of which they may be a part: (1) 
enhance private property (2) preserve market competition (3) retain the 
profit motive for its patrons and (4) maintain and strengthen the 
individual consumer and entrepreneur. The cooperatives in a 
capitalistic system can not properly service members if they do not 
produce profit on behalf of their members, although in a sense
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cooperatives themselves make no profit12 (this point shall be further 
elaborated in subsequent sections).
The idea for a cooperative commonwealth was advanced by Charles 
Gide who believed that the capitalistic society could be transformed 
into a 'Cooperative Republic' by stages and by means of cooperative- 
organizations. Recognition of the unsuitability of the state for 
carrying on business or for establishing real contact with and among 
the people led many to suggest cooperative control of state companies. 
Some pointed out that state action, even in an advisory role, would do 
more harm than good if it took the form of direct authoritarian 
intervention. The state should act through the local cooperative which 
handled all produce, credit or even the flow of ideas through its 
educational activity.12
As noted, the criticism of the capitalistic system is that it can 
generate a distribution of benefits which is unequal, and, according to 
some value judgements, inequitable. This is rather different from the 
argument that it necessarily immiserizes some people, or that only the 
rich are its beneficiaries. There is a good deal of evidence that 
capitalism has increased the real standard of living of the poor, even 
although relative to the rich they may have achieved little progress. 
This is consistent in particular with the co-existence of an 
undercapitalized agriculture with cultivators constantly in poverty. 
Nevertheless from this pragmatic perspective cooperation does not aim 
to supplant the capitalistic system. Cooperation, in the pragmatic 
sense, is looked upon as an attempt by agrarians, craftsmen and other 
small producers to improve their relative position in a modern 
capitalistic society. The proponents of the pragmatic approach thus
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perceive cooperatives more or less as an entirely voluntary 
organization formulated with a view to deriving economic benefits for 
its members through a common enterprise on the basis of mutual 
cooperation and self-help. However benefits arising from undertaking a 
cooperative would be distributed in proportion to the contributions of 
individual members, without in any way aiming to bring about equality 
in income distribution through cooperative o r g a n i s a t i o n . 1 4
The cooperative, in a pragmatic framework, may thus appear as a 
vehicle by which farmers interact both as buyers and sellers, thereby 
exercising ’countervailing power'. As a distinctive institutional form 
a cooperative can therefore be looked upon as an association which is 
democratically controlled, includes any number of farmers and serves as 
a device for getting economies of large scale operation in the handling 
of farm products and also in providing and capitalizing such facilities 
as elevators, grain terminals, warehouses and creameries within the 
existing system.15
As noted before the pragmatic conception of cooperation has 
largely been based on the writings and teachings of those such as 
Rochdale Pioneers, Raiffeisen and Schultze. In view of their 
importance it is worthwhile presenting a brief account of their ideas 
and also an assessment of the progress made by these founders of the 
movement based on their objectives. In fact, the 'ideology' 
underpinning the modern cooperative movement has largely been derived 
from the views advanced by these innovators.
The Rochdale Pioneers16 were a group of 28 individuals, ranging 
from flannel weavers to shoemakers. They were craftsmen or 
entrepreneurs who came together in 1844 in Toad Lane, Rochdale in the
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UK to purchase supplies and consumer goods cooperatively. The original 
subscription was one English pound for one share of stock with original 
capital estimated at $140. The Rochdale experiment was organized under 
a comprehensive plan which provided for (a) the establishment of a 
store for the sale of provisions and clothing (b) the building of 
houses in which those members desiring to assist each other in 
improving their domestic and social conditions may reside (c) the 
manufacture of such articles as the society may determine upon, for the 
employment of such members as may be without employment, or who may be 
suffering in consequence of repeated reductions in earnings (d) the 
purchase of estates of land which shall be cultivated by the members 
without employment (e) to proceed to arrange the powers of production, 
distribution, education, government, in other words to establish a 
self-supporting home colony of united interests.
As 'idealistic pragmatists', the Rochdale Pioneers, therefore 
believed in the founding of a self-supporting community of common 
interests by helping to reduce the hardship faced by workers under 
industrial capitalism. They soon realised that they would not at once 
set-up a self-supporting community without wealthy donors or outside 
financing which was not immediately available. They were therefore 
constrained to confine themselves to drawing up the broad lines of 
their programme and getting down to work at once, relying only on 
themselves. This left them the only choice of exploiting their own 
modest purchasing power as consumers by setting up a consumer store.
A store was established as the 'Rochdale Society of Equitable 
Pioneers' with members pooling their labour and working capital. The 
members of the society subscribed to shares, payable in small amounts
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weekly, in order to raise capital to buy goods at less than retail 
costs and sell them to their members at a saving. Members were paid 5 
percent interest on their shares and were entitled to a proportionate 
division of the society's savings or profits at the end of the year. 
The Rochdale principles of cooperation included amongst others open 
membership to all; democractic control of the society, with each member 
having only one vote regardless of the number of shares owned; a 
limited interest on share capital; and return to members of the 
cooperative's profit in proportion to their patronage. The example and 
principles of the Rochdale Pioneers have profoundly influenced the 
cooperative movement in many other countries of the world.
The Pioneers chose a consumer association of a sort which proved 
able to make the best possible uses of their assets. The growing 
number of consumer cooperatives and their association to form 
cooperative wholesale societies opened up new possibilities of 
rationalising distribution systems and planning their own market.
As idealistic pragmatists in regard to cooperation the Rochdale 
Pioneers always aspired to found a complete community. They started by 
founding consumer cooperatives as a matter of practical tactics, not as 
a denial of those aspirations; they postponed attainment of their 
communal idea but did not abandon it. The pressure of specialized and 
therefore competitive society around them made cooperators copy the 
policy of specialization within the existing system which was in line 
with pragmatic conception of cooperation. Nevertheless this did not 
invalidate the essentially reformist ideal of their movement.
Most cooperatives established on Rochdale principles managed to 
become established permanently in the economic landscape, most notably
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in Britain initially but in other countries later.
The development of the cooperative credit movement, however, 
originated in Germany.17 The names of Hermann Schulze and Friedrich 
Raiffeisen are most notably associated with its evolution.
Herman Schulze1® was born in 1808 to a well-to-do family. He 
graduated in law and was appointed to the position of Patrimonial 
Richter in 1841. Later he won a seat in the parliament. He quickly 
became identified with the liberal members of the National Assembly who 
were pressing for a constitution and reforms. This led in 1850 to his 
being tried in the court on the charge of high treason. Although 
acquitted, he lost his position as Patrimonial Richter.
In 1846 a crop failure in Germany which brought great distress to. 
the population prompted Schulze to form a local committee which rented 
a grist mill and bakery and purchased grain at wholesale prices to 
distribute to the needy. The crop failure was followed by the severe 
winter of 1846-47, which produced even more suffering. Two important 
events occurred for Schulze during the hard times of late 1840’s. 
After losing his post, he founded a friendly society for craftsmen to 
provide cooperative insurance against sickness and death. He also 
organized a cooperative purchasing society for master shoemakers to buy 
leather at wholesale prices for its members. But even then, the 
society had to borrow funds to make their first purchase. Out of this 
experience Schulze discovered the great need for credit among craftsmen 
and shoemakers.
Schulze founded a cooperative credit association for these 
craftsmen and shoemakers and its subsequent success was attributed to
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principles which Schulze considered essential. Each member paid an 
entrance fee of $2.50 and proved that he was capable of paying for one 
share, initially valued at $12.00, in instalments. Members deposited 
their savings in the society in order to provide working capital, and 
modest dividends were paid on these share accounts. Additional capital 
when needed, was borrowed from other financial institutions on the 
principle of 'unlimited liability'. 'All for one and each for all'- was 
in a sense the character of the Schulze credit association.
Loans granted by the Schulze association were made for productive 
purposes and were secured on an assessment of the character of the 
person borrowing rather than on collateral or mortgage. Loans were 
endorsed by two members and were extended for three months. Membership 
in the Schulze association was open to all. He stressed democratic 
control. The supreme authority was the general body comprising all 
membership which practised one vote for each shareholder regardless of 
the number of shares held. A general committee was elected by the 
members annually and consisted of president, treasurer, secretary and 
nine members. This committee decided on requests for loans and also on 
such other matters as recovery from members.
Schulze had no scheme in mind for the moral regeneration of 
mankind. Nor did he imagine the creation of a workingmen's paradise. 
He did not have the intention of interfering in members' private life, 
or educating them in moral issues. Economy was enough for him. And, 
economy- must be sound, resting upon self-help, production and thrift, 
Schulze believed.
As Schulze-type societies or unions spread, he worked to provide 
cooperation within the movement. Schulze and his associates created a
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'central office' to clear the way for business connections between the 
unions, for the exchange of mutual experience and an understanding 
about the common purpose. However, despite the evolution of central 
organizations, Schulze insisted that each local society was autonomous 
in performance of its basic functions. Schulze participated in the 
organization of the Universal Federation of German cooperative 
societies, which embraced the older central organizations and the 
subordinate leagues. In 1857, the German Cooperative Bank was 
established to accept deposits of surplus bank funds and to raise money 
to lend to cooperatives. A majority of the stock in this central bank 
was owned by the credit associations, and the remainder by private 
individuals. Then Schulze sought legislation giving legal status to 
his associations and finally succeeded in 1867. Schulze also set forth 
his ideas on laws for a new cooperative, which was published in 1883, 
only a year before his death. Schulze banks continued to grow in 
Germany even after his death. There were over 1000 such credit 
associations with a membership of 641,000 in Germany by 1912.
Even before Schulze's death a rival type of cooperative credit, 
institution appeared in Germany and this was promoted by Friedrich 
Raiffeisen.
Raiffeisen^ was born in 1818. His father died when Raiffeisen 
was only eleven years old, leaving him in poor circumstances. However, 
a local minister taught Raiffeisen on an informal basis. At the age of 
seventeen he joined the army; after two years an eye disease forced him 
to retire from the army. He however took the civil service examination 
and rose from a clerkship to become Mayor of Weyerbusch in 1846. As a 
Mayor, Raiffeisen was deeply moved by the sufferings caused by the
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famine and hard winter of 1846-47, and he decided to concentrate on 
helping the farmers. Raiffeisen was much moved by the deplorable 
economic conditions of the farming population in Germany and visualised 
that the only way to help peasants solve their economic problems was to 
persuade them to join credit societies which Raiffeisen had started- 
promoting after 1846-47. And this task he continued till his death in 
1888. Failing eyesight and poor health plagued Raiffeisen constantly 
and as a result he was forced to retire on a small pension in 1863. 
Later, he established his own business and earned enough money to 
support himself until his death. Before he died, he was recognized by 
society and the government alike for his services to the farmers of 
Germany and those who benefitted from his cooperative credit schemes 
increasingly used the name "good father Raiffeisen".
As noted, Raiffeisen was profoundly moved by the suffering caused 
by the famine and hard-winter of 1846-47, but unlike Schulze, he 
concentrated on helping the farmer. The famine was however one factor 
that dramatized the bad underlying conditions among farmers with which 
Raiffeisen had become concerned. The reforms that freed peasants from 
their feudal obligations and gave them their own land had not improved 
their situation. Indeed farmers were "half-starved - ill-clad, ill- 
fed, ill-housed, ill brought-up who eked out by hard labour barely 
enough to keep body and soul together". Indeed, farmers were not 
prepared for commercial-type agriculture. They did not have money to 
pay for machinery, fertilizer, seed or livestock in order to increase 
farm productivity and thus their income. Mortgages on land provided 
the basis of most rural credit, but mortgages were granted only to 
owners of large properties.
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The typical farmer in Germany was at the mercy of money-lenders. 
When he purchased land, he had to borrow from a high rate money lender 
who quickly foreclosed on the property if payments were not made on the 
day they were due. For money needed to buy seed and supplies the 
farmer had again to turn to the money-lender who often charged as much 
as 100 percent interest.
It was therefore not extraordinary distress caused by famine, but 
the steadily worsening condition of farmers that prompted Raiffeisen to 
help them.
As a first step, in 1846-47, Raiffeisen organized a Bread union 
to distribute flour to the hungry, later building a bakery to sell 
bread to the destitute at low prices. Another association borrowed 
money and purchased seed and potatoes for planting and sold them at a 
discount. Neither of these organizations was fundamentally 
cooperative, however, because money was contributed or borrowed from 
the more fortunate for benefit of the poor. In 1849, Raiffeisen 
started a 'society' for the support of poor farmers, which began its 
operations by purchasing cattle and reselling them to farmers on 
generous terms payable in instalments. Later the society began to 
extend credit to farmers to improve their farms.
Raiffeisen's society was composed of well-to-do citizens who 
pledged themselves in joint liability for the debt of the society, 
deciding who should be admitted to membership and who would receive 
loans. The members, on the other hand could borrow money, contribute 
to capital but had no voice in the governing of the body. Nevertheless 
this union freed many farmers from the grip of money-lenders and helped 
to put them on a better economic footing. The Raiffeisen society
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promoted the care and education of destitute children. Raiffeisen 
adopted the principle that profits were not to be distributed to 
investors until a reserve fund had been established. In addition, the 
capital was inalienable and if the society was ever dissolved, it would 
be distributed for the benefit of the poor.
Raiffeisen soon realised that the public-spirited or wealthy 
persons who had initially contributed capital to his society out of 
religious and benevolent enthusiasm imparted by him, began to lose 
interest because benefits only accrued to the poorer borrowers. He 
thus replaced the original charitable principle with the principle of 
'self-help1.
Although Raiffeisen adopted the principle of self-help, there 
were still differences between these two types of loan societies. 
Raiffeisen insisted that brotherly love and Christian principles should 
motivate the credit union. While Schulze was concerned primarily with 
promoting the borrower’s economic objective of self-sufficiency, he 
believed that membership should come from a large and economically 
varied area; Raiffeisen preferred to restrict membership to a small 
district, preferably a 'parish1. Moreover Schulze concentrated on 
urban workers, while Raiffeisen devoted himself to helping farmers.
Membership of a Raiffeisen society was conditional, in that a 
farmer was admitted if his neighbour judged him to be of good 
character, industrious and friendly. The society did not distinguish 
between the rich and the poor, but a person admitted to membership had 
nonetheless to have some tangible assets. A tenant was eligible for 
membership if he had his own livestock and equipment. There was no 
share capital, as the societies raised money by borrowing on the joint
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liability of their members. Therefore no dividends were paid. 
Interest was paid on deposits. At a later stage Raiffeisen societies 
adopted a token requirement of one share of $2.50 per member, in 
particular after the passage of the German Cooperative Law in 1889.
The Raiffeisen society was a democratic association. All members 
participated in general meetings, each having one vote. They elected a 
committee of management to approve loans and to see that the borrowers 
used the money specifically for the purposes set forth in the 
application. The council of inspection or supervisory committee was 
responsible for checking on the activities of managers and reporting to 
the general meeting. Raiffeisen stressed volunteer work in his 
society, providing compensation only to the full time secretary.
Raiffeisen faced the problem of creating regional and national 
organisations to bind his societies into a whole, to promote their 
common purposes by providing a forum for the exchange of useful 
information, to supply legal and legislative advice, and to facilitate 
central banking services. The societies enjoyed no strong financial 
backing, and all societies suffered from time to time from a lack of 
adequate funds, and only occasionally from surplus money. He organized 
a first central association (the Rhein Agricultural Union Bank) in 
1872, to serve as a central banking institution and to oversee and 
control local credit societies. Other regional banks of this sort 
followed soon, and in 1874 he created a national organization called 
the German Agricultural Bank of Neuwied. The German law did.not allow 
one association to combine with another nor an association without 
shares to engage in banking.
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In response to the obstacles imposed by the legal system of the 
day Raiffeisen dissolved all his central banks, and in 1876 organized a 
new bank called the 'Central Agricultral Loan Bank', as a joint stock 
company with its shares held in trust by officials. The following year 
the 'General Federation of Rural Cooperative Societies of Germany' was 
organized to provide legal services, give advice, organize new 
societies and disseminate information. Numerous other regional and 
central organizations were founded in the ensuing years.
Raiffeisen societies enjoyed a much larger growth than the 
Schulze associations. Whereas Schulze stressed a purely business-like 
philosophy the Raiffeisen Societies emphasized their founder's moral 
and Christian principles. In later years, however, professional 
business leadership became more decisive in the affairs of Raiffeisen 
societies.
In short, Raiffeisen societies helped a great deal in providing 
economic relief to the peasant farmers from the usurious money-lenders 
who by charging high interest rates kept them permanently in their 
power. The system of agricultural cooperative credit was later 
extended to many parts of the world in its original or modified form 
depending upon the local conditions of different countries. Most 
credit societies in developing countries have been established on 
Raiffeisen principles and are firmly established in their agrarian 
economies.20
a ^
Cooperatives received little attention from economists until 
recent years.21 Economic literature on the cooperative economy is 
normally associated with the writings of Jaroslav V a n e k 2 2 / Robotka2 ,^ 
Phillips24, A r e s v i k 2 5 and Bateman, Edwards and L e v a y 2 ^. They have
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centred on the analysis of the cooperative as a firm using conventional 
microeconomic analysis. A consensus appears to be emerging regarding 
the workings of cooperatives as economic institutions. In particular, 
it is realised that a number of different forms of behaviour are 
possible, depending on the nature of the cooperatives' chosen 
objectives. Furthermore, there may be conflict of interest between 
different types of members depending on the objectives pursued.
The task of mobilizing international and national resources to 
make the cooperative approach more effective has been undertaken by the 
International Cooperative Alliance. The analysis of the ideological 
pronouncements of the Alliance suggests that the Alliance has tended to 
vacillate somewhat between pragmatic and idealistic approaches.
The institution of cooperation assumes that all members have 
equality of status regardless of their contribution in terms of 
capital. The membership of the group is voluntary and not covered 
overtly and/or covertly, directly or indirectly, through social or 
political means. The leadership in the group is elected and 
responsible to general membership which is supposed to be active enough 
to exercise control over the leaders. Where government sponsorship is 
accepted, it is expected to be temporary to enable the cooperatives to 
secure necessary resources which would otherwise be difficult to 
obtain, a version of the infant industry argument. Finally the 
cooperative should be neutral politically and religiously, in the sense 
that it is not intended to be an instrument of any political or 
religious group.28
Cooperatives were established primarily as self-help 
organizations in many western countries. Whether organized by farmers
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or urban residents, they were started by groups who wanted to join 
forces to protect their interests in the face of what they saw as 
adverse conditions in the surrounding private markets. While they had 
to run business-like operations in competition with others, 
cooperatives differed from the usual business firm in that: capital is 
contributed in equal shares by all members, who have one vote each in 
running the organization: Policy makers are elected and major policies
decided by members voting. Profits are distributed either in 
proportion to purchases or as a return on membership shares. As 
cooperative activities spread to nearby groups, cooperative federations 
were formed to supply the primary cooperatives with joint services, 
operating with the same principles as their member units. This concept 
of a tightly operating group following strict democratic principles, 
highly effective in producing solidarity in a struggle to assert the 
groups interest in a hostile environment, became diffused as the scale 
and complexity of their operations increased with success. However the 
fundamental principles remained a significant influence on the 
activities of cooperatives in many western countries, even if attention 
to the spirit or letter of these principles is somewhat variable in
practice.29
Cooperatives in many developing countries were initiated with 
more or less the same image - i.e. as 'self-help' organizations. 
However, in the process deviation from the 'principles' has become even 
greater. For one thing, these organizations were in many cases 
sponsored by westerners - outsiders to the group whose self-interest 
was to be asserted. In colonial times - especially in British colonies 
- this was a western-based government; in post war years it was usually
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the national governments responding to western advisors or ideas; in 
other cases western-based churches or foundations started cooperatives 
both before or after political independence. In such circumstances the 
independent self-help element took on a very different coloration; 
irrespective of the sincerity of the sponsors' desire to help, 
cooperative members did not but sense that something was being done for 
them from above rather than something they themselves did to fight back 
against their economic environment. The extent of external support 
certainly conditioned the ideology, the conduct and performance of 
cooperatives. Sometimes the original cooperative ideology was changed 
in the contemporary context of developing countries to serve the 
interests of ruling elites and political parties or to serve national 
developmental interests rather than local interests.30
When judged in this context cooperative ideology would have to 
acknowledge the interaction between economic and socio-political power 
and recognise the frequent need either for structural change or for 
political mobilization in order for cooperatives to be able to benefit 
their members.
In summary then, the early interest in cooperative structures 
stemmed from a deep disquiet among the pioneers regarding the social 
consequences of the industrial revolution. Critics of the new order 
conceived of cooperation, not simply as a framework for business 
organization but also as a vehicle for the realization of radical 
social and political goals. Efforts attempted to establish cooperative 
communities by Robert Owen and other socialists yielded little success. 
Most utopian models failed either to reshape society or find an 
accommodation with the emerging forces of industrialism. However, more
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specialized forms of cooperation, consumer's societies and credit 
cooperatives, in particular, managed to establish themselves 
permanently in the economic landscape from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards, most notably in Britain and Germany initially but in other 
western and developing countries later. Over time, however, the more 
visionary aspects of cooperation declined. Thus there are cooperators, 
even in the late twentieth century who would regard cooperatives be 
they industrial, agricultural, consumer or credit societies - as 
indistinguishable from conventional business enterprises. But although 
concepts of cooperation have largely been shorn of the extravagant 
claims of earlier social prophets, a residual belief remains that 
cooperators are motivated by group interest as well as self-interest 
and that both non-economic as well as economic objectives may be 
pursued by a cooperative.
In short, two schools of thought emerged concerning the way to 
solve the problems of industrial revolution. One believed that the 
whole capitalistic system upon which the industrial revolution was 
based should be overthrown and replaced by non-capitalistic self- 
sufficient communities based on mutual aid and equality. This, 
according to the 'idealistic ideologists' would give its members a 
direct share in building up a new society, one radically new in its 
motivating idea - that of the self-supporting community - and its aims; 
no small scale pooling of capital for profit, but for a society to give 
service to its members to secure drastic improvement in living 
conditions. The other group believed in preserving the system which 
had produced such great accomplishments and in making any necessary 
changes within the structure of the system. In this group could be
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found the cooperative pioneers we know about today ... the Rochdale 
Pioneers, Friedrich Raiffeisen, Schulze, Delitzsch and many others. 
They were termed the 'pragmatic schools'. The ideological struggle 
between the two even continues to date.
We may agree with Webbs' judgement that "it seems to us to only 
darken counsel to use the term cooperative to designate both forms of 
combination". Both have however the same basic rules of control by 
members voting equally and of profit distributed according to trade; 
they have walked along parallel paths, if not always shoulder to 
shoulder, they have contributed so much to each others' development 
that to understand one, we must study both. With the exception of 
extreme socialists and advocates of a cooperative commonwealth, most 
would agree that their common aim is to ensure the survival of small 
units of production or consumption in a world where ever-increasing 
concentration makes their elimination otherwise inevitable.
In point of fact, in recent years in both the western world and 
many developing countries cooperatives have not been true in letter and 
spirit to either the idealistic or pragmatic conceptions of 
cooperatives. The original ideologies have been radically transformed 
through the increasing interest in and control of the cooperative 
movement by central governments, particularly so in developing 
countries.
2.II Economic and Social Aspects of Cooperatives
Growth in scale of an economic activity generates pressure for 
institutional change. The scale of business grew markedly during the 
industrial revolution and various structures of enterprise developed by
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which business activity could be given expression. Capitalists have 
based organization on private property rights in the equipment of 
production. At a time when capital was scarce and new technology 
offered greater profit to those who could control it, this was a 
natural and efficient form of organization. The capitalist bought the 
other means of production such as labour or raw material, as cheaply as 
he could and sold the product at the best price obtainable.32
The increasing use of specialised physical capital however 
increases commercial risk (basically derived from the possibility that 
no market exists for the product it will produce). The incidence of 
this risk then depends on the institutional property rights. Under 
capitalism these are a private (or individualistic) matter; under 
socialism they are a collective matter.
Socialists have tried to avoid the unequal distribution of income 
and wealth under capitalism by endeavouring to make the community 
perform the role of entrepreneur. All citizens are 'shareholders'. 
Profit or loss shows ultimately in the accumulated reserves accruing to 
the taxpayer or the loss he must underwrite. To most socialists, the 
ultimate unit of organization is the state but the principle of 
collective liability can be applied to any other grouping of prople. 
The crucial point is that the enterprise belongs to the whole group 
whether or not they use the service p r o v i d e d ^ .
Cooperatives developed as a means of obtaining the benefits of 
large scale operations but with a distinctive approach .to shared 
liability. As noted earlier, the cooperative movement dates from the 
Industrial Revolution. Cooperatives were formed to counter
deficiencies seemingly inherent in the existing capitalistic system.
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People joined togeher, pooling their resources to gain the benefit of 
large scale enterprise. The benefits belonged collectively to those 
who set it up for their own use. Naturally control rested with those 
who took the risk - the trading members. Depending on the
circumstances some set up consumer's cooperatives, producers
cooperatives, credit cooperatives and so on. These have very different
objectives. In each there is a factor of production such as labour, or 
an interest, such as consumer of the service, which controls the 
enterprise to its own advantage.34
In point of fact, cooperatives are a form of business
organization within the capitalistic system. They are capitalistic 
because they (a) are based on private property, ownership and exchange,, 
and are removed from government or societal ownership (b) contain the 
spirit and essence of private enterprise, namely the power to start and 
stop a business (c) seek to maximise profit or maximise utility of each 
of its member entrepreneurs although cooperatives themselves seek no 
profits. A cooperative is a joint plant with the plant being operated 
for and on behalf of its members firms or entrepreneurs, not the member 
entrepreneurs operating for the joint plant. In short, cooperatives do
not eliminate profit motive; they extend it to more people, thus
strengthening capitalism and broadening its base of operation.35
A cooperative is an organization designed for the benefit of a
particular group. Under some conditions a cooperative may exploit
employees, consumers or suppliers for the selfish interest of members. 
The very rich capitalist is often contrasted with the cooperative of 
small producers intimately involved in its working. But a capitalist 
firm may have very many small shareholders and the cooperative may be
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an association of the poor or the rich. In the same way, trade unions 
may be formed by well-off professional workers and act against the 
interest of the poor.
A firm needs equipment and working capital whether its structure 
is cooperative or private. The capitalistic entrepreneur puts in
personal effort and capital. In addition, he may subscribe equity
capital which accepts the risk of loss and gains the variable reward of 
profit. The other factors of production are paid a going rate fixed by 
the market, as wages, rent or interest. The basic idea is to get away 
from domination by capital, but the service of capital is still
required. Attracting risk capital is a problem for the cooperative 
since its normal reward, profit, is excluded while in the event of 
failure the capital is lost.36
The capital needed by a cooperative may be divided into (a) fixed 
capital (b) operating or working capital. In addition, there is a need 
for (c) organizational funds.
Fixed or long-run capital is needed for land, buildings,
equipment, vehicles needed by the cooperative. Short-term or working 
capital may be required for making crop advances, inventories, 
supplies, wages and other current expenditures. And the organizational 
funds may be needed for purposes such as legal and recording fees, 
incorporation fees and the expenses incurred in forming the 
cooperative.
The exact amount of capital needed by a cooperative however 
depends on (a) the type and size of cooperative to be organized (b) the 
extent of ownership or rental of fixed facilities (c) the pledges of 
business volume (d) the availability of borrowed funds and the ability
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of members to subscribe capital and (e) the type and extent of services 
to be provided.
Cooperatives may be divided into two main schools: those with
share capital and those without. Nevertheless both types encounter
specific problems. Cooperatives relying on share capital do not
generally attract sufficient funds. By definition only members can
subscribe for shares in the cooperative. If members have only limited
means permanent share capital will in turn be limited. Moreover, Levay
has argued that, given there can be no market in such shares
"capital attraction and maintenance in a cooperative 
is complicated by the fact that share capital does 
not appreciate, so that there is little incentive for 
members to fund the organization in that form. Where 
additional capital is needed, other methods of 
raising it are increasingly commonly adopted"^7
capital can be borrowed on the security of the members private assets. 
Some cooperative founders made this joint liability a matter of 
principle, to develop greater feelings of solidarity among the members 
who each had unlimited liability for their common debt. Raising 
capital for the cooperative on the joint liability of members may have 
the advantage in that the loyalty of members is ensured by an 
enforceable contract. Nevertheless the disadvantages of the system may 
outweigh the advantages. A joint and several guarantee given for the 
cooperative can be enforced in full against any selected member.
Limited liability offers definite advantages to the shareholder. 
However, if the liability of the members is limited to the amount of 
share capital subscribed by them, the cooperative can not easily borrow 
unless that capital, plus accumulated reserves, is adequate to cover 
risks.
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A special method for increasing the share capital of members
through supplementary voluntary payments is provided by the system of
"revolving funds". These revolving funds could serve to complement
equity capital. In essence, these funds remain at the disposal of the
enterprise for only a fixed time, after which they are repaid according-
to the principle of "first in, first out", on a time schedule
determined by the society. Therefore this system is highly flexible.3®
Nevertheless revolving funds
"complicate the relations between the cooperative and 
its membership, already complex enough, in that the 
member may be in receipt of interest on share 
capital, interest on loan capital, the patronage 
rebate and now funds revolved back from the
organization, each a potential source of satisfaction 
or discontent in addition to quoted prices and 
discounts for bulk purchases".39
In general societies do not find share capital sufficient for 
their purposes. Accordingly they have to look elsewhere for funds.
As the possibility of mobilizing capital from within the members 
group are mostly very limited, a cooperative may turn to indirect 
methods of accumulating reserves which are not available to the 
individual member if he leaves the society. The financial strength of 
cooperatives in many developed countries is based on financial reserves 
accumulated from annual surpluses which have not been paid to members 
a s •dividends on their own purchases. Nevertheless, a solid financial 
base in the form of reserves can not be built up in the short-run and a 
cooperative may be constrained to find ways of attracting limited 
capital from outside.
Despite all the financial- possibilities contemplated above, 
primary cooperatives in many developing countries do not grow without
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considerable grants from the government or the official development 
banks. Even cooperatives in many developed countries have received 
'grant-aids' from the government to build a sufficient capital base to 
run their business.
It may thus seem that although the cooperatives have restricted 
opportunities to raise fixed capital, in other respects (eg in trading) 
they behave like the capitalists. Indeed, the desire to earn surpluses 
parallels the drive to earn profit.
Nonetheless, cooperatives are difficult institutions to
administer in terms of capital management, a factor that might
prejudice their efficiency, however well qualified, alert and assiduous
the executive and board may be. The dilemma is that
"management of associations with a preponderence of 
'divi' hunters may be hazardous in that too much 
pressure may be put on reserves, a chronic problem in 
consumer socieities. If members are used to both 
large amounts and to annual increments of bonus 
payments, they may resent attempts to apply 
correctives in years when business is less buoyant, 
however insistent the management as to the need for 
retention, or a low rate of 'divi' may be determined 
such that capital accumulation is effected, though 
the members may feel that they are insufficiently 
rewarded for their patronage, especially if the 
cooperative deals with non-members. The benefits of 
membership are then at issue - indeed, it is possible 
for them to be scarcely discernible, particularly 
since any capital members supply to business is 
accorded a relatively low rate of interest and in 
this sense they subsidize the enterprise, whereas 
non-member patrons are called upon to contribute no 
capital at all".^1
Cooperatives can suffer a conflict of interest. Bateman, Edwards 
and Levay^2 show clearly that in certain circumstances restrictive 
policies on membership or output can be in the interests of the 
existing members of the cooperative. In discussing the variety of
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objectives that might be pursued by an agricultural society, Bateman et 
al seperate out three interest groups - shareholders, directors, and 
management - who might have differing degrees of attachment to 
particular objectives. For instance, the aim of maximizing profits may 
well appeal to managers but it is not in the interest of the general 
membership. Other possible objectives with varying implications for 
those three groups can, from the view point of Bateman et al, are joint 
profit-maximization (that is allowing for profits made by the members 
in supplying the cooperative with raw material inputs as well as 
profits on the processing and marketing side), output maximization, 
maximization of membership, maximization of patronage refunds per unit 
of input supplied and so on. A similar type of analysis is applied to 
farmers' requisite societies, that is societies which purchase farm 
inputs and other goods for the farmer-members.
A more or less similar account is made of credit cooperatives by 
T a y l o r ^ .  According to Taylor, a credit society can be conceptualized 
as a purchasing cooperative from the viewpoint of its borrowing members 
and as a marketing cooperative from the standpoint of its saving 
members. The first type of member, if motivated solely by self- 
interest will seek to fix the society's lending rate as low as 
possible; the second type will seek the highest possible interest rate 
on savings, deposited with, and loaned out by the society. There is a 
clear conflict of interest regarding the pricing policy to be pursued 
by the society. This point has a much wider significance in relation 
to other types of cooperative organizations which encompass a 
membership pursuing possibly conflicting objectives. A major example 
is the multipurpose agricultural cooperative. This may purchase farm
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produce from some of its members, process these materials, and then 
market them to a different category of members. Similarly, in the case 
of rural development cooperatives, where the membership tends to be 
rather diverse, problems may arise in relation to the kinds of outputs 
produced, pricing policies adopted, and the extent of cross
subsidization allowed within the firm. In the case of credit unions
Taylor suggests that potential conflicts are muted to the extent that 
members are both savers and borrowers, i.e. the members do not always 
belong exclusively to one group or another.
The managerial aspects of c o o p e r a t i v e s ^  have received 
considerable attention as a cooperative requires superior managerial 
ability because of the dual roles of its customers, that of patrons and 
stockholders. Since most cooperatives are formed as a defensive weapon 
against deficiencies inherent in the capitalist system, cooperative 
management is often pressed for quick and decisive results requiring 
strong leadership and fortitude during many crises.
The committed and enlightened membership of the cooperative 
elects a board from within its own number which then formulates policy, 
directs the business and supervises the executive in the best interest 
of participants. The management carries out the decisions of the board 
capably but without usurping directoral power and without intruding 
into the policy-making privileges.
Although cooperative management is important, the role of the 
manager appointed by many societies, has become increasingly. so due to 
their special knowledge and know-how. The top level managers in
societies are generally competent, properly paid and realistic about 
their problems. At the lower levels, however they generally are not,
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due commonly to a reluctance in cooperatives to take the managerial 
role and corresponding training seriously. Further, many cooperatives 
suffer from poor management and inexpert directoral leadership. Most 
farmer members can not see any further than the farm gate and directors 
of cooperatives are in essense production, rather than market-oriented. 
They remain in office, because they tend to be re-elected unopposed 
after their original period of office and thus may serve for many years 
on the board. It is of course possible that farmers as an occupational 
group may make excellent directors as they have acquired business 
skills at their farms so that they will know at least something about 
capital and labour management before taking office in their 
cooperative. Long tenure may indicate apathy on the part of membership, 
and the absence of other aspirants to the board, but it may equally 
reflect members' satisfaction with their directorate and a confidence 
in their ability to run the societies in their interest.
These management problems notwithstanding, most active members of 
cooperatives see the cooperative merely as a shop and have no knowledge 
of or commitment to the ideological side; the ordinary member is merely 
a customer, of whom it might be said that the question of opting out of 
genuine participation has never arisen. The managerial problems, 
therefore, are not regarded by the membership as a critical weakness.
The casual attitude of members to their cooperative is not a 
problem as long as the organization pursues its aims to the 
satisfaction of members, provided at the same. time members feel that 
they have the right to voice their disgruntlement if necessary. 
Nevertheless, if membership is passive and its involvement in the 
affairs of cooperative is weak, the board can relax its vigilance, fail
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to monitor the needs of members and allow the management to dominate, 
possibly to the extent of permitting it to pursue ends of its own 
rather than servicing the needs of its membership. To the extent the 
membership is passive, real contenders for power will be the management 
and the board of directors.
The accounting system of cooperatives has received considerable 
attention, as success most often depends on the ability of cooperative 
management to maintain proper accounts. The cooperative has a 
distinguishing feature in this respect as it maintains an accurate 
record of each patron's purchases and sales; separate departmental 
accounts are maintained with more than one account; capital which 
originates from operating proceeds is allocated to member-patrons; 
member and non-member business is separated; Balance Sheets and 
operating statements are prepared; and audited financial statements are 
presented to cooperative membership.45
Again, auditing is important. The task of appointing and 
retaining an auditor generally belongs to the cooperative itself. In 
many countries however government officials are appointed to perform 
this function. Two kinds of audits are undertaken (a) A 'qualified' 
audit, which means that the auditor assumes no responsibility for the 
accuracy of certain information such as inventories and accounts 
receivable (b) An 'unqualified' audit, which means that the auditor 
keeps no reservations on his assessment. 'Unqualified' audit may be 
preferred for cooperatives, where inventories and accounts receivable 
form a significant part of current assets.45
The structural aspects4  ^ of cooperatives have received 
considerable attention from experts given the expansion of the movement
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into many spheres of economic activity. Earlier pioneers of 
cooperation assigned importance to the movement having viable 
organizational and financial structures. In addition, many of the 
pioneers were aware of the necessity to seek legal status for their 
societies. Schulze, the Rochdale Pioneers and Raiffeisen set rules and 
proposed schemes for the founding of organizational and financial 
structures which not only worked in their time but proved instrumental 
for the movement in the years to come.
The organizational structure of the movement may vary from one 
country to another country, but generally there is at the base or 
operational level of the cooperative movement a primary society. This 
unit epitomizes the vitality and service potential of the movement. A 
primary society comprises in its membership individual persons. It can 
be single or multipurpose society and either large or small. It might 
be a single unit based on a village, or a complex organization covering 
a large area, with many branches. The size and complexity is not 
necessarily related to whether the cooperative is single or 
multipurpose.
Primary societies in many countries may unite to form a 
'Federation'. A federation of primary societies is called as a 
secondary cooperative. A common example of secondary cooperative to 
which reference will be made later is the Cooperative District union.
As the primary cooperatives federate to form secondaries, these 
in turn can federate at the apex level. At the top of the structure 
there can be an apex cooperative which may include all others in its 
membership. The size and shape of the pyramid-like structure 
established can vary from country to country and can be simple or
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highly complicated. The main advantage in having a federation rests on 
the premise that functions which cannot be done by the small-scale 
primary societies or cannot be undertaken sufficiently effectively on a 
smaller scale, may well be tackled by the Federation, given its larger 
scale.
Whatever other federal structures of cooperative movement may be 
set-up, in many countries, there is frequently a National Cooperative 
union, whose principal responsibility is to represent the movement in 
dealing with the government and society at large. The union provides a 
forum for exchange of experience in the field of cooperation through 
convening conferences and seminars and acts as an unofficial spokesman 
of the movement. In many countries, the union may take up certain 
other responsibilities such as education, training and guidance of 
individual members of societies. It may also take on such functions as 
audit and arbitration in disputes. Apex unions are usually financed by 
some kind of levy on the member cooperatives, based either on their own 
membership or on trade.
The cooperative movement is usually governed either by a 
country's general legislation, or a specialized cooperative Act may be 
enforced to regularize the working of societies and to grant them 
separate legal status. The need for cooperatives to seek legal status 
was recognised by the earliest pioneers of cooperation. Thus as the 
'People's Bank' spread, Schulze successfully sought legal status for 
his associations. He even set forth ideas on laws for new 
cooperatives. Raiffeisen also took a keen interest in seeking legal 
status for his societies and succeeded in his efforts.
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In practice, in most countries, a well prepared specialised 
cooperative legislation has been needed by the cooperative movement in 
any case. In most regions of Asia and Africa, the basic legal forms 
for cooperation have been retained from the days of colonial 
administration. In almost all countries of the world the general 
features of the legislation pertaining to cooperatives are more or less 
similar. The cooperative legislation usually covers all types of 
societies, and deals with some of the following matters: appointment of 
an administering authority; qualification of members; liability of 
members; voting rights; limits on shareholdings; procedures for 
registration; amalgamation or winding up; exemption from taxes, 
procedure for recovery of dues; audit and inspection; and the 
responsibilities and powers of the administering authority, including 
the powers to issue rules for the implementation of legislation.
Apart from the particulars of the general enabling legislation is 
the question of bylaws (statutues). The more general the legislation, 
the more details have to be regulated or clarified in the bylaws 
adopted by the individual societies.
A more important regulation in almost all countries concerns the 
responsibilities of the authority administering control and supervision 
of cooperative movement. In many countries the administering authority 
for the legislation covering all types of cooperatives is the Registrar 
(sometimes called Commissioner) of cooperatives. In most countries, 
the Registrar is vested with the powers to require registration, audit 
and inspection, cancellation of registration etc., as well as the power 
to require the cooperatives to submit annual statement of accounts. 
Changes in the bylaws have to be sent to the registering authority and
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become effective only after registration. Speaking generally the
powers of the administering authority, both actual and potential, are 
considerable in many countries. These may include amongst others 1) 
the power to register or refuse registration 2) the power to intervene 
in the management 3) the power to audit accounts 4) the powers to 
inspect the working of societies 5) the power to decide disputes 
between societies 6) the power to execute the awards for recovery of 
dues through attachment and sale, or sale without attachment, of any 
property of a person or cooperative.
The extent of powers of the Registrar have been a subject of much 
controversy in many countries. It has been argued that, though there 
is a necessity for a legal framework empowering the Registrar to 
control and supervise the movement, nevertheless excessive powers 
vested in him jeopardize the autonomous character of the movement and 
empowers the government actually to control the cooperative movement.
In fact the governments of many countries do have considerable 
control over the cooperative movement, exercised through the Registrar, 
located in a department of cooperation. The power, role, authority and 
jurisdiction of the Registrar, as that of the Department, are generally 
spelled out in the respective laws of the country. There is a
considerable body of evidence, however, that the powers granted to the 
Department/or Registrar has undermined the autonomy of the movement. 
This is particularly so when the government views the cooperatives as
an integral part of governmental policy. Then its intervention in and
assistance to the organization become highly significant. Assistance 
to cooperatives may take various forms: out-right grants or subsidised 
loans, preferential treatment in the allocation of controlled
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commodities for distribution, the provision without charge of the 
services of special government departments, or the use of cooperatives 
as monopoly outlets for the distribution of official loans or other 
forms of assistance to farmers.
When cooperatives enjoy substantial government support, their 
economic performance cannot be assessed so readily. This applies even 
if the amount of direct and indirect government assistance can be 
measured, for a most important advantage of a policy of official 
support is the mere knowledge that the government will not be in a 
position to refuse help in case of need, even if it might wish to 
refrain from helping. A policy of large scale government support of 
cooperatives in general creates for government a contingent liability 
to continue the support, and to come to the aid of cooperatives which 
run into financial difficulties. This liability is particularly 
onerous when government support is directed in favour of particular 
cooperatives which acquire large numbers of members as a result of this 
support. A large proportion of the inhabitants of a particular area 
may become largely dependent upon particular cooperatives, and the 
ability of the government to stand aloof from its difficulties is 
impaired.
Generally government control is exercised through the provision 
of public funds to the movement, and in turn governments demand 
overriding control. In particular cases, government administration and 
control of the cooperatives clashes with the principle of democratic 
control to an extent sufficient to cast doubt on the existence of a 
genuine and viable cooperative movement.
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The necessity for the cooperative movement to be supported by 
viable financial organizations, cannot be ignored. Earlier pioneers, 
such as Schulze, took part in the organization of German Cooperative 
Banks which accepted deposits of 'surplus banks' funds and raised money 
to lend to cooperatives. A majority of stock in this central bank was 
owned by Schulze's 'credit societies' and the remainder by private 
individuals. Similarly Raiffeisen's 'credit unions' enjoyed no strong 
financial backings, and also suffered from time to time from lack of 
adequate funds, or occasionally from surplus money. He therefore 
organized an Agricultural Union Bank, to serve as a central banking 
institution and to oversee and control local credit unions. Various 
other regional banks were also established by Raiffeisen.
In many countries cooperative banks at both the apex and 
secondary levels have been established primarily to cater for the 
credit needs of the cooperative movement. In some countries cooperative 
banks have also been established at district levels.
A cooperative bank is effectively a special kind of federation 
for the financing of the movement. It is owned and controlled, like 
any other cooperative federation, by the members. Its resources are 
generally derived from the share capital, deposits from member 
cooperatives and in turn from their individual members, and frequently 
by borrowing from the country's central bank or the government. The 
policies of the cooperative banks vary greatly from country to country. 
Nevertheless almost all of these banks finance the short and medium 
term working capital needs of the cooperative, such as the holding of 
stocks of produce between purchase from the farmers and disposal to the 
market. Many cooperative banks finance productive loans to farmers,
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but usually, because this business is risky, only with some kind of 
government support. Some cooperative banks also go in for long term 
lending, for a land purchase, building etc. In India, for instance, 
this business is done by separate cooperative organizations, known as 
cooperative Land Development Banks.
It may be noted that the cooperative banks have received 
significant importance in many countries, especially in the context of 
their role in promoting agricultural cooperative credit movement. 
Agricultural credit societies in many countries receive loanable funds 
from the cooperative banks to build a sufficient base of their working 
capital, and it may be rather difficult for the credit societies to run 
their business without the provision of funds by the cooperative banks, 
especially in many developing countries of the world.
We now turn to see the definitional issued of cooperatives in the 
next section.
2.II.1 Some Definitional Issues
The practical and theoretical interest in cooperation shown by 
social scientists makes it necessary to try to establish exactly what 
is meant by "a cooperative". The term is used to refer to such a great 
variety of organizations that it is likely to cause serious 
misunderstanding and misconception in the mind of the reader if no 
definition is attempted.^
The conventional approach to the definition of a cooperative is 
to list the Rochdale Principles and to assert that any organization 
upholding these principles is a cooperative. This however, is not true 
under all circumstances as some organizations claiming to be
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cooperatives do not in fact subscribe to the Rochdale Principles. This 
poses a problem if it is anticipated that there should be a standard 
model to which all organizations known as cooperative must conform.4®
In the search for an ideal definition that satisfies the social 
scientists, we begin with definitions dating from the evolution of 
institutional ideology of cooperation.
Fay,5® one of the earlier scholars, saw a cooperative as
"... an association for the purposes of joint trading 
originating among the weak and conducted always in an 
unselfish spirit, on such terms that all who are 
prepared to assume the duties of membership may share 
in its rewards in proportion to the degree in which 
they make use of their association.1,51
This definition specifies a bond of union over and above the 
relation of monetary ties. According to Fay the interests of the group 
of members has more significance than those of the individuals who 
established it.
Emelianoff5^ and his followers did not subscribe to the viewpoint 
of Fay. They judged the argument, that the whole could be 
fundamentally different from the sum of its parts, to be untrue. 
Accordingly "a cooperative has no more economic life or purpose apart 
from that of participating economic units than one of the individual 
plants of a large multiplant firm"5^. They maintained that a 
cooperative was a non-acquisitive economic agent, operating at cost, 
and therefore earning no profit. They further explained that the 
normal behavioural assumptions governing the firm were not appropriate 
and consequently, it should not be taxed as a firm. Fay, however, was 
of the view that there was no possibility of serious divergence of 
interest in a cooperative for the reason that there was "unselfish
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spirit" in this organization and the principle of mutuality was so 
fundamental in cooperation that it was an essential property of a 
cooperative. The difference of opinion, if and when it arose among the 
members, would be discussed and overcome at a forum.
Babcock^4 did not compromise with the aforementioned views of Fay - 
and claimed that a "cooperative is a legal practical means by which a 
group of self-selected, selfish capitalists seek to improve their
individual economic position in a competitive society".55
The idea of Fay that cooperatives originate amongst the weak was 
supported by Helmburger,56 who argued that cooperatives were formed 
only in conditions of revolt against the prevailing market environment. 
From this he drew the conclusion that waves of new cooperatives could 
be expected especially in depressed times followed by waves of
cooperative failures.
The definition of Fay was further extended by Lambert^7 who
expressed the view that a cooperative is "an enterprise formed and
directed by an association of users applying within itself the rules of 
democracy and directly intended to serve both its own members and 
community as a whole".58 It implied that a cooperative was concerned 
with its members as a whole rather than as individuals, and was 
intended to benefit society in addition to providing advantages to 
individual members. Most theorists however do not agree that 
cooperatives are set-up to benefit society but according to 
Helmberger59 and Meade^O efforts have been made to show that they do so 
at least in the short run.
Recent attempts to define the cooperative are rooted in the 
efficacy of the principles of cooperation - hence, according to the
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definition proposed by the International Labour office
"A cooperative is an association of persons, who have 
voluntarily joined together to achieve a common end
through the formation of a democratically controlled
organization, making equitable contributions to the
capital required and accepting a fair share of the
risks and benefits of the undertaking in which the
members actively participate".^
According to this definition a cooperative is established on the 
initiative of members themselves and not imposed from above.
Membership in it is voluntary. The institution is run and controlled 
by the members themselves and members actively participate in the
benefits and risks in the provision of capital; and members combine to 
seek their economic interests.
To be precise, the fair 'share of risks and benefits' is achieved
by the procedures whereby the capital is raised and surplus
distributed. Every member is required to contribute a minimum sum in 
share capital, although in many rural cooperatives, this may be a very 
small amount. No individual member is allowed to have more than a
stated maximum number of shares. Profits or surpluses are usually
dealt with as follows: Firstly there is an allocation to reserves,
that is to say, the collectively owned capital of the cooperative. 
Secondly a fixed and limited rate of interest is paid on share capital.
Thirdly a return is made to members in proportion to the amount of
business they have done with the cooperative.
An analysis of the definitions suggests that the cooperative has, 
to a greater or lesser extent, been treated as essentially an economic 
institution by the earlier scholars, as well as by the International 
Labour organization. Nevertheless this view is a narrow one since one
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can legitimately speak of a cooperative movement in terms of its 
distinctive social, political and psychological objectives, outcomes 
and aspirations. Cooperation is known to appeal to people, not merely 
as a means of running a business but as an instrument of social 
amelioration. It is impossible to exclude from consideration its non­
economic attributes. A true appreciation of a cooperative therefore 
may demand an understanding of the movement as a whole, its history, 
its philosophy, its successes and its failures.
In practice, characteristics and common features of a cooperative 
determine both the basic economic and social behaviours and effects of 
the organization wherever cooperation exists.
From the economic standpoint, cooperatives are engaged in 
securing for their members services of various kinds at cost, that is 
without seeking profits on the capital or labour or enterprise used in 
providing these services. Cooperatives are not themselves acquisitive 
economic units, but aggregates of small or large sections of individual 
economic units of production or consumption, each of which, in greater 
or lesser degree retains its separateness and individuality. The 
aggregates or agencies are owned and controlled by the separate units 
and are essentially branches or parts. Where the interests of the 
separate units are sufficiently similar and the benefits of the 
aggregages are recognised as sufficiently large, they maintain these 
aggregates. Otherwise disruptive forces may be too strong.62 xt is 
for this reason that it is necessary to choose the purposes of 
cooperative societies carefully, and to have members whose interests in 
these purposes are closely similar and who understand enough of how 
these purposes may in practice be achieved. These matters determine
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the degree of cohesion of members within their cooperative and also the 
effectiveness of the cooperative in serving them. They also determine 
relations among the membership and efficiency in business affairs.
From a social and political standpoint, the most important 
feature of a cooperative is that therein persons voluntarily associate 
themelves as human beings on the basis of equality, for the promotion 
of their economic interests. Thus in a cooperative 'Equality' governs 
the relations between members, and democracy is assured. The moral and 
social objects are reflected in the undertaking itself and also in the 
tradition of allotting part of the 'profits' to education and community 
schemes. Individual and personal integrity and skills are not 
submerged ... capital is a hired but contented servant ... and true 
cooperatives are part of a free movement, neither class-bound nor 
state-bound.63 Emphasis is laid on the rights and obligations of each 
member as an individual to his cooperative and not on the size of his 
stake of capital in it. The concepts of mutuality and of ethical 
dealings are kept in mind.
The definition given by the International Labour organization is 
generally regarded as a starting point and in many cases, its 
attributes are embodied in the form of legal definitions. The legal 
definitions however vary from one situation to another and from one 
country to another. This is because the legal and institutional 
conditions vary considerably around the world. For instance in the 
United Kingdom and in all developing countries influenced by English 
legal concepts, cooperatives have generally been organized in 
accordance with the cooperative Model Law.64 jn this approach the 
fundamental legal basis is of a more general nature, while particular
56
provisions, differing in detail, and often varying from country to 
country, are the province of by-laws. The essential ingredient is the 
registration of the cooperative as a "society" often referred to as the 
British-Indian pattern, which has been followed by new laws in some 
countries. For instance, Pakistan's Cooperative Societies Act^5 
suggests that a cooperative is a society which has as its objects the 
promotion of the economic interests of the members in accordance with 
cooperative principles.
For the question of operational performance, the definition given 
in an institutional or legal form may not suffice and the term 
cooperative might have to be considered as a socio-economic category, 
rather than purely as a legal one. This may be so when the cooperative 
is viewed as just one of the organizational responses to the demands 
for the "development and widespread use of increasingly productive 
technologies" and where the cooperative functions as one of the new 
intermediary bodies through which government and farmers interact.
In view of the diversity of cooperative phenomena on the one hand 
and the inadequacy of a purely legal definition on the other hand, a 
working definition of cooperative from the socio-economic viewpoint is 
desirable, because the assessment of a cooperative's performance, 
cannot be proved unless one clearly understands what a cooperative 
stands for, and what it is trying to achieve.
Given the assumption that a cooperative is a means to some end, 
it follows that adaptation of its organizational structure to the given 
socio-economic conditions will be a necessary feature. It is therefore 
not really important to know whether a particular cooperative form 
corresponds to some classical conception; it is relevant, however, to
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know whether this form is really appropriate for pursuing the aims of 
the actual cooperative groups concerned, in relation to the constraints 
imposed by their surroundings.
In view of above it becomes rather important that a cooperative 
be considered as an institutional form with distinguishing 
characteristics and functions that must be examined in detail.
Four characteristics of a cooperative, starting with a quite 
general feature and proceeding to more particular ones, may be
considered^. .
1. The first characteristic of the cooperative is the grouping of
individuals who are united by at least one common interest which may be 
common economic welfare. The cooperative group, thus considered has 
much in common with other social groups. However this characteristic 
already presumes certain pre-requisites regarding the individual 
background of members and their possibilities for action.
2. A second characteristic of cooperative is collective action by
the member group for pursuing certain group aims and targets, which can 
be religious, humanitarian, idealistic or geared to social reform and 
so on. Such group self-help has many points in common with other 
organizations, but cooperatives pursue these targets, whatever they may 
be, through the economic betterment of their members. This second 
characteristic therefore sets the cooperative apart from religious 
sects and sport or social clubs for which engagement in economic 
activities is incidental.
3. The third characteristic is the attempted establishment of a
permanent business organization set up and maintained by the members of 
the cooperative group as a functionally operational instrument, which
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is allowed to conduct its affairs like other permanent economic units 
offering commercial and banking services, or producing agricultural 
handicrafts, or industrial products. This common business organization 
is called a cooperative enterprise (without its special relationship to 
the member economies).
4. The fourth characteristic is the special service relationship 
between the cooperative enterprise and the member economies (businesses 
or households). This relationship is also encapsulated in the 
expression that the cooperative is entrusted with the task of promoting 
the welfare (in a broad sense) of its members. This special 
relationship distinguishes a cooperative from other business 
institutions. Accordingly a cooperative enterprise may not act 
independently of its members but its activities will be determined by 
economic needs of the member economies. The result is a greater 
organizational complex consisting of member economies and the 
cooperative enterprise.
The principles of cooperation and their critical analysis is 
dealt with in the next section.
2.II.2 Principles of Cooperation and their critical analysis
Cooperatives have traditionally followed certain rules of 
organization and operation. They have come to be referred to as the 
Rochdale Principles, named after the Rochdale Pioneers, a group of 28 
weavers who established the first cooperative in Rochdale, England in 
1844. These principles^? are
1. Open membership
2. Democratic control (one man, one vote)
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3. Cash Trading
4. Membership education
5. Political and religious neutrality
6. No unusual risk assumption
7. Limited interest on stock
8. Goods sold at regular sale price
9. Limitation on number of shares owned
10. Net margins distributed according to patronage
These principles reflect the egalitarian nature of the social and 
economic goals of cooperation. In the earlier years of the development 
of the movement, efforts aimed at establishing cooperatives were 
generally made in the context of these fundamental rules.
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), an international 
non-governmental organization dedicated to the propagation and 
promotion of cooperation, has taken on the responsibility of 
periodically defining the substance of the principles. In 1966 a 
commission charged with examining the present application of principles 
presented a resolution to the 23rd Congress of ICA in Vienna redefining 
the principles that were "considered as essential to genuine and 
effective cooperative practice both at the present time and the future 
as far as that can be foreseen".68 This commission used the findings 
of a similar ICA investigation reported to congress in Paris in 1937 as 
a starting reference.
The 23rd Congress accepted the commission's recommendations, 
declaring their definition of the principles of cooperatives to be:
1. Membership of a cooperative should be voluntary and available
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without artificial restriction or any social or religious 
discrimination, to all persons who can make use of its services and are 
willing to accept the responsibilities of membership.
2. Cooperative societies are democratic organizations. Their
affairs should be administered by persons elected or appointed in a 
manner agreed by the members and accountable to them. Members of 
primary societies should enjoy equal rights of voting (one member one 
vote) and participate in decisions affecting their societies. In other 
than primary societies the administration should be conducted on a 
democratic basis in suitable form.
3. Share capital should receive only strictly limited rate of
interest if any.
4. Surplus or savings, if any, arising out of the operations of the
society belong to the members of that society and should be distributed 
in such a manner as would avoid one member gaining at the expense of 
others. This may be done by decision o.f the members as follows:
a) by provision of development of the business of the
cooperatives;
b) by provision of common service; or
c) by distribution among the members in proportion to their
transactions with the society.
5. All cooperative societies should make provision for the education 
of members, officers and employees, and the general public in the 
principles and techniques of cooperation, both economic and democratic.
6. All cooperative organizations, in order to best service the 
interests of their members and their communities, should actively
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cooperate in every practical way with other cooperatives at local, 
national and international levels.
These six principles are given no ranking. They are all assumed 
to be of equal priority and their application "must be equally observed 
to the full extent and in a manner that circumstances permit at any 
time and place".69
The first ICA principle accepts the Rochdale Pioneers' idea of 
open membership. The essential feature is to admit any one (male or 
female of any political persuasion or opinion) who would abide by this 
rule. There are however certain exceptions to this rule. As the 
Rochdale Pioneers themselves recognised, a maximum limit might have to 
be set on membership; for instance if a cooperative owns a plant with 
limited capacity it may be completely impracticable in the short run to 
accept more than a specified number of members. Indeed, many economic 
output determination models refer to the possibility of restricting 
membership in order to achieve some maximand. This will be 
inconsistent with the principle of open membership.70
The plausible reason for the popularity of open membership is 
that many retail cooperatives aim to expand business volume rapidly and 
have chosen not to screen their member applications closely.
The requirement for democratic control is stated in the second 
principle of ICA. Departures from the 'one man one vote' principle 
have been quite common. In fact, there is a strong plea for voting to 
be based on the proportion of cooperatives' business transacted for the 
individual member.71
Emelianoff7^ has made a thorough analysis of the one man, one 
vote principle. He argued:
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"Cooperators vote equally in their associations 
because they are for all practical purposes, 
economically equal, not because they strive for 
economic equality. There cannot be a more striking 
and persuasive illustration of this fact than the 
very case of the Rochdale Pioneers themselves, who 
were perfectly equal in their poverty".7^
In practice the one man, one vote principle may work against 
large patrons. However, laws in many countries stipulate voting only 
on the basis of one man, one vote principle. It might require a long 
time before changes are made in such laws.
The Principle of paying 'limited interest on share capital' is
justified on the grounds that a cooperative is organized to serve its 
patrons, (those who use the services) not investors; and if patrons are 
simultaneously investors they may not mind a limit being set on the 
interest paid on capital. Although the principle is open to debate, it 
might be legitimate to suggest that the members should receive at least 
the opportunity cost of their capital.7^
Distribution of surplus arising from cooperative operations in 
accord with Principle 4 can be judged as a secure rule for the 
viability of a cooperative. However, maximizing 'Divi' in accord with
principle 4-c - which may be expressed in terms of return per unit of
labour or throughput depending on whether the firm is a labour 
cooperative or a marketing cooperative - has been proposed as a 
possible objective of cooperative by several economists. This can be a 
sensible maximand from the viewpoint of cooperative management, but for 
the members it is the combination of both 'Divi' and 'price', which is 
more relevant. The precise formulation of the principle will therefore 
be different for different cooperatives.7^
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Principle 5 emphasises the need for disseminating ideals and
aspirations of cooperation among the public, members, officers and the 
employees. The importance ascribed to education is a recognition by 
ICA of the limited understanding and popular misconceptions still held 
by many persons as to the nature and operation of cooperatives. 
Nevertheless, despite necessary responsibility of the cooperatives to 
educate people in the ideas and practice of cooperation, it may be
argued, that this responsibility is not being duly accepted by the
movement in many cases.
The justification for concerted cooperative action at local,
national and international levels expressed in the form of principle 6,
is based on a belief that the cooperative movement must command an.
increasing scale of enterprise if it is to survive and compete with 
international capitalism characterised by huge transnational companies.
Some divergence may possibly be expected from the set of 
principles that represent an ideal form of cooperative organization. 
It is believed that the causes of this shortfall from some ideal of 
conduct of a cooperative is primarily the result of the individual 
cooperative's officials' and members' interests in safeguarding their 
economic and other benefits from the organization. The restriction of
membership, for example, can confer both economic and psychic
advantages on the existing members within a closed cooperative. 
Similarly cooperatives can have considerable reservations as to the 
commercial advantage to the membership of undertaking intercooperative 
cooperation. The existence of popular democratic participation by the 
members can also threaten the position of cooperative management used 
to seeing their position as a long term tenure. The principles of
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cooperation are utopian to the extent that they presume a level of 
selfless action by the participants in the movement, a presumption that 
is frequently confounded by the different parties in the organization 
anxious to secure private advantages.
It may be noted that as cooperatives deviate from their ideal 
form and aspirations they become more like capitalist organizations. 
The longevity of the composition of management; the limited application 
of democracy; the selection of more desirable members are some of the 
characteristics that can make a cooperative indistinguishable from any 
capitalist firm in the operational sense. However a full transition to 
capitalist practice is impeded by the continued observance of two 
fundamental cooperative requirements. Firstly the cooperatives may not 
pay interest on their share capital above a limit set by the Registrar 
or appropriate authority. Secondly the profit (or surplus) of the 
cooperative may only be distributed to members in direct proportion to 
their patronage of the cooperative. The fulfilment of both these 
stipulations prevents a cooperative acting as a capitalist firm, 
irrespective of the similarity of their character in other respects.
The limited observance7^ of the principles in practice prompts an 
important question. If an organization does not conform to the tenets 
of cooperation, can it continue to be regarded as a cooperative? The 
ICA report suggests that all of the principles have equal priority. 
But how many principles does a cooperative need to uphold to retain its 
status as a cooperative? In that virtually all cooperatives diverge 
from one or more principles, are they all non-cooperatives? Lambert77 
argued that democracy and prohibition of surplus distributed in 
proportion to capital remain the seminal principles of cooperatives.
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Yet he offers no guide as to how either of these principles, 
particularly democracy, may be evaluated. This question of appraisal 
is a crucial problem for the cooperative's participants and observers 
alike. It is considerably easier to say what a cooperative is not 
rather than what it is.
The question of what is a cooperative is not merely of 
theoretical interest. Many cooperatives in the developing world are 
the recipients of a number of peculiar grants and other advantages from 
the government. If the cooperative movement does not conform to the 
distinguishing characteristics of the organizational type, should it 
continue to benefit from this preferential treatment? This thus 
introduces the question as to why governments, particularly in 
developing countries, support the cooperative movement.
Despite a lack of analytical clarity, cooperation continues to be 
an important organizational form because of its ability to act 
primarily in the interests of its members as users (This does not 
obviate its usefulness to government as a vehicle for state policies). 
The dominance of users' interests over those of the owners of capital 
remains the most profound difference between a cooperative and a 
capitalist company. While a cooperative may deviate from strict
adherence to some list of principles, it remains an organization 
ultimately in the control of its customers.
2.Ill Effectiveness of Cooperatives as an Instrument of Development
Governments in many developing countries consider cooperatives to 
be an effective instrument of social and economic development, and 
frequently use them in dealing with the political and economic 
situation of the rural sector. The advocacy of cooperatives is usually
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founded on a large element of faith in the efficacy of this device. 
This is not surprising: there are, as we shall see, cogent reasons for
promoting cooperatives. The fundamental belief however rests on the 
assumption that in addition to benefitting the private interests of 
their individual members, cooperatives can also serve as a vehicle to 
reach certain purely public objectives, thereby promoting the process 
of overall economic development.
Nevertheless the problems faced by developing countries are quite 
complex in nature and may require a variety of economic tools in 
addition to cooperatives to achieve economic development. For 
instance, such problems as over-population, illiteracy, low standards 
of living, lower levels of productivity, rising levels of unemployment 
and under-employment, the need for land reforms, lack or high cost of 
credit, lack of transportation or communication, lack of managerial 
talent and government administration are some of the problems that are 
deep rooted and require more than cooperatives alone for their 
solution.
2.III.1 Government Choice of Cooperatives as a Policy 
instrument
Cooperatives serve as an important instrument of development 
policy in developing countries throughout the w o r l d . T h i s  form of 
organization is used by the government to serve many of its sociai, 
political and economic purposes. Two particular types of public 
purposes may however be often noted: on the one hand, a nationalistic
and highly political purpose; and on the other hand a concern with the 
uplift of the under-privileged sectors or areas - a purpose which is as 
much political as economic. The two are often intertwined. However it
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is a mistake to ignore political purposes, or treat them as a mere 
intrusion into the cooperative movement. Being an economic 
institution, cooperatives cannot be brought into existence and flourish 
without some kind of political support or facilitation.
The nationalist purpose may be described as "nation building" 
that is, an effort toward mobilization of national strength by 
government leaders, 'modernization' of a backward society and a vehicle 
for political leaders to reach rural inhabitants. These are important 
needs felt by governments. Cooperatives have been started in many 
places to serve such political purposes and their use as a vehicle of 
agricultural development is consistent with some political aims. 
Economic development is thought to be enhanced but it is not a central 
objective in many cases.
The cooperatives are, more or less promoted for purely political 
purposes in addition to serving certain economic aims by many 
governments. The political objectives of national unity and the 
consolidation of political power in the countryside is achieved but a 
more reformist kind of political motive (i.e. the uplift of backwards 
group) is also involved. Here the purpose of the government for 
cooperatives is closer to the western self-help idea, and also closer 
to but not identical with what the economist would hope to accomplish. 
Cooperatives formed for this purpose are often granted special 
privileges to enable their under-privileged membership to compete on 
favourable terms in the market: low interest loans, with rules to bring 
about allocation to favoured groups; monopolistic rights to supply 
inputs at low prices and to market members' produce; special 
cooperative banks and supply organizations having monopolistic rights
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etc.
Would the interest of the under-privileged groups be served 
through cooperatives? In political terms this may be possible. 
Through associating with cooperatives, the under-privileged groups may 
acquire a voice and a claim to attention, that otherwise would be 
lacking. But frequently the potency of cooperatives of poor farmers to 
assert group interests will be limited due to the strength of 
political-cum-landholding/commercial groups on the outside (or indeed 
inside the membership) and inability of cooperative officials to stand 
up to them when the government is indifferent to their needs.
We now turn to the use of public funds for the promotion of 
essentially privately run cooperatives. The problem is that 
cooperatives, whether in western or in developing countries, are 
traditionally supposed to advance the interests of their member groups. 
In such terms the cooperatives' purpose is to do what their members 
most want to do, whether or not this coincides with what governments 
may wish to see happen. Nevertheless public standards need to be 
applied in the allocation of public funds, and in the cooperatives' 
promotion as an instrument of development policy, there is always an 
equal chance of "success" or "failures".
2.III.2 Potential Benefits to the Government from Cooperation
As stated earlier in many developing countries government 
attitudes and policies typically overshadow autonomous motivations.
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Where government chooses to encourage cooperation, its policy measures 
tend to become the dominant element pointing farmers towards 
cooperation. Elements of national political leadership may be drawn to 
cooperation by their attachment to the principles of cooperative 
ideology, usually as a part of a more broadly socialist commitment. 
However more practically and more demonstrably, national political 
leadership is drawn to cooperation as a half-way house between direct 
state involvement in economic activities and state intervention limited 
merely to the regulation of private enterprise.7^
Cooperation is chosen when, on the one hand, the 
institutionalized privileges of private property set unacceptably 
confining limits to regulatory activity, and on the other hand, direct 
state operations entail too great a strain upon available resources and 
too great a risk of failure. Part of the burden of resource 
mobilization and responsibility for failure of an economic programme 
may be shifted from the state to the cooperatives. Nevertheless, as a 
distinctive institutional form, dependent upon government backing, 
cooperatives are both legally and practically susceptible to a far 
higher degree to government regulation and intervention than other 
purely private undertakings.
The potential benefits to the government from cooperation as a 
vehicle for securing certain objectives can in fact be numerous. 
First, in many developing countries, cooperatives, as . an ideal 
mechanism for state intervention, can transfer agricultural operations
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of a multitude of individual small farmers to the framework of a formal 
body registered and recorded in government files and operating within 
the context of government laws and regulations. Thus cooperation 
transforms innumerable, anonymous, informal and unrecorded activities 
and transactions into clusters of relatively parallel and uniform 
behaviours and exchanges channelled through the cooperative and 
recorded by it. Second, in many instances the government inherits from 
its predecessors a large cooperative network and a government agency 
skilled in dealing with this cooperative network and also skilled in 
dealing with cooperatives. Other things being equal, this thus 
encourages the government to favour cooperation. This factor has been 
of great importance in shaping government policy inr a number of Asian 
and African states where the colonial power had already built strong 
cooperative structures.®0
The advantages of cooperation as a medium for governmental 
attempts to achieve improvements in farm productivity lie quite simply 
in the ability of group work methods to multiply the impact of 
restricted number of governmental field staff. Through contact with 
the cooperative, government efforts to promote innovation will reach a 
greater number of farmers than will individual farmer contact. 
Political leaders, in many developing countries may also use farmer 
resentment as a source of backing for their regimes. They find the 
cooperative an attractive means of transferring economic control to 
local hands. Through cooperative membership large numbers of citizens 
become directly and personally involved as beneficiaries of government 
localization programmes within organizational frameworks which maintain 
close continuing relations with supervising government agencies.®
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The governments with socialist preferences may be drawn to the 
cooperative concept by its potential contribution to equality. The 
cooperative can serve as a means of achieving an egalitarian 
distribution of trade and processing profits in programmes designed to 
eliminate commercial middlemen and place farmers in control of such 
activities.82
And finally, given its democratic membership structure, 
cooperation is seen as achieving egalitarian goals through means which 
involve the mass of farmers in national development efforts and promote 
civic virtues within the state.
Although government is enabled to derive certain benefits from 
using cooperatives as an instrument of government policy, the question 
of cooperative autonomy versus government control remains tedious and 
unresolved in most developing countries. In this regard, it may be 
asserted that government policy determines certain basic parameters 
which constitute centrally important elements in the operational 
environment of cooperative organizations. However, detailed direction 
of the operations of local-level societies is typically beyond the 
means of national political leaders and the administrative bodies 
nominally responsible for the enforcement of cooperative policy. 
Intensive intervention is therefore generally limited to the local 
level, only to deal with crisis situations. Nevertheless, secondary 
and/or tertiary cooperative organizations, by virtue of their smaller 
number and greater economic power, attract more attention from 
governments. Government's inclination to restrict cooperative autonomy 
and to exercise more direct and detailed control wil be a function of 
two main factors; cooperative's ability to fulfil their government-
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given economic responsibilities, and the political acceptability of 
cooperative leadership.83
2.III.3 Role of Cooperatives in Development
The role performed by cooperatives in promoting economic 
development would vary and depend largely upon the particular socio­
political and economic conditions in a given country. Nevertheless 
from the viewpoint of the government as well as of the reformists 
cooperatives may be expected to undertake functions which facilitate 
the processes of 1) Land reform, whereby natural resources are 
allocated productively to those who will use them; 2) Credit reform, 
whereby needed funds are made available on productive terms to users; 
3) technical assistance, whereby technology and its productive 
application is made known and utilized; 4) economic infrastructure, 
whereby needed transportation, storage and marketing facilities are 
made available; 5) resource development, whereby reclamation, 
irrigation, drainage and conservation projects are achieved on a 
feasible basis and 6) full employment, whereby jobs are created in the 
development of both infrastructure and resources.
The revelance of some of the objectives as outlined above to a 
policy designed to achieve development through cooperatives is assessed 
below.84
a) Agriculture and Employment
In many developing countries, agriculture is frequently the 
largest sector of economy and it is therefore obvious that economic 
growth in these countries must depend on the expansion of agricultural
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output. At the same time because of rapid growth in population it is 
necessary to keep as many people on the land as possible. Agricultural 
development policy must therefore be connected with overall improvement 
in the socio-economic environment surrounding small farmers. Generally 
these farmers are under-capitalized. Even if they understand the 
importance of improved farm inputs, they do not have sufficient capital 
to buy them. Some institutional device is required through which 
capital funds and other improved farm inputs (seed, fertilizer, 
technical know-how, improved farm machinery etc.) are provided to 
facilitate the agricultural production process, thereby increasing 
productivity and farm incomes. The cooperative, if properly run, is 
arguably one of the most efficient and least expensive of the possible 
systems of providing agricultural credit. At the same time 
cooperatives can supply inputs and market farm produce. The 
cooperatives can serve as an organization for agricultural education 
and extension. It will grant loans for and carry stocks of fertilizers 
and other inputs which are recommended by agriculture departments. It 
will encourage the most advantageous crops, and ensure their proper 
preparation for market. Agricultural cooperatives therefore, whether 
they are multipurpose or single purpose potentially provide valuable 
machinery for agricultural development. Joint farming cooperatives and 
fully integrated cooperatives are likely to be sponsored by government 
with the objective of modernizing agriculture and expanding production, 
while retaining population in rural areas,
b) Land Reform
Land reform may be undertaken for economic reasons, that is, to 
expand production, or for social and political reasons, or a
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combination of the two. Cooperatives are almost always involved in one 
way or another. In most land reform laws, membership of a cooperative 
is a condition of being a beneficiary. The reason for this is that the 
old landlord did provide services, such as credit and marketing, which 
have to be carried on after he has been displaced. Or if the land 
reform has broken up very large estates, the small farmers who have 
received the land must be able to provide the services which the large 
estate was able to provide on its own. The gap can be filled by a 
multi-purpose credit, supply and marketing cooperatives. Land reform 
can also lead to joint or cooperative farming of the former estates. 
In fact, the successful examples of these are in relation to land 
reform, since the peasants were not, formerly, their own masters, 
individualism is not so strong anyway.
In Land Settlement Schemes, cooperatives have much the same role 
as with land reform. Again it is common to make membership of a 
cooperative a condition of becoming a settler.
(c) Development Projects
Comprehensive development projects are becoming more and more 
common. Many of them are financed by international agencies. A 
typical development project provides a comprehensive package including 
roads and communications, agricultural extension, credit, supply and 
marketing services. Sometimes all the services and control procedures 
are provided by the project. Inputs are supplied direct, on loan, from 
the project to the farmer. The project markets the crop and pays the 
balance to the farmer. Increasingly, however, it has come to be 
realised that this is an expensive way of doing things. Cooperatives 
are therefore being introduced in these projects in varying degrees and
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at varying times. In some cases the cooperatives emerge from farmers' 
committees to handle loans and to undertake the primary stages of 
marketing, while in others cooperatives are rooted in from the very 
beginning to undertake specified functions.
Finally, as a tool of development, cooperatives can be 
established to promote savings of peasant farmers and wage earners. 
They can be equally good in promoting small scale industries and 
handicrafts, thereby contributing to solution of the problem of
employment or under-employment in rural areas. They will also promote
social development, because as can be seen from their history as well 
as from their nature, cooperatives have a social as well as an economic 
purpose.
2.III.4 Some Potential Benefits and Weaknesses of Farmers Cooperatives
The argument in favour of cooperatives asserts their potential 
for helping the small farmers to overcome most of his economic
weaknesses. The typical farmer suffers a number of disadvantages
compared with large farmers. He lacks financial reserves and his 
income is too low to facilitate innovation. The small scale of his 
operation makes him a poor credit risk and raises the overhead 
administrative costs of providing him with credit; thus it is difficult 
for him to obtain loans for innovation at reasonable rates of interest. 
Moreover lack of land makes certain innovating investments 
unprofitable, even if funds could be obtained. A greater part of his 
energy and labour resources must be devoted to assuring the family food 
supply. Also, the small scale of his production means that on purely 
economic grounds, the typical farmer cannot expect to receive the same
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consideration which the larger-scale producer receives in the market, 
whether as buyer of production inputs (discounts for bulk purchase; 
priority in allocation of scarce commodities) or as as sellers of 
produce (advance purchase contracts at guaranteed prices; buyer 
participation in provision of transport).
The small farmer also lacks social or political resources to 
counterbalance his economic standing in relation with the field 
representatives of business and government. Nor does the mass of small 
farmers possess organized political power which could be mobilized to 
demand national agricultural policies aimed at removing the small 
farmers’ disabilities.85
Organization offers a possible means of overcoming the 
difficulties faced by the small farmers through the pooling of 
economic, technical, social, and political resources. The claimed 
theoretical economic and technical advantages of cooperation are 
several86 and hypothetically open the way to both improved efficiency 
and equality.
The prospect of building up some form of 'countervailing power1
is an attractive one to farmers since they tend both to buy from, and
to sell to, highly concentrated buyers. A source of inspiration may be
found in Galbraith: ' American Capitalism'.
"The necessary instrument of organization was also 
available to the farmer in the form of a cooperative.
The membership of the cooperative could include any 
number of farmers and it could be democratically 
controlled. All in all, the cooperative seemed an 
ideal device for exercising countervailing power".S'7
The claimed advantages from cooperation to the farmers are often 
related to the sphere of marketing, credit, purchase of inputs, and
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production. In addition the cooperative is seen as an effective
instrument of borrowing. AS such, cooperative is viewed a
"democratic organization, not too blatantly profit 
oriented and therefore non-exploitative, a mechanism 
of self-help, a means of maintaining the family farm 
while at the same time attaining economies of 
scale".88
The claimed advantages of a cooperative would only be realised if 
(a) its real costs are lower than that of alternative firms, 
individuals or corporate entities; (b) it can by negotiation or 
otherwise reduce the monopoly profits of alternative firms; (c) it can 
secure greater realisation of the services or (d) it can ensure most 
effective use of services.89
The appeal of cooperatives has been greatest in the potential for 
removal of perceived exploitation in the marketing of agricultural 
p r o d u c e . 90 Collusive tendencies and price fixing are often rampant in 
traditional rural markets as there are only a few intermediaries at 
each level of marketing. Marketing costs are also believed to be high 
as there usually is a long chain of intermediaries from the producer to 
the consumers. Small farmers are seen to be the greatest victims of 
marketing inefficiencies because of their meagre marketed surpluses and 
poor bargaining power.
The introduction of marketing cooperatives is considered an 
effective way of reducing marketing margins and improving the prices 
received and paid by the farmers. Pooling of sales makes it possible 
for the farmer to achieve a number of commercial gains: for example the 
achievement of bulk profit in the sale of produce on the one hand, and 
ability to submit tenders in competition for special supply contracts
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on the other. A guaranteed cooperative marketing channel is also seen 
as an effective way of facilitating an increase in the production for 
market.
However, there is another side to the argument. Marketing 
societies have serious disadvantages as compared with private traders: 
lack of knowledge and experience; lack of time to maintain close 
contact with changing market conditions and to control management; 
insufficient realisation of the need for skilled staff and difficulties 
in securing honest initiative; shortage of capital to meet the risks of 
wide price fluctuations. Serious difficulties are also encountered in 
trying to overcome the habits of many poor producers in using credit 
from middle-men prior to harvesting their crops and thus expecting 
immediate returns for their produce.
When a marketing cooperative tries to supplant the middle-man 
trader, it may find that members are at first reluctant to await the 
distribution of surplus till all the sales are concluded. Since the 
basic prices at which goods are purchased from members are lower than 
the market price, members who are more concerned with immediate profit 
are apt to feel that they are not being benefitted. In consequence, 
they may succumb to the blandishments of the trader who offers a 
slightly higher price for their produce and is prepared to take both 
the good and bad quality stock, whereas a society must endeavour to 
maintain the standards of its produce.
On the other hand, if cooperatives are encouraged to operate side 
by side with traditional traders, they can play an important role in 
increasing competition, provided (a) the size of the market is 
sufficiently large (b) cooperatives are operated efficiently and they
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at least offer a service comparable with what is offered by the trader.
The Farmers' requisite societies^ may offer substantial 
reduction in the prices charged to farmers for the goods and services 
such as chemical fertilizers, pesticides, improved tools etc. by 
overcoming the causes of these higher prices. These societies can 
achieve a commercial gain: for example the achievement of bulk buying 
discounts in the purchase of supplies. Thus in an attempt to overcome 
various causes of higher prices, these societies have substantial 
economic advantages over private traders or other statutory monopolies. 
By centralizing the demands of their members, societies can avoid some 
of the costs due to the scatter of individual farms and irregularity 
and small size of purchases by individual members. This concentration 
can be achieved at comparatively low cost: some at least of the
administrative overhead costs of private traders can be avoided by the 
voluntary labour of cooperative members, and by their interest in and 
loyalty to their organization. The societies may also secure for their 
members goods and services of appropriate quality and of course, 
correctly weighed and measured. And in many circumstances, 
concentration of demands can counter the monopoly powers of private 
traders, or serve to keep statutory monopolies more efficient. Another 
advantage which cooperatives have as against private traders arises 
from the attitude of the governments during periods of scarcity. 
Indeed governments in many developing countries frequently rely on 
cooperatives to ensure a fair distribution of scarce goods and 
services.
The private merchant, on the other hand, may have substantial 
comparative economic advantages over cooperatives. He may be better
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trained in business management, particularly in the timing of his 
purchases and the changes in his stock of goods. He can more readily 
alter the area of his operations and the types and qualities of goods 
in which he deals. His opportunities to be flexible in the control of 
credit and outstanding debts may be greater. Given a better capital 
base for a period he can operate at a loss and thereby out-compete a 
new society during its most critical initial operations. These 
economic advantages are not however always sufficient. Even allowing 
for his greater skill in business management and greater flexibility, 
the private merchant's real costs in distribution may sometimes be 
considerably higher than those of cooperatives, able more readily to 
concentrate the demands of individual farms. Where there is not full 
competition between merchants, it is not in the general economic and 
social interest to counter or eliminate their monopoly power.
The potential advantages of cooperative credit associations^2 
include amongst others the provision of low-cost consumer or 
agricultural loans or relatively high rates of return on small savings. 
These societies can protect the weak and save them from the usurers. 
The principal advantage of credit societies is that they help farmers 
to overcome the financial barrier to innovation, through the pooling of 
funds for mutual lending, and by serving as an intermediary between the 
small farmer and government agencies or banks. The cooperative makes 
lending to small farmers possible by taking upon itself the effort and 
expense of administering many small loans and through its commitment of 
institutional income and assets to the repayment of the sum borrowed.
The weaknesses of credit societies, on the other hand, are that 
they generally cannot raise sufficient funds in the form of members
81
saving deposits and/or members loans to dispense credit sufficient for 
the needs of its poorer members. Since small investments of its 
members do not provide enough capital to meet all the demands for 
loans, credit societies most often borrow money on the basis of 
"unlimited liability", which (as already pointed out) means that all 
members are equally responsible for the entire debts of the 
association. The principal problem with 'joint liability' is that a 
few members, may secure short term gains in the expectation that in the 
long run they will exit, leaving those who stay to carry the remaining 
debt. Further, since credit societies generally borrow from the banks 
and other external sources, banks and other lenders view the society as 
their agent and may expect it to protect their interest (e.g. by 
limiting credit to failing members; but the associations are guided by 
their own interests which are not always identical to those of the 
lenders). Similarly officers in societies may be tempted to expand 
operations and to assume risks which prudent members would avoid..
Farmers in many countries often sell their output or buy inputs 
in markets in which both the price and non-price terms of sale are 
virtually dictated to them. Nonetheless most growers are not fully 
aware of an imbalance of market power due to a complex of factors. The 
recourse to cooperatives can provide a means to these farmers to 
counter-balance the power of their opponents.
Farmers Bargaining Associations^ have the potential advantage in 
improving terms of trade for growers, preventing buyers from adopting 
procurement practices which are against farmers interests, improving 
efficiency in production, negotiating contracts etc. Nevertheless the 
role of bargaining association in counter-balancing the power of its
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opponents is not as dramatic and strong as often advocated. Effective 
collective bargaining would depend on there being a close homogeneity 
of interest among farmer-growers, sharing common production and 
marketing problems. Further, such bargaining power is greater where 
the marketing channel is relatively simple and contractual 
relationships exist, and where buyers are all engaged in performing 
similar functions so that they, too, share common interests. In short, 
for effective bargaining to occur the institutional environment must be 
appropriate.
Many advantages are claimed for groups of various kinds that 
directly engage in farming. From an economic standpoint, they reduce 
essentially to those of large scale economies in farming operation. 
These advantages may be secured on communal farms. They may be 
considered in relation to collective farms. And the advantages may 
also be realised on group farms.94
Production cooperatives, on the other hand, are frequently 
associated with allocation of land to landless through reclamation or 
settlement schemes or involving appropriations from large land-owners 
in the course of a land reform, frequently to maximize the use of 
existing physical infrastructure that is geared to large scale farming.
Although most of the advantages that are frequently ascribed to
the production cooperatives are, from an economic standpoint,
essentially those of large scale operation, ideological concerns for
equity and grassroot participation have also led to the promotion of
production cooperatives. Levay has argued that
"They are often envisaged as a method of obtaining 
scale economies, as an alternative, perhaps, to farm 
amalgamation, or of permitting more leisure for the
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farmer and his wife, or as a means of introducing 
innovations. They sometimes seem a convenient way of 
capitalizing agriculture since by cooperating farmers 
have access to certain special channels of grant aid.
Sometimes more is hoped of the production 
cooperative. It may be viewed as a mechanism by
which rural social ties can be created or improved, 
and the drift from the land can be stemmed, so
keeping local communities in being, with their 
traditional customs, mores and, often, language"^.
A number of pragmatic considerations that explain the attraction 
of production cooperatives to policy makers in many developing 
countries include savings arising from the delivery of services to
groups rather than to individual farm families, more rapid 
dissemination of new agricultural technologies through group inter­
action, exploitation of economies in the use of "lumpy" or indivisible 
technology such as irrigation facilities or farm mechanization, more 
effective use of under-employed labour, increased production and 
greater social control over marketed output.
Nevertheless various advantages may or may not outweigh the 
disadvantages which large scale operation may have in comparison with 
activities on a small scale. A loss of close personal attention, 
particularly to intensive crops, and a loss of incentives to 
individuals and families to work diligently and save carefully are 
recognized as liable to result from group farming. Further many small 
farm families may fear a loss of freedom of economic activity and of 
security if they in any way pool their individual rights. Even some of 
the objectives of policy makers to promote the case for production 
cooperatives may not be satisfactorily achieved. For instance, 
mechanization frequently leads to increased labour use on private 
holdings, but on group farms it can often be labour-displacing because
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of poorer management and less intensive resource use. Participation in 
decision-making may also not be always consistent with the use of lumpy 
technology as mechanised or irrigated farming may often be centralized 
in management. Further differential ownership of assets of individuals 
can create management problems and problems relating to broadening 
participation in decision-making as the members who own most of the 
capital usually attempt to acquire political control, whereas those who 
mainly contribute labour can be reduced to the role of no more than 
paid labourers. Even the degree of government assistance can affect 
efficiency of resource use, choice of technology and effectiveness of 
management. Group farms may often tend to over-capitalize both in 
comparison with similar privately owned farms and from the view point 
of efficient resources.
In the light of the above discussion it may be pertinent to seek 
some inference in respect of cooperative performance from Galbraith who 
asserts that
"As a device for getting economies of larger-scale 
operations in the handling of farm products or for 
providing and capitalizing such facilities as 
elevators, grain terminals, warehouses and 
creameries, cooperatives have enjoyed a considerable 
measure of success. For exercising market power they 
have fatal structural weaknesses. The cooperative is 
a loose association of individuals. It rarely 
includes all producers of a product. It cannot 
control the production of its members and, in 
practice, it has less than absolute control over 
their decision to sell. All these powers over its 
own production are possessed, as a matter of course, 
by the corporation. A strong bargaining position 
requires ability to wait-to hold some or all of the 
product. The cooperative cannot make the non-members 
wait; they are at liberty to sell when they please 
and unlike the members, they have the advantage of 
selling all they please. In practice, the 
cooperative cannot fully control even its own 
members. They are under the constant temptation to
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break away and sell their full production. This they 
do, in effect, at the expense of those who stand by 
the cooperative."96
The cooperatives, be they marketing cooperatives, requisite
societies or production cooperatives, will only succeed when they offer
considerable benefits to their members in terms of improved farm
incomes. This role, according to Levay, has not been successfully
undertaken by many types of cooperatives.
"Cooperatives have so often been advocated as a means 
of raising farm incomes, and yet it is hard to come 
by any evidence as to the extent to which they 
perform this role. Such data as are available seem 
to indicate that neither very large nor very small 
farmers tend to join cooperatives, except in the case 
of requisite societies in which the membership may be 
extremely heterogeneous. If this is true, then 
policies aiming to improve the income generated from 
small (though just viable) farms by grant aiding 
cooperatives are not likely to benefit farmers in 
that particular category. Price differentials on 
farm inputs and outputs between cooperatives and 
other businesses would be extremely hard to assess, 
as adjustments to any quoted prices must include 
cooperative 'divis', bonuses on trade granted by 
private firms, discounts for prompt payment or bulk 
buying and a whole range of other considerations 
that make comparison virtually unworkable, so that 
the precise financial gains enjoyed by cooperating 
farmers are almost impossible to ascertain".97
The cooperatives, however, do offer many social benefits to 
individuals and to society as a whole.98 The formal cooperative can be 
a source of "solidarity" incentives as well ... a means of improving 
the small farmers' image and raising their status, in their own eyes 
and in the eyes of the rest of society. Moreover, successful economic 
operations may also be valued for their "purposive" aspect, enabling 
common agriculturists to feel that they are contributing selflessly to 
the achievement of the goals of any of several reference groups with
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which they may identify.
The effort of a cooperative in improving the acumen of its 
members regarding the political and economic institutions comprising 
their environment may well result in increased and improved farm 
leadership. Cooperatives can introduce farmers to the use of modern 
business techniques. This applies both to the operation of their 
cooperative and the operation of their farms at more efficient levels. 
Furthermore, since a successful and strong cooperative depends upon 
strong leadership from farmers, this process in turn makes more well- 
informed, better leaders of farmers and thus assists them in more
effectively defending or representing their political, economic and 
social interests.
In addition to the benefits that could accrue to cooperative
members, benefits can be passed on to other residents of the community
who are not members of the cooperative. Studies show that lower prices 
in a market may be associated with the presence of a cooperative. Thus 
all members of the community may benefit.
Cooperatives may benefit their local economies because of the 
additional money spent locally. An argument regarding the favourable 
role of cooperatives in their local economies rests with the 
implications that the earnings of cooperatives declared and eventually 
paid as patronage refunds are generally spent locally, generating a
local "multiplier" effect. One may not expect such a conclusion 
regarding the operating profit earned by a profit-seeking enterprise 
that is not locally owned.
Finally the egalitarian, democratic membership principle of 
cooperative organization can redner the cooperative's structure
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symbolic of the shared identity and interest of farmer-members as they 
face the culturally distinct and economically hostile outside world.
2.III.5 Impact of Cooperatives on Economic and Social Development
As stated earlier, cooperatives in many developing countries are 
generally introduced on the initiative and with the sponsorship of the 
government and their activities have often had little effect on the 
existing patterns and trends of economic activity in a country. 
Moreover, despite the potential advantages set out in the preceding 
sections, their performance has usually had little relevance for the 
wider issues of social and economic change and general strategy of 
development. Thus the design and functioning of a cooperative has 
left untouched such major socio-economic problems in rural areas as 
marginalization of small farmers and unemployment among landless 
agricultural labourers. Even smaller proportions of farming population 
are signficantly affected by cooperatives in many countries.99
In assessing the impact of cooperatives, there is a problem of 
identifying when the cooperatives are responsible for certain changes 
and when quite often different factors are the cause of such changes. 
In fact, cooperatives may appear effective or ineffective, successful 
or unsuccessful, for reasons quite unrelated to the policies of 
cooperatives themselves.
As well as an identification problem there is also a problem of 
the relation of idealised objectives to. actual performance. A 
considerable gap may exist between the propounded aims and the actual 
performance; their impact may have little relation to their stated 
goals. It is arguable whether it is more appropriate to compare
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cooperative performance with what prevailed before the cooperatives 
were introduced, or to assess performance in terms of (perhaps limited) 
benefits realised since their inception. Often there appears to be a 
gap between what the sponsoring agency considers the aims and purposes 
of cooperatives to be and what the local farmers want or expect. The 
latter, in many countries, look upon cooperatives as a source of 
benefits from authorities without recognising the efforts and 
obligations inherent in cooperative enterprise.
For these and other reasons, assessment of the role and impact of 
cooperatives is a complex undertaking. However impact of cooperatives 
in relation to the objectives of a) self-reliance; b) agricultural 
innovation and productivity, and c) structural change may be of some 
legitimate significance in many developing countries throughout the 
world.
1. Self-reliance and Development
Two somewhat contradictory strands are intertwined in cooperative 
policies. An older liberal tradition emphasizes self-reliance of local 
communities, voluntary organization and a healthy independence from 
government. In this approach goverment involvement is viewed with 
scepticism, and the primary objective of cooperatives is seen to extend 
organized mutual aid among farmers and artisans, to reduce the role of 
commercial middlemen and money-lenders, and to reap some of the 
benefits of economies of scale by consolidating resources and sharing 
equipment and storage facilities, especially those requiring heavier 
investments. The other "Liberal approach" (generally adopted by many 
LDC's) looks upon government involvement and assistance as a necessary 
condition for the promotion of cooperatives. There has, however not
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been an effective reconciliation of these two perspectives on the role 
of cooperatives.
In some countries self-reliance is prominent as an objective of 
national policy and cooperative self-reliance is seen as a part of 
national self-reliance effort.
One of the arguments for introducing cooperatives is that in 
order for development to occur, traditional dependency systems (e.g. a 
paternal system) need to be replaced by self-reliance and community 
initiative, achieved through cooperative action. What often happens in 
practice, however, when cooperatives are introduced into rural areas 
characterized by dependency relations is not replacement of dependency 
by self-reliance but perpetuation of dependency in another form, under 
the cooperative, or the substitution of a new dependency system in 
which the state becomes the new patron. A condition of dependency may 
also be created where none existed before.
Where local initiative and self-reliance are significantly 
stimulated by cooperatives, the result may be an increase in the 
capacity for political action in defence of local interest. In this 
connection, cooperatives with the least political or social content 
(being mainly concerned with straightforward economic benefits) may, in 
the end, have a greater impact than those explicitly but ineffectively 
seeking to transform society.
2. Agricultural Innovation and Productivity
In the diffusion of agricultural innovation and promotion of 
higher productivity, cooperatives may have a mixed and not particularly 
significant success. There can be instances of clear failure and
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instances of evident success, but little basis on which to conclude 
that cooperatives per se are superior or inferior, to other 
institutional means of promoting innovation and increase of 
productivity. What seems particularly important is the general quality 
of management of the cooperative, regular training of members and 
effective links with agricultural departments and institutes.
Where these conditions are met and where cooperatives can supply 
the necessary inputs including credit, and where the methods of 
extension and demonstration are such that they have meaning to the 
individual farmer in the context of his own farm, the net result may be 
the successful propagation of a new practice, with resulting higher 
productivity. However, the prevailing circumstances such as prices of 
inputs and produce, transportation, etc. must be suitable. This 
emphasises the need for such healthy circumstances which cannot always 
be guaranteed.
It is important to comment specifically on credit since credit 
intended for agricultural use is one of the services most commonly 
offered through cooperatives. Where cooperative credit provides 
farmers with an effective alternative to money-lenders or to commercial 
banks, cooperatives can fulfil an important function in promoting 
agricultural production. Interest rates in the informal credit market 
may be lowered and factor prices corrected. Evidence on the other hand 
show that, in many countries, much of the credit advanced by 
cooperatives is not used for productive purposes. Also the record of 
repayment is remarkably bad, and those who most need credit are often 
disqualified.1®®
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Productivity considerations in cooperatives may pose a further 
dilemma. Where some cooperative members, especially those better off, 
take advantage of cooperative credit and of new methods and techniques 
of production, compared with those who do not, there may be an increase 
of economic inequalities in the community, contrary to cooperative 
ideals. In this situation some farmers may even suffer absolute 
decline of living standards. On the other hand, preoccupation with 
maintaining or realizing equality in the cooperative or in the 
community at large, can mean low overall productivity and low income 
levels more or less equally shared. Cooperatives may be unable to 
resolve this dilemma of productivity and equality within their 
framework and questions have to be raised as to whether the same 
institution can be expected to pursue both goals effectively at the 
same time.
3. Social Impact and Structural Change
It is generally assumed that social benefits of cooperatives are 
slower to emerge and less apparent than economic benefits, although the 
latter are by no means a common feature. Actual achievements in regard 
to greater socio-economic equalization, structural change and relief of 
mass poverty fall far short of the announced goals in many cases. 
Where credit is extended through cooperatives, the poorest among the 
rural inhabitants frequently receive the least benefit.
As such, the introduction of cooperatives into local social 
systems that are structured along hierarchical lines or dominated by 
particular entrenched interests does not bring much reform and 
democratization. Rural communities, in many of the LDC's are very
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often not characterized by communal solidarity, although such 
solidarity tends frequently to be assumed by outside policy makers.
In short, cooperatives may seem to play a variable role in 
increasing economic productivity in agricultural areas, with a typical 
economic impact that is not very significant, and a marginal role in 
implementing social and structural change, inspite of the ambitious 
goals often claimed for them.
2. IV Conclusions
This chapter has examined some analytical issues with the purpose 
of establishing their implications for cooperative behaviour and 
performance. It has been noted that the ideological and pragmatic 
conceptions of cooperatives are quite distinct; they assign different 
roles to cooperatives. These different roles each present problems 
when it comes to defining a cooperative. The cooperative as a business 
organization can both serve economic interests of its members and be a 
vehicle of governmental development policy, undertaking functions which 
other forms of institution cannot generally perform. Nevertheless as 
an instrument of development, the merits of cooperation have by no 
means been conclusively established.
The foregoing discussion has established that the principles of 
cooperation themselves do not provide essential rules of conduct to 
which all types of cooperatives in the world conform. The need to 
define cooperative as a heterogeneous socio-economic category of 
institution has been identified, together with the need to view the 
cooperative as an organizational form through which the member 
participants and government may interact to achieve certain economic
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and socio-political goals. The need for and justification of base 
level and apex cooperatives have been examined. The potential benefits 
and weaknesses of farmers' cooperatives both as autonomous 
organizations and as a vehicle of government policy have also been 
summarized in general terms.
It is now appropriate to examine credit issues in greater depth.
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CHAPTER 3
SUBSISTENCE AGRICULTURE, WORKING CAPITAL AND 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVES
This chapter seeks to delineate the need for working capital in 
a subsistence economy and looks at the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of informal and institutional capital markets in providing 
working capital to subsistence farmers. The advantages and 
disadvantages of cooperatives as a channel of credit are examined in 
particular. The chapter is organized in four sections. Section 1 is 
concerned with the need for and available sources of working capital 
in a subsistence setting. Section II covers the social and economic 
aspects of agricultural credit cooperatives, and provides a brief 
summary of the historical evolution of credit cooperatives, together 
with general experiences of the operation of credit. societies in 
developing countries. Section III assembles information on criteria 
for assessing the performance of agricultural credit cooperatives. 
And finally section IV presents a brief review of the issues raised in 
the chapter.
3.I The Need for and Nature of Working Capital in Subsistence
Agriculture
It is well known that certain distinctive features of 
agricultural production place it in a disadvantageous position as 
against manufacturing industry. First, the scale of production in 
agriculture is typically small. While other industries dependent to a 
greater extent on capital equipment tend to become concentrated in 
units of ever-increasing size, agriculture, dependent in land, remains 
dispersed, individualistic, small scale and disorganized. The problem
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is further complicated by the simultaneous presence of production for 
both domestic consumption and the market. Second, the risks and 
uncertainities involved in agricultural production are of a different 
nature and order compared with manufacturing industry, as success in 
agriculture depends crucially on natural factors outside the control 
of the cultivators. Agricultural production is affected by the monsoon 
and natural calamities like flood, drought, diseases, insect pest 
attack etc. A third distinctive feature is that agricultural products 
are often perishable or of such nature that they cannot be stored 
cheaply without significant risk of loss. Lastly, agricultural 
production involves a longer time scale than does the bulk of 
industrial production - the essential biological processes cannot be 
hurried, so that in the case of field crops, for example, the 
cultivator has to wait a year for his harvest. Moreover, he cannot 
switch over to alternative crops in response to a shift in prices once 
the land has been sown with a particular cropJ
Subsistence agriculture, in particular, has its own peculiar 
characteristics.^ it is generally confined to regions with little 
access to good physical infrastructure and markets. The cultivable 
land is limited, as there is typically a higher density of population 
which in turn exerts pressure on available land. There is intensive 
application of labour to the land, but the absence of complementary 
inputs keeps the yields low, as also the quality of cultivable land is 
generally poor. The techniques of agricultural production are 
primitive, and socio-economic factors are not conducive to improving 
farm technology. And, as a result, growth of output of subsistence 
agriculture is low and erratic. Agricultural production is not able
101
to keep pace with the increasing demand from the market, and this is 
presumably due to the subsistence mode of production as against 
commercial specialization.
The vast majority of cultivators in subsistence agriculture have 
a very small land base, and their farm holdings are often fragmented 
into dispersed parcels. The subsistence farmers lack the capacity to 
earn a reasonably decent living from the land either due to the poor 
quality of land cultivated by them or because of inefficient 
management of their farm enterprise. This arises because it is 
generally necessary for them to look for additional sources of 
employment to meet their overall consumption requirements leading to 
neglect of the land from time to time. Most subsistence farmers have 
a low capacity to acquire new technology and their ability to get 
access to markets and public services is constrained by their scale of 
operation or their tenurial status.
The subsistence agricultural sector cannot be properly 
understood if no attention is paid to the social and psychological 
attitudes of subsistence farmers. The agricultural activities are 
materially influenced by social constraints and taboos; decisions of 
subsistence farmers to grow particular crops are not determined 
primarily by demand in the market. With a deep sense of family 
obligation, they produce mainly to satisfy their family's immediate 
needs. The extended family provides a form of social insurance for 
its members and its obligations may minimize the inducement towards 
economic improvements. Moreover, primitive technology is frequently 
an integral part of the social framework.
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Notwithstanding many economic weaknesses, the subsistence farmer 
has to solve a major problem of cash flow and risk management without 
large reserves of cash.3 The cash flow problem arises from seasonal 
deficits and surpluses inherent in the biological characteristics of 
farming. In addition to these predictable deficits, he has to consider 
unpredictable failures due to fluctuations in growing conditions, 
diseases, markets, health and other risks. Despite low levels of cash 
flow he nonetheless has to find some reserves with which to bridge 
both the predictable and unpredictable deficits.
For the subsistence farmer the drawing down of crop inventories 
to meet the food requirements of his household is the equivalent of 
cash outgoings to meet the operating expenses of the commercial farm. 
The subsistence character of his activities does not permit him to 
draw a distinction between farming for production and farming for 
consumption; working capital and consumption requirements are to all 
intents and purposes the same thing.
This point may be elaborated in relation to a more precise 
definition of working capital. In manufacturing, of continuous 
(machine-based) type, working capital would be funds perpetually tied 
up in stocks (raw materials, semi-finished goods, or work-in-progress, 
and finished but unfinished goods). In addition, it would include 
funds used to pay labour only to the extent that the production (and 
sale) period was longer than the agreed payment interval - which in 
this type of manufacturing is rarely.4 In marked contrast, in 
agriculture, with its typical annual cycle, working capital is all the 
outgoings from seed-time to harvest (or in commercial agriculture to 
sale of output). Payment for labour is a very substantial component
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of these outgoings in a commercial setting. But in a subsistence 
setting it largely comprises the consumption requirements of the farm 
households themselves. In short, once harvested a particular crop is 
the reserve of working capital for the next.
Problems often arise in identifying the adequacy of available 
working capital - i.e. the adequacy of the annual harvest in a 
subsistence setting. As noted before, there are considerable
fluctuations inherent in the biological nature of farming. In 
addition, unpredictable failures attributable to growing conditions, 
diseases, markets, health and other risks are more evident in
subsistence setting. Even good crop harvests leave the farmers with 
little marketable surplus after judging what the family’s food 
consumption and production requirements will be. The problem is
further complicated by the fact that agricultural products are often 
perishable and cannot be cheaply and easily stored; any farmer lacking 
storage is forced to sell his produce at harvest time just when there 
are large seasonal declines in product prices. But for the 
subsistence farmer in particular it is part of his household's 
consumption stock of grain he may be obliged to sell at this time at 
low prices. Then, towards the end of the agricultural year the
subsistence farmer, due to faulty judgement or unexpected losses, has 
to buy back grains and other items in the market at much higher prices 
due to now-pressing consumption needs. The basic input requirements 
of the household are vital but it would be unrealistic to assume that 
these consumption requirements are the same as basic physiologically- 
determined needs and that they are known in advance with certainty. 
The subsistence farmer is a member of a social structure and the need
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to maintain self-respect influences consumption requirements in 
addition to the need merely to survive. Social obligations have to be 
considered and there are many unpredictable social events requiring 
expenditure: weddings, funerals and other ceremonies. These entail
very real consumption requirements from the point of view of the 
farmer.
Given the biological nature and the scale of his productive 
activities and the social nature of his consumption requirements, it 
is to be expected that a subsistence farmer who has come to the 
conclusion that his working capital is inadequate may, once given 
access to funds, use them not for the purchase of material 
agricultural inputs or investment in agricultural capital, but instead 
for consumption purposes.
In a subsistence setting, the scope for extension of cultivation 
into new areas is frequently limited due to the non-availability of 
more cultivable land and also because of increased pressure on land 
due to population growth. In such a situation what is needed, 
particularly once cultivation has extended as far as possible, is the 
improvement in the productivity of land already under cultivation, 
i.e. increased intensity of cultivation. Up to a point this can 
perhaps be done by increasing the use of traditional inputs of labour, 
animal power and implements for tillage and the improvement of methods 
of irrigation or the pattern of crop rotation. But sooner or later a 
stage is reached when the gains from the. increased application of 
these traditional inputs, as also from local seeds and farm yard 
manure, with which the subsistence farmer has long been acquainted, 
become extremely limited. At such a stage to obtain additional output
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will require the use of improved farm technology to yield the 
necessary upward shift of aggregate production.5 Additional working 
capital would be required here primarily for purchasing improved farm 
technology (improved seed, chemical fertilizers, pesticides etc.) and 
also for making minor capital improvements at his farm. In short, the 
cash requirements for the purchase of these inputs from the market 
would constitute a need for additional working capital to fund 
intensification of production. The key issue then, is whether 
improved availability of working capital will be used by the farmer to 
improve consumption directly, or to improve agricultural productivity, 
income and consumption indirectly.
3.1.1 Sources of Working Capital in Subsistence Agriculture
As noted in the preceding section subsistence farmers frequently 
lack internally generated working capital and must turn to external 
sources to meet their requirements. There are two major sources (a) 
formal institutional credit sources and (b) informaal credit sources6 . 
An account of the nature, working, merits and demerits of these 
sources is given in the following pages.
The institutional credit market in many developing countries 
forms only a small part of the rural capital market; commercial banks, 
specialized agricultural banks, cooperatives and other institutions 
cover a very small percentage of the total rural population in the 
developing regions of the world. Credit is more generally - provided 
informally to farmers by their relatives and friends; and a large 
proportion originates with informal commercial lenders such as local 
merchants, large farmers - including landlords lending to tenants -
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and full-time money-lenders.
No comprehensive data are available for the amount of credit 
advanced by the non-institutional sector. It is generally believed 
that most of the loans borrowed by the farmers in. the subsistence 
setting come from the non-institutional sources. For example a study 
undertaken by the World Bank in 19797 revealed that some 70 to 90 
percent of loans in South Asia came from non-institutional sources. 
According to this study, subsistence farmers in particular relied even 
more heavily on non-institutional and non-commercial sources (among 
whom the majority were money-lenders, traders, commission agents, 
friends and relatives). For instance in India and Bangladesh nearly 
50 percent of all credit came from rural money-lenders, while in 
Pakistan the ’friends and relatives' category dominated all the 
sources. Findings from other countries8 establish the dominance of 
non-institutional credit sources in the total supply of farm credit. 
Evidence shows that loans obtained by subsistence farmers from non- 
institutional sources^ are frequently incurred to meet consumption 
expenditure related to social obligations: to pay for litigation,
weddings, illness or house repairs. Only a small share of the loans 
acquired by the subsistence sector from non-institutional sources is 
put to what could readily be identified as 'productive use', that is 
directly linked to augmenting future income.
In contrast, institutional credit providers generally focus on 
large farmers and exclude most subsistence farmers from their lending 
schemes. Since larger farmers produce for the market, institutional 
lenders work on the basis that their credit will be applied primarily 
to increase marketable surplus. Accordingly institutional sources do
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not provide for 'non-productive1 credit. In turn, this compels the 
subsistence farmers to rely further on the non-institutional sources 
to meet their credit requirements.
Many factors contribute to the reluctance of the institutional 
lenders to lend in the subsistence setting even for purposes which 
might merit the term 'productive1. First is the very small size of 
the typical agricultural enterprise. Millions of cultivators operate 
tiny farms and the loan agency would have to deal with great numbers 
of dispersed clients for extremely small loans. This in turn involves 
a high transaction cost of a loan which deters the institutional 
lender from lending to subsistence farmers. There may be potentially 
a large number of loan applicants in the subsistence setting but it is 
extremely difficult for the institutional lenders to lend since the 
cost of administering loans is out of proportion to the loan size. 
Second is the formal procedures employed the institutional lenders. 
They often require their loan recipients to sign a promissory note 
that demands a co-signer; they may require a mortgage or other 
collateral; collateral values may have to exceed the amount loaned. 
However, the subsistence farmers do not have good collateral to offer. 
Apart from personal surety acceptable to friends, relatives or 
sometimes a cooperative, there are only three types of collateral 
available to the subsistence farmers: land, crops and ornaments. As 
to the land, most subsistence farmers own very small holdings: many 
cultivators work as tenants and do not own any land at all. In 
addition, the security offered by land depends on the land tenure 
situation. Even a land-owner cultivator may be unable to borrow 
because of various restrictions on the transfer of land. Given these
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conditions, it is generally difficult for the institutional lenders to 
accept land as security for a loan. The security offered by growing 
crops is meaningless in the face of unpredictable events. The 
subsistence farmer has virtually no other assets: any way personal 
ornaments are rarely accepted by the institutional lenders as security 
for a loan. Thirdly the institution has to confront the difficulty of 
establishing and maintaining an effective relationship between credit 
and income generation, presumed to be the basis for repayment. The 
level of near poverty at which the majority subsists creates an almost 
irresistible temptation to divert credit nominally obtained for 
'productive' investments to what the farmer regards as unavoidable 
consumption. The loan therefore mortgages future income rather than 
augments it. Moreover, when funds are actually employed to increase 
production, there is a tendency to divert the fruits of increasing 
productivity to raising consumption rather than to repaying the loan. 
The institution has difficulty in enforcing its claim as creditor. 
Fourthly, the subsistence farmer has a highly insecure income base: 
he has barely adequate means to maintain his and his family's 
consumption from the produce of land. He may seek occasional 
employment outwith the sphere of the farming business in order to try 
to earn an adequate livelihood. Not only is dependence on non- 
agricultural sources of income unreliable; more often than not it 
results in the inability of the farmer to concentrate adequately on 
his farming business. This affects crop productivity and in turn the 
total incomes may fall even further. The insecurity and the 
unpredictable fluctuations in the income base in the subsistence 
setting helps the farmer to remain in perpetual need of funds from
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external sources. But lacking dependable means of repayment of loans 
institutional sources provide no support.
Given the general inappropriateness of the institutional lenders 
for the subsistence farmers, the institutional lenders focus on the 
large farmers. They supply capital to agriculture from urban sources, 
(in contrast to informal lenders which provide capital, either their 
own or borrowed from others, which is often rural in origin) through a 
network of branches located in the rural sector. Generally all of them 
are present in rural areas as branches of large, urban based 
institutions.
The contrasts with informal credit provision are marked. First, 
most loans in the informal market carry no collateral; the guarantee 
for repayment is merely the verbal promise of the borrower backed up 
by sanctions operating through social pressures. In some cases there 
may be an informal mortgage on land or defacto arrangement that the 
farmer's crop will be sold to the lender. Almost all loans are for 
short-term purposes (one year or less). Second, access to the 
informal sector is straightforward. The zone of operation for the 
informal credit market varies with type of lender. For instance 
money-lenders tend to operate in rather a small area (a village for 
example) and loans granted by neighbours, friends and relatives 
usually originate in the same neighbourhood. The informal credit 
market may be found anywhere; around small villages and in dispersed 
settlements through the entire countryside. Informal lenders zones 
may be remote from or overlap with the zones of operation of the 
institutional credit market.
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Third, lending procedures are very simple. Among institutional 
lenders some version of commercial bank procedure predominates. The 
borrower must present a series of forms (statements of financial 
condition, tax records, land titles, etc.). In many cases, the 
borrower is asked to come back in a few days, a few weeks, or even a 
month or more to learn the preliminary decision on the loan 
application. Some times the farm is inspected by bank employees to 
evaluate the property and potential production. The requirements for 
such procedures are quite inappropriate for the bulk of subsistence 
farmers. In contrast, the lending procedures for credit from the 
informal lenders are quite simple. The borrower talks directly to the 
lender about his financial needs. There are usually no forms to fill 
out. Since the borrowers and lenders know each other, the borrower 
asks for credit directly and the lender accepts or rejects the request 
more or less immediately.
Fourth, the borrower from informal sources does not have to 
justify his credit requirement. The informal lenders do not usually 
have any interest in the likelihood of the loan generating the 
economic improvement of their clients. In contrast the institutional 
lender seeks assurance that the loan could provide a net economic 
benefit to the borrower - or at least enable the debt to be serviced 
and repaid. The informal lender could even wish to promote the 
economic decline of their clients, so that they could acquire real 
assets, or accumulate labour obligations and other personal benefits 
(loyalty, voting support etc.). In short, the informal lenders, often 
in conjunction with their marketing activities, are generally regarded 
as taking advantage of the farmer.
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The outcome of their contrasting structure, conduct and 
performance is a significant interest-rate differential. The 
institutional credit sources generally acquire most of their funds 
from government, or from funds supplied by external aid donors, at 
concessional rates. They in turn charge "low" interest rates from 
their customers, who generally are the larger farmers. The existence
of low interest credit, it is logical to suppose, further discourages 
other credit institutions from entering the rural market in 
competition with credit agencies that obtain their funds cheaply. But 
it also discourages the tapping of indigenous savings that might have 
been forthcoming to augment rural loan funds. And the low interest 
rates hold down the net income of the publicly supported credit 
institutions, restrict their loan capabilities to the limited supply 
of concessional funds they can get, and involve many of them in 
operating losses that necessitate a flow of subsidy to keep the 
institution in business. The result is therefore a perpetuation of 
dualism in the rural capital market. The public credit agencies are 
locked into their artificial and often precarious sphere, with other 
institutional lenders holding back, but without any contact with or 
stimulus to improve in the informal sphere. There is not the kind of 
healthy competition between the two market segments, which would 
otherwise invigorate the service to the farmers, nor are there new
institutional outlets for rural savings to enter. Instead a limited 
number -of farmers receive cheap loans, allocated by administrative
decision that does not ensure allocation to the most profitable 
investments. Moreover the informal credit market also remains for the 
most part fragmented with little internal competition. Most farmers
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simply save or borrow as before within the confines of the prevailing 
fragmented market. The service to farmers is spotty and inadequate 
and less than it would have been. Public capital tied up in these 
operations and subject to depletion from operational losses bears a
high opportunity cost in a development context since the greatest
beneficiaries are the richer farmers, and rural income disparities are
probably accentuated rather than moderated. Under these conditions 
some farmers undoubtedly receive more capital than could be justified 
on any social criteria while others receive none.
The non-institutional lenders charge a 'higher' interest rate 
from their borrowers as compared with the rate charged by the
institutional lenders from their customers. In addition, effective 
rates charged by the informal lenders may be found to be even higher 
if it were possible to account for hidden charges. These could 
include: demanding repayment in kind for a loan made in cash and 
undervaluing the commodity received; demanding labour services for the 
favour of giving the loan; or giving no receipt, so the borrower can 
be required to pay more than the original amount.
As stated earlier, the subsistence farmers require additional 
working capital to finance their consumption, production and to carry 
them over many other adversities (e.g. crop failures, disease, health, 
payment for funerals, and other social ceremonies): in view of their
restricted access to consumption loans from the institutional credit 
market they are left with no option except to borrow from the non- 
institutional sources. Nonetheless this demand for credit is real and 
most farmers are constrained to borrow from the informal lenders at 
rates higher than charged by the institutional sources (more detail on
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interest rates is provided in subsequent discussion).
We have noted earlier some of the important sources of non- 
institutional credit. A brief note on them is in order.
Friends and relatives are an important and traditional source of 
credit in most agricultural communities, developed and undeveloped. 
In Pakistan, for instance, they emerged as the major source of credit 
after independence. A large number of refugees were in the process of 
settling down, and in a period of rapidly shifting population, 
personal security could hardly be offered by the new settlers or 
accepted by the lenders. Thus they could only fall back upon those 
whom they knew and who could afford to spare some money. In other 
instances, however 'friends and relatives' together with other 'well- 
to-do ' people may demand conditional sale of land or other legal 
subterfuges to evade restrictions on transfers of land from peasants.
The village shop-keeper most often provides credit to the 
peasants in the subsistence setting. The shop-keeper feeds and 
clothes the farmers and meets their cash and other requirements until 
the harvest. These supplies are often provided at higher than 
prevailing market prices, thus including a hidden interest charge. If 
the shop-keeper also markets the farmers produce, he either obtains 
repayment in kind or specifies that the grower should not sell his 
crop through any other party.
In addition the landlord provides credit in the subsistence 
setting, either to his tenants or to poor peasants. While advancing 
loans, no contract for the loan is made and no interest ordinarily 
charged, though it is a common practice for the landlord to collect 
the loan from the sale of the loanee's marketable surplus which the
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latter is often compelled to sell through the landlord. Sometimes the 
price paid by the landlord bears no close relationship to the market 
value of the produce and thereby involves an element of interest. As 
the peasants lack any alternative source of credit, they are generally 
left with no better option except to borrow from the landlord on these 
unfavourable terms. The system works given the proximity, flexibility 
and intimate association of debtor and creditor; it is neither the 
most economically sound, nor does it aid the development of the moral 
fibre of the agrarian setting. Sometimes landlords provide loans in 
kind (generally in the form of cereal grains) for small sums 
negotiated on a short-term basis (one year or less). These loans may 
be used by the peasants either for seed or subsistence purposes. 
Grain-lending may turn to be a political as well as an economic 
activity. During times of famines, general food scarcities or other 
unpredictable adversities landlords may dispense grain to their 
clients as an obligation and a favour to be repaid at the lender's 
bidding. Consequently grain lending may place a considerable amount 
of economic and political power in the hands of the rich farmers 
(landlords).
Money-lending on a commercial basis is done in most developing 
countries of the world. The money-lender (in his multiple roles as a 
village trader, shop-keeper, landlord, commission agents etc.) lends 
money on personal surety and does not press for repayment of credit so 
long as- interest is paid. There is no publicity attached to his loan 
which is eminently necessary for protecting the 'self-respect' of the 
borrower. In return he charges exorbitant rates of interest (some 
times as high as 50 percent or even more) per annum. The money-
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lenders influence is demoralizing: since loans are easily available,
that they are readily spent. The oppression of money-lenders has been 
felt in many countries. Laws have been passed by governments, 
particularly to check the activities of the money-lenders and to
enable the peasants to escape from the money-lenders system. 
Nonetheless these laws have proved to be effective instruments in 
regions only where alternative sources of credit were made available 
to the indigent peasants. In many cases, however the superior 
bargaining power of the money-lender, the illiteracy of the debtor, 
the absence of satisfactory enforcement machinery, insufficient 
provision of credit by the institutional sources, and the lack of 
deterrent penalties to the money-lenders all contribute to the 
infringement of these laws.
We have already noted in the preceding section that in the
subsistence sector, it is most often than not an urgency for cash 
flows and the perishable nature of agricultural produce together with 
large seasonal variations in the product prices that leave little 
chance for the subsistence farmer to hold his crop and gain from 
seasonal price appreciation. The subsistence farmers cash requirements 
in terms of cash flow include a repayment commitment to the money­
lender. The money-lender typically requires the subsistence farmer to 
repay in kind. Thus the money-lender may acquire a crop inventory (at 
a lower price) with which to gain further in seasonal price
appreciation, in addition to the high rate of interest extracted from 
the subsistence farmer.
The money-lender also frequently acts as a village trader. He 
generally enters into an informal contract with the producer requiring
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from him the supply of the farm produce in return for a loan at a pre­
determined price or with price unfixed until the delivery of the 
produce. The former alternative is however more general and the 
grower receives a percentage of the price in advance as a loan. Loans 
are sometimes provided by the processors (e.g. the cotton ginners) to 
the producers. No interest may be charged but the price fixed is 
generally unfavourable to the producer. Alternatively the price may 
be reduced when the final payment is made. It was reported that a 
discount known as 'ghati' is generally charged against loans made by 
cotton-ginners to the cultivators in the province of Sind in 
Pakistan^ 0.
The traders (for instance enterprising farmers or even the small 
agriculturists) may also find in trading a more lucrative source of 
income. They may operate with personal funds or obtain credit from 
processors of crops who in turn draw on institutional sources of 
credit. The growers may sometimes also obtain credit directly from the 
commission-men or dealers.
In short the money-lenders (e.g. shop-keepers, traders, 
landlords, commission agents, dealers etc.) who more often than not 
are also traders are supported by a network of urban money-lenders, 
indigenous traders and urban wholesalers who are ultimately supported 
by the commercial banks. The village trader-cum money-lender also has 
links with the traders in the urban areas, who in turn are financed by 
the commercial banks. Then the money-lending activity is an essential 
adjunct of an entire trading system which acts in an effective manner 
as a mechanism for transporting the agricultural produce from the 
rural to the urban sectors either for further processing or
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consumption in the terminal centre. It may be noted that since
commercial banks open their branches in more commercialised areas, the 
non-monetized regions (the subsistence setting) continue to be short 
of banking facilities. Even so, in the non-monetized regions credit 
is provided by the money-lenders cum traders, and to some extent they 
are supported by the urban money-lenders and thus the commercial
banks.
The loans advanced by a money-lender-cum-trader generally trap 
the subsistence farmer in deteriorating circumstances. The dependence 
on high-cost lenders has a severe and direct effect on their
production choices. The subsistence farmer might have to pay the 
money-lenders an interest rate that may amount to 50 percent or higher 
a year. From the point of view of borrowing to invest (and so 
increase production) such rates impose minimum requirements on rates 
of return that simply exclude many alternatives that otherwise could 
be economically useful to him. Even important improvements in 
technology and marketing may fail to generate pay offs that reach a 50 
percent level. It is frequently the case that the other conditions 
attached to loans from the money-lenders may constrain the subsistence 
farmers from making certain types of capital investments such as land 
improvement, bullocks, tillage equipments etc. The money-lender is 
ill equipped and uninterested in making a loan for a period that 
allows for sufficient increase in farmers income to serve as a basis 
for repaying the loan. Credit access that is limited to the money­
lender on a short-term basis and at high rates of interest severely 
restricts the subsistence farmers' response to production alternatives 
that otherwise might be rewarding to him.
118
A question arises: if the subsistence farmers cannot obtain a 
reasonable level of net output with the loanable funds received from 
the money-lenders, how ultimately do they manage to fulfil the money­
lenders' obligations? This may partly be explained in terms of the 
money-lender-borrower relationships in the subsistence setting. The 
money-lender has generally complete information about his clients. 
Having been born and raised in the rural areas he has accumulated this 
knowledge over a long period of time. As such the money-lender knows 
the true financial condition of the borrower, where he can be found 
and who his relatives are, for example. He can apply indirect 
pressure through his acquaintance with local personalities. In 
addition the terms of loans, as stated earlier, may include a. 
commitment of the borrower to market the produce through the money­
lender. This practice enables the money-lender to recover at least 
part of his principal sum together with interest charges. Second, it 
is possible and was evident in India and Germany in the last century 
that most of the peasants were not capable in paying back to the 
money-lenders the exorbitant interest charges out from their farm 
produce. Many more findings from India1* have established that most 
of the indebted peasants, due to non-payment of loans, became 
virtually the slaves of the money-lenders in the 19th century. Under 
these conditions indebtedness was not only widespread but its 
implications more worsening. The money-lenders were able to foreclose 
on lands of their borrowers who were .unable to fulfil their 
commitments, when loans were due. Many peasants were transferred to 
the status of tenants, who produced for the money-lenders and lived at 
the mercy of the money-lenders. Thus it may be argued that the
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establishment of regular financial institutions could to a greater or 
lesser extent, save the peasants from the money-lenders system by 
providing effective competition to the non-institutional lenders.
The foregoing discussion suggests that in the subsistence 
setting the money-lender generally enjoys strong bargaining power vis- 
a-vis the peasant farmers and generally a lower price paid to a farmer 
of his produce is an indirect form of charging interest. In addition, 
the money-lender charges interest openly (or not so openly), and the 
rates are high. Are these hidden charges/high interest rates signs of 
monopoly? Some analysts argue that the money-lender extracts 
unjustifiably large profits from poor farmers by his monopolistic 
position. As noted earlier the money-lender does frequently operate 
in a market where there is no effective competition between the 
lenders due to the general scarcity of capital, and the borrowers are 
all reasonably homogeneous in terms of poverty. It is thus unlikely 
that there would be any potential threat to the business of the money­
lender. Further, there is little movement of potential lenders or 
borrowers in and out of the small market area. The number of lenders 
is thus restricted by the small number of those living in a limited 
market area and who have sufficient capital to engage in commercial 
lending with the entry of additional lenders restricted by low 
mobility and who already occupy key positions in the various trading 
links which in turn generate their capital. How much monopoly power 
is implied by this situation? The structure of the market for the 
informal commercial lenders may possibly range from pure monopoly (the 
one lender village) down to some point well short of workable 
competition. Oligopoly may seem to be a general descriptive term for
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these markets, given their diversity. Nonetheless, there may be 
frequently a free exercise of lenders' monopoly power. It may be 
possible for the lender to charge a relatively higher rate of interest 
in such a situation, as the borrowers are the poor farmers under some 
form of time-bounded economic pressure, and a less elastic demand with 
respect to interest rates seems likely. It may thus seem that 
monopolistic tendencies are more prevalent in a subsistence setting 
but at the same time there is a likelihood that the lenders are also 
aware that borrowers do have some alternatives. The greater weight is 
however on the monopolistic side of the overall spectrum, but there 
may be considerable variations in the degree of monopoly.
The money-lender does not have a need for specialised buildings 
and staff and is therefore able to operate at much lower 
administrative cost than that of the institutional lenders. He 
generally carries on his business from his home or farm or village 
store. He employs himself and when he needs information, he goes to 
the borrower's farm for inspection. It may thus be argued that the 
money-lender has a strong cost advantage albeit at low volume, and 
while increases in loan volume achieved by formal credit institutions 
serving much wider areas can reduce their unit cost quite 
considerably, it is likely that a quite high volume of institutional 
lending may be needed to overcome this cost advantage. Further, the 
supply of lending capital for institutional sources is arguably fixed 
by administrative decisions, unrelated to demand, whereas more 
sensitive market-based relations may be found within the informal 
markets. The supply response to shifts in demand in informal markets 
depends on the mobility of funds, on the lenders' capabilities or
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desire to expand his clientele, and on the ability of new lenders to 
enter the market. As such, a wide range of interest rates charged by 
money-lenders can be explained in a large part by a prevalence of 
locally low supply elasticities both in the short and long run.
As noted interest charged by the money-lenders may vary within 
the same market and even for the same borrower. It might be that the 
money-lender is able to adjust the terms on his loan to reflect the 
costs and risks peculiar to the loan situation. Often there are no 
legal barriers to freely adjusted rates; but even with usury laws, the 
money-lender usually finds ways to build an added return for risk into 
his loan charge. The borrower, as already stated, may lack 
alternative sources of credit. Thus the segmented informal lenders' 
market (imperfect competition on the supply side) and lack of 
information (on the demand side) create and maintain differential 
rates of interest among informal lenders and discriminatory rates for 
the same lender.
Whether high interest rates mean considerable monopoly profits 
earned by the money-lenders still remains to be considered. It is 
certainly difficult to see how interest rates ranging from 50 to 100 
percent or above can correspond to differences in cost. And from what 
we have said earlier clear cost advantages are enjoyed by the money­
lenders. It may be hard to imagine that the money-lenders' cost of 
lending would approach 40 percent or higher for interest charged even 
where the volume of loan is small. However the impact of defaulters 
and the need for appropriate risk premia have to be taken into 
consideration. The default rate on the loans advanced by the money­
lenders is not generally known. Institutional lenders charging lower
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interest rates themselves experience default levels which are regarded 
as high. It could be argued that money-lenders by being more 
selective could do better. But the higher rates charged by money­
lenders could still be explained by risk of default rather than 
monopoly profits/ since there are many hazards of weather and price 
variability confronting agricultural producers in the subsistence 
setting. The resulting risk faced by the money-lenders whose incomes 
are closely tied to those of their small farmer clients would remain 
substantial. Bottomley^ acknowledges the existence of many 
imperfections of competition in informal capital markets, though he 
questions whether these are important determinants of interest rates.
Aside from the need to cover defaults, the money-lender has few 
if any firmly fixed costs to meet, and his main concern is to obtain 
an acceptable income level for his family from his activities. The 
minimum acceptable income level which will keep him in the market as a 
lender may be regarded as the equivalent of a competitive level of 
return on his capital and time: any income beyond that level can be
defined as monopoly profit. When the lender is geographically 
immobile and lives in a low-income farming community, his minimum 
acceptable income level may be quite low - at least by comparison with 
urban income standards, though perhaps higher than those of his 
neighbours who have no lending capital. He might have alternative 
local use for his time and capital, but these may be circumscribed by 
his economic environment - i.e. his opportunity costs are low. Thus 
it may be that monopoly profits exist while at the same time his 
income may not appear to be excessive by the standards of urban 
sector.
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The determination of interest rates is one of the most complex 
theoretical issues. But evidently this has an important bearing on 
the problem under consideration. The following brief note is an 
oversimplification of a complicated problem.
Economists distinguish between net ('Pure') and gross rates of 
interest. The former is the rate which would emerge if there was 
perfect competition among the borrowers. Gross interest is what is 
meant by interest in ordinary use, the amount actually paid by the 
borrowers. Thus while net interest is that portion of gross interest 
which is simply paid for the use of capital in competitive conditions, 
gross interest includes, apart from net interest, the cost of
management, a premium for risk and monopoly profit.^
According to some approaches to monetary theory, rates of 
interest are related on the demand side to the marginal productivity 
of capital. In the subsistence agriculture, where the supply of 
capital is scarce in relation to other factors of production,
investment in inputs like fertilizer, pesticides and improved 
varieties of seed can be highly productive. But as noted earlier, the 
major part of borrowings is spent for consumption p u r p o s e s . And 
while it is true that some part of the capital is directly used for 
productive purposes, investment in traditional factors is hardly 
sufficient to borrowers to increase the existing low level of
productivity. It would therefore seem to be fairly clear that the
high rate of interest in a subsistence setting is not determined by 
marginal productivity or efficiency of capital.
According to monetary interest theory, interest is not the price 
paid for saving, but the charge made for parting with liquidity. In
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subsistence agriculture, liquidity preference is very strong and it is 
believed that the 'liquidity complex' is one of the reasons for the 
high level of interest rates. The findings from India that the rates 
of interest are higher in areas where a subsistence economy prevails 
strengthen this opinion.15 But again this does not explain why even 
in the more monetised and commercialised areas the price of borrowed 
funds is so high.
From these considerations it is fairly clear that the price of 
capital in the rural areas generally represents gross interest16. it
is not possible to estimate the extent to which each of the three 
components of gross interest (monopoly profits, premium for risk and 
administrative costs) is responsible for the high price.17 However, 
there is some evidence to show that the first two factors are at work. 
Firstly, it has been noted that the rates of interest in India were 
generally lower in areas where cooperative credit societies were
formed.1® This would seem to indicate clearly that the failure of the 
regular financial establishments to fulfil certain essential functions 
leave money-lenders in a strong position to take advantage of the
monopoly control they enjoy of a scarce factor (capital) in a poor 
agriculture.
Secondly, in a subsistence setting, the rate of interest on 
secured loans is generally much lower than in the case of unsecured 
loans. Such a pattern would indicate that a part of the high rate of 
interest represents a premium for risk. This clearly conforms to what 
can be expected in poor agriculture. In essence, the nature of
security depends on two factors (a) the capacity of the borrowers to 
earn an income beyond the basic needs of subsistence which will
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determine their ability to meet interest charges and eventually to 
repay the loan and (b) the market value of the asset pledged as 
security should it be necessary to acquire them because the borrower 
cannot meet his obligations.19 jn both these respects the specific 
conditions in the subsistence setting are generally unfavourable to 
borrowers. As the larger section of the rural population lives at the 
margin of subsistence, their repaying capacity is generally poor. And 
as to land, which presumably is. the only asset to be offered as 
security, there are many landless peasants. Further, it is possible 
that the sale price of land is depressed, as the land yields low 
return and there are few buyers of land due to the general scarcity of 
capital. As such the money-lender enjoys a monopoly in the 
subsistence setting, and can charge a price that is otherwise not 
possible.2® Nevertheless, considerable risk is involved in lending to 
borrowers with inadequate credit and this leads the money-lender to 
charge a premium. The preceding discussion would thus suggest that it 
is not only monopoly profits as such, but low level of per capita 
production of borrowers and the uncertainty they confront, which 
account for the high rates of interest in subsistence agriculture.
In short, high interest rates charged by the money-lenders imply 
a scarcity of capital. While this scarcity may often reflect a 
shortage of loan funds relative demand for consumption credit in the
subsistence setting, as opposed to a demand based on production
possibilities, nevertheless the demand is genuine, and cannot be 
overlooked.
In summary then the institutional credit sources focus on large
farmers and exclude most subsistence farmers from their lending
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schemes. While this tendency has decreased over time in particular 
countries, its persistence remains an important fact of life in many 
developing countries. Consequently subsistence farmers still 
generally acquire loans from informal sources, primarily to meet 
short-term consumption and production needs. In fact the informal 
market is poorly adapted for financing substantial medium-term 
investments. Most subsistence farmers obtain funds for medium term 
investments on their farms either from their own savings, or from the 
sale of their assets, rather than from either the institutional 
sources or informal commercial lenders.
The informal sources are an important source of credit in the 
subsistence settings. These sources do not have standardised interest 
rates and regulations, and the conditions attached to the loans are 
subject to bargaining. Naturally as outlined earlier, the borrowers 
are the weaker side. The farmers have often to pay usurious interest 
rates. Moreover, a credit market dominated by informal lenders tends 
to operate outside, and often at cross purposes with, the overall 
framework of economic policy. It is difficult for the government to 
enforce its policy choices in such matters as the quantum of total 
credit supply and the terms and conditions, uses and cost of credit.
Informal lenders serve highly localized borrower clienteles; 
their capital sources are not only limited in area but in volume by 
the local savings. The usual formal institutions do bring in outside 
capital, but in most cases, their scope is limited as they are biased 
towards large farmers. Genuine credit projects for subsistence 
farmers are few in most developing countries and then are frequently 
designed in ways that can hardly be said to reflect the supply or
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demand for credit in any systematic way appropriate to subsistence 
agriculture. At the same time, rural savings institutions are under­
developed. The relatively meagre savings they attract generally do 
little to augment the capital available for making agricultural 
investments. In short, in most cases specialized agricultural 
development projects, with few exceptions, do rather little to
overcome the weaknesses of the segmented informal capital markets.
The informal credit sources are still the major source of 
credit. Any attempt to drive them out, or at least to compete with 
them, principally by lowering interest rates, may not be particularly 
successful. The policy makers nonetheless think in terms of rates of 
interest, often overlooking other credit traits essential for the
subsistence farmer such as simple procedures, adequacy and timeliness. 
The informal sources are easily accessible and the service is
available virtually at the farmers1 doorsteps. These are some of the 
characteristics that institutional sources with their immense 
resources should do well to emulate. The very fact that a large 
number of farmers prefer to borrow from the informal sources in spite 
of high cost (among other factors) shows that demand for credit is 
highly service elastic, a factor which is often overlooked.
Let us consider what should be the functions of a well- 
organized, credit institution in a developing country. On the one
hand it should stimulate and mobilize savings where the potential 
exists; on the other it should move funds to individual producers who 
can make best productive use of loan; and it should provide for 
dynamic growth, both in eliciting increasing volumes of savings and in 
facilitating output increases from subsistence farmers who have been
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less productive than they could be.
It is against this backdrop of a dualistic structure of credit 
provision that the potential offered by credit cooperatives can be
assessed. The major institutional problem in the subsistence setting 
is how one can deliver credit to a large number of small producers and 
at the same time do it cheaply. This capability depends on
administrative skills, low-cost delivery, supervision and collection 
methods and access to a large supply of funds. In relation to these 
requirements cooperatives have considerable potential relevance. 
Their outstanding features include intimate knowledge of the character 
of their members and of local production possibilities. They can have 
low administrative costs because their work is done voluntarily and, 
as a result of social pressures, with honesty. As a means of reaching 
the poor, cooperatives have no rival except the money-lenders.
Cooperative credit can offer the only possible proven method for
reaching the bulk of subsistence farmers. It is potentially the best 
practical alternative to usury. Well-organized cooperatives can 
instil in members strong feelings of responsibility for prompt payment 
of interest and repayment of loans and can also provide strong 
incentives to thrift and savings. As compared with other rural 
institutions, seeking to tap small savings, well-organized
cooperatives have distinctive advantages. The procedures of deposit 
and withdrawal are far less complicated, since identification and
similar- problems do not exist; the officials to be approached belong
to the same village as members and work in the same trades; and the
fact that the money accumulated through savings is generally to be 
spent within the village creates that additional sense of confidence
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needed to practise the habit of banking.
In the following sections, the evolution, and the potential of 
cooperatives as a channel for credit are reviewed, and the set-backs 
they have experienced are examined.
3.II Cooperation as a Channel for Farm Credit
Agricultural credit cooperatives have come to be regarded as one 
of the important institutions catering for the credit needs of their 
member participants in many countries. The basic reason is that as 
compared with alternative institutions, these societies have some 
special advantages in their work, and that in many countries the 
withdrawal of agricultural cooperative credit would leave farmers at. 
the mercy of local monopolies or partial monopolies of money-lenders.
A credit cooperative is a unique institution in that it acts as 
a financial intermediary, gathers savings from its members by selling 
deposit-type savings accounts called shares and lends these funds to 
its members in the form of consumer loans. It is essentially a 
cooperative owned by the membership and operated by them on a 
volunteer basis without pay. Most cooperatives represent organizations 
of producers, such as farmers who market or purchase their 
agricultural products through them, or they represent organizations of 
consumers who use the cooperative to collectively purchase goods. A 
credit cooperative can be thought of as a combination of both types: a 
'producer' cooperative from the standpoint, of borrower's access to 
inputs and a 'consumer' cooperative from the standpoint of lenders' 
access to financial services^.
Many economic incentives stem from belonging to a credit
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cooperative: These frequently include low cost production or
consumption loans or relatively high rates of return on small savings.
A credit cooperative also captures the altruistic motives of people.
This dimension of cooperative credit activity has been summarized by
John T. Croteau as
"credit unions seek to protect the weak, to save 
them from the exactions of usurers. They emphasize 
voluntary action, the democratic dream, the 
development of latent abilities found in the common 
man. These explicit values are not amenable to 
economic analysis, but they cannot be ignored by any 
one who would understand the credit union"^2
An economic analysis of a cooperative must take into account 
several important relationships. There is the economic relationship 
between the cooperative and its members on the one hand, and the 
relationship between the cooperative and the market on the other. In 
most instances members of a cooperative interact on a single side of 
the market. In a credit cooperative, however, members are both 
suppliers and users of loanable funds. A credit cooperative has been 
called the purest form of all cooperatives since it deals exclusively 
with its members.
Typical of agricultural credit cooperatives in many countries 
are the non-profit organizations relying on voluntary management 
elected by members using one man - one vote principle. By law with 
the exception of Treasurer, most credit cooperative officials do not 
receive payment for their services.
3.II.1 A Summary of the Historical Evolution of credit cooperatives
The concept of mutual help in obtaining credit may be traced in
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primitive forms far back into history. Credit associations first came 
into prominence in China during the Han Dynasty 200 years before the 
Christian era, when Pong Koong, a rich and influential Chinese 
instituted the first money-lending society bearing cooperative 
features.21.
As discussed in detail in Chapter Two the beginning of the 
organized cooperative credit movement may however be traced to the mid 
nineteenth century in Germany^. Raiffeisen's original cooperative 
model^ 5  derived during the 1850's, was really a multipurpose society. 
At that time the farmer was not able to compare different market 
sources of supply because of his full dependence on the local trader, 
who was simultaneously the money-lender. The cooperative society 
therefore had to organize the supply system and obtain credit grants 
for the farmer on the basis of common liability. In view of the 
farmers' lack of experience in disposal of cash, the cooperative 
society took over all monetary transactions in connection with the 
supply of goods and credit repayments through the proceeds from the 
produce marketed.
The concept was based on the premise that the subsistence farmer 
was neither accustomed to nor qualified for participation in a market 
economy with a monetary system. Thus, the cooperative's assistance to 
the farmer was given and repaid in kind. Although in Germany the 
Raiffeisen type was known as a loan coooperative society with 
commercial business, in early days its activity was oriented to the 
supply needs of the farmer. Credit and later marketing were only 
complementary functions.
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The different combined functions were later separated in 
specialized single-purpose cooperatives, which worked however in close 
collaboration within the enlarged Raiffeisen organizational system. 
In this context the pure Raiffeisen loan bank was born as a
specialized (single purpose) credit cooperative society.
26The Raiffeisen 'Loan Bank was essentially an association of 
neighbours. Besides borrowings it received savings deposits which 
often produced a large part of the capital it needed. Usually a few 
of the members of the association were comparatively well-to-do 
people, who joined to help their neighbours by increasing the 
society's credit. This Raiffeisen considered essential. They had no
actual privilege but by common consent they took a leading part. The
liability of each member was unlimited, but limited liability was also
introduced in some of the modifications of the Loan Banks. The 'Loan 
Bank' restricted its operations to a small area, usually a village, 
where every one knew every one else. Each borrower specified the
purpose for which he wanted a loan and this was rigorously inquired 
into. Only members could borrow, and only for a profitable approved 
purpose. Practically all members watched that the money was applied 
as agreed, and while the loan was provided for a long period, a year 
or two - even ten or more - so as to repay itself out of the profit, 
power was reserved to call it in at short notice if misapplied. Loans 
were repayable by periodical instalments, but repayment was mandatory 
with absolute punctuality. No bills, mortgages or other securities 
were taken, except a note of hand either along with one or two
sureties. There were two committees, one to lend and do work for the 
society and the other to supervise the work of the first one, and on
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both of these the richer members were in majority. No committee 
members or officers received any remuneration for their services, 
except that the Accountant got a salary. Originally there were no 
shares, but when the legislature ordained, the Raiffeisen union made 
theirs as small as possible. Nothing was paid on the shares in the 
way of interest or dividend. All profit earned was voted once for all 
to the ordinary reserve and the indivisible reserve, the latter the 
backbone of the system. In every large district the Raiffeisen banks 
were federated into unions, and these unions culminated in a general 
agency. As an intermediary among themselves and between them and the 
money-market, the Raiffeisen Banks had a central bank.
Raiffeisen banks claimed that neither members nor creditors lost 
a penny by them. Their credit was so good that they obtained money at 
very low rates, and re-lent to their members at rates but a little 
higher. The members were allowed to join because of their personal 
character (credit worthiness) and not their property. This besides 
spreading prosperity, promoted sobriety and good conduct. The 
Raiffeisen banks fulfilled credit needs of peasants especially the 
very poor, and for this purpose they proved well.
A second and entirely independent origin of the credit 
cooperative movement was attributed to Schulze-Delitzsch who 
established his credit society^7 in a distant part of Germany almost 
at the same time when Raiffeisen advocated his 'Loan Banks'. However, 
contrary to Raiffeisen, Schulze established a form of credit union for 
townsmen, especially craftsmen working on their own account, the 
joiners, the shoemakers and so on. The idea behind establishing the 
credit union was primarily to promote their thrift.
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In the Schulze union, a number of such members combined together 
to raise a capital of guarantee. To do this, every member took up 
only one share, which was of a large value, but could be paid up by 
small instalments. Thus every member was committed to a long course 
of saving. On the strength of capital formation and the unlimited 
liability of the members, the bank was able to borrow, or to receive 
as savings and deposits from members and others a much larger capital. 
The funds so constituted were lent out at the highest rates it could 
command, varying of course, with the market. It lent to members only 
but to any amount, for any purpose and on any good or sufficient 
security. The loans were granted for a short period, usually three 
months renewable for another three months, and sometimes more than 
that. The committee of management was elected by general meetings. 
They decided on all loans and received a salary plus a commission on
business done. The council of supervision was paid. The great object
which the Schulze bank kept in view was security and good return on 
capital. The bank was not confined to a small area but worked for as 
large and as varied a constituency as possible. The Schulze banks 
grew and accumulated a large capital of their own. All the profits 
were disbursed as dividends on capital or put to reserve, except small 
sums which were retained for charitable or educational purposes.
In short, these two types of credit systems were both founded on
the principle of unlimited liability, but broadly speaking they
contrasted in that the Schulze banks worked primarily among townsmen, 
were based on share capital, worked for profit which they distributed 
as divided on shares, were conducted by paid Directors and conferred 
their benefits not on the very poor, but rather to the middle class.
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On the other hand, Raiffeisen banks were designed for peasants, 
especially the very poor, were not based on share capital, neither 
paid dividends nor worked for profit, were conducted by unpaid 
Directors and conferred their benefits on the very poor.
With the passage of time the two types of the credit systems 
came to rely on the state financial system . While the government 
showed little concern during the earlier period, it became interested 
in the growth of both the systems in subsequent years, either for 
political or economic reasons. The German government, in response to 
popular demand vigorously supported by cooperators interests, founded 
a central cooperative bank and placed a good amount of funds at the 
banks’ disposal. The Raiffeisen banks, which were federated into the 
"Raiffeisen Verband" had considerable access to the funds of the 
German Cooperative Bank.
In short Germany saw the first development of a cooperative 
credit system in the form of small local credit associations and 
village banks. This development was soon extended to other parts of 
the world. In general agricultural credit cooperatives were derived 
from the original concept of Raiffeisen and the supplementary 
influence of the concept of Schulze - Delitzsch and adapted to their 
local conditions. In most European countries credit cooperatives 
developed largely following Raiffeisen principles. In Russia, where 
usury on a most serious scale followed the emancipation of the 1860's 
and the greater commercialization of agriculture, the first savings 
and loan association was formed in 1866 and despite indifference and 
suspicions of the government flourished well. Raiffeisen cooperatives 
were introduced in Czechoslovakia around 1870 and developed well
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because of rising nationalist enthusiasm. Surveying in 1950 the 
position in Europe as a whole, the International Labour Office found 
that in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland, cooperative 
societies were quite independent of the government, providing a major 
part of the entire credit needs of the farmers. In most other 
countries cooperatives were major sources and administrators of 
credit, they were linked with government corporations or government 
departments in various ways. They were specifically well adapted to 
administer short term and medium term credit and to bring together for 
productive use the savings of small farmers.2**
In many countries of North America, People's Banks were 
established on the German Raiffeisen system but with liability limited 
and all capital withdrawable. At first they developed to serve non- 
agricultural workers, but later they were formed by farmers and grew 
to provide a large part of rural credit. They also influenced 
formation of credit unions in the United States, although these unions 
concentrated more in urban areas.2^
In Asia local societies organized for purposes somewhat similar 
to those of Raiffeisen cooperatives existed in Japan and Korea in 
primitive periods. However in Japan these societies were partly 
reorganized on Raiffeisen lines after the passing of a cooperative 
law. Such societies, with unlimited liability, were the basis of the 
post World War II short-term credit system of Japan.2** In Korea many 
old small village associations for economic betterment through 
cooperative efforts were reported to have functioned with success.
Raiffeisen principles were introduced to India at the end of the 
19th century and promoted more rapidly after the passage of a
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Cooperative Credit Societies Act in 1904. Government officials were 
established as Cooperative Registrars in each province but at first 
little government financial assistance was provided. The formation of 
unions of primary credit societies and of co-ordinating associations 
was authorized in 1912. A considerable measure of success was
achieved. The debts of many small farmers were consolidated and
sometimes completely repaid. Prevailing rates of interest were 
reduced, not only for individual members who benefit ted from the
average cooperative charge of about 12 percent per annum, but also for 
whole districts where cooperation was strong. Some permanent 
improvements in the land and better methods of cultivation were
fostered. A new spirit of independence was reported to be evident 
among the small farmers who became the cooperative members, and the 
societies were considered to have greater educational value and to be 
a means of preparing the way for further education, agricultural 
advice and training.31
Primary cooperative credit societies were also promoted in 
China. Despite disturbances due to world wars, these societies, 
together with other multipurpose societies proved successful in 
granting loans to the peasants^.
In the Middle East, Egypt developed an agricultural credit 
institution, combining the advantages of commercial banks and 
government credit corporations, but farmers' own credit cooperatives 
successfully developed on a wider s c a l e d .
In Turkey agricultural credit societies succeeded in enrolling 
large numbers of farming population and did reasonably well in 
providing credit for raising production.
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In Cyprus the cooperative credit societies established on a 
sound basis and almost every village in the island was served in one 
way or the other by the cooperative credit movement.
Cooperative credit societies established in Algeria and carried 
out savings and credit functions on behalf of both the Muslim and 
French members.
Raiffeisen principles were introduced among European settlements 
in Latin America and the societies following these principles 
developed on a considerable scale. The promotion of credit 
cooperatives among indigenous groups was also witnessed with the 
passage of basic legislation. Such promotion also proceeded in the 
West Indies and in tropical Africa with considerable success.34
3 . I I . 2 Agricultural credit cooperatives Experience:
Causes of Failure and Success
Despite the promise of these early developments and their world­
wide application, the general experience with the working of 
cooperatives in many countries of the world has been a matter of much 
disappointment to members of societies, government and other 
promotional agencies. Generalization is very difficult over many 
countries, each with its own history and peculiar socio-economic 
conditions. Nevertheless, evidence derived from numerous case 
studies^5 reveals a common pattern of poor performance as assessed by 
reference to the cooperatives' own proclaimed goals.
It may be noted that a great majority of cooperatives in Asia, 
Africa, Latin America and elsewhere in the world have been initiated 
generally by governments, adapted either on the Rochdalean model or 
Raiffeisen principles and principally concerned with the provision of
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consumers goods and services/ marketing farm produce and allocating 
credit. Very often this policy has been disappointing with a larger 
proportion of cooperatives becoming inactive.36
The most consistently recorded criticism of cooperatives has 
been their falling into control by the wealthier and more politically 
powerful members of rural areas. Most s t u d i e s ^  reporting domination 
of cooperatives by a wealthy elite judge it to be undesirable. 
Usually this conclusion depends . on the attribution of failure to 
achieve cooperation to the alienation of the majority of cooperators. 
Few studies have investigated the economic effect of such domination 
of members. It seems likely that while in some cases such domination 
leads to exploitation, in others cooperative leaders in purusing their 
own economic interests, make available management skills which benefit 
the remaining members.
Nevertheless, there has been general tendency of cooperatives to
benefit the poorer groups least . This phenomenon can in fact be
traced back to the origins of the modern cooperative movements. In
his centenary history of British Cooperation G.D.H. Cole pointed out
"The cooperators never succeeded in reaching down to 
the lower levels of working-class income, and their 
success would have been much more limited than it 
actually was had there not been a substantial rise 
in wages for the main body of the industrial workers 
after the middle of the nineteenth century"38
In other words, the early cooperatives in Britain did not 
benefit the lower levels of working class until general development 
first took place and brought about improvement in the conditions of 
income and employment of the poor. There is a parallel situation 
regarding cooperatives in many developing countries where the masses
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of the very poor, who have yet to participate significantly in 
development, fail to benefit from the cooperatives.
Myrdal has posed the dilemma of cooperation in Asia
"unfortunately, the notion that cooperation will 
have an equalizing effect is bound to turn out to be 
an illusion. While land reform and tenancy 
legislation are, at least in their intent, devices 
for producing fundamental alterations in property 
rights and economic obligations, the "cooperative" 
approach fails to incorporate a frontal attack on 
the existing inegalitarian power structure. Indeed, 
it aims at improving conditions without disturbing 
that structure and represents, in fact, an evasion 
of the equality issue. If, as is ordinarily the 
case, only the higher strata in the village can 
avail themselves of the advantages offered by 
cooperative institutions - and profit from the 
government subsidies given for their development - 
the net effect is to create more, not less, 
inequality. This will hold true even when the 
announced purpose is to aid the disadvantaged 
strata"39
Examples of disproportionate benefits from cooperatives going to the 
better-off people have been reported in many countries. A study 
undertaken in Iran4^ established that only the better-off farmers had 
obtained loans and fertilizer from their cooperatives. It was 
reported from Pakistan41 that the cooperatives had reinforced the 
position of patriarchal village authorities who dominated them and 
controlled the allocation of government provided funds. In Latin 
America the impact of rural cooperatives appeared to have been weakest 
at the point of greatest need: the lower income small farmer.42
Similarly local influentials dominated rural cooperatives in most of 
the African cooperatives. In Uganda, for example control of 
cooperative communities by village elites was frequently reported, and 
the ability to take advantage of services offered by rural
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cooperatives depended on the extent of existing control of land, 
equipment and other resources.4^943
Cooperatives undertake many activities, but of all, credit is 
one which has come to be regarded as an essential function. In most 
of the developing countries, credit is usually necessary for farmers, 
especially low income farmers, to attempt innovations that can lead to 
increased productivity. Many studies report that insufficient credit 
is generally available to farmers when channelled through the 
cooperatives. On the other hand, the officials in charge of credit 
programmes claimed that loan repayments were inadequate to justify 
credit provision. The entire issue of agricultural credit as a means 
of agricultural production is nevertheless a thorny problem, obviously 
far from solution, when judged from the findings of many studies.4-^
Despite the provision of substantial amounts of credit through 
cooperatives by governments in many countries this has nevertheless 
been insufficient to serve the credit needs of farmers for both 
agricultural production and development. Various studies on the other 
hand criticised provision for allowing available credit to be diverted 
to non-productive consumption4^ .
Where governments are liberal in providing low-interest 
agricultural credit, the primary cooperatives, nevertheless often have 
at their disposal only limited supplies of credit, because of their 
failure to follow prescribed conditions, their inability to generate 
enough capital of their own or to recover loans or because of their 
reluctance to borrow from governments.46 According to findings of a 
study undertaken in Ceylon47 about one third of the cooperatives in 
the country became ineligible for government loans because of defaults
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on previous repayments. About half of the total membership of 
cooperatives became share-capital defaulters and therefore lost the 
rights of membership including the right to get loans.
Conspicuous examples of the unproductive use of cooperative 
credit have often been reported by studies undertaken in many parts of 
the world. It was reported that the impact of the loans advanced by 
credit societies on agricultural productivity was almost neglible in 
Pakistan as nearly two thirds of the funds were used for marriage 
ceremonies, building new houses etc.48 in Iran substantial loans 
advanced by societies went into consumption channels and dependence on 
the money-lenders did not significantly decrease.49 in Western Africa 
the levels of loan repayment were generally low, primarily due to 
diversion of loans to consumption purposes, and even the pressures for 
collection of loan caused negative reactions to government-sponsored 
agricultural development programmes in general.80 a study of four 
cooperatives in Uganda^ found that none of the cooperative credit 
schemes produced any demonstrable impact on crop yields or on 
agricultural incomes. Another study82 found that credit extended by a 
cooperative union in the eastern region of Uganda to enable local 
societies to make cash purchases of members' early deliveries were 
frequently used by committee members for personal purposes such as 
buying cattle or 'purchasing' non-existent crops from relatives. In 
the case of Latin American cooperatives, a study83 found that the 
credit - made available by two Colombian cooperatives was seldom used 
for more than private consumption or to deal with personal 
'calamities'.
143
Examples of productive use of credit have nevertheless been 
reported. In Ceylon and Comilla (Bangladesh) credit provided by 
cooperatives was used primarily for adopting innovations or for other 
productive purposes^.
The Comilla credit programme was particularly effective. 
Individual members of local societies deposited savings and bought 
shares in the central association. With this as security the central 
association then provided credit to the local cooperatives. Each 
member's request for a loan was scrutinized by the cooperative 
management committee and then approved by the central association. 
The local cooperative exerted group pressures on individual members 
for repayment, without which the cooperative would have lost the right, 
to further loans.55
Evidence of the effectiveness of this system is the fact that, 
in contrast to most other areas, the loans were nearly all used for 
productive purposes. This was a result of close supervision by the 
local cooperatives and by the central association.56 in addition, the 
recovery rates of loans advanced to members was extremely high, 
sometimes even 100 percent. There were two pragmatic reasons for
that: commission on loans recovered was offered to managers as
inducements, and defaulting members were expelled.S’7
Whereas members' savings deposits have been an essential pre­
requisite for the receipt of loans by them from their societies in 
Bangladesh, this important source of the working capital of societies 
has virtually been ignored by cooperatives in most developing 
countries.58 In fact, a fundamental defect with cooperatives in many 
countries is that the element of thrift plays too small a part and the
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measure of dependence on external sources of finance is 
disproportionately large.
In strong and significant contrast to this situation is the fact 
that most consumers' cooperatives in the United Kingdom and other 
developed countries have been almost entirely financed by means of 
capital formed with the societies and their central organizations.59
It may thus seem that the fundamental difficulty of many 
cooperatives in most developing countries is lack of funds both due to
(a) inadequate rates of savings in the form of deposits by members of 
the societies and/or to (b) the inability to secure adequate funds 
from government and other sources.
Indeed, in subsistence agriculture, where farms are very small 
and incomes low, most individual families often find it difficult to 
save. Savings will be inadequate so long as there is chronic 
insufficiency of farmers income, and the consequent tendency of 
consumption to outrun production. Although some studies^ presume 
that peasant farmers in many developing countries have both the desire 
and the ability to save, absence of suitable institutional 
arrangements and/or inability of cooperatives to handle farmers 
savings have resulted in excessive reliance of societies on government 
funds to meet their working capital requirements.
The assistance granted by the governments to the societies in 
the form of finance has nevertheless badly effected the performance of 
many credit societies. Cases have occurred where in the first flush 
of enthusiasm to help the cooperatives, public funds have been made 
too easily available at cheap rates. The history of cooperatives in 
several countries bears witness to the disastrous effect of such a
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policy.
The inability of the management of cooperatives to understand
the purposes of credit and its administration has often led to the
failure of societies in many countries. In the rural settlement in 
Barbecho (Venezuela) agricultural credit was provided, but when 
managerial errors in technical matters led to falls in production many 
settlers acquired large debts to the credit service and departed from 
the premises, leaving the debts behind.62 Management errors in the
handling of supervised credit led to serious problems in a Colombian 
cattle ranching cooperative. The management attempted to use credit 
to diversify agricultural production. The result was a fiasco and the 
peasants were left deeply in debt, unable to repay even a fraction of 
their large loans. There was a return to cattle ranching, but the 
farmers had lost confidence in the cooperative.63
Limitations on the willingness of governments to secure adequate 
staff for the promotion of credit cooperatives have often been cited 
as one main obstacle to progress. True understanding of cooperative 
methods and of credit cannot be fostered on an adequate scale unless 
enough staff of the right skills is secured. Attempts by small staffs 
to obtain quick growth of credit cooperatives have often led to
failures, particularly where there are not enough educated, public 
spirited rural residents to act voluntarily as leading foundation 
members of societies. Moreover, the characters as well as the special 
training of staff are highly important. The staff should have a 
strong and sympathetic interest in the problems of the families with 
whom it deals. It must therefore usually have the same social 
background, adaptability and sense of service. Evidence proves that
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contrary to these required characteristics, most staff members in 
societies have been illiterate, came from urban backgrounds and lacked 
in general a sense of sympathy for the problems of rural folk.64
Some studies in developing countries have concluded that the 
records and accounts of societies have generally not been kept in a 
proper and orderly fashion. If a society was able to afford the 
employment of a paid secretary and if it agreed to do so, then its 
records were usually kept in something resembling intelligible form. 
In most other societies, the committees shirked their duties so 
frequently that the future of these societies was regarded with
misgivings.65
A most important difficulty which credit cooperatives confronted 
in many developing countries is opposition to them from landlords, 
traders and money-lenders. However, correction of this difficulty 
frequently depends on the introduction of changes in basic land tenure 
arrangements and on the development of better marketing, including in 
suitable circumstances, the promotion of purchasing and marketing 
cooperatives.66 These cooperatives are difficult to establish unless 
supported by cooperative wholesale societies, for otherwise private 
traders are averse to dealing with them.
The limited success of credit cooperatives has often been 
attributed to the fact that the need to consider the overall 
indebtedness of their members was overlooked. A high level of 
borrowings from informal sources frequently continued at high rates of 
interests and these informal lenders were able to secure priority for 
the prompt repayment of their loans at harvest time to the detriment 
of the societies. Although small local societies generally restricted
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themselves to short term loans, they had often made large loans for 
the repayment of old debt. The need to think carefully in terms of 
repayment plans for individual members was not adequately realised by 
the management. Most committee members abused their positions by 
securing large amounts of cooperative loans, which they did not repay 
later and not only became loan defaulters themselves, but became 
unable to control other defaulters.67
Cooperatives as a vehicle for reforming social structure have
had an insignificant impact in most rural communities of developing
countries. Evidence shows that instead of reforming, cooperatives
reinforced the existing social structure.68 a study undertaken in
Asia recorded
"In societies where commitment to traditional social 
structure is strong, where inequalities of wealth, 
power and status are great, where positive 
individualism has not developed, etc. efforts to 
create workable cooperatives are likely to prove 
futile".69
Research studies undertaken in Latin America and Africa also
reached more or less similar conclusions.76 It was found that
cooperatives established in highly structured communities of Latin 
America produced little significant changes in the community system.
Similarly, cooperatives studied in Africa have also been found to be
ineffective in bringing about structural change.71
The argument that cooperatives reinforce the social structure 
rather than reform it has led Fals Borda and others7^ to suggest that 
by reinforcing the social structure, cooperative policy has in general 
had the undesirable effect of delaying alternative institutional 
changes.
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Such a result is however contrary to the general aim of 
cooperation. The objective usually reflects a local wish to change 
the social structure by enabling active participation by the majority 
of people in an institution suited to modern economic activities. The 
way in which mass participation has been replaced by elite domination 
has led many7  ^ to suggest that cooperatives are only appropriate when 
combined with other socialist policies designed to reduce the power of 
rural elites.
In the past the traditional wisdom has been that cooperatives 
are particularly useful tools for the achievement of institutional 
change in rural societies because they reflect traditional cooperation 
between villagers. The frequent failure of cooperatives to encourage 
active participation by members has cast doubts on this piece of 
conventional wisdom. It has been argued that the type of cooperation 
traditionally existing has had a quite different economic purpose and 
is based on different types of relationship to those required in the 
formal cooperative. The conclusion of this argument is that a 
tradition of cooperation is not a useful precursor to the 
establishment of successful cooperatives7 .^
The cooperative form has often shown itself to be insufficiently 
sensitive to the abilities and norms of behaviour found in particular 
cultures. It was recorded that kinship relationships in Ghana7^ made 
it impossible for the coooperatives' financial procedures to be 
followed. Cooperatives' failure due to regulations being too complex 
for membership have also been reported.7^ Such an experience has led 
to the conclusion that the formal cooperatives should no longer be the 
basis of institutional policy. It has been argued that instead of
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looking for possible applications of the cooperative form, policy 
should be concerned with finding appropriate institutional forms for 
particular socio-economic situations.77
So far the account has focussed on the failures of cooperatives, 
in particular the credit societies, and the underlying reasons. The 
case of a few Singalese and Comilla cooperatives has been an 
exception. Although the extent of failure has been reflected in the 
weight of recent literature, successes have also been recorded.
In general terms the successes of cooperatives reported in some 
countries were that they instilled a new spirit of hope, thrift and 
mutual help into the minds of their members. The members of 
cooperative credit societies were saved from the burden of interest 
charges and in some cases entirely freed from debt. Owing to the 
reduction of the rates charged by money-lenders in localities served 
by cooperative credit societies, non-members were enabled to obtain 
loans at reduced rates. Other good results have included promotion of 
savings in areas where no other institutions, apart from cooperatives 
have existed.7^
The prerequisite for success migh be anticipated to be the 
correction of factors which ordinarily are expected to result in 
cooperative failures. However in individual cases, success has been 
reported to be due to the willingness to relax the formal rules of 
cooperatives. In Niger,7^ for instance, cooperative procedures were 
simplified to allow full participation by illiterates. Government 
actively encouraged participation and discouraged domination by 
elites, by establishing direct contact with ordinary villagers through 
a policy of 'animation1. Other cooperatives proved successful after
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the introduction of intensive supervision and provision of
comprehensive development services.80
The stage of development has also been shown to be crucial to 
the success of cooperatives. In Taiwan, for instance, successful 
adoption of cooperatives followed commercialization of the rural 
economy. It has been argued that at less commercialized stages of 
development simple forms less remote from traditional institutions are 
more likely to achieve economic benefits through cooperation.®1
Nevertheless, there has been little systematic experimentation with 
alternative forms.
The above account has shown that the performance of agricultural 
credit societies in many developing countries has remained generally 
less than satisfactory. Nevertheless, this cannot be taken to imply 
that the credit cooperative movement has entirely failed to achieve 
its objectives. Wherever credit societies were established and 
actually succeeded, they were generally managed by competent and 
honest management. Target groups were carefully identified and 
provision of goods (credit) was ensured to the group under close 
supervision. It is evident that wherever disparities in terms of farm 
sizes and ownership of wealth were small, and where membership in
societies was more homogeneous, success was possible. Further, the 
success of societies depended on the groups being small enough for 
them to be cohesive and to work actively in exercising mutual pressure 
to make the organization viable. On the other hand, they had to be 
large enough to take advantage of the cost reduction that occurred 
from scale. Credit societies also succeeded where paternalism was 
combined with an understanding of various factors that were essential
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to achieve effective local participation, and where institutions were 
protected from local political influences. The successful examples 
are the Commilla cooperatives where viable grass root institutions 
have been developed over time to benefit the poorer members.
Finally, in coming to an understanding of the record of 
performance of credit societies it is important to remember the direct 
ways cooperatives have been introduced to developing countries. In 
Europe and America cooperatives grew gradually and spontaneously, 
succeeding here, failing there; in contrast, in many third world 
countries, cooperatives have largely been introduced from above, not 
from below; and into local communities dominated by deeply ingrained 
non-market relationships of dependence, caste, kin and clan.
3.Ill Criteria for the Assessment of Agricultural Credit
Cooperatives: The relevance of Raiffeisen Principles
In an attempt to devise criteria for assessing performance of 
agricultural credit cooperatives, we shall appraise the principles 
which Raiffeisen considered essential and employed for the success of
his cooperative.
In the context of Raiffeisen principles a credit society will 
prove to be a success when it is located at a village or small area, 
composed of villagers who are allowed to join because of their 
personal character (credit worthiness) and not their property, funded 
primarily by the savings and share capital of local members. External 
assistance in the form of financial aid is avoided; and if at all it 
becomes inevitable for the society to seek funds to meet its working 
capital requirements, capital loans should be obtained from the 
cooperative central banks and/or the government at relatively cheaper
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rates. Loans should be disbursed to those most needy, but only for 
profitable approved purposes so as to enable the members to raise 
their incomes and in turn ensure effective repayment. The rate of 
interest on loan and repayment schedule should be fixed by members 
themselves. Mutual trust in members' ability to repay should be 
considered an essential security for loan and this should be 
reinforced by the principle of unlimited liability and every member 
would be financially obliged to the full extent of his property to 
make good the debt of his societies. In short, mutual security, 
limited scope (village and its environs) and unlimited liability are 
essential principles which, Raiffeisen believed, will create a viable 
agricultural cooperative credit system based on thrift and prudence of 
associated members.
It is difficult to argue that success of Raiffeisen type 
societies was entirely due to their strict adherence to these self­
same Raiffeisen principles. Nevertheless we shall critically analyse 
the Raiffeisen principles in order to see if these rules can provide 
some basis for formulating criteria for the assessment of agricultural 
credit cooperatives in an agricultural development context.
1. Restricted area of operation
According to Raiffeisen, the scope of a society should be 
restricted to a village or a small area. This will determine the size 
of the society, generally making it small, composed of members who 
live within the same village and/or its environs. A small sized group 
can be more cohesive and work actively in exercising the necessary 
mutual pressure to make the organization viable.
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2. Joint and Unlimited liability of members
Mutual trust in members' ability to pay, together with the 
principle of unlimited liability has been considered essential as this 
reassures the creditor and enforces mutual control and vigilance. 
According to Raiffeisen, the intimate mutual knowledge of members 
makes unlimited liability both possible and desirable in rural areas. 
In a village the reputation of a member of society depends on personal 
factors rather than on impersonal realizable assets, so that it is 
possible to grant loans on personal credit standing alone. Moreover 
the existence of unlimited liability is valuable in maintaining 
cooperative discipline, as it stimulates the members to keep each 
other up the mark. Public opinion forces each member to keep his 
contract and repay his loan more or less within the appointed time.
3. Provision of loans for profitable approved purposes
Raiffeisen advocated that loans granted by the society should be 
for profitable approved purposes, in order to enable the members to 
make an effective use of credit so that productivity at the farm level 
is increased. This, according to Raiffeisen, would not only improve 
economic conditions of members, but also enable them to repay loans to 
the society.
4. Equality of status of members and democratic control
In the earlier years of the promotion of the credit movement, 
Raiffeisen judged that well-to-do members of the community should join 
and manage the affairs of societies on a voluntary basis. He hoped 
that well-to-do members would also bring capital to the society. 
Nevertheless Raiffeisen soon realized that the well-to-do members 
showed less interest as they received no separate reward for their
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services. Raiffeisen replaced the principle of 'control by well-to- 
do' by the principle of 'self-help', wherein equality of status was 
granted to every member, and the affairs of society were run on a 
democratic basis by adhering to 'one man, one vote' principle.
5. Honorary services for managing cooperative affairs
This was an essential principle. Raiffeisen judged that 
unnecessary administrative expenditures should be avoided and services 
should be provided by members to run the affairs of the society on an 
honorary basis. Consequently, no member of the management committee 
of Raiffeisen society received remuneration for the services performed 
for the society.
6. Need for viable organizational and financial cooperative
structures
Raiffeisen judged that the operation of village-level units in 
isolation was essentially limited as the individual societies often 
faced difficulties due to shortages of funds (as well as from 
surplus). He proposed the organization of a overarching financial 
structure, viz central banks at the secondary level of the credit 
movement to overcome this problem, which in the ultimate were 
federated at the apex level. In addition, he realised that there were 
many activities which required a minimum scale for efficiency. These 
activities and other aspects of cooperation of village societies would 
require a level of management expertise which was not found in every 
village. These considerations pointed to the need for the 
establishment of a larger unit or the federation of societies in the 
form of a union. Raiffeisen responded to this need and village 
societies based at the village level were federated in the form of a
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union at every district, and these unions were then amalgamated into a 
general agency.
7. Mobilization of Members' Resources
One major objective of Raiffeisen societies was to generate 
funds from their own sources in order to serve the credit needs of 
their poorer members. And for this purpose they mainly relied on 
members' saving deposits and/or shares. Nevertheless this was not 
possible in the long run. As the amount of loans and number of 
loanees both increased demand for loans no longer matched the 
availability of funds. Raiffeisen turned to external sources such as 
the government, the central societies and banks for loanable funds. 
This practice did not imply that Raiffeisen assigned lesser importance 
to the societies' ability to generate enough working capital from 
within their own sources. In fact success of Raiffeisen, societies was 
determined by their greater reliance on owned funds rather than 
borrowings from external sources.
8. Distribution of Cooperative Profit into Reserves
Raiffeisen ensured that all profit earned by society, if any, 
should be allocated to the 'Reserve Fund'. This in his opinion would 
act as a main bulwark for the unlimited liability of members and 
inspire confidence amongst members of the society due to its financial 
stability and strength.
9. Rate of interest on loans
Raiffeisen ensured that the society obtained money from outside 
at very low rates and in turn lent to members at rates which were but 
a little higher. The main object behind this practice was not to earn 
profit for the society but to enable the members to obtain relatively
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cheaper loans, to make its use productive. Another object of charging 
relatively lower interest rates on cooperative credit was to help 
members escape from the grip of money-lenders who charged too high 
rates on their loans.
10. Repayment Schedule for loans
The loan by Raiffeisen societies was granted for a long period, 
a year or two - even ten or more - so as to repay itself out of the 
profit earned by members. Nevertheless power was reserved to call it 
in at short notice if misapplied. Loans were repayable in periodical 
instalments, but repayment was mandatory with absolute punctuality. 
Insistence on this practice brought success to his society.
11 . Good conduct and discipline of Members
Raiffeisen societies succeeded as members were carefully 
selected on the basis of their character and reputation in the 
village. In addition Raiffeisen placed a greater reliance on personal 
rather than material security. This in turn brought success as a 
result of good conduct and discipline shown both by members and the 
management. The commitment of members to the socieity was shown in 
their desire to help each other by mutual cooperation, and this was 
shown in their strict adherence to Raiffeisen principles. The 
committee members ensured that the society worked to the satisfaction 
of all members and earned profit to justify its existence and 
performance.
In short, the essential principles which brought success to his 
societies were
(1) Restricted area of operation
(2) Joint and unlimited liability of members
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(3) Provision of loan for profitable approved purposes
(4) Equality of status of members and democratic control
(5) Honorary services for managing cooperative affairs
(6) Establishing of organizational and financial structures at 
secondary and apex levels
(7) Mobilization of members resources
(8) Distribution of cooperative profits into a Reserve fund
(9) Rate of interest on loans
(10) Repayment of loan out of the profit earned by members
(11) Good conduct and displine of members
So far we have briefly assessed the relevance of Raiffeisen, 
principles as the basis for devising criteria for the assessment of 
agricultural credit cooperatives. There are however other factors 
which must be taken into account in evaluating the performance of
agricultural credit societies. The first in this regard is the degree 
of autonomy and the nature and extent of government control of the 
cooperative credit system. Past experience suggests that the fullest 
advantages of societies cannot be secured if the formation and
development of cooperatives are left entirely to spontaneous voluntary
effort on the part of farm families themselves. Only in a few 
developed countries have cooperatives developed without any 
substantial assistance from government or non-governmental 
organizations. Elsewhere help in one form or the other has been 
required.
In many countries, governments have provided assistance to
societies in the form of general education and through special
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promotion work. This assistance sometimes has strengthened social 
cohesion and the desire for technical and economic imporvements in 
groups of farm families. The governments have further influenced 
policies on special training and advice on cooperative methods, 
regulations determining legal constitution of societies and 
supervision of these regulations. They have provided help by grants 
of capital loans at low or no interest.
Related to the above, functions of inspection and audit have 
also been carried out in many countries by a special government 
department. Such a department generally undertakes duties of auditing 
which are of greatest important where cooperatives do not and cannot 
carry them through with thoroughness.
One criterion for evaluating the performance of credit societies 
should therefore be to see if the sponsorship of the movement by the 
state is intended only to assist, guide and train the members and 
management or if it is to establish permanent control over the 
movement.
The second additional factor to be looked into is the linkage of 
credit societies with other instruments for national social and 
economic development.
Third, there is a need to judge the effectiveness of societies 
in terms of their ability to procure loans from cooperative banks for 
short, medium and long-term purposes. The structural and 
organizational aspects of cooperative banks and working relationship 
of these banks with individual credit societies can influence the 
success of credit societies. Criteria for evaluation must cover this 
aspect.
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The fourth is the nature and sources of external supportive 
services. The role of the government has already been noted. At the 
same time cooperative banks have their own particular significance. 
As stated earlier in Chapter Two, in many cases cooperative unions 
have been established to overcome the weaknesses of primary societies 
arising from their local character. These unions have not only 
facilitated cooperative activity over wide geographical areas, but 
have also helped to secure more and longer term capital, fuller 
technical knowledge and abler management. The role and assistance 
granted by the unions to credit societies therefore needs due 
consideration and must have a role in the criterion for assessing 
performance of societies.
Finally the issues concerning provision of technical inputs, 
financial incentives, through selective subsidies geared directly to 
costs of lending to small farmers, composition of the membership of 
the cooperatives, importance of cooperative credit in relation to 
other sources, welfare effect of cooperative credit distribution are 
nonetheless quite important in addition to Raiffeisen principles and 
so must be included in the criteria for assessing performance of 
credit societies.
To sum up, we conclude that in addition to Raiffeisen 
principles, the above aspects must also be carefully taken into 
account in analysing the performance of cooperatives. Nonetheless the 
first question to be posed, therefore, when assessing the performance 
of agricultural credit cooperatives is to what extent do they reflect 
Raiffeisen principles? These principles are our primary criteria. 
But in the light of later discussion we can in addition derive a
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checklist of supplementary issues for assessment of the cooperatives, 
all concerned with their relation with government and wider 
development matters.
The essential checklist for the assessment of cooperatives may 
be assembled as follows:
1. The extent of autonomy and control of the cooperative movement 
by the government.
2. The role and impact of the Department of Cooperation (or its 
equivalent) on the promotion of cooperatives.
3. The general education and training of members and cooperative
management by non-governmental organs such as cooperative 
unions.
4. The audit and inspection of cooperatives by the government.
5. The nature of relationship between primary, secondary and apex
level cooperative institutions.
6. The linkage of societies with other instruments of national
social and economic development.
3 .IV Conclusions
This chapter has highlighted issues concerning the need for 
working capital and the available sources of working capital in 
subsistence agriculture. It has been argued that most subsistence 
farmers cannot meet their production and consumption requirements from 
their own sources, primarily due to their low level of production, and 
thus have to borrow from elsewhere to meet both ends.
The characteristics, advantages and weaknesses of informal and 
institutional capital markets have been identified and it has been
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argued that most subsistence farmers have to borrow from the informal 
capital market at high rates of interest together with many other 
restrictive conditions, which in the ultimate have disastrous effects 
on their socio-economic status. They get a lesser share of 
institutional credit, because (amongst other reasons) of large-farmer 
bias in the lending policy of government credit programmes and 
especially the commercial banks. The problems of institutional 
capital market have also been summarized.
The effectiveness, and problems of agricultural credit 
cooperatives as a channel of credit have been adjudged. And it has 
been argued that certain structural and organizational deficiencies 
are inherent in cooperatives, which have in turn influenced 
performance of many agricultural credit societies in developing 
countries of the world.
Criteria for the assessment of agricultural credit societies 
have been identified, primarily based on Raiffeisen principles, but 
also keeping in view the role of the government in the promotion of 
the cooperative movement.
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CHAPTER 4
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT 
IN PUNJAB. PRE-PARTITION AND POST-PARTITION
The purpose of this chapter is to trace the course and direction 
of the historical development of the cooperative movement in the Punjab 
for the period 1904 through 1947 when India was ruled by the British 
colonial regime. In addition, the chapter compares the expansion and 
direction of the movement that followed in two Punjabs (the Indian 
Punjab and Pakistan's Punjab) after the partition of India in 1947, 
particularly up to the year 1980. The chapter is divided into four 
sections. Section I is concerned with the problem of rural 
indebtedness and its general effects in India. Section II deals with 
the origin and development of the cooperative movement in India with 
particular reference to the province of Punjab. Section III presents a 
brief account of the course and direction of the cooperative movement 
in the two Punjabs for the years 1947 through 1980. And finally 
section IV concludes with a summary on the expansion and direction of 
the movement in the undivided Punjab, Indian Punjab and Pakistan's 
Punjab.
4.1 The Problem of Rural Indebtedness and its effects
Money-lenders (known variously as Mahajans, Sahukars, Banias) had 
been- part of the socio-economic structure in rural India since long 
before the inception of British rule. Agriculture was a highly 
uncertain occupation because Indian peasants were dependent on variable 
monsoons. Also due to primitive methods of cultivation, agriculture
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did not yield enough returns to enable agriculturalists to meet their 
normal day-to-day needs, not to speak of leaving a surplus for 
investment. Famine conditions arising out of failure of rains left the 
village money-lender as the only recourse for the poor villager. The 
money-lender enabled the peasants to meet their immediate contingencies 
and was considered by village folk a useful man who often gave credit 
when it was most needed.^
The need for credit in the Indian agriculture arose primarily due 
to unpredictable seasonal deficits (or surpluses) which were inherent 
in the biological characteristics of subsistence farming. In addition 
to failures in growing conditions, diseases, uncertain markets and 
illhealth were an essential character of Indian agriculture. 
Subsistence farmers had generally a low volume of working capital with 
which to meet both the predictable deficits and unpredictable 
adversities. Despite a low volume of capital they had to meet the food 
requirements of the household and also to cover the operating expenses 
of the farm. The subsistence character of farming frequently did not 
leave them with enough working capital to finance their consumption and 
production requirements.
As noted earlier in chapter 3, the drawing down of crop 
inventories to meet for the food requirements of the subsistence farm 
household is the equivalent of the cash outgoings to meet the operating 
expenses of the commercial farm. The subsistence character of farming 
in Indian conditions does not permit the farmer to draw a distinction 
between farming for production and farming for consumption; working 
capital and consumption requirements were to all intents and purposes 
the same thing.
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The characteristic inherent in the biological nature of farming, 
together with unpredictable failures attributable to diseases, markets, 
health and other risks were more prevalent in the Indian setting. Even 
good crop harvests, if any, left the farmers with little marketable 
surplus after allowing for the family's food consumption and production 
requirements. The problem was further complicated by the fact that 
while the basic input requirements for the household were important, 
under the given socio-economic conditions consumption requirements were 
not just those relating to basic physiologically-determined needs and 
some were not known with certainty. The subsistence farmer was a 
member of a social structure and the need to maintain self-respect 
influenced consumption requirements in addition to the need merely to 
survive. Social obligations were as important and in this respect, 
there were many unpredictable social events requiring expenditure: 
weddings, funerals, and other ceremonies. These entailed very real and 
inescapable consumption requirements from the point of view of the 
farmer.
Given the biological nature and scale of his productive 
activities and the social nature of his consumption requirements, it 
was frequently evident that the available working capital was 
inadequate. As a result the subsistence farmer was left with no option 
except to borrow from relatives or friends; but in this respect the 
latter were in no better economic circumstances than the subsistence 
farmer was himself placed. The subsistence farmer turned to the local 
merchant or the money-lenders to finance his consumption and production 
requirements. However, once given access to funds, he did not use the 
working capital for the purchase of agricultural inputs or investment
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in agricultural capital but instead employed it for consumption 
purposes.2
It may however be noted that despite the necessity for credit, 
the general socio-economic conditions in rural India were not 
favourable to either the borrowers or the lenders. This was 
attributable (among other reasons) to the fact that (a) there was 
little marketable accumulation of capital to lend (b) there was little 
surplus from which the peasant could pay back the loan (c) there was 
practically no security to offer to the lender, because the rights in 
ownership of land were neither valuable (because cultivable land 
produced not much surplus over cost of production), nor definitely 
recognised and enforced and (d) there was no sure means of enforcing 
recovery against the recalcitrant borrower, as there were no regular 
courts to enforce the contracts between the debtor and creditor.3
Prior to British rule, however, money (or the cash economy) 
assumed lesser importance in the subsistence setting in India, and its 
use did not assume great prominence in areas or among sections of 
population who largely remained unaffected by commercialized urban 
regions. Nicholson, in his study of the rural credit structure in 
Madras (India) found that, despite necessity for credit by the peasants 
the preponderance of loans was made in kind between ryots (peasant 
farmers) for small sums negotiated on short-term (one-two years) basis. 
These loans were called 'Nagu' or grain loans. They were used by 
farmers either for seed or subsistence purposes. Money-lending, on the 
other hand, played a minor role in the over-all credit structure of 
Madras. Grain lending was, however, frequently a political as well as 
an economic activity. During times of famines rich farmers dispensed
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grain to their clients as an obligation and a favour to be repaid at 
the lender's bidding. Money was often of secondary importance in a 
region of persisting scarcity and famines. Substantial money-lending 
activities were confined to the irrigated or stable agricultural zones 
of the presidency. Consequently, grain-lending and to a lesser extent, 
money-lending placed a considerable amount of economic and political 
power in the hands of a minority of rich peasants.^
In addition, activities of informal lenders in the Indian 
villages took many other forms. There were the village shopkeepers cum 
traders/merchants interested in the purchase of agriucltural produce. 
The shopkeeper (in his various multiple roles) fed and clothed the 
peasants and also met their credit requirements until the crop harvest. 
The supplies were often provided by him at higher than prevailing 
market rates, thus including a hidden interest charge. As the 
shopkeeper marketed the farmer's produce, he either obtained repayment 
in kind or specified that the grower would not sell his crop through 
another party. Alternatively credit was provided by a trader 
interested in the purchase of the grower's produce. The grower entered 
into an informal contract with the dealer stipulating supply of produce 
at predetermined prices or with price unfixed until delivery or later. 
The former alternative was more general and the grower received a 
percentage of the price in advance. No interest was charged but the 
price fixed was frequently unfavourable to the producer. Alternatively 
the price was reduced when the final payment was made^.
The money-lenders (Mahajans, Saukars, Banias, village 
shopkeepers, traders etc.) performed an indispensable economic 
function, but the price they charged for their services was very high.
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And this had an adverse effect on the overall socio-economic conditions 
of farmers. The farmer's dependence on high cost informal lending had 
a severe direct effect on his production choices. The farmers paid the 
money-lenders an interest rate that amounted sometimes to over 100 
percent or more per year. Such rates imposed minimum requirements in 
rates of return on investment that simply excluded many alternatives 
that otherwise were economically useful for him as well as the 
subsistence economy. Even important improvements in technology or 
marketing failed to generate payoffs that reached 100 percent level. 
In addition, the money-lender required the farmers to repay in kind. 
He acquired a major part of the crop-inventory and reduced the risk of 
default by controlling the farmer's marketing in many cases. Further, 
product prices were often depressed in the market as usually the money­
lender was the sole buyer, and in the absence of sufficient storage 
facilities the farmer could not hold even his meagre marketable 
surplus. The farmer was therefore not able to take advantage of 
seasonal price appreciation, if any.
As such the money-lender was the only literate person in the 
village but he was ill-equipped and uninterested in making loans over a 
period of time that allowed for much of the increase in farmer's income 
to serve as the basis for repaying the loan. As noted earlier in 
chapter 3, in the subsistence setting credit access that is limited to 
the money-lender on short term and with high rates of interest severely 
restricts the farmer's response to production alternatives if any, that 
otherwise can be rewarding to him and also to the subsistence sector. 
Under the given conditions, the farmers in India had no option except 
to borrow from money-lenders to meet their consumption and production
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requirements, but the provision of credit by the money-lender to the 
peasants often left them in worsening economic conditions; the farmers 
were unable to pay back to the money-lender due to lower levels of 
production.
The money-lender in India became so powerful that he was commonly 
described as the capitalist of the concern who practically met all 
expenditure, paid the rent and took all the profit from the borrower. 
The effect of money-lending was acute in all parts of India. In Bengal 
for instance 'Zamindar' was literally a mere rent charger whereas the 
peasant was reduced to the status of field labourer barely earning his 
livelihood.^
The establishment of British rule in India tended to increase the 
demand and facilities for borrowing so that increasing indebtedness was 
accompanied with improvements in agricultural methods and organization. 
British rule generally brought with it a degree of peace, order and 
security in India. This, together with the removal of a number of 
positive checks to population growth resulted in a rapid increase in 
the population and increased pressure on the land. With the increase 
in population, new land, often less fertile, was brought into use. At 
the same time it became necessary to cultivate the "old" land more 
intensively. These changes necessitated more expenditure on land, 
especially in areas dependent upon irrigation. The gradual 
infiltration of European methods of cultivation increased the demand 
for capital. Hence the peasants needed to borrow both in order to make 
capital investments and more often, to carry on ordinary cultivation.7
Prior to British rule, the power to borrow was generally limited 
by the political, economic and legal lack of security; land would
\
\
\
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hardly be considered acceptable security for a loan. Under British 
rule, the price of land rose considerably owing to increased political 
security, increased security of tenure, increased demand for holdings 
and the extension of valuable commercial crops. Moreover, whereas it 
was previously not customary for a creditor to seize the land of his 
debtor, under the new laws and the systematic execution of the decrees 
of the court land could now be mortgaged, and if not redeemed at the 
appointed time became the property of the creditor. The money-lender 
eagerly accepted land as security, and if his loan was not repaid, he 
either became the absolute owner of the mortgaged land or defacto owner 
of the labour and produce of his debtor, who under British rule could 
not escape from his bargain. Thus increased security meant more loans 
and greater indebtedness. The growth of law and order led to
competition for land instead of tenants while the institution of civil 
government tended to act as a vehicle to deprive the cultivator of his 
holding and of the profits of cultivation. Thus the verbal contracts 
of the past and the easy relations with a hardly more literate money­
lender gave way to a formal, though one-sided account-keeping which 
tended to reduce the more important party to slavery or indigence.®
It may further be noted that, prior to British rule, the land 
taxes in many regions in India were levied at too high a rate and 
collected in too rigid a manner, which provided another reason for 
resort to the money-lenders.
In point of fact, there was generally a worsening effect of the 
money-lender's system, as it became apparent in terms of increased farm 
indebtedness. The magnitude of indebtedness was severe in many 
provinces. The Deccan Riots commission found in 1857 that one-third of
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the occupants in twelve villages in the Ahmed Nagar district of Boombay 
were involved in debt, to the extent of about eighteen times of their 
revenue assessment. The Famine Commission (1880) expressed the view 
that one-third of the land-holders in India were deeply in debt and an 
equal proportion was in debt but not beyond the power of recovering 
themselves. Darling found that rural debt in Punjab was at least 
nineteen times the land revenue demand of the government. In the case 
of proprietors the debt was equal to three years' net income.^
As noted earlier loans borrowed by the peasants from the money­
lenders were used by them often to meet consumption requirements, which 
included in many instances expenses on social ceremonies. As such, 
indebtedness in the Indian setting was as much a problem of character 
as of credit. Indebtedness was therefore a problem of national and 
personal characteristics coupled with laws, social customs, modes of 
inheritance, seasonal difficulties and the like. They were the key 
contributing factors resulting in the peasants borrowing beyond his 
needs for "unnecessary" or "unproductive" purposes. And this led to 
serious economic, social and moral consequences in the subsistence 
setting.
Insofar as economic consequences were concerned indebtedness led 
to agricultural inefficiency. When the cultivator found that all his 
additional efforts went merely to enrich his creditors he lost interest 
in improving his position by greater effort and improved methods of 
production. Productivity of land thus declined further. When the debt 
involved mortgaging and finally sale of landed property, the result was 
an increase in tenant cultivation and increased number of landless 
labourers. Both these developments were not conducive to agricultural
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progress and prosperity. In the marketing of his produce also, the 
peasant had to suffer as he was debtor to the middleman-trader. As 
stated before the peasant sold his produce to the creditor on the 
latter's terms. This meant not only lower monetary return to the 
debtor, but also it acted as a barrier to the improvement of his 
marketing methods. Thus no agricultural progress was possible for the 
indebted peasants.
As to the social consequences, class friction arose between the 
creditors and debtors. The increase in landless labourers with no 
avenue of employment created further social discontent and political 
instability.
The moral consequences of indebtedness were not less 
debilitating; the cultivator lost his ancestral property and in many 
cases with it his economic freedom. In many regions in India, the 
tenants were practically slaves of money-lenders (as also of the 
landlords) who thoroughly mistreated them. In short, once in debt, it 
was virtually impossible for the cultivators to get out of it. "~
An important cause of increasing indebtedness was increasing 
poverty of the peasant farmers. Though important, it was not solely or 
invariably due to increasing poverty, rather the deplorable by-product 
of a number of changes, that in themselves were the signs of increased 
prosperity such as the increased security and the rise in the price of 
land already mentioned. In fact, indebtedness was not so much the 
result of poverty as a cause of poverty, as the most poor in India, at 
least in the villages, could not and did not borrow.
The problem of indebtedness in India did not assume exceptional 
importance because indebtedness was exceptionally great, nor because it
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was due to increasing poverty, but because it was accompanied by 
exceptionally disastrous effects. The Indian farmers had to pay 
exorbitant rates. It has been documented that loans to agriculturalists 
given on the security of land generally varied from a little over 18 
percent to about 37.5 percent per annum. Interest on loans given 
without security generally varied within the range of 200 and 300 
percent per year.  ^^
A question arises as to how the money-lender was able to charge 
such high rates of interest on his loan. Some reasons in this regard 
have already been advanced in chapter 3. It may be noted however, that 
the market for the money-lender in the Indian setting was small - 
restricted to a village. In addition, there was one money-lender in 
one village, and entry of additional lenders was retricted by low 
mobility. As such, the money-lender enjoyed a monopoly in his 
business. Further, when there was a general scarcity of capital and 
the borrowers were the poor farmers under some time-bounded economic 
pressure, a less elastic demand with respect to interest rates was 
evident. It may further be noted that the absence of any regular 
financial establishment to fulfil an essential function in the Indian 
villages left the money-lender in a strong position to take advantage 
of the monopoly control he enjoyed of scarce factor (capital) in the 
rural areas. As has been noted earlier, the money-lender charged a 
lower rate on secured loans as against a higher rate on the loans 
advanced without any tangible security. This pattern suggests that a 
part of the high rate of interest represented a premium for risk. And 
this conformed to what can be expected in a poor agriculture.^
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We have already outlined in chapter 3 that the nature of security 
in a subsistence setting depends on two factors (a) the capacity of the 
borrower to earn an income beyond the basic needs of subsistence which 
will determine their ability to meet interest charges and eventually to 
repay the loan, and (b) the market value of the asset pledged as 
security should it be necessary to acquire them because the borrowers 
cannot meet their obligations. In both these respects the specific 
conditions in India were unfavourable to the borrowers. As the larger 
section of rural population lived at the margin of the subsistence, 
their repaying capacity was poor. As to the land which was the best 
asset to be offered as security, there were many peasants who were 
landless. On the other hand, the sale price of land which the owner- 
occupier could obtain was depressed as the landlords were entitled to a 
transfer fee. It may be argued that since the money-lender had a 
monopoly in rural areas he charged a higher price than was otherwise 
possible, but it cannot be denied that considerable risk was involved 
in lending to borrowers with inadequate credit and this led to money­
lenders charging a premium. It may thus seem that it was not only 
monopoly profit as such, but low level of per capita production of 
borrowers which accounted for the high rates of interest in the 
agriculture sector.
In short, the peasant borrowers in India stood little chance of 
ever extricating themselves from debt once they borrowed from the 
money-lenders. They had no alternative occupation and as the money­
lender was often both the local shop-keeper and the purchaser of the 
produce of his debtor, the latter had no chance of earning or saving 
anything to .begin to repay his debt. The social and educational
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superiority of the money-lender also strengthened his position. As 
already stated, the money-lenders alone kept the accounts, and 
manipulated the repayment to perpetuate debt. As such indebtedness in 
India became a permanent feature. And, a larger part of the capital of. 
the country became concentrated in the hands of the money-lenders.  ^3
For a long time the policy of the British government in India 
remained one of non-intervention with the forces which perpetuated the 
problem of rural indebtedness even further. However, the famous Deccan 
Riots led the British government to pass the Deccan Agriculturists 
Relief Act of 1879; to inquire into and adjust disputes which arose 
between the cultivators and the money-lenders. This was not a useful 
attempt as it tended to multiply litigation and stimulated ill-feeling 
between the classes. Although this act empowered the courts to alter 
the terms of the contract and reduce the interest if it was feared that 
excessive rates were charged and to arrange for the repayment of 
capital debt by instalments, the results were generally 
disappointing.1^
The Famine Commission (1880) was appointed to examine the whole
problem of rural finance and to suggest measures to promote revival of
Indian agriculture. The Commission made many recommendations. It was
however underlined by the commission that
"violent interference with the legitimate business of 
the rural banker would be disastrous, as it would 
result in the calling in of all agricultural loans 
and transfer of his capital to some other fields of 
investment.^
This was why, in spite of political considerations, no extreme measures 
were taken to wipe out the money-lenders altogether.
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The Famine Commission (1880) proposed extension of Deccan 
Agriculturist's Relief Act, 1879 to the other provinces. Further, the 
commission stressed upon the government the need to make provision of 
public funds to the agriculturalists, particularly the indebted 
peasants.
The Land Improvement Act of 1883 was passed as a result of the 
recommendation of the Famine Commission. The Act provided facilities 
for loans to be used for capital expenditure upon Land Improvement. 
Simultaneously the Agriculturists Loan Act was passed and this provided 
loans for the purchase of seed and cattle and other miscellaneous 
agricultural purposes. Loans were provided to the farmers under the 
administration of the government, especially by the Department of 
Revenue Collection. These Acts did not succeed in their purpose as 
those most in need could not obtain loans. The peasants had no 
security to offer while the state did not enter into sufficiently 
intimate contact with individual cultivators to enable it to gauge 
personal credit. Additional drawbacks of these loans were that (a) 
they were generally available to landowners and not to the landless 
tenants who constituted the majority of the farmers (b) administrative 
bottlenecks did not make loans available to the borrowers as and when 
desired (c) they were recovered as arrears of land revenue, and there 
was a practice of coercive recovery by the Revenue Department at a time 
when the peasant was worst off for money and (d) the amount loaned was 
generally inadequate to serve the required purposes.16
The general failure of the state system (commonly termed as 
Taccavi advances) and increasing urgency for the provision of credit to 
the agriculturists, in particular the indebted peasants led to the
181
preparation of a scheme for the establishment of agricultural banks by 
Sir William Wedderburn and Mr. Justice Ranade in the early 1880s. This 
scheme proposed (a) that farmers' debts should be liquidated with the 
help of government funds; (b) the agricultural bank should perform two 
functions (i) to take over the claims of the government under the 
liquidation plan and (ii) to advance money to farmers; (c) the bank 
should be able to recover its dues as arrears of land revenue. - This 
scheme was accepted by the government but rejected by the Secretary of 
State on the grounds that public funds would be locked in 'hazardous' 
and 'speculative' business.^7
The measures taken by the government to check the problem of 
rural indebtedness generally failed, as the supremacy of money-lenders 
remained undisturbed and the transfer of land continued. By the end of 
the 19th century, the problem became rather severe, for instance in the 
province of Punjab. As a result, the Punjab Land Alienation Act (1901) 
was passed. The Act aimed at preventing money-lenders from obtaining 
possession of their debtor's land, by prohibiting land from passing 
into the hands of the non-agricultural classes. This again was 
unsatisfactory insofar as it reduced the security which cultivators 
could offer and so made it more difficult for them to obtain command of 
working capital.  ^®
Indeed, the problem of rural indebtedness in the Punjab as in 
other provinces in India, together with the attendant question of land 
alienation, arose out of the fundamental necessity for credit on the 
part of the village cultivator. The attempts made by the government 
generally failed in providing a reasonable amount of credit to the 
peasants, and helping them in overcoming the problem of rural
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indebtedness. In addition, little success was achieved in imposing
legal restrictions on the alienation of land. It was as late as in
1928 that the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India remarked that
"no usufructuary mortgage of agricultural land should 
be permitted by law unless provision is made for 
automatic redemption within a fixed period of years, 
of which twenty should be maximum".  ^9
In addition, voluntary attempts were made in various provinces in 
India to provide loans on reasonable terms for productive purposes. 
For example, loans banks and companies were formed in Bengal, while 
'Nidhis' of Madras and similar associations in the United provinces 
aimed at providing credit to their members on reasonable terms. These 
voluntary associations, in particular the 'Nidhis', enrolled in their 
membership persons from a more highly educated and advanced class than 
the poor agricultural population. 'Nidhis' were merely the financing 
bodies and had no interest in the object of loan and/or with their 
members' thrift and indebtedness. As such they proved less important 
in resolving the problem of rural indebtedness.20
As discussed earlier in the preceding chapters many German 
farmers faced a problem of rural indebtedness in the 19th century. 
They had to borrow from high rate money-lender to buy seed and 
supplies. The money-lender charged as much as 100 percent interest on 
his loan, and many German farmers were unable to repay the loan to the 
money-lenders due to their low levels of production. The money-lender 
foreclosed on the property if payments were not made by the cultivators 
on the day they were due. As such, problems of Indian peasants were 
not very different from those of the German farmers. A viable solution 
for checking the problem of rural indebtedness in Germany was proposed
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by Raiffeisen, who by founding successful rural credit unions had 
succeeded in helping the peasants. It was argued by many pioneers of 
cooperation in India that the principles on which credit unions were 
founded in Germany were applicable to the subsistence setting. The 
experiments of Raiffeisen in launching successful agricultural credit 
unions prompted the British government to find a solution to the 
problem of indebtedness in rural India on more or less similar lines. 
During the latter half of the 19th century the government of Madras, in 
particular, took initiative and deputed Sir F. Nicholson to study the 
possibility of introducing a system of viable agricultural land banks 
in the presidency. Attempts in other provinces followed and an opinion 
and consensus on the efficacy of the cooperative device in resolving 
the problem of rural indebtedness started gaining roots. As such the 
British government became serious in the inception of the cooperative 
movement in India around the turn of the 19th century.21
4.II The origin and Development of the Cooperative Movement in India
with reference to Punjab
The idea for using cooperation as a means of combating the 
problem of indebtedness in India was thus conceived by Sir F. 
Nicholson. Other pioneers such as Dupernex, Maclagan and Crothwaite 
were also involved around the turn of the 19th century. Nicholson, in 
particular, made a detailed study of the German and other European 
cooperative movements in 1895-97. He suggested the establishment of 
cooperative credit societies on the pattern envisaged by Raiffeisen in 
Germany. Nicholson emphasized that it was not only credit that was 
needed, but also the inculcation of habits of thrift and ’self-help'. 
The best way to do this, Nicholson urged was to "Find Raiffeisen” .
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About the same time Mr. Dupernex was deputed by the government of the 
United Provinces to suggest a form of societies suitable for the 
prevailing conditions of the United Provinces. Dupernex too advocated 
the establishment of cooperative credit societies with the financial 
aid under the aegis of the government. As a result of these two 
enquiries, a few cooperative societies were started in Punjab, the 
United Provinces and Bengal, on the personal initiative of district 
officials.22
The driving force for the provision of a legislative basis to the
cooperative movement in India was provided by Lord Curzon. He
appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Law, which
investigated the whole matter during 1901-3. The report of the
committee made definite recommendations and served as the basis of the
cooperative credit societies Act of 1904.23
The theory underlying this Act, and indeed the whole cooperative
movement was that
"an isolated and powerless individual can, by 
association with others, and by moral development and 
mutual support, obtain in his own degree the material 
advances available to wealthy or powerful persons, 
and thereby develop himself to the fullest extent of 
his natural abilities".24
Hence, the cooperative credit societies Act, 1904 provided for the 
founding of cooperative credit societies on the basis of personal 
knowledge and credit of those who lived in intimate contact with each 
other. Each society was to consist solely of persons living in one 
particular village or locality and to be limited to quite small 
numbers, in order that members really should know each others' position 
and character. In rural areas the liability of members was to be
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unlimited, while in urban areas liability might be either limited or 
unlimited. The expenses of administration were to be minimized and the 
ideal of "self-help" maintained by appointing the officials from 
amongst the members, on a voluntary and gratuitous basis. Any idea of 
exclusiveness or profit sharing was to be prevented by allocating any 
surplus made by a society to reserve, on an indivisible basis. In 
fact, the whole scheme was based on the principles, and the societies 
were to be formed on the model of the credit societies of Germany.25
A special government official, called the Registrar of 
cooperative credit societies, was appointed in each province to 
organize and control the development of the movement, but the principle 
was adopted that as soon as possible, the societies should be placed on 
an entirely independent footing. In short, the objects of the Act were 
to provide facilities for the provision of reasonably cheap credit for 
productive purposes, on personal credit, in order to encourage the 
investment of capital in the land and at the same time to inculcate 
thrift and foresight by means of mutual cooperation, without 
undermining the independence of cooperators.
Registrars were consequently appointed in each of the provinces 
and the formation of a few model societies was immediately undertaken.
As the movement developed, it faced serious opposition from 
money-lenders, who feared that success of credit societies would mean 
their displacement. Besides, the persons who administered civil law 
mainly came from a non-agriculturist class and they became biased 
against the movement. In the Punjab province, the then Registrar of 
the cooperative societies remarked in his annual report of 1912 that
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"the Munsifs as a body are recruited largely from the 
money-lending or small shop-owner classes so that 
many of them have a class prejudice against the 
village banks. This is shown in way of vexatious and 
even illegal action, towards parties who happen to be 
members of cooperative societies and by insulting 
treatment of them in court. It is not an uncommon 
practice for a money-lender to put members of a newly 
started bank into court with the object of- 
frightening the other members who are also on his 
books from joining a society. Once a client is in 
the court, many and various are the ways in which a 
hostile Munsif can persecute him".26
As a result, the pace of the formation of credit societies in India in 
general and in Punjab in particular remained slow.2?
The cooperative credit societies Act 1904, provided only for the 
registration of credit societies. Soon, however certain defects were 
discovered in this Act. In the first place this act did not provide 
legal protection to societies formed for purposes other than credit. 
Second, the growth in the number of societies and the difficulty 
experienced in raising capital locally gave rise to the question of 
establishing some form of central organization to provide capital to 
local societies and also to supervise them. Third, classification into 
rural and urban societies was inconvenient and unscientific. These 
issues led to the passing of the cooperative societies Act 1912. This 
act authorized the formation of District Unions of primary societies 
and of central banks (on an unlimited liability basis). The act also 
replaced the classification into urban and rural societies by a 
classification according to whether liability was limited or unlimited 
irrespective of the location of the society.28
As a result, primary societies (such as consolidation of land- 
holding societies, better living societies, sales societies and 
commission shops besides agricultural credit societies) started
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establishing in Punjab. In addition, district unions of primary 
agricultural societies and central banks were established. 
Nevertheless, the pace of progress in the immediately following years 
both with regard to the formation of primary societies and central 
banks remained slow.^9
Prior to the passage of the cooperative societies Act 1912, the 
primary agricultural credit societies were established at the base 
level of the movement. The Act of 1912 allowed central cooperative 
banks to occupy a position above the primary societies. The central 
cooperative banks were very important for the growth of the credit 
movement in that they collected deposits from townspeople and from the 
primary societies which had surplus funds. These banks, in turn, 
channelled funds to the affiliated societies in need of capital. Later 
the central cooperative banks in the Pubjab were affiliated to form the 
Punjab Provinicial Cooperative Bank. The Punjab Coooperative Bank 
mobilized funds in a similar manner from the cities, channelling them 
back to the movement at the lower levels. A federal credit structure 
was thus built up in the province. Cooperative Land Mortgage Banks for 
meeting medium/or long-term credit needs of agriculturalists were also 
established, but they stood somewhat apart both in regard to nature of 
credit and security against which it was provided.30
The government of India passed a resolution in 1914 remarking on 
the progress made and recommending a change in policy as regards the 
purposes for which loans might be granted to members. Up to this time 
loans were restricted to "productive purposes" and could not be given 
to enable members to pay off old debts, but it was now considered to be 
more satisfactory if members dealt solely with cooperative societies
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for credit purposes, whether the loans were needed for agricultural 
purposes or "domestic reasons". From this time onward a policy was 
adopted of enabling members to pay off all other creditors and 
consolidate their debts.
With the earlier shortcomings thus removed, the movement made 
considerable progress, although qualitatively progress left much to be 
desired. The government appointed a committee under the chairmanship 
of Sir Edward Maclagan in 1914. The committee reporting in 1915, 
listed a large number of defects such as the misappropriation of the 
bulk of loans by means of 'Benami loans'; nepotism in advancing loans 
to relations and friends; exclusion of deserving persons from the 
movement on the grounds of their being of inferior castes; delay in the 
grant of credit; lack of proper auditing and inspection etc. The 
report of the committee resulted in the overhauling and reorganization 
of the whole administration of cooperation. Attempts were made to 
eliminate all societies which did not live up to the ideals of 
cooperation and in particular to insist upon the punctual repayment of 
loans by members. Amongst many of its recommendations, the committee 
proposed "one society to one village and one village to one society".-^1
The movement received a set-back due to world war 1, but recovery 
soon supervened. A severe set-back followed the scarcity of 1918-19 
but again proved only temporary. The government of India passed a 
Reform Act 1919, which transferred the subject of cooperation to the 
.provincial governments. Some governments (including the Government in 
Punjab) retained the 1912 Act, while others passed their own Acts. 
Thereafter the progress was further stimulated, particularly because of 
economic prosperity which prevailed during 1920-1929. The expansion as
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before was largely quantitative. The most distressing qualitative 
weakness of the movement was a steady increase in the overdues.32
The period of general agricultural prosperity was cut short by 
the 'Depression' of the 1930s. Agricultural prices fell disastrously. 
Between 1929 and 1933, the value of agricultural produce in the Punjab 
fell by some 50 percent.33 similar developments took place in other 
parts of India. As the incomes of the farmer fell, the burden of his 
debt increased further. His capacity to pay back his obligations 
decreased. In most cases, he had to resort to the money-lender to help 
him out.34
The condition of the cooperative credit movement was bound to 
deteriorate under these circumstances. Overdues accumulated. Societies 
assets were almost frozen. Recovery of loans became a near
impossibility. As such, recovery by societies in the Punjab fell from 
32.9 percent in 1927-28 to some 16.1 percent in 1930-31. Between 1931— 
32 and 1933-34 it ranged between 13 and 13.9 percent.35 The weaknesses 
of the movement such as lack of education, inadequate supervision and 
guidance, earlier pointed out by the Royal Commission on Agriculture 
(1928)36 seemed to have aggravated the problem even further.
In addition, oppression by money-lenders was felt acutely in the 
depression years after 1929. Several laws were passed by the
government for controlling money-lenders' activities, but were not 
entirely effective as the alternative source of credit (e.g. 
cooperative credit) was not available to many indigent peasants. The 
superior bargaining power of the money-lender, the illiteracy of the 
ordinary debtor, the absence of satisfactory inspecting machinery and 
lack of sufficiently deterrent penalties contributed to infringement of
190
these laws. To the extent these laws were effective, they produced new 
sets of money-lenders, such as landlords, and they led to contraction 
of credit facilities where cooperative societies were weak and/or did 
not emerge.37
The outbreak of the second world war in 1939 found the movement 
struggling to find a new equilibrium and a basis for further advance. 
With the rise in agricultural prices, the general economic conditions 
of the peasants improved. The members were thus in a position to repay 
their debt to the societies. This improved their financial position. 
Further the deposits of central cooperative banks increased and the 
demand from affiliated societies for loans decreased. Even central 
cooperative banks were faced with the problem of surplus funds. A 
spirit of planning was also abroad in the country. The war years 
produced an upward trend in the growth of the movement. Nevertheless, 
expansion of the movement was largely accounted for by non-credit 
societies. As such, war imparted a stimulus to supply societies, 
consumer stores and to marketing societies in the Punjab.38
Even before the war ended, various proposals for post-war 
economic reconstruction were put forward. And in all these schemes an 
important place was assigned to the cooperative movement by the 
government. As such, the cooperative movement was conceived by the 
government as a vehicle for furthering the cause of economic 
reconstruction in the country.
A committee, commonly known as the Saraiya Committee was 
appointed by the government of India in 1945 with the object to draw up 
a comprehensive plan for the development of the movement. The 
committee submitted its report in 1946. The recommendations of the
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committee covered almost every aspect of cooperative activity. The 
committee made a large number of recommendations for the reorganization 
of the movement. It especially stressed the importance of cooperation 
in any plan of economic development of the country. The committee 
attributed limited success of the movement in the past to the "laissez 
faire" policy of the state, the illiteracy of the people and above all 
the failure of the movement to tackle the life of the individual as a 
whole. The other shortcomings of the movement, viewed by the 
committee, were the small size of the primary unit and undue reliance 
on honorary services with resultant inefficiency in management.39
No notable developments took place between 1945 and the 
partitition of India in August 1947.
In short, the cooperative movement in India was not an outcome of 
any popular demand. It was introduced by the British government as a 
public policy with the object to improve the socio-economic conditions 
of the peasants. Public enthusiasm and a spirit for voluntary 
cooperation had yet to be developed. The movement was therefore 
introduced under a statutory framework, and cooperative societies Acts 
were subsequently promulgated to regularize the working of societies. 
A government department (department of cooperation) was established to 
take charge of the movement until unofficial workers came forward to 
promote the object of the movement. This was however in significant 
contrast of what had appeared in Germany and Britain, where the 
movement developed spontaneously. The state stepped in only at a later 
stage when the cooperatives were already functioning and the purpose of 
intervention was merely to establish business and contract regulations. 
The rules governing membership, operation, finance, profit sharing etc.
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were largely developed by members themselves.
In point of fact, the movement in India did not emerge from any 
popular demand primarily due to intertia, illiteracy and ignorance 
among the rural masses. The government had therefore to come forward 
and play an active role in the promotion of cooperatives, their 
supervision, audit, and inspection. Furthermore, the task of 
cooperative education, training and provision of technical advice and 
guidance was undertaken by the government. It was thus under the 
prevailing conditions that a statutory framework was required to 
regularize the introduction of the movement. As has been noted, a 
Registrar was appointed to supervise the movement, and vast powers were 
granted to him to intervene in the 'cooperatives' affairs. 
Nevertheless, it. was intended that as soon as the movement developed 
and established firmly in the local setting, the Registrar (as also the 
Department of Cooperation) would withdraw gradually from his extensive 
control of the movement. However, the crux of the matter is that at no 
time in the subsequent period were serious or conscious efforts made to 
make the movement a People's movement. The movement thus did not grow 
from the grassroots and the societies did not manage their own affairs 
for their own good without any form of external interference or 
government support.
Nonetheless, it can be argued that in the absence of public 
enthusiasm the movement in India would not have been introduced at all 
without government support, and a statutory framework was necessarily 
required to promote the cause of the movement. Indeed, in Germany the 
necessity for the legal and statutory provisions was underlined by both 
Raiffeisen and Schulz, but this was made mandatory at a time when the
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movement had gained roots by voluntary and spontaneous efforts and the 
state stepped in only when it was considered essential by the pioneers 
themselves to seek a legal status for the movement.
4.II.1 Development of the movement in Punjab (1904-47)
The various types of societies which started taking root in the 
Punjab after the passage of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, 
included (a) Primary credit societies based sometimes on unlimited, 
sometimes limited, liability (b) Primary non-credit societies 
(agricultural and non-agricultural), (c) Central organizations, for
both general and credit purposes and (d) the apex cooperative 
institutions viz, the Punjab Cooperative Bank, and the Punjab 
Cooperative Union.
The whole object of the movement in Punjab, as in any other part 
in India, was to encourage humble and unimportant individuals to join 
together on an egalitarian basis in order to assist each other morally 
and materially. Hence the strength of the movement depended on the 
soundness and energy of each of the primary units. Of the latter, 
however, primary agricultural credit societies in Punjab formed the 
mainstay.^0
A primary agricultural society, in particular credit society, 
could be started by not less than ten members, and was typically 
located at the village level. The society comprised villagers who were 
allowed to join because of their personal character (credit worthiness) 
and not the extent of their existing property. In theory, the 
societies were to be founded primarily by the deposits and share 
capital of local members. Loans were to be disbursed to those most
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needy, with interest rates and repayment schedules fixed by the members
themselves. Mutual trust in members' ability to repay was the only
security for a loan. This was reinforced by the principle of unlimited
liability i.e. every member was to be financially obliged to the full
extent of his property to make good the debt of the society.4  ^ The
Committee on Cooperation (1915) remarked that
"it is clear that the creditors' real security
consists not in the material assets of the members, 
but in the ability and desire of the members to put 
the borrowed money to productive uses and to repay 
the loan out of the profits made thereby ... The
security, in fact, lies in the use of each loan for
genuine productive purposes, the honesty and thrift 
of members, the watchfulness they exercise over each 
other, the moral influence which they bring to bear 
upon dishonest or unthrifty co-members, and the
feeling of solidarity which is usually awakened by 
association for a common purpose".
In short, mutual security, limited scope (village and its environs) and 
unlimited liability were the basic principles of rural credit societies 
established in Punjab, as well as in other parts of India.
The primary society elected a managing committee from amongst its 
members, and then one of them, usually a literate member of the 
committee, was chosen to be the secretary. It was considered essential 
that the members of the managing committee in general and the secretary 
in particular should have a knowledge of, and belief, in cooperative 
principles and methods. Theoretically, the managing committee 
undertook the tasks of financing., admitting new members, advancing 
loans and ensuring effective recovery of credit from members.
The membership of primary societies was extremely varied, 
although in many cases, members of any one society were often 
predominantly drawn from the same caste or group of castes. Also it
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was generally customary that a society comprised solely of Muslim or 
non-Muslim members. Nevertheless members of the under-privileged 
sections of society were also enrolled by the cooperatives.
A vigilant watch had to be kept by the society to ensure that 
money was actually spent for the purpose for which it was borrowed, and 
efforts were aimed at building up strong reserves for the society and 
to encourage members to save and invest in the society.
The relevant statistics on the progress of the cooperative 
movement in Punjab from 1910 through 1946 are presented in Figures 4.1 
through 4.5 (also see Tables 4.1 through 4.4). It may be noted that by 
and large the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, and the general increase 
in agricultural prices on account of the First World War, helped the 
rapid expansion of the movement. In the five year period 1915-20, the 
number of societies more than doubled, with an equally impressive rise 
in the membership and total working capital. The expansion continued 
through the post-war years and by 1926, the number of societies more 
than doubled with further impressive increases in the membership and 
working capital. In addition, the base of the movement was widened 
with the opening of societies in fields besides credit. The steady 
expansion continued from 1927 through 1928. Nevertheless with the 
onset of world-wide depression in 1929, there was a stagnation of the 
cooperative movement, as is evident from the statistics presented in 
Figs. 4.1 through 4.4.
_ The progress of the movement in Punjab is revealed further by the 
analysis of the performance of societies in terms of their growth, 
membership, coverage granted to rural population, their asset position 
and the expansion of cooperatives into fields other than credit.
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The growth of primary societies, both agricultural and non- 
agricultural for the years, 1910 through 1945 is given in Figs. 4.1 
through 4.5. It can be seen from the data presented in Fig.4.1 (also 
see Table 4.1) that the total number of primary societies in Punjab 
rose from 699 (with 693 as agricultural and only 3 as non-agricultural 
societies) in 1910 to 23476 in 1938 (with 19057 as agricultural and 
4419 as non-agricultural societies). Thus, about 81 percent of primary 
societies in Punjab in 1938 were agricultural and only 19 percent were 
urban societies, indicating that the cooperative movement in the Punjab 
remained primarily agriculturally oriented up to the end of the third 
decade of the present century. This position, however slightly changed 
in subsequent years. Thus out of a total of 27054 primary societies in 
1945, some 77 percent were classified as agricultural and 23 percent as 
non-agricultural societies. There was a sharp expansion in the number 
of primary non-agricultural societies after the first quarter in the 
1930s. This may be attributed to the severe strain imposed on the 
agriculture sector by the 'Depression' and consequent liquidation of 
considerable numbers of agricultural societies. The growth of non- 
agricultural societies e.g. cooperative marketing societies, sale 
societies, commission shops etc. after the 1940s was probably the 
result of war conditions, as old trade channels were not performing 
well, and the movement was entrusted a role to restore general economic 
conditions by entering into non-agricultural spheres.^4
Nevertheless amongst the primary agricultural societies, the 
movement generally remained confined to the sphere of credit. Thus out 
of 26873 primary agricultural societies in 1945 as many as 17603 (about 
66percent) were agricultural credit societies (see Table 4.3).
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FIG 4.1 NUMBER OF PRIMARY SOCIETIES IN UNITED 
PUNJAB
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Evidently this high proportion of agricultural credit societies 
underlines the importance which was assigned to the problem of 
agricultural credit.45
The data on the growth of membership in societies presented in 
Fig. 4.2 show that the two groups (agricultural and non-agricultural) 
had some 37,000 and 600 members respectively in 1910, whereas by 1945 
the two groups (agricultural and non-agricultural) had some 0.86 
million and 0.26 million members, respectively representing 76 percent 
and 24 percent of the total membership, which indicates that the rural 
population in Punjab had greater attraction towards the movement. 
Nevertheless, as against the recommendation of the Committee on 
Cooperation (1915) the average size of membership in a society remained 
small and indeed declined from 53 in 1910 to 43 in 1945.
On the other hand, the cooperative movement in Punjab covered 
only 15 percent of the rural population in 1936-37. Even in subsequent 
years this position did not change considerably. Thus in 1945, a 
little under 19 percent of the rural population came under the fold of 
movement in Punjab. As against the all-India level, this was not too 
bad, since only 12.7 percent of the rural population in India was 
embraced by the movement by 1945. Further, in Punjab nearly 50 percent 
of the total villages had a cooperative society of one kind or another 
in 1936. It was estimated that in 1945, one society in Punjab served 
around 1.3 villages.45
. The primary societies in Punjab obtained their capital from the 
following sources: (a) share capital paid up by the members, (b) a
Reserve Fund created out of profits, (c) deposits from the members and 
loans from (d) central banks, (e) non-members, (f) government and (g)
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FIG 4.2 MEMBERS OF PRIMARY SOCIETIES IN UNITED 
PUNJAB
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other societies. Funds from the first three sources formed the owned 
and those from the last four formed the borrowed capital of societies.
The relevant statistics on the working capital of societies are 
presented in Figs. 4.3 and 4.5. It can be seen that the working
capital in societies kept pace with an expansion in membership.
Nevertheless the data presented do not reveal if capital in societies 
was generated from within the internal (owned) sources or by borrowings 
from external sources. It has been estimated that owned funds 
constituted about 36 percent of the working capital of societies in 
1926 and about 41 percent in 1934. Thus some 64 percent of working 
capital in societies in 1926 and some 59 percent in 1934 were from 
borrowings from banks or other sources. This implies that the movement 
relied principally on external funds and had failed to secure adequate 
capital from its own members. Indeed, only 3 percent of the working
capital in societies was generated in the form of members deposits in
1947.
As already noted, primary agricultural credit societies had 
outnumbered all other types of societies in Punjab during the period 
under reference. The primary agricultural credit societies provided 
credit to their members for "production purposes" and to meet other 
"domestic occasions". The complete statistics on the loans advanced 
and recovered by societies in Punjab are not available for the whole 
period (1904-47); nevertheless the position may be judged from the 
loans advanced by societies from the data presented in Fig.4.4 (also 
see Table 4.2) These loans amounted to Rs.17.7 million in 1925, and 
out of these only some 34 percent were recovered by societies. The 
recovery of loans for the period 1924-38 generally ranged between 13
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FIG 4.5 WORKING CAPITAL OF PRIMARY SOCIETIES 
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and 38 percent, with a considerable degree of fluctuation. The data 
presented in Fig. 4.4 reveal that while total advances to members 
increased between 1924 through 1928, thereafter a decline set in. In 
fact, loans issued to members touched a peak in 1928 and so did 
recovery, but the loans outstanding against members fell slowly after 
touching a peak in 1930. It may further be seen from Fig. 4.4 that 
there was a tendency for recoveries to fall after the on-set of the 
depression (i.e. 1928). The causes of low recovery shall be discussed 
later, but it can safely be argued that the problems in recovery of 
loans advanced by societies to their members undermined the whole 
cooperative movement in Punjab during the period under reference.
Another indicator of performance of societies was their audit 
classification. The Registrars' meeting at Bombay in 1926 placed 
cooperative societies into 'A',B', C 1, and 'D', categories. An 'A' 
class society, required and received no help from the government. 'B' 
class societies carried out their own clerical and executive business, 
but a sub-inspector kept an eye on their affairs. In other words, 
they could stand on their own feet. 1C 1 class contained all in- 
betweens, which were carrying on useful work, but needed help from the 
inspector and were often in danger of stepping into 'Df class. 'D' 
class was under threat of cancellation.
Out of 9506 credit societies in 1926, only 4 percent were classed 
as 'A', 26 percent as 'B1, 62 percent as 'C', and 8 percent as 'D', 
class societies. Some 2546 societies were unclassed, which means that 
those were not performing at all. In 1938, the shares of 'A' and 'B 
class societies were equal at 17 percent. Though the figures for 'A' 
and 'B class societies slightly improved in 1938, compared with that in
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1926, on the whole the figures for 'D' class societies were increasing 
after 1926^9.
The criteria for classification of societies were inadequate in 
certain respects. In the absence of information on parameters such as 
size of society, its repayment rate, involvement of large vs. small 
farmers, the number of years a society had been established, it would 
be difficult to argue that a society could be placed in the 'A' class, 
merely because it does not receive any assistance from the government. 
It is probable that data on the above variables were generally 
unavailable to the department, and this would possibly have been the 
major reason for adoption of such an inadequate classification. Many 
members of management committees of societies in Punjab were generally 
illiterate and did not maintain proper records. It would therefore have 
been rather difficult for the departmental officials to devise 
relatively better criteria for the classificiation of societies than 
those which were employed.
Let us now examine the working of some of the primary non-credit 
societies, which developed in rural areas in Punjab after the passage 
of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912. The first amongst various 
kinds were cooperatives for consolidation of holdings, which came next 
to agricultural credit societies both in regard to number as well as 
functions. The Punjab had always been a land of peasant proprietors 
with small and scattered holdings. Improvements in agricultural 
practices were not possible until the tiny holdings of peasant farmers 
were grouped into large blocks. The settlement officers in the Punjab 
had made repeated attempts to consolidate land holdings in the past, 
but their efforts yielded little success for one reason or another.
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The idea of cooperatives having a responsibility for consolidating land 
was first devised by an official of the Indian civil service 
Mr.Calvert, who believed that given patience and understanding, the 
peasants could be persuaded to accept voluntarily the groupings of 
little patches of holdings into farmable blocks. The first society for 
the consolidation of landholdings was started in 1920 in Punjab, and by 
July 1930, some 0.26 million acres of patchy holdings were consolidated 
out of a total cultivable area of 34 million acres. At the time of 
partitition of India in 1947, some 1.5 million acres had been 
consolidated in Punjab by voluntary action, (also see Table 4.4)
The key issue was the acceptance of the idea by the farmers, 
although the scheme met with criticism and opposition from vested 
interests. In order to give a boost to the task the government passed 
the Punjab Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1936. The Act granted more 
powers to the settlement officers. Nevertheless, cooperatives declined 
to use them. They relied on their ability to persuade peasants for 
voluntary consolidation. It was not an easy task as every peasant to 
be affected by the scheme had to be satisfied and every conflicting 
interest reconciled. In a way the poor, the weak and the inarticulate 
were to be regarded as just as important as the more influential. 
Technical difficulties, together wih peasants' passionate love for the 
land, aggravated the task, but on the whole the work for consolidation 
was successfully undertaken by the cooperative movement in Punjab.
The other types of primary agricultural non-credit societies 
which started gaining roots in Punjab after the passage of the 
Cooperative Societies Act 1912, included the Better Farming Societies, 
Cattle Breeding Societies, sales societies, and commission shops. All
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these societies were established for some specific purposes arising 
from the doctrine of necessity. Nevertheless they were generally small 
in number and in size. Thrift, education and better- living societies 
were also established and they generally showed more interest and 
effort in educating illiterate peasants, in the broader sense of the 
word. The better living societies were concerned with the general 
well-being of their members in that they sought to restrict expenditure 
on ceremonies, penalised cattle trespassing and forbade the sale of 
daughters. The initial enthusiasm was tremendous, but adherence to 
strict rules and norms set by societies subsided with the passage of 
time and so did their operations.
The commission shops and sales societies were important in that 
they were established as a consequence of wartime conditions. The 
commission shops did not achieve success largely due to absence of a 
coherent and interested directorate, competent and honest management 
and adequate supervision and goodwill on the part of the departmental 
officials. The sales societies encountered problems such as members' 
disloyalty, indifference and friction amongst members, confused 
accounts and dishonest management. In addition, given the absence of 
appropriate marketing arrangements such as apex and secondary level 
marketing institutions, they faced considerable competition from the 
middlemen cum money-lenders, who generally provided credit to their 
clients and also catered for growers' other needs.
In addition, central organizations were established in Punjab. 
For instance the Punjab Cooperative Union was established in 1920, 
primarily to impart education in cooperation to the members and the 
management of primary societies. All societies in the province were
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affiliated to the union. The Punjab Cooperative Union also undertook 
publications on cooperation and organized conferences for cooperators 
at various levels. The union thus served as a vehicle for organizing 
training classes and conducting examinations for the members of the 
managing committees of cooperative societies. In addition, the union 
aimed at the promotion and extension of the movement, the audit of 
societies and developing and strengthening various cooperative 
organizations.
As has been noted earlier the central cooperative banks and other 
central banking agencies were established in Punjab after 1912. The 
central cooperative banks were registered on the basis of limited 
liability and were generally located at the district level. The 
central cooperative banks were important in that they collected 
deposits from townspeople and from primary societies which had surplus 
funds and channelled these funds to other primary societies in need of 
funds. The central cooperative banks in Punjab were later affiliated 
to form the Punjab Cooperative Bank, established in 1924. The Punjab 
Cooperative Bank mobilized funds in a similar manner from the cities, 
and channelled them back to the movement at lower levels. In short, a 
three-tier structure was established, where the primary societies were 
located at the village level, central Cooperative Banks were 
established at the district level and the Punjab cooperative bank was 
organized at the apex level of the movement.
The three tier cooperative structure served to cater for the 
short-term and medium term credit needs of cooperators. Nevertheless 
the need for long term credit to enable the peasants to repay mortgaged 
debts and to make investments in land was soon realized. As a result,
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the Land Mortgage banks were established in Punjab to provide credit 
for the repayment of mortgage debts and for financing long term schemes 
of agricultural expansion and investment. The first Land Mortgage Bank 
was thus opened in Punjab in 1920, and by 1926 nine mortgage banks had 
been established in Punjab with a membership of 2477 individuals (as 
well as societies). The major part of the working capital of these 
banks was subscribed by the government and a very nominal amount was 
generated by these banks from their 'own sources'. These banks started 
work by redeeming land and by advancing loans to their members for land 
improvement, and also for clearing old debts. During the elementary 
stages of their development, cases against loan defaulters were 
recorded by these banks. These banks generally held security in the 
form of land, in addition to the sureties, and loans granted by them 
were not more than 15 times the annual profit of the pledged land. 
There was, however, a mania for the purchase of land and this led to 
misutilization of loans by the loan recipients. The general working of 
these banks deteriorated with the passage of time. After the 'Great 
Depression' and indeed during its on-set land security was not of much 
use to these banks. It thus became administratively impossible for 
these banks to take over and manage the land of defaulters. In many 
cases, attempts were not made to take possession of defaulters' land to 
avoid any further loss to these banks. Amongst the difficulties 
encountered by these banks were the absence/shortage of competent 
managerial staff, lack of interest in execution of work, avoidance of 
mortgage by creditors and risks in taking possession of land on lease, 
in the face of opposition from a borrower and his friends. The 
irresponsible and even selfish behaviour of some of the directors and
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the failure of banks to carry out their duties also contributed to the 
overall poor performance of land mortgage banks in Punjab. There were 
a total of 12 such banks in operation when Punjab was bifurcated into 
Pakistan Punjab and Indian Punjab in 1947.52
The foregoing discussion indicates that the cooperative movement 
in Punjab witnessed a varying degree of success during the years 1904— 
47. The achievements were generally accounted for by the cooperative 
credit movement, though some success was achieved by non-credit 
societies, such as those concerned with consolidation of landholdings. 
Nevertheless, the weaknesses of the movement, in particular those of 
the cooperative credit movement, far outweighed the limited success of 
cooperatives in Punjab. An attempt is now made to isolate the main 
problems facing the movement during the period under reference.
The optimum development of the cooperative movement in Punjab was 
inhibited due to complex extrinsic factors. The more complex extrinsic 
factors included poverty and malnutrition, widespread inebtedness, a 
high percentage of illiteracy, lack of business experience, inadequate 
transportation and storage facilities, exploitation by money-lenders.
The movement sought to improve the socio-economic status of 
peasant farmers by providing them with credit at reasonable rates of 
interest, but in the absence of essential complementary farming inputs 
viz consolidated holdings, better supply of irrigation water, improved 
farm inputs and technical knowledge, the peasants could not and did not 
make productive use of credit. Thus despite the provision of 
reasonable amounts of cooperative credit, agricultural productivity 
remained low and the economic conditions of many peasants were
alarming.53
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The widespread illiteracy and lack of business experience 
contributed to the poor performance of the movement. It was generally 
difficult for the cooperative and the cooperators to find a literate 
villager to serve as secretary of the management committee of a 
society. There were reported villages which were even without a single 
literate man, but even if a suitable secretary for managing the 
cooperative's affairs could be found, the illiteracy of the ordinary 
members in societies made it difficult to educate them in cooperative 
practices.54
The weakened morale of cooperators also hindered proper 
development of the movement. Members' disloyalty was, for instance, 
identified as a cause of failure of many commission shops and sales 
societies. Further, where the cooperative spirit was lacking and self- 
interest led to buying and selling outside the society, it was the 
result of a failure to understand the objects of cooperation.
Administrative difficulties such as shortage of competent staff 
in the cooperative department was another obstacle in the way of the 
movement. The department did not undertake one or other type of 
desirable activity and even neglected many of its statutory functions. 
Nevertheless, the scales of remuneration were quite low and made it 
difficult for the department to recruit the needed staff. It even 
became difficult for the cooperatives to command the proper type of 
services from the department for the vitally important work of 
supervision of the movement.55
The essence of the cooperative movement was to improve the 
economic status of its members through the 'self-help' approach. The 
recognition of their needs by the prospective beneficiaries should have
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come first, then the realization that cooperation offered a way to meet 
them and finally the taking of the steps necessary first to function. 
The lack of spontaneity in the cooperative movement was its greatest 
inherent weakness, and this was unavoidable in the given circumstances. 
The movement, with the exception of few genuinely cooperatives cases, 
was not seen strictly as a cooperative movement, rather it was a 
government policy. The greatest obstacle on the way towards the goal 
of 'self-reliance' was the habit of looking towards the government to 
do the things which could and ought to have been done by the peasants 
themselves.
The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India in its report,
(1928) stressed the need for strengthening official control of the
movement, but recognised genuine cooperative control to be the ultimate 
objective. Nevertheless, the powers granted to the Registrar by the 
government were quite large: none could be organized without his
sanction, and while appeals against his decisions were possible, in 
practice few dared to do so. In many cases illiterate members did not 
know that they enjoyed the right of appeal and a strong tendency was 
reported to take his suggestions as orders, which obviously did not 
lead to the development of 'self-reliance' and a sense of 
responsibility amongst cooperators.56
In addition, many internal problems either inherent in the 
organization and/or in the operation of societies affected adversely 
the performance of the cooperative movement. Some of the several
problems in this respect are summarized below.
The first was associated with the size of a primary society. The 
Committee of Cooperation (1915) had recommended 'one society to one
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village and one village to one society1. Nevertheless this principle 
was seldom adopted by the organisers of the cooperative movement. It 
was argued that organisers at the village level had insufficient 
knowledge of banking and supervision and, as a result, it was not 
possible to manage larger societies more efficiently. As such, the 
experience of the depression years was quite relevant, when many 
societies with larger membership had to be liquidated.57
Second, the village level primary agricultural societies were 
generally organised under the principle of unlimited liability, which 
implied that every member would be financially obliged to the full 
extent of his property to make good the debts of the society. It was 
claimed that intimate mutual knowledge would make unlimited liability 
both possible and desirable in rural areas. The proponents of the 
principle of unlimited liability contended that in a village the 
reputation of a member of a cooperative society depends upon personal 
factors rather than on impersonal realizable assets, so that it is 
possible to grant loans on personal credit alone. Moreover, the 
existence of unlimited liability was regaded as very valuable in 
maintaining true cooperative principles, as it was expected to 
stimulate the members to keep each other up to the mark. Public 
opinion forces each member to keep his contract and repay his loan, 
more or less within the appointed time.58 it seems, however, that in 
requiring unlimited liability too much emphasis was laid on the moral 
aspect of the movement, as against its business side. Had the 
principle of unlimited liability operated better it would have placed a 
moral obligation on members to repay the laon to their societies. The 
low recovery of loans from members itself implies that the principle of
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unlimited liability did not prove conducive to stimulating members to 
keep a watch on each other. Further no one was able and prepared to 
make good the debt of the society in the event of default on loan. It 
may thus be argued that the principle of limited liability would have 
also not made any difference on the recovery of loans, which has 
emerged in this study.
Third, particular credit societies made poor progress in terms of 
extending coverage of the movement to large numbers of farm familities. 
The Banking Enquiry Committee (1931) argued that the people in general 
had a preference for the loans available from money-lenders.59 There 
is a considerable element of truth in this opinion as loans advanced by 
societies were generally granted for 'specified purposes', and the 
amounts loaned were frequently insufficient. Moreover, loans received 
from cooperatives had to be repaid by members on some specified time. 
On the other hand, loans received from money-lenders were generally 
flexible in their use and more readily available than those from the 
credit societies. Moreover reliance on money-lenders was strengthened 
by the fact that often they combined in themselves the role of 
landlords, merchants and village headmen. It is conceivable that this 
factor in itself would have placed an obstacle in the way of curtailing 
the power of money-lenders even if outside finances had been available 
at the required level and required time.
Nevertheless, the Banking Enquiry Committee (1931) did not see 
any difficulty from the supply side, ie. in terms of the opposition or 
at least the non-cooperation of the money-lenders. Since money-lenders 
had a monopoly in the rural areas, it was futile to expect that they 
would make their business less attractive by associating themselves
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with the cooperative movement and much less to take the initiative in 
the formation of primary societies. The money-lenders were in a better 
position to safeguard their business when they were the only literate 
men in the villages.
The fourth factor which probably set limits on the effective 
coverage of the movement was the level of per capita income in the 
agriculture sector. The ideal of ’self-help1 is the basis of the 
cooperative movement and it presupposes that at least some of the 
prospective members have a surplus over their annual requirements. But 
given the low level of per capita income, and the underlying trend, the 
major section of the rural population of the villages had no such a 
surplus; the peasants were 'homogeneous' in terms of poverty. This 
would imply that poverty itself was a basic cause of why the coverage 
of credit movement was inadequate.60 This argument rests on the 
premise that cases were often reported wherein the share capital 'paid- 
up' by the members of primary societies and paid up by the latter to 
the central cooperative banks was actually an amount deducted from the 
loans advanced.
The money-lenders, and a few other members of the local society 
had sufficient loanable funds. But they (especially the money-lenders) 
did not join the movement, in order to keep their existing business 
attractive. The general cultivators were simply insufficiently 
enthusiastic because they did not have enough resources.
If the above analysis of socio-economic life of rural areas is 
accepted then it would explain why the owned caipital of primary 
societies constituted much the smaller part of their working capital. 
For it follows that in areas where credit societies were formed they
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mostly attracted prospective borrowers. The obvious result of this 
inadequacy of the internal resources of primary societies was the 
dependence on borrowed funds, mainly from the central banks. But, 
since the capital available from the latter was not sufficient to meet 
all credit needs of members, they must have at the same time depended 
on the money-lenders. It is likely that such a situation would have 
added to the reluctance of the money-lenders to join the credit 
societies.
Let us now turn to see the problems faced by the cooperative 
movement in the recovery of loans. As already noted, the recovery of 
loans by societies in Punjab generally remained low during the period 
under discussion. The problem in recovering loans from members was
mainly due to the type of uses to which loans were paid. The
<■
Cooperative Credit Societies Act, 1904 was silent as regards the
purpose for which loans could be advanced by the societies. At the
time of the passage of the Act, it was however proposed by some experts 
that loans should be granted only for 'productive' purposes. 
Nevertheless, such a proposal was rejected by the government on the
premise that it would be difficult to restrict provision of loans for
productive purposes, since the poor peasants in India required loans 
not only for productive uses, but also for 'domestic occasions'. The 
cooperative societies took advantage of such a latitude, and loans were 
granted for as many purposes as ordinary expenses of cultivation, 
capital expenditure on land, purchase of cattle, redemption of 
mortgage, payment of old debts, payment of land revenue, the purchase 
of farm implements; ceremonial expenses, litigation and education of 
children.61
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Admittedly it was a sound idea to grant loans for a wide variety 
of purposes, especially for such long term purposes as the repayment of 
old debts and the capital expenditure on land. In particular it was 
advisable under the prevailing circumstances to enable members to get 
rid of their accumulated obligations to the money-lenders, but the 
difficulty was that though most of these - finances were raised by the 
central banks on a short-term basis the period within which the loan 
was to be repaid was not fixed. On the contrary it was hoped that the 
societies would strictly enforce repayment within some "reasonable" 
period.^2 it is not known whether loans so obtained were really used 
for repayment of old debts or other uses or whether these became an 
additional burden on members: but in practice, societies generally
failed in adhering to enforce strict repayment and the greatest 
weakness of the whole movement lay in the heavy outstanding overdues. 
The situation was even more complex in the eyes of the Committee on 
Cooperation (1915), which remarked that systematic "fictitious 
repayments" were adopted by many societies; Thus when repayment was due 
the loan was cancelled, but an equivalent loan was immediately issued 
without further inquiry to the borrower.63
Obviously, it should not be concluded that mere procedural 
changes would have materially improved the repayment capacity of the 
borrowers. As pointed out by the Reserve Bank of India, where debt is 
a chronic feature of the cultivator’s life, such debt signifies a 
perpetual disequilibrium between his income and expenditure. The 
disease is thus the deficit budget and if the symptom of debt is to be 
removed, the causes of the deficit budget must be treated first.64 But 
since the cooperative movement, in particular the credit societies,
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were not conceived as part of a coordinated programme for increasing 
the per capita income of the cultivators, the granting of loans for the 
repayment of old debts essentially meant the transfer of the obligation 
of the borrowers from the traditional money-lenders to a kind of 
'institutional money-lenders'. Stagnation of the economy against a 
background of a fast rate of population growth suggests that even 
short-term loans would accumulate over time. This was indicated by the 
considerable volume of rural indebtedness in India. It is true that 
the slump in agricultural prices during the Depression imposed such a 
severe strain that it virtually paralysed the cooperative movement. 
But considered in the light of the inadequate realization of the 
limited effectiveness of institutional credit in a backward economy it 
would seem that essentially the main contribution of the Depression was 
greatly to accelerate a process which had already been started earlier.
Another reason for poor repayment of loans, and consequently the 
limited effectiveness of the whole movement, was that the major part of 
the funds were taken by those who were in charge of the management of 
primary societies and these particular members were reluctant to repay 
their loans. In the light of available evidence it is difficult to 
question the validity of the first part. Nor is it difficult to 
appreciate the phenomenon of the unequal distribution of loans if we 
keep in mind the fact that the available funds were far too inadequate 
to meet all the credit requirements of their members, and that the 
rural life was already characterized by marked differences in the 
socio-economic circumstances of the different classes of household. 
The fact that this latter aspect of the problem was not adequately 
recognized underlines the unrealism of some basic assumptions behind
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the cooperative movement. As to the second part, some of the 
influential members did deliberately withheld the repayment of their 
overdues, and this could be anticipated under the given conditions. 
Poverty was a common feature, and this was associated with mass 
illiteracy. In this context it was convenient for influential members 
of the societies to withhold the repayment of loans, since they 
invariably controlled cooperative affairs.65
It can thus be seen that the problems of obtaining prompt
recovery of loans were the result of a mix of several factors viz 
economic, legal, moral, educational, social and even political. The 
economic ones lay in depression in agriculture; the legal in the
agrarian legislation; the moral in the decay of the peasants' strong
sense of obligation to pay; the educational in the borrower's failure
to differentiate between the nature of cooperative credit and the 
money-lenders loans; the social in the erosion of the sense of disgrace 
in attachment and insolvency proceedings; while the political factor 
was the realization by the peasant that representative institutions, 
particularly the power of the ballot box, could be used to deflate 
official pressure for the repayment of cooperative dues. In fact, all 
these factors individually and in combination influenced the extent of 
recovery of loans advanced by societies to their members.
From the perspective of coverage of the farm population and 
fulfilment of their credit needs the problem of the movement was 
essentially either to (a) incorporate the money-lenders in the primary 
societies and to ensure that they could not abuse their powers or (b) 
to eliminate them by effective competition. With regard to the first 
point efforts were far too insignificant - in one respect even
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contradictory - to be effective in inducing the traditional sources to 
surrender their profitable business. The alternative solution involved 
procuring a flow of finance from outside sources, given the homogeneity 
of borrowers in terms of low income and inadequacy of working capital. 
The establishment of central cooperative banks under the Cooperative 
Societies Act, 1912 was a sound decision in this respect, but as a 
federation of the primary societies lower down, these in turn showed 
precisely the same financial weaknesses. The Reserve Bank of India 
also insisted that until the problem of rural indebtedness was solved 
and cultivators were made credit worthy it could not provide any 
financial accommodation. Nor could the cooperatives look to the 
government for much more than supervision, administration and advice. 
Thus, in the absence of sufficient funds and lack of advice, the 
movement could not develop.
The problem confronting the cooperative movement was not only to 
provide cheap loans, but also to emphasize their productive use. The 
evils of finance drawn from traditional sources were due partly to 
higher interest rates and partly to the fact that it was not generally 
used directly to augment the per capita income of the borrowers, but to 
balance their deficit budgets. If the problem of rural indebtedness 
was to be solved what was needed was to ensure effective and efficient 
use of capital to promote growth in per capita income. But in the 
absence of a suitable socio-economic climate for economic development 
and other essential prerequisites for agricultural development, this 
was not possible. Had such circumstances prevailed, the problem of 
rural indebtedness in India would have been solved and the rate of 
interest reduced by increasing the availability of loanable funds and
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helping the cultivators to build up their security.
So far the above account has been concerned with the problems and 
weaknesses of the cooperative movement in general and the cooperative 
credit societies in particular. Nevertheless, the cooperative movement 
was able to achieve success in certain respects. The achievements of 
the movement are briefly summarized below.
The greatest achievement often ascribed to the cooperative
movement has been that it helped to break the money-lenders’ monopoly
and thereby reduce interest rates. The principle underlying the fixing
of the rate of interest charged on a loan was set by the Committee on
Cooperation (1915) which observed
"it is a sound policy for a society to start by 
lending to members at rates which are still 
substantial, though very much lower than those at 
which, with their precarious credit, they would 
borrow from the local money-lender".66
The local money-lender was in the habit of charging anything from 30 to 
60 percent per annum from the peasant cultivators of the class of which 
cooperative societies were usually composed, although in some 
localities he charged much less (say 8 to 9 percent) to customers whose 
credit was good. Hence cooperative societies charged as a rule between 
6 and 25 percent for their loans and one of the more beneficial results 
of this practice was a reduction in the rates charged by the money­
lenders . 67
The practice of charging relatively lower rates on cooperative 
loans instilled a new spirit of hope, thrift and mutual help into the 
minds of the cooperators. Not only were the members of credit 
societies saved from a very heavy burden of exhorbitant interest
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charges and in some cases entirely freed from debt but non-members were 
also able to obtain loans at greatly reduced rates owing to the 
reduction in rates charged by the money-lenders in the areas served by 
cooperative credit societies.
The cooperative movement generated funds in the form of shares 
and savings of members and deposits from non-members. These sums were 
made available to those in need of credit at rates at least well below 
the money-lenders. Moreover, through the land mortgage banks, the 
movement facilitated the gradual redemption of agriculturists from 
debt. The movement, by cooperative consolidation of holdings and 
otherwise, helped to promote agricultural development and subsidiary 
industries, and impressed a part of rural population with the value of 
combined effort and will; aided members in the purchase of their 
produce and in isolated instances gave a convincing demonstration of 
the possibilities of a concerted cooperative attack on many aspects of 
the small man's problems. The movement also offered a large number of 
non-officials with a very useful outlet for philanthropic energy.
Mere numbers of societies and growth of their membership is not a 
comprehensive measure of success of the movement; quality is a further 
criterion, in terms of the improvement in the general outlook of 
members. In this regard increased openness of the cooperators to 
suggestions for improved methods of production may be regarded as an 
achievement, which was essentially a by-product of the movement.
And finally, the cooperative movement helped in transforming 
villages and their people by rendering all manner of contributions to 
the well-being of the community. The movement brought together on 
equal footing people of different castes and creeds in an enterprise
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which aimed at the mutual benefits of its members and encouraged a 
feeling of community of interest in the villages.
In short, the discussion in the preceding pages suggest that the 
cooperative movement in the Punjab, as in any other part of India, was 
initiated by the government primarily as a defensive weapon against the 
problem of rural indebtedness. The movement was considered as an 
instrument of government policy and not, as the original ideology would 
suggest, voluntary and spontaneous groupings of farmers.
From its very inception in 1904 and up to 1947 the cooperative 
movement remained largely centred in the field of credit. The limited 
attempts made to diversify the movement into fields other than credit 
witnessed a varying degree of success, but on the whole the movement 
was essentially labelled, and rightly so, as a 'credit movement'. Even 
in this sphere, the bulk of the finance available to the movement came 
from the government, and this made many primary agricultural credit 
societies in Punjab an extension of the government's welfare and 
expenditure policy rather worthwhile self-sustaining institutions in 
themselves. Nevertheless, many more problems of the movement, 
classified as organizational, financial and functional far outweighed 
the limited achievements made by the credit societies in the Punjab up 
to 1947.
In the next section, development of the cooperative movement in 
two Punjabs is viewed from the years 1947 through 1980.
4.Ill Development of the Cooperative Movement in Two 
Puniabs - 1947-1980
The creation of Pakistan in 1947 resulted in the bifurcation of 
Punjab. Out of 29 districts of erstwhile Punjab, thirteen districts
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became the Indian Punjab and sixteen the Pakistan Punjab. The creation 
of Pakistan in general and the division of Punjab in particular 
resulted in a large scale transfer of population from India and 
Pakistan. It was estimated that some four milion refugees (Hindus and 
Sikhs) moved from the Pakistan Punjab to the Indian Punjab abandoning 
some 5.7 million acres of land. At the same time some 4.4 million 
Muslims abandoned some 4.5 million acres of land to move from the 
Indian Punjab to the Pakistan Punjab. This was one of the larger human 
migrations in history in so short a time. An estimated one million 
persons lost their lives in the intercommunal savagery.68
The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 effected the 
entire economic life of both India and Pakistan. Inevitably, it also 
affected the cooperative movement. The number, membership and working 
capital of the movement was suddenly cut short, and the movement in two 
Punjabs was worst hit at all its levels.
The partition of Punjab resulted in a large scale withdrawal of 
cooperators and deposits from the movement in the two Punjabs. In 
addition, the managers, accountants, auditors and inspectors who had 
largely staffed cooperative institutions and the department migrated to 
either India or Pakistan. The social upheaval caused by the massaive 
exchange of population created a serious vacuum of leadership. The 
incoming refugees and the local occupation were preoccupied by the 
imperatives of personal adjustment to the new environment. Many who 
were previously active in the movement were drawn to profit-making 
opportunities in trade and transport vacated by the departing 
population. And in this effort they were assisted by the prevailing 
chaos.69
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The cooperative movement in the Pakistan Punjab was virtually
compelled by the government to undertake the financing of commercial
activities by relaxing by-laws which restricted lending to members
only. The cooperative banks provided minimum banking facilities, acted
as treasury and operated as agencies for the procurement of food
grains, paddy, cotton and other field crops on behalf of the
government. They undertook the distribution of controlled items such
as sugar, kerosene and cloth in the rural areas. Many small evacuee
concerns - wheat, flour mills, rice mills and cotton ginning and
processing factories - were allotted to them for management. As
private enterprise revived, the cooperative banks did withdraw from
their purely trading and industrial activities. They showed no
disposition to withdraw from commercial lending even after commercial
banks were re-established. The effect of the partition in the Pakistan
Punjab was thus
"to turn the upper tier of the cooperative movement 
into ordinary banking, financing the very merchants 
against whom it was designed to protect the small man 
and neglecting the primary societies"^
As noted, the effects of partition of Punjab were adverse for the 
cooperative movements in both Punjabs. The movement in the Indian 
Punjab however faced many more problems after 1947. In the United 
Punjab, the Punjab Cooperative Bank and the Punjab Cooperation Union 
had been established at the apex level. As a result of division of the 
Punjab, these two vital institutions were left in Pakistan. The Punjab 
Cooperative Bank was important in that it played a key role in 
financing, coordinating and controlling the working of central 
cooperative banks and the bank also served as a clearing house for the
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excesses and deficiencies of central cooperative banks. The Punjab
Cooperative Bank also served as a link between the general money-market
and the primary societies in the villages. In the absence of an apex 
bank, the movement in the Indian Punjab was badly affected at the 
secondary and primary levels.^
In addition, large funds belonging to cooperative institutions in 
the Indian Punjab got blocked up in the Punjab cooperative bank. Large 
amounts due from Muslim members in societies became irrecoverable. 
There were many societies in the Indian Punjab with membership 
consisting almost wholly of Muslims. Loans advanced to these societies 
by central cooperative banks became bad debts. The movement had to 
build itself up almost from scratch without any apex level financing 
institutions, in particular, a cooperative bank. The Punjab (state) 
Cooperative Bank in the Indian Punjab was established in 1949. Later, 
the Punjab Cooperative Union was also established in 1952. At least up 
to 1948, the cooperative movement in the Indian Punjab had to pass
through hard times in the absence of any apex level financing
institution.72
The central cooperative banks and the primary societies, in 
particular agricultural credit societies, had a common share of 
suffering in the two Punjabs. The central cooperative banks had to pay 
interest on members' deposits and honour cooperators' claims. In the 
process they were virtually in danger of collapse. The respective 
governments in the two Punjabs came to the rescue of central 
cooperative banks and provided them with financial assistance to tide 
them over the financial crisis.
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The position of land mortgage banks was in no way better than the 
central cooperative banks. Out of 12 such banks in the undivided 
Punjab, 3 were left in India, while 9 came to the share of Pakistan. As 
already noted in the preceding section, land mortgage banks in united 
Punjab were not doing well. The problems inherent in the structure and 
organization of these banks became an obstacle to developing a viable 
long-term cooperative credit structure in the Pakistan Punjab. The 
land mortgage banks in the Pakistan Punjab were abandoned by the 
government in 1954. The decision was so instrumental, that the 
movement in the Pakistan Punjab has not been capable of developing a 
long term cooperative credit structure even to date.7^
Nonetheless the government in the Indian Punjab took a keen 
interest in the organization of land mortgage banks. A viable 
organizational setup was erected at both the apex and secondary levels 
during the mid 1950s and the land mortgage banks went ahead in the 
provision of long-term credit for making investment on land. 
Randhawa7^ points out that from its inception in 1958, the Punjab State 
Cooperative Land Mortgage Bank has made an increasingly significant 
contribution to the financing of tubewell installation. In 1965-66 the 
level of lending for tubewells was only Rs 5,400,000. By 1970-71 , 
total annual lending was Rs 95,184.000.
As noted earlier in the united Punjab, a non-governmental 
organization i.e. the Punjab Cooperative Union was established with the 
task of imparting education and training to the ordinary members and 
also to the members of management committees of societies. In 
addition, the union organized seminars, arranged conferences and 
published material on cooperation. The primary societies and all other
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cooperative institutions in the Punjab were members of the union. The 
union met its expenditure from the grants provided by the government 
and also from the contributions made by the societies as well as other 
cooperative institutions. At the time of partition of the Punjab in 
1947, the existing union was left in Pakistan. A new Punjab state 
cooperative union was established in the Indian Punjab in 1952.
The Punjab cooperative unions in two Punjabs have generally 
undertaken the taks of arranging seminars and conferences, in addition 
to publishing leaflets and books on cooperation. The role of the 
unions in imparting training and education to the members of societies 
has however largely remained far from satisfactory. This is primarily 
due to shortage of competent staff with the unions. In both the 
Punjabs, short courses were arranged and the unions have often invited 
members of the management committees of societies to attend these 
courses on a voluntary basis. Nonetheless attendance in these courses 
has generally remained low. The unions in both the Punjabs have 
however made good attempts to represent the non-governmental character 
of the cooperative movements at the National and International 
Cooperative forums.
At the time of partition, the cooperative movement in an 
undivided Punjab was largely centred in the sphere of credit. As a 
result of partition therefore, a large number of agricultural credit 
societies were shared between the Indian Punjab and the Pakistan 
Punjab. In the united Punjab, it had been generally customary for a 
primary society to be comprised either purely of Muslim members or non- 
Muslim cooperators. The division of the Punjab resulted in the 
migration of Muslim and non-Muslim members of societies to Pakistan and
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India respectively. And, in the process, they took away or destroyed 
the cooperative records. Loans received by members remained unpaid and 
many societies became defunct for all practical purposes. It seemed as 
if there was a complete collapse of the movement at its base level in 
both the Indian Punjab and Pakistan Punjab.
Nevertheless, the deadlock was broken through the sheer pressure 
of necessity, the grim determination of the people and above all under 
the leadership of the departments of cooperation in the respective 
regions in India and Pakistan. The existing societies were revitalized 
and new societies formed as the need arose. The credit societies began 
to function and advance loans again. The outlook was however changed 
very soon as the governments in both the Indian Punjab and Pakistan 
Punjab started thinking of extending the scope of the movement into 
other fields besides credit. In the Pakistan Punjab, in particular, 
the movement was forced to shift from purely credit provision into 
multipurpose activities. Many commission shops and purchase-sale 
societies were organized in the 'mandi-towns1 to save the marketing 
organizations from complete collapse. But this welcome change proved 
to be short-lived. After 1951-52, there was a continous decline in the 
value of purchases made by multipurpose societies. As private traders 
re-entered the field, growers seemed to prefer to deal with them 
because of the poor management of the societies. In several cases, 
where the management was initially efficient, the office bearers 
deserted the cooperative societies and established themselves in 
business, illustrating the basic poverty of leadership in the movement 
after partition.76
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The attempts aimed at consolidating the movement in the Indian 
Punjab by reorganizing societies at the base level were rewarded with a 
reasonable measure of success. In a short time the movement stood on a 
sound basis, and made some rapid strides. It was estimated that a 
little under 45 percent of the rural population was embraced by the 
movement, and out of a total 15283 inhabited villages in the Indian 
Punjab as many as 10766 had a society of some kind functioning in their 
midst by 1956.77 in comparison, only 8 percent of the rural population 
in the Pakistan Punjab was covered by the movement. And more than half 
of the total villages in the province were without a cooperative 
society of any kind in 1954.
Two reasons might explain the relatively better performance of 
the movement in the Indian Punjab. First, the central Punjab (area
comprising the present Indian Punjab) was an area of smallholdings and
small self-cultivating peasant proprietors. The partition of Punjab in 
1947 enhanced this egalitarian factor, because a policy of graded cuts, 
heavily weighed in favour of the small man, was adopted by the
government for alloting land to the incoming refugees. Second, the 
process was given a push by the land reform legislation of 1953 which 
placed a ceiling of 30 acres on a family holding. This was 
subsequently cut to 18 standard acres. The net effect of these 
measures was positive. The big landlords who in the past spent most of 
their time in idleness and luxury totally disappeared as a result of 
land reform. The situation thus represented a model of agriculture 
based largely on small peasants, providing an ideal base for the growth 
of the m o v e m e n t . A n o t h e r  contributory factor, as pointed out by 
Randhawa,80 was the influx of most progressive Sikh peasantry from
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Pakistan's Punjab to the Indian Punjab; while almost one-third of the 
Muslims they replaced were not even agriculturists. In fact, it has 
been argued that after its inception, the movement was weak in the 
south-west and the south east of the united Punjab, while it 
consistently had done well in the central districts (Indian Punjab) at 
least up to 1947.
The organized and more planned attempts for restructuring and 
rehabilitating the movement in the two Punjabs were made by the 
respective governments in the mid 1950s. In the Indian Punjab concerted 
efforts were made by the government to implement recommendations made 
in the All India Rural Credit Survey (1981). An attempt was made to 
establish large-sized viable primary societies in parallel with 
agricultural credit societies. It was envisaged that ultimately all 
primary credit societies would be converted into large-sized viable 
units. The state became a partner of the movement by contributing to 
the share capital of societies. The large-sized societies were 
entrusted with the role of providing improved seed and chemical 
fertilizer, besides credit. In addition, marketing of members’ produce 
was assigned to societies as an additional task. The large sized 
societies were expected to enrol in their membership persons from all 
classes of society. In short, the proposed society was a model ’multi­
purpose’ primary unit.
In Pakistan's Punjab, on the other hand, the Cooperative Enquiry 
Committee Report ( 1 9 5 5 ) had also underlined the need for reorganizing 
existing primary credit societies into 'multipurpose societies', 
capable of providing credit for production purposes to its members. 
Besides, the multipurpose units were entrusted with the role of taking
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up supply business by providing improved farm inputs to their members.
The planned and voluntary attempts were made and as a result, 
large sized societies in the Indian Punjab and multipurpose societies 
in the Pakistan Punjab were started in the latter half of the 1950s. 
These units succeeded here and there, but on the whole, societies in 
the two Punjabs failed to establish firm roots in the villages. In 
very many cases these societies did not supply improved seed and 
chemical fertilizers. Neither did they undertake marketing of produce 
with success. In the provision of credit, they did no better .than the 
existing credit societies. Many qualifying members did not receive 
loans. The large sized societies in the Indian Punjab further failed 
to achieve effective coverage of weaker sections of society. Many 
factors contributed to the limited success - indeed failure - of these 
societies. Absence of well trained and experienced managerial staff, 
lack of education of members, divisions in village life based on social 
groupings, members disloyalty, dependence on unpaid honorary staff to 
run affiars of societies, inadequate provision of credit by the 
cooperative banks, and absence of viable marketing structures were some 
of the major factors which determined limited success of these 
societies in both the Punjabs.
In view of the malfunctioning of a large number of large sized 
societies in the Indian Punjab and wider criticism at the hands of the 
late Prime Minister Nehru, organization of agricultural service 
societies in India was proposed following a decision taken at the 
Indian National Congress Session held at Nagrup in 1959. However, this 
made little difference in terms of the structure and organization of 
service societies from the earlier large-sized societies. The service
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societies were instead assigned a role to take up the total
responsibility for the socio-economic development of its members by
providing them with credit and 'other services' in a 'package deal'.
In the Punjab (India) service societies came into existence from 
scratch as well as by reorganization of existing societies. The 
conversion of large sized societies into service societies resulted in 
a substantial reduction in the total number of large sized societies at 
the base level of the movement. There were 417 large sized societies 
in 1958-59; this number was brought down to 25 by 1961-62. The
organization of agricultural service societies was not preceded by any 
well planned efforts. The organization was completed as a rush job to 
attain the target by the simple device of converting existing societies 
into service societies.83
The service societies did not fulfil the hopes expected of them 
as the names of many existing units were changed into service societies 
without bringing any change in their day-to-day functions. Further, 
weak or defunct societies were not eliminated from the scene. In many 
instances service societies did nothing apart from appointing 
secretaries to justify receipt of subsidies from the government for 
administrative e x p e n s e s . 84
It seems that at least during the 1950s and in the first half of 
the 1960s, the governmental attempts to diversify the movement into 
fields besides credit invariably failed in both Punjabs. The major 
thrust was once again on agricultural credit societies, which through 
time had increased both in number and also in membership. However, the 
progress shown by the credit movement was largely accounted for in 
numerical terms; the weaknesses became even more evident in qualitative
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terms. The inadequacies of the operational aspects of the credit 
societies were associated with shortcomings in their management, 
disbursement of loans and their recovery. In many instances, managing 
committees in these societies were manned by inefficient persons with 
inadequate training and little awareness of cooperative principles. 
The ordinary members, had little control over the operation of these 
societies. The members were selected and admitted without care and 
this resulted in the control of the credit movement falling into the 
hands of a few powerful persons. The weaknesses of these societies 
were often seen in respect of poor coverage of the farm population, 
neglect of the most needy and also in terms of inadequate generation of 
'owned funds'.85
At the secondary level, the cooperative credit structure in 
Pakistan's Punjab however showed many more weaknesses. The Credit 
Enquiry Commission (1959) came to the conclusion that the central banks 
constituted a very weak link in the cooperative credit structure. The 
commission attributed these weaknesses of the banks to their poor 
administration and involvement in commercial lending for which they had 
little experience and which led to corrupt practices.86
However, against the odds, expansion of the credit movement was 
helped by the improvements in the agricultural situation in the 
Punjabs, particularly in respect of increases in production since the 
mid 1960s, when the new bio-chemical technology began to make an 
impact. As such, governmental efforts contributed a lot to the 
furtherance of the cause of the movement. In the face of technological 
developments taking place in the agricultural sector, the movement in 
the two Punjabs was assigned the role by the government of distributor
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of subsidized credit together with improved farm inputs. The 
cooperative movement acted as a government vehicle which linked the 
supply of subsidized fertilizer, on credit, with an approved package of 
farm practices and seed. Especially in the Punjab (Pakistan) large­
sized agricultural development societies were organized, following the 
publication of the Wazir Ali Committee Report (1964),87 primarily to 
disburse credit and supply improved seed and chemical fertilizer in the 
farm sector. These societies made some progress, but irregular and 
untimely supply of farm inputs together with a defective marketing 
network proved a stumbling block to the success of these societies in 
Pakistan's Punjab.
The movement was however employed by the agriculture departments 
in the two Punjabs as an integral part of the extension effort and also 
as an instrument of the governments’ agricultural policy in the 1960s. . 
And cooperatives played a significant role in the programme for 
disseminating new bio-chemical technology.88
By the end of the 1960s, the All India Rural Credit Review 
Committee in India had made exhaustive recommendations for the 
revitalization and reorganization of the whole administration of the 
movement in the country. The Review Committee placed the emphasis on 
large-sized viable primary units. The committee underlined the need 
for provision of credit both in cash and kind under a well-defined 
'crop loan scheme'. Emphasis was once again given to integrate supply 
of credit with that of marketing members' farm produce. A vital 
recommendation of the commission concerned the injection of all 
commercial banks into rural lending.89
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The recommendations made by the Review Committee Report (1969) 
had important bearings on. the cooperative movement in the Indian 
Punjab. Nevertheless significant changes in the organization and 
functions of the movement took place after 1976, following publication 
of the Report of the National Commission on Agriculture (1976)^0 in 
India. The commission while upholding many recommendations of the 
Review Committee, proposed instead the organization of farmers' service 
societies at the base level of the movement. The main recommendations 
made by the All India Rural credit review committee and the National 
Commission on agriculture were made a part of government's cooperative 
policy in the Indian Punjab. Farmers' service societies were 
established in the Indian Punjab in the 1970s to provide their members 
with credit together with other requisite services in a package deal. 
The pace of formation of farmers' service societies however remained 
slow largely due to lack of competent managerial staff. Nevertheless 
many agricultural credit societies in the Indian Punjab provided credit 
both in cash and kind under crop loan schemes.' In addition commercial 
banks were inducted into the business of rural lending.
The reconstruction of credit and marketing societies was 
undertaken in Pakistan's Punjab during the second half of the 1960s. 
Many more agricultural credit societies together with a limited number 
of agricultural marketing societies were established. The scope of the 
cooperative movement was further extended to cover mechanised 
cooperative farming. The general performance of credit societies was 
not much better than that of the existing primary units. The 
mechanized cooperative farms, though sponsored and administered in 
specified areas by the government, worked well for some time, but over
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the years they outlived their utility due to shortage of competent 
managerial staff, the indifferent attitude of cooperators, inadequate 
operational funds and the absence of any services centre for the repair
of machinery. 9
The limited number of marketing societies in the two Punjabs did 
not make significant contributions as most of these societies depended 
more on government patronage. It was not uncommon for the governments 
to try to meet their failings by providing them a monopoly business in 
consumer goods, fertilizer and improved seed. These measures however 
also failed to set up their business on competitive lines with the 
private sector. In Pakistan's Punjab marketing societies were used as 
a vehicle to funnel food grain and consumer goods to the rural 
population during the period of post-independence stringency. Later, 
however these societies took up their traditional role. Nevertheless 
they generally failed in undertaking to dispose of members' produce. 
And this was in part due to the absence of viable apex and secondary 
level cooperative marketing structures. The primary marketing 
societies in the two Punjabs faced strong competition from the private 
traders and the middlemen. The other limitations related to their 
trading practices. These societies did not undertake processes such as 
grading, pooling, bulking of produce, and processing where necessary. 
Many marketing societies did not even arrange sale in the most 
favourable markets. They were manned also by persons who had little 
knowledge and training in marketing techniques or familiarity with 
cooperative methods of work.92 The performance of marketing societies 
in the Indian Punjab, however, considerably improved following the 
establishment of the State Cooperative Marketing Federation in 1967.
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The state cooperative marketing federation (commonly called Markfed) 
was established at the apex level. District cooperative marketing 
federations were established soon thereafter, and these in turn had a 
link with the primary agricultural marketing societies located at the 
base level. The three tier marketing structure was thus developed in 
the Indian Punjab after 1967. The 'Markfed' undertook the task of 
dispensing improved seed, chemical fertilizers, pesticides to the 
farmers through a well developed system of 'village depots' in the 
1970s. The state 'markfed' together with district based organizations 
and the primary societies served as a sole buying agent of food grains 
for the government. R a n d h a w a ^  points out that, at least in the trade 
in food grains, the Markfed achieved considerable success by 
eliminating the role of middlemen and grain dealers in the Indian 
Punjab.
Many administrative changes which were introduced by the national 
governments in India and Pakistan affected both the course and 
direction of the movement in the two Punjabs, especially in the 1960s 
and 1970s. As already noted, the Indian sub-continent was partitioned 
in 1947, and as a result Punjab was divided. In May 1948, the eight 
native states of Patiala, Kapurthala, Jind, Nabha, Farid Kot, 
Malerkotla, Nalagarh and Kalsia were amalgamated into the state of 
Patiala and the Indian Punjab States Union (PEPSU). Similarly, 17 of 
the Punjab hill states were combined to form the state of Himachal 
Pradesh. In 1956 under the States Reorganization Act PEPSU was 
integrated into the Indian Punjab with some internal changes in the 
districts. A further reorganization in 1966 brought about by the 
government of India on linguistic grounds led to yet another division
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of the Indian Punjab. The two present-day states of the Indian Punjab 
and Haryana were formed. The area comprising the present Indian Punjab 
was inhabited by the progressive Sikh peasantry, and, as stated
earlier, had a good number of successful cooperatives in united Punjab.
The administrative changes introduced in 1966, however, resulted oncq 
again in the transfer of staff from the Department of Cooperation in 
the Indian Pub jab to Haryana. As such, the pace and performance of the 
movement in the present Indian Punjab was badly affected in the late 
1960s.
On the other hand, at the time of the creation of Pakistan in 
1947 the federal unit of the country had five provinces viz Punjab, 
Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan and East Pakistan (present Bangladesh). This 
federal unit lasted till 1959, when the government removed the 
provincial autonomy of the Punjab, Sind, NWFP and Baluchistan by 
federating them into 'one unit' called 'West Pakistan'. At that time
(1959), the cooperative movement in each of the four provinces had a 
different structure and the movement was administered by different sets 
of cooperative Acts. In addition, separate Registrars, one for every 
province, served as administering authorities of the respective 
departments of cooperative societies. Following the creation of 'one 
unit', the performance of the cooperative movement in all the former
four provinces was influenced since there was a merger of respective
departments of cooperative societies into one department of cooperative 
societies, West Pakistan, headed by a single man (i.e. the Registrar). 
A separate Cooperative Societies Act, was promulgated in West Pakistan, 
which granted the Registrar many more powers to intervene in 
cooperative affairs. It has been argued that it was the powers granted
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to the Registrar which instead allowed the government to use the 
movement as a vehicle to serve some of its political objectives.
The federal unit "West Pakistan" remained operational until 1969, 
when once again the old administrative set up allowing provincial 
autonomy to the former four provinces was revived. The course of 
development of the cooperative movement was once again affected with 
the revival of the old set up of the cooperative institutions in 
Punjab.
Another significant change in Pakistan which accompanied 'one 
unit', was the creation of the West Pakistan Cooperative Development 
Board in 1962 with the purpose of creating the required capacity for 
development planning, project preparation and for promoting self­
management within the movement. The Board achieved some reasonable 
measure of success in its task. But it had hardly taken roots when the 
government in West Pakistan decided in 1966 to abolish the Board. 
While justifying dissolution, the government held that the tasks 
undertaken by the Board and the department of cooperative societies 
were almost of the same nature and this in turn caused confusion in the 
minds of the cooperators and created administrative problems in the 
successful implementation of cooperative policies. When judged from 
the viewpoint of the government, this justification seems plausible. 
But this also revealed the weakness of the government in failing to 
adhere to its committed policy towards the movement at least for a 
reasonably long period, to find out the real outcome. The dissolution 
of the Board caused a severe blow to the movement at the apex level. A 
large number of employees of the Board were made redundant. Many more 
staff members were transferred to other departments. Above all, many
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development schemes, prepared by the Board for the overhauling of the 
movement in the province, were overlooked.94
The decade of the 1970s influenced once again the growth and
performance of the movement in the two Punjabs. The government of 
Pakistan, for instance, passed a series of cooperative laws in 1972, 
and these laws in turn affected the cooperative movement in Pakistan's 
Punjab at all its levels. The Cooperative Reforms Order 1972 was
passed. It was important in that it provided that (a) no individual 
would be a member of the managing committee of a cooperative bank for 
more than two consecutive terms (b) no individual would be a member of 
a central cooperative bank (c) no trader would be a member of an 
agricultural credit or marketing society. This order caused a great 
upheaval in the cooperative movement. A good number of individuals 
ceased to be the members of central cooperatives in the province. 
Administrators were appointed for 28 out of a total 30 central banks in 
the Pakistan Punjab. The unseating of directors of cooperative banks 
was justifiable on account of their misconduct of cooperative banking 
operations. Nevertheless the appointment of new administrators was an 
imposition of the government from above and also a violation of 
cooperative principles. The new administrators were generally 
incompetent and did not take up their responsibility satisfactorily due 
to a lack of requisite experience and knowledge in banking practices.95 
Another important step taken by the government of Pakistan was
the creation of the Federal Bank for cooperatives in 1976, with the
power to extend credit facilities to the provincial cooperative banks 
and to regulate their operations. This step was accompanied with the 
dissolution of all central cooperative banks and the banking unions in
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Pakistan's Punjab. This decision was taken on the ground of 
malfunctioning and mismanagement of a large number of central 
cooperative banks in the province. However dissolution of central 
cooperative banks and their unions was not preceded by the development 
of any well-planned alternatives. The dissolution of the banks and 
their unions was a major setback to the movement, as the secondary 
level cooperative institutions were comprehensively eliminated at the 
district level at once, thereby creating a gulf between the apex 
cooperative institutions and the base level primary societies.96
It may be important to recall that at the time of partition there 
was a three-tier cooperative structure of the movement in united 
Punjab. And the same pattern was retained in the two Punjabs. 
However, after 1976, the government in the Pakistan Punjab dissolved 
all the central cooperative banks and their unions, which resulted in 
the elimination of all secondary level cooperative institutions. The 
structure of the movement was naturally reduced to two tiers. The 
primary societies were located at the base level, and the Punjab 
Cooperative Bank was organized at the apex level. In contrast, the 
three-tier structure of the movement in the Indian Punjab remained 
operational. The important point is that the change from the old three 
tier structure to a two tier structure in the Pakistan Punjab 
restricted the smooth flow of credit from the Punjab Cooperative Bank 
to the primary credit societies, given the absence of any secondary- 
level cooperative institutions. In addition, critics^7 suggest that 
cumbersome precedural formalities were required before a primary 
society was able to seek funds from the apex cooperative bank in 
Pakistan's Punjab. These measures adversely effected the development
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of the movement.
The reorganization of. the cooperative movement at the base level 
in the two Punjabs provided a further boost and instilled new spirit 
and hope in the working of primary agricultural credit societies in the 
1970s. There was a complete overhaul and reorganization of the credit 
movement in the Indian Punjab. The non-viable primary societies were 
eliminated from the scene. Small sized units were amalgamated to form 
large-sized primary societies. The scope of the movement was extended 
from purely credit to other fields of economic activity. The 
reorganizational measures resulted in a considerable reduction in the 
number of primary credit societies in the Indian Punjab. And the 
average size of membership in a society more than doubled. The large­
sized units provided credit, improved seed and chemical fertilizers. 
Although these measures provided a boost to the movement, the 
weaknesses became even more evident. Members did not repay their loans 
and, as a result mounting outstanding loans stood against members in 
the societies^®.
In the Pakistan Punjab, the Federal Bank for Cooperatives 
provided an increasing amount of credit to the Punjab (Provincial) 
Cooperative Bank in the late 1970s, and in turn the Punjab Cooperative 
Bank extended loanable funds to the primary societies. A crash 
programme was also introduced to achieve faster growth in the provision 
of credit to members in societies. This resulted in mushroom growth of 
primary societies in the province. Later on in 1978 the Government of 
the Pakistan Punjab decided to provide mark-up interest free loans to 
small farmers (owning land up to 12£ acres), through the cooperative 
movement. Initially the maximum limit of the mark-up interest-free
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loan per member was fixed at Rs 6000.00 and this was a sufficient 
amount at least for the purchase of seed, an appropriate quantity of 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides. The period of repayment for such 
loans was stretched up to 10 to 12 months to enable cultivator members 
to ensure prompt payment from the sale proceeds of their current 
harvest. The limit was further raised up to Rs 10,000 as a result of 
increased prices of farm inputs. The loaning scheme was simplified by 
the federal cooperative bank still further by introducing certain 
changes in the provision of loans by the movement. Loans 'in kind' 
were provided and its recovery made in cash. The societies instead of 
providing cash, have instead dispensed improved seed, chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides in the Pakistan Punjab to their members, 
since the .simplification of a new loaning scheme by the federal 
cooperative bank in 1978.
The general impact of mark-up interest free loaning scheme in 
Pakistan's Pubjab was commendable in one respect in that it ensured 
almost 100 percent recovery of loans from members. This was a 
significant achievement of the movement. Critics^ 0n the other hand 
questioned the reliability of such claims. It was alleged that funds 
meant for the disbursement of loans in the form of improved farm inputs 
were diverted by the members of societies towards various short-term 
interest bearing investments. And, through illegal practices, new 
loans created in fictitious names were adjusted against the 'old' 
loans. Further, through this practice, the members besides making big 
illegal earnings, are able to show high recovery rates.
In short, the cooperative movement received a set back at the 
time of partition and this was demonstrated both in terms of a
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reduction in size of the movement and the inefficient working of many 
cooperative institutions in the two Punjabs after 1947. The movement 
was forced by the respective governments to shift from credit to 
multipurpose activities. The governmental attempts in general failed 
as in very many cases new societies established with the object to 
provide improved seed, chemical fertilizers and market members farm 
produce, besides dispensing credit, failed as a result of 
mismanagement, insufficient owned funds and absence of viable secondary 
and apex level supporting cooperative institutions. The credit 
movements nevertheless witnessed some success in the two Punjabs 
especially during the 1960s, when many societies were employed as a 
governmental vehicle to funnel credit and other improved farm inputs in 
the farm sector. Later, however, it became clear that reorganizational 
measures were not generally successful especially during the 1970s, 
when a large number of societies in two Punjabs showed more or less 
similar but many more qualitative weaknesses. Performance of the 
movement in the two Punjabs, though impressive in quantitative terms, 
was not so sound in a qualitative sense.
4.IV Conclusions
Debt-peonage and chronic credit shortage were among the chief 
causes of low agricultural incomes and productivity in India in the 
latter half of the last century. . The British administration in India 
set up various commissions of enquiry. Among recommendations of these 
commissions was the proposal that the government enter the business of 
credit supply through the introduction of cooperative credit societies. 
As a result, a Cooperative Credit Societies Act was passed in 1904 and
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was supplemented by another Act in 1912. These two acts remained a 
model for cooperative legislation not only in pre-partition India, but 
also in post-independence India and Pakistan.
The cooperative movement in the Punjab, as in any other part of 
India was sponsored and nurtured under state patronage. The movement 
expanded during and after World War 1, but largely remained centred in 
the sphere of credit. The outbreak of the Second World War provided a 
basis for further advance and many supply societies, consumer stores 
and marketing societies were established. In practice, however, 
performance of the movement, in particular that of the credit 
societies, remained poor due largely to low level of local 
participation, low recovery, insufficient owned capital, dependence on 
borrowed funds, and inefficient management. Weaknesses of the movement 
were evident and these in turn outweighed the limited achievements made 
by the movement during the pre-partition period in the Punjab.
The partition of the Punjab resulted in considerable reduction in
numbers, membership and working capital of the movement in the two
Punjabs. The initial set back was overcome soon, but the movement was
*
forced to shift from purely 'credit' to multipurpose activities. The 
governmental attempts, nevertheless failed in changing the direction of 
the movement, except in that the movement served as a vehicle to funnel 
credit, improved seed and chemical fertilizers to the farm sector. In 
that respect, the movement acted as an instrument of the governments' 
agricultural policy in the two Punjabs.
The movement showed some progress in the field of marketing in 
the Indian Punjab, after the mid 1960s; however the Pakistan Punjab 
lagged much behind in this respect.
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The reorganization of the movement in the 1970s provided a boost
to many credit societies in two Punjabs. Nevertheless performance was
largely shown in quantitative terms. The bulk of finance to the
movement came from the government and the major function remained to 
develop a means to provide credit and only credit. The qualitative 
weaknesses of the movement in addition, became more evident in two
Punjabs.
In the following chapters we shall analyse the performance of the 
cooperative movement, particularly agricultural credit societies in the 
two Punjabs from a more detailed empirical perspective. Data shall be 
presented to show that the actual performance of the movement in the 
two Punjabs has been consistent with the arguments flagged in this 
chapter.
248
Notes to Chapter 4
1. For an elaborate account on the nature and extent of rural 
indebtedness, as also the character of agriculture in India 
during the 19th century see for instance Darling (1925); chaps X 
and XI; Calvert, H. (1936) Chapter 2; Government of India Report 
of the Indian Famine Commission (1880); Hough, E.M. (1950) pp30- 
50; Government of India Report of the Royal Commission on 
Agriculture in India (1928).
2. See Government of India Report of the Royal Commission on 
Agriculture in India (1928); Darling (1925); Chapter X.
3. See for instance Thorburn, S.S. (1886); Wolf, H. (1927); 
Government of India Famine Commission Report (1901).
4. See Nicholson Report, 1895-97 (1960) edition p492
5. See Nicholson Report (1960) edition; also see Darling (1925) 
Chapters X & XI.
6. For a detailed account of money-lenders and their system in 
India, with special reference to Punjab see Darling, M. (1925); 
Chapters X and XI; also see Calvert, H. (1936); Government of 
India Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture (1928); 
Metcalf, T.R. (1962) pp390-97
7. See Darling, M. (1925) pp146-164.
8. See Thorburn, S.S. (1886) Chapters VIII and IX.
9. See Darling, M. (1925) pp208-221; also see Calvert, H. (1936).
10. See for instance Nicholson Report (1960) ed. pp4-42.
11. See Government of India Report on the Indian Central Banking 
Enquiry Committee (1931) p198.
12. Ibid, p136.
13. See Darling (1925); Mr. Darling calculated that in Punjab, no 
less than one-fourth of the income tax paying class were money­
lenders (op. cit. p212).
14. Vij, B.D. (1959), p37.
15. See Government of India Report of the Famine Commission (1880) 
Part II Section IV, Chapter III, p130.
16. See Hough, E.M. (1932) pp46-47; Wolf, H. (1927) pp16-17.
17. See Hough, E.M. (1932), p46.
249
18. The deprivation of security on which the peasants can borrow 
money is a circumstance which should seriously be taken into 
account before the peasants right of sale of his land is 
restricted in any manner, as was lately done by the land 
alienation act; See for instance Attaullah (1937)
19. See Government of India Report of the Royal Commission on 
Agriculture (1928); Abridged Report, p47.
20. See Hough, E.M. (1950) p44.
21. A good account of the German and European Cooperative movements 
has been portrayed by Nicholson in his 'Report regarding the 
possibility of introducing Land Banks into the Madras Presidency' 
see Nicholson Report 1895-97 (1960) edition.
22. See E.M. Hough (1950) pp43-51.
23. See Government of India Report of the Indian Famine Commission 
(1901) p67; also see Government of India Report of the committee 
on the establishment of cooperative credit societies in India 
(1903), p6.
24. See Government of India Report on Cooperation in India (1915),
p1.
25. See E.M. Hough (1950), pp47-48.
26. Quoted in the Government of Pakistan Cooperative Inquiry 
Committee Report (1955), p8.
27. See Government of Pakistan Cooperative Inquiry Committee Report 
(1955), p9; By 1912 number of societies in Punjab was only 1769, 
with a membership of 93 thousand and a working capital of Rs 7.3 
million. About 24 districts were embraced by the movement, but 
in 9 of them number of societies was even less than ten.
28. See Hough (1950) pp47-51.
29. See Government of Pakistan Cooperative Inquiry Committee Report 
(1955) p10.
30. See Gill, M.S. (1983) pp28-43.
31. See Government of India Report of the Committee on Cooperation 
(1915).
32. See Hough (1950) pp50-51; Government of Pakistan Cooperative 
Inquiry Committee Report (1955) pp25-38.
33. Ibid.
34. See Madan (1958) pp55-78.
250
35. See Gill, M.S. (1983) pp38-39.
36. See Government of India Report of the Royal Commission on 
Agriculture in India (1928).
37. For an excellent description of the money-lenders system see
Darling (1925) Chapters X & XI.
38. See Gill, M.S. (1983) Chapterss 3 & 4.
39. See Government of India Cooperative Planning Committee Report
(1946), p12.
40. It was estimated that out of some 23476 primary agricultural 
societies in Punjab in 1938 as many as 17017 (72 percent) were 
agricultural credit societies; see Gill, M.S. (1983) pp70-72.
41. See Nicholsons Report, 1895-97 (1960) edition, p17.
42. See Government of India Report of the Committee on Cooperation in 
India (1915), pp9,10.
43. See E.M. Hough (1950) pp47-48.
44. See Government of Pakistan Cooperative Inquiry Committee Report 
(1955) pp11-12.
45. The cooperative movement in Punjab, as in any other part in India 
remained centred in the sphere of credit. And this was mainly 
because it was started as a defensive weapon against the rising 
problem of rural indebtedness. See for example Hough (1950); 
Qureshi, A.I. (1947)
46. See F.W. Wace (1939) pp8-9; also see Hough (1950), p278.
47. See Gill, M.S. (1983) pp59-60.
48. For a classification of Cooperatives into different categories 
see Hough (1950) p107.
49. See Government of Pakistan Cooperative Inquiry Committee Report 
(1955), p11.
50. Ibid, p10.
51. Ibid, pp10—11.
. 52. See Gill, M.S. (1983) Chapter 4.
53. For an elaborate account on it see Hough (1950); Qureshi (1947);
Government of India Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture 
in India (1928); Darling (1925); Calvert (1936).
251
54. This confirms that many more members in societies were 
illiterate. They did not even know what cooperation is actually 
meant. For discussion on this point see Government of India 
Report of the Royal Commission on Agriculture (1928), pp469-470.
55. See Hough (1950) pp293-294.
56. See Government of India Report of the Royal Commission on 
Agriculture (1928) pp448-50.
57. See Reserve Bank of India All India Rural credit survey (1954) 
Vol II p247.
58. See for instance Hough (1950) pp48-49, 61 ; also see Qureshi
(1947); Government of India Report of the Committee on 
Cooperation (1915)
59. See Government of India Report on the Indian Central Banking 
Enquiry Committee (1931), pp150-151.
60. See E.M. Hough (1959), p70.
61. See Gill, M.S. (1983) Chapter 3
62. The principle was that agricultural finance should be based on an 
agricultural cycle, which may under certain circumstances be a 
matter not of one, but of from two to five years; see Government 
of India Report on Cooperation (1915) p12.
63. Ibid, pp10-12; 38,47.
64. Reserve Bank of India, Agricultural credit Department Bulletin 
No. 1, p12, cited by Hough, (1950) p38.
65. See Reserve Bank of India All India Rural Credit Survey (1954); 
Gill, M.S. (1983) Chapters 4,5
66. Government of India Report on Cooperation in India (1915), p13.
67. For an account on the rates charged in the Punjab see Darling
(1947) pp180-82.
68. For the general affect of partitition of Punjab in the Indian 
Punjab and the Pakistan Punjab see Richard H. Day and Inderjit 
Singh (1977) Chapter 3
69. See for instance M.S. Randhawa (1984); Government of Pakistan 
. Credit Enquiry Commission Report (1959); Government of India All
India Rural Credit Survey (1954); M.S. Gill (1983); Government of 
Pakistan Agricultural Enquiry Committee Report (1975).
70. See Government of Pakistan Food and Agriculture Commission Report
(1960), p179.
252
71. See M.S. Gill (1983) chapter 3; Nanavati, M.B. (1952) pp33-38
72. Ibid.
73. See Government of Pakistan Agricultural Enquiry Committee Report 
(1975) pp30-31.
74. See M.S. Randhawa (1974); p89.
75. See Government of Pakistan Cooperative Inquiry Committee Report 
(1955); M.S. Gill (1983) chapters 3 & 4.
76. See Government of Pakistan Credit Enquiry Commission Report 
(1959); para 217.
77. See. M.S. Gill (1983) p111.
78. Government of Pakistan Cooperative Enquiry Committee Report 
(1955), p47.
79. See for instnace M.S. Randhawa (1954) pp96-97.
80. Ibid; also see M.S. Gill (1983) chapters 1 and 2
81. See Reserve Bank of India All India Rural Credit Survey (1954).
82. See Government of Pakistan, Cooperative Enquiry Committee Report
(1955). For the assessment of the Cooperative movement in two 
Punjabs during the 1950s see for instance Government of Pakistan 
Food and Agriculture Commission Report (1960); M.S. Gill (1983); 
State Bank of Pakistan (1962); Singh, G. (1967).
83. See for instance Singh, G. (1967) pp11—12.
84. Ibid.
85. For the detailed account of the performance of credit societies
in the two Punjabs during the 1960s see for instance Reserve Bank 
of India Report of the All India Rural Credit Review Committee
(1969); Government of Pakistan Report of the seminar on
Integrated Rural Development (1973), pp15-55. Mahmood Ali Khan
(1971); Mahmood Ali Khan, Dilawar Ali Khan and Mohammed Hussain
Bhatti (1973); also see Government of Punjab; and Government of 
West Pakistan Annual Reports on the working of cooperative 
societies in Punjab, (various issues); M.S. Gill (1983); chapters 
3,4,5.
86. See Government of Pakistan Credit Enquiry Commission Report 
(1959); paras. 93-99, 112-117.
87. See for instance Government of Pakistan Report of the Committee 
on the Working of Cooperative institutions (1964).
253
88. See for instance M.S. Randhawa (1984) pp16-18; M.S. Gill (1983); 
Government of Pakistan Agricultural Enquiry Committee Report 
(1975) pp12-19.
89. See Reserve Bank of India All India Rural Credit Review committee 
Report (1969).
90. See for example Government of India Report of the Indian National 
Commission on Agriculture (1976) pp571-575; also see Jagrup Singh 
Sidhu (1980) pp2-3.
91. See for instance Government of Pakistan Report of the seminar on 
Integrated Rural Development (1973) pp5-15.
92. See for instance Jagrup Singh Sidhu (1980) pp108-116; Government
of Pakistan Cooperative Enquiry Committee Report (1955), pp63-69; 
also see Abdul Waheed (1985) Government of Pakistan Agricultural 
Enquiry Committee Report (1975); Government of Pakistan Report of 
the National Commission on Agriculture (1988) chapter 23.
93. See M.S. Randhawa (1984) pp16-17.
94. See Government of the Punjab Report on the Working of Cooperative
Societies in Punjab (1968) pp2-8.
95. See Federal Bank for Cooperatives Act (1977); Reports on the
Working of Cooperatives in the Punjab for the years 1970 and 
1976.
96. See Abdul Waheed (1985) pp30-31; For the structural aspect of
Cooperatives See Farooq Haroon (1986) pp11-12; Government of
Pakistan Report of the National Commission on Agriculture (1988) 
Chapter 23.
97. See Government of Pakistan Report of the National Commission on
Agriculture, (1988) pp401-402.
98. See for instance Government of the Punjab Sixth Five Year Plan of
the Government of Punjab - Framework 1980-85 (1980) Chapter VI
pp43-48.
99. See for instance Dilawar Ali Khan (1982) p125.
TABLES - CHAPTER 4
Ta
bl
e 
4.
1 
Pr
og
re
ss
 
of
 
th
e 
Co
op
er
at
iv
e 
Mo
ve
me
nt
 
in 
th
e 
Un
it
ed
 
P
u
n
j
a
b
254
W-H 0
G "Hty> 4->
< 0
1 dt -Hr-1 GOO
fd - O O O
4-> G 2 U CO-H o
CU -H
fd pH •
O rH a w■H O 0
Cn 6 O -H
G O -P-H W . 0
^ cd -H -H
G G O
o cn o
& <C CO
w-H 0
G -H
Cn -p
<c • 0
a. 1 Oi *H-H GOO
x: — OOOw - Z U CO
g  o
0  o
,Q o •
6  - Qi W0 O 0
S G O -H
H U -P
«H ^ • 0
0 •H -H-P G O
o Cn 0
Eh <C CO
w-H 0
W G *H
0 Cn -p*H < • 0
•P 1 Ch *H
0 GOO■H OOO
o 2 U COoCO
<P a W
o O 0O -H
g U -P
0 . 0
.Q -H  -H
E G OG CT> O2 < CO
g
fd
0)
>H
m o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
o N ^ D ( N t ^ r r) o o o i ' - o o i n o i c r i f ri in ( T ic r i o j C N i
o  o  o n n i n o o o n ^ r o n ^ ^ ' f i n w i ^
■ m o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
t n r ' O O O ^ ^ T - ^ ^ ^ N O f f i a i o o ' i ' r ' O ^
r - n ^ i n i D O \ ^ r o n n f O r - ^ n ^ ^ u ) k O ' i ' ( N
i - r - t N C N M f O ^ i n i O t ^ O O O O C O C O C O O O t O O O O O
CO CT>
t M ^ c o o ^ c N j i n n o D C T i ^ o o
t- t—  t—  cNmmr^cxJcriOT— t- ■^  ro t -  i -  cn n
t^ i^,nc^rO'^,ininojro^OCT>oro^i,«^{Nr^o
r o i n c o m M i n o ^ o i n o ^ O M ^ c o o m m f f i
t - T - p j i N N n f O ' t ^ i n i n i n i n i n i n i D i D i o i o
VO O O  •«— ' I ' M l O M ’ U D i n N h O O O O ' O f O a i  ro^O'^ovocrir^T-ninncvj'^^^ojvOT-CN'#^VDCTi>(NlDOO(?iOr-NninCOr-^
T - { N ( N ( N M n r o n n r o n ^ ^
ror-T-opr>T-oor-'-cocrimoO'<— ouDmmcriUDr" 
o>ioro(NinaiOT-^o^r'(N'iiaioonT-in^in 
i D ( v j c o \ D c O ' t ^ i D ' - { N ^ , ( N i n i n f ' c r i ( N i i n c o o  
niDcocoo^r-(N^,inio>>r't^^cocoooai
o i n o t N m ^ m i D M O t T t O t - M f O ' i ' i n i O M i or - t - N N N ( N ( N ( N ( N ( N r g r n n r o r o n n m n n
cnc nc ncn c nC T> cn cn cn cn cr ic n cn cn cn cn cn cr «c r> c n
r-
CN
cn
O
o
pq
T3
G
<d
<D
>-H
4->
fd
g
<D
Cu
o
o
o
a)
o
g
G
oCO
Ta
bl
e 
4.
2 
Pr
og
re
ss
 
of
 
Ag
ri
cu
lt
ur
al
 
Co
op
er
at
iv
e 
Cr
ed
it
 
So
ci
et
ie
s 
in 
th
e 
Un
it
ed
 
P
u
n
j
a
b
(R
s.
 
M
i
l
li
on
)
255
1
-M
P tn o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
O C 4-> CO CO in cn T— CO T— oo oo o o
•H CO C4 . • • • • • • • • • • • • •
CO TJ C CD T— CM CD CM as cn r- CO CO in co CM
C G -H X3 CO co in CO CO r- CO CO co CO CO CO CD
to fd fd E
o 4J tn 0
►4 CO fd E
Sn
0 l“H
P C
0 CO o
> u
o CD 1—1
o X) fd
Q) E a o o O o o o o o o o o o o O
P CD -H CO 00 CO in r- CM o r- 00 00 in CM
E o • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
CO a CT> T— CM in in T— o cn cn cn cn o *-
C E -H T— .— T— .— T— T— T-- T— t—
td o u
o P (k
cw
o
-P
CO O o o o o o o o o o o o o O
73 U 00 o CM T— in 00 o as T-- CO r- r— r-
CO 0 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
c P n ID r- CM co T-- CM 00 r- cn cn cn cn ' o
fd CO E .— ▼— CM CM CM CM *— T—
o CO 0
►4 ■rl E
CO
CQ 4J O o O o O O o o o o o o o o
$-i -H T— r- o O CO in in CO co
CD CO . • • • • • • • • • • • • •
jQ o CM CM CM co CO CO co CO co CO co CO CO CO
E a
0 a)
S T3
I—1
fd O O O o o o o o o o o o o o
CD 4-> T-- 00 r- 00 00 in T-- CO o T-- T-- o in
J-i -H • • • • • • • • • ■ ■ • • •
fd a in in CO r* 00 cn o o T— T— T— T— o o
X fd .— T— T— T— T-- X— T-- T--
CO o
CQ
c
cd
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
1—I in CT> 00 CM cn CD o CO o 00 00
I- 1 00 CM cn in o in in CM cn CO CO CO CM
fd T3 T— CM CM CO CO CO co CO co CO
4-> i—1
o (D
Eh X!
U in CO 00 cn o CM co in CO r-~
fd CM CM CM CM CM CM CO co co CO CO co CO co
CD cn cn OS cn cn cn as as cn cn cn cn cn cnr—
cn
co
cn
Q)
U
td
S
CQ
Cn*
0
U
J-i
P
O
CO
256
Table 4.3 Progress of the Cooperative Movement in the United Punjab
I. PRIMARY SOCIETIES:_________ 1940_________1944_________1945
(a) Agricultural Credit 
Societies:
1. Number 18592 12213 17603
2. Membership 615 587 589
( in ’000’ )
3. Working Capital 74.10 64.70 68.90
(Rs million)
(b) Agricultural Non-Credit 
Societies:
1 . Number 7346 8609 9270
2. Membership 420 500 640
( in '000' )
3. Working Capital 6.30 12.20 14.20
(Rs million)
Source: Annual Reports of the Department of Cooperation, Punjab
(various issues)
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Table 4.4 Progress made by Cooperative Consolidation of Holding 
Societies in the United Punjab
Year Number of 
societies
Number of members 
( In ’000' )
Area consolidated 
(In '000' Acres)
1921 60 1698 7571
1922 107 3397 6983
1923 133 5225 5376
1924 154 7078 8120
1925 174 8412 11707
1926 237 10928 21258
1927 314 15387 38071
1928 428 20495 64699
1929 543 28305 48709
1930 654 35778 50105
1931 795 47948 72821
1932 911 55803 60348
1933 1011 67992 62062
1934 1097 78319 56148
1935 1167 89429 63534
1936 1210 103584 92689
1937 1270 119875 120295
1938 1360 141929 132313
1939 1477 160782 157211
Source: Annual Reports of the Department of Cooperation, Punjab
(various issues).
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CHAPTER 5
COOPERATIVES AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAKISTAN PUNJAB
This chapter seeks to analyse the performance of Cooperatives, 
particularly agricultural credit societies both as autonomous 
organizations and as an instrument of the Government's development 
policy. The chapter is organized into four sections. Section I deals 
with the organizational and operational aspects of Cooperatives. 
Section II is concerned with the role and impact of Cooperatives as an 
instrument of development. Section III covers the factors determining 
the limited success of Cooperatives and finally Section IV assembles 
the major conclusions about Cooperatives' performance in the Pakistan 
Punj ab.
5.I Organizational and operational aspects of Cooperatives
The course of historical evolution of the cooperative movement, 
as discussed in Chapter Four, has shown that major organizational and 
operational features of the movement, particularly agricultural credit 
societies in the present day Pakistan Punjab, are derived from the 
ideas and value judgements that brought forth the movement in the sub­
continent in 1904. It was shown there that Cooperatives - in 
particular the credit societies in the Pakistan Punjab - have had a 
relatively high rate of default, disproportionately low levels of local 
farmer participation and that the societies have tended to function 
largely as conduits for the transfer of Government subsidies (through 
low interest loans) to the richer and more powerful class of rural 
landowners. Further, it was argued that from the very day of their
259
introduction and during the post-partition period, agricultural credit 
societies in the Punjab were used as £n instrument of the Government's 
development policy and were not, as the original ideology would 
suggest, voluntary and spontaneous groupings of farmers. They were 
directed and controlled from above. They were registered with the 
Government, headed by a Government nominee, that is the Registrar. 
Further, it was held that the major decisions on membership, lending 
policy, finance and general operations were all made from above in 
accordance with Government policy. Since the bulk of finance available 
to the movement came from the Government, this made the societies an 
extension of Government welfare and expenditure policy rather than 
worthwhile self-sustaining institutions in themselves.
The actual subsequent experience of Cooperatives in the Pakistan 
Punjab will be analysed in the context of the above propositions, from 
an empirical perspective, and data shall be presented to show that the 
performance of the societies, especially the agricultural credit 
societies, has been less than satisfactory even in terms of attaining 
these development targets.
As discussed earlier in Chapter Four, the structure of the 
cooperative movement in the Pakistan Punjab was derived from the 
Cooperative Societies Act 1912 which remained in operation until 1976. 
The age-old three tier cooperative structure was replaced by a two-tier 
cooperative structure, following widespread complaints regarding the 
operations of secondary-level cooperative institutions. At present 
there is a two-tier cooperative structure in the Pakistan Punjab. At 
the base or operational level in the villages are established primary 
societies. These societies, in turn are affiliated to the Punjab
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Cooperative Bank, organized at the apex level of the cooperative
movement in the province.
The two-tier structure of Cooperatives has created many problems 
obstructing the smooth working of agricultural credit societies in the 
Pakistan Punjab. As has been noted in Chapter Four, the dissolution of 
central Cooperative Banks and the Banking unions entirely eliminated 
from the movement the secondary-level cooperative institutions and this 
has created a gulf in between the apex level and base level primary 
societies. In the absence of any central Cooperative Bank and other 
secondary level cooperative institution, the primary societies must 
approach directly the Punjab Cooperative Bank for their financial
needs. The Punjab Cooperative Bank, being located at the apex level,
with its headquarters at Lahore finds it extremely difficult to assess 
the true operational position of the individual societies, and thus 
relies on information provided by the Department of Cooperation. The 
Punjab Cooperative Bank has been acting just as a pay office. On the 
other hand, societies are required to fill in proformas and follow 
other cumbersome procedural formalities, which many members of
cooperative management find hard to understand. The only viable 
connection between the societies and the Punjab Cooperative Bank is 
through the Department of Cooperation. The departmental staff at the 
base level of the movement thus form the only link between societies 
and the Bank.
The staff of the department (usually a cooperative inspector) 
enjoy discretionary power in sanctioning the loan limit of a society. 
As the cooperative inspector is low paid, he is often tempted to take 
undue advantage of the situation. The loan limits of societies have
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often been fixed at higher levels without any rational grounds. And 
this is done with the mutual understanding of the Cooperatives' 
management and the inspector, who in turn share the advantage of loan 
by employing forgery practices.^
The Punjab Cooperative Bank was established in 1924. The Bank 
has passed through many changes in structure, forms and rules. At the 
time of partition of the Punjab in 1947, the existing Bank became an 
institution of the Pakistan Punjab. The Bank now has 144 branches in 
different parts of the province. The executive body of the Punjab 
Cooperative Bank is a board of directors comprising one director 
elected from each of the districts of the province. The Registrar of 
cooperative societies is also a director and the ex officio president 
of the executive body. The Registrar nominates one of the elected 
directors as vice president of the Bank. The chief auditor of the 
Cooperative Department is also ex-officio a director of the Bank. The 
day-to-day administration of the Bank is run by the general manager, 
who is assisted by one deputy general manager and a number of managers, 
zonal managers, district managers, branch managers and other clerical 
and lower administrative staff.
At the end of June 1965, the working capital of the Punjab 
Cooperative Bank amounted to US $31.2 million. Owned funds accounted 
for 12 percent of the working capital, deposits over 30 percent and 
borrowings for over 57 percent. It should be pointed out that 
Government participation in the share capital of the Bank exceeded the 
limit of one-third of the total envisaged between 1960 and 1965. For 
borrowings, the Punjab Cooperative Bank mainly depends on the Federal 
Bank for Cooperatives. The bulk of the loans provided by the Federal
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Bank for Cooperatives to the Punjab Cooperative Bank are advanced for 
financing seasonal agricultural operations. The total working capital 
of the Punjab Cooperative Bank swelled manifold over the years. Thus 
in 1980 total working capital of the Punjab Cooperative Bank amounted 
to US $60 million. However, some 62 percent of the total contributions 
to the working capital of the Bank in 1980 came primarily from 
borrowings from the Federal Bank for Cooperatives.
The advances by the Punjab Cooperative Bank to the credit 
societies have increased considerably following the introduction of the 
interest free lending policy of the Government of Punjab in 1977-78. 
Under the new lending policy a small farmer (owner of holdings of up to 
12£ acres) could be provided by a credit society with a loan amounting 
up to Rs 6000 per crop season primarily for the purchase of improved 
seed, chemical fertilizer, pesticides etc. The total advances by the 
Punjab Cooperative Bank to the primary agricultural societies increased 
from Rs 165.13 million in 1970 to Rs 883.00 million in 1980, with some 
99 percent recovery of loans from societies during the year 1980. (see 
Fig.5.1; also see Tables 5.1 and 5.2)
The loans to the Punjab Cooperative Bank, for onward disbursement 
to the primary societies are released by the Federal Bank for 
Cooperatives on the approval of the State Bank of Pakistan and also on 
the guarantee provided by the Government of the Punjab. The interest 
on loans provided to the Punjab Cooperative Bank by the Federal Bank 
for Cooperatives is, however, paid by the Government of the Punjab from 
the Government exchequer.
The Punjab Cooperative Bank under the law, is basically a 
cooperative society itself, operating under the dual control of the
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Department of Cooperation and the Federal Bank for Cooperatives. The 
Bank is expected to operate on commercial lines and compete with other 
commercial Banks especially in terms of attracting deposits from the 
public. Nevertheless the Bank has not been particularly successful in 
mobilizing savings especially from the rural areas, which would have 
enabled the Bank to supplement its own resources. Total credit 
availability of the Punjab Cooperative Bank from its own resources is 
far short of the total credit requirements and with no line of credit 
available from any donor agency and no savings of its own, it is left 
with a very limited role as a development Bank. Furthermore, the 
Cooperative Banking system is responsible for the unsatisfactory 
operation of cooperative credit and its facilities of low cost credit 
open to abuse. The Punjab Cooperative Bank disburses the cost-free 
loans upon the advice of the Department of Cooperation. The Bank has 
merely been reduced to a pay office, making payments according to the 
recommendations and instructions of the Department of Cooperation. The 
borrowings of the Punjab Cooperative Bank have exceeded its own 
resources (although these have been built up recently as a result of an 
interest subsidy provided by the Government) rather than resource 
mobilization at a local level, one of the national objectives of the 
cooperative movement. The Federal Bank for Cooperatives, despite all 
its efforts, finds it difficult to improve the operational capacity of 
the Punjab Cooperative Bank when its role is restricted to that of a 
re-financing agency for the Punjab Cooperative Bank.2
A brief note on the Federal Bank for Cooperatives is in order. 
The Bank was established in 1976 at the national level of the movement 
with the object of providing financial assistance to the provincial
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Cooperative Banks in all four provinces of Pakistan. In addition, the 
Federal Bank for Cooperatives has assisted the federal and the 
provincial Governments in formulating schemes for the development and 
revitalization of the movement, undertaken research on problems of 
rural credit and other matters having a bearing on the development of 
the movement and assisted the provincial Cooperative Banks in preparing 
their seasonal development lending programmes and undertaking
appraisals as well as feasibility studies of projects covered by such 
programmes. However, in practice, the Federal Bank has served merely 
as a channel of credit catering for the credit requirements of the 
Punjab Cooperative Bank, as also of the other provincial Cooperative 
Banks. The Bank has not made any worthwhile progress on research work, 
especially on the problems of rural finance. Neither has it been able 
to undertake appraisal work or conduct feasibility studies of any 
considerable significance. The assistance rendered by the Bank to the 
federal and provincial Governments in formulating schemes for the 
development and revitalization of the movement has also remained less 
than satisfactory.3
As discussed in Chapter Four, primary cooperative societies have 
been established at the base level of the cooperative movement in the 
Punjab. The primary cooperative societies, especially the agricultural 
societies may further be classified into credit and non-credit 
societies. Agricultural credit societies form the back bone of the 
movement in the Punjab, as in terms of number, total membership and 
working capital these societies are bigger than those of the non-credit 
societies. The relevant statistics on the number of agricultural 
credit and non-credit societies, their membership and working capital
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for the years from 1950 through 1980 are presented in Figs. 5.2 (also 
see Table 5.3). It may be noted that the total number of primary 
agricultural societies (credit and non-credit societies) in the Punjab 
in 1950 was 10186 with 8598 as agricultural credit and 1588 as 
agricultural non-credit societies. This number rose to 39136 in 198.0 
with 37920 as agricultural credit and only 1216 as agricultural non­
credit societies. Thus some 97 percent of the primary agricultural 
societies in 1980 were agricultural credit societies and only 3 percent 
were agricultural non-credit societies indicating that the movement in 
the Punjab remained centred in the sphere of credit. Evidently a high 
proportion of agricultural credit societies underlines the importance 
which was assigned to the problem of agricultural credit in general and 
cooperatively provided credit in particular.
A careful perusal of the data presented in Fig. 5.2 would further 
show that there was a significant increase in the formation of 
agricultural credit societies after 1977 (between 1977 and 1980) 
agricultural credit societies increased roughly at the growth rate of 
32 percent a year) while non-credit societies declined from 1241 in 
1978 to 1216 in 1980. It may however be noted that after 1978, a 
vigorous campaign was started by the department to establish as many 
new agricultural credit societies as possible. In addition, 
agricultural non-credit societies which were not operational were 
converted to agricultural credit societies to undertake the task of 
providing interest free credit to the peasants. A greater emphasis 
assigned to the cooperative credit movement, especially after 1978, 
however resulted in the stagnation of the non-credit societies. Many 
non-credit societies in the Punjab were reported to have performed
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FIG 5.2 PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL CREDIT AND NON 
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badly due to the lack of proper attention given by the Department of 
Cooperation to the non-credit societies.
The cooperative movement in the Punjab did not only depend on the 
formation of new agricultural credit societies, but also on the growth 
of their membership. The growth of membership in agricultural credit 
and non-credit societies is shown in Fig. 5.2 which reveals that the 
two groups (credit and non-credit) had 246,000 and 86,000 members 
respectively in 1950 representing some 74 percent and 26 percent of the 
total membership. This indicates that the rural population in the 
Punjab were already more attracted towards the cooperative credit 
movement. In subsequent years agricultural credit societies accounted 
for some 93 percent of the total membership in 1980. The average size 
of membership in a society remained small - 41 in a credit society as 
against 98 in a non-credit society. Indeed, throughout the period, the 
average size of membership in a non-credit society remained large, 
compared with that of the credit societies.
The data presented on the working capital of agricultural 
societies (credit and non-credit) in Fig.5.2 further show that the 
total working capital available to credit societies remained lower 
compared with the capital available to the non-credit societies 
throughout the period under reference. Indeed, a significant increase 
in the total working capital available to the credit movement occurred 
after 1977. At the same time, however, there was a significant decline 
in the working capital of the non-credit societies. These statistics 
thus confirm that the Government assigned a greater emphasis to the 
credit movement, especially after 1977. Nonetheless available working 
capital per member in non-credit societies remained more compared with
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that in credit societies. This reflects the different nature of the 
business conducted by the non-credit societies.
The data on the sources of working capital in non-credit 
societies were not available. But bearing in mind the source of the 
growth in credit societies, working capital in later years (see 
Fig.5.5) the falling stock of total working capital of non-credit 
societies at a time when their members were falling substantially 
implies that Government loans rather than owned funds, were crucially 
important for them too.
It is against this background that the experience of agricultural 
credit societies in the Punjab is now studied in detail through an 
examination of the following aspects.
a) the relative importance of credit Cooperatives among 
institutional sources of finance.
b) the importance of cooperative credit in relation to the total 
credit needs of farmers.
c) the extent of local participation in, and support for 
agricultural credit societies, and
d) the welfare effects of cooperative credit distribution.
The relative importance of cooperative credit among institutional 
sources of finance can be judged from the data presented in Table 5.4. 
The share of cooperative credit in total institutional credit was 
significant during the years 1948 through 1966. This was mainly 
attributed to the policy of the Government in the country which showed 
interest in developing and expanding the role of the cooperative credit 
movement. Nevertheless the provision of cooperative credit was not 
sufficient. The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan was thus
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established in 1961; with that the total supply of credit in the farm 
sector increased, from 75.12 million in 1960 by some 174 percent by 
1966. Again in 1971 all commercial Banks entered the business of rural 
finance. These measures enhanced the supply of farm credit, and the 
share of cooperative credit among the institutional sources of finance 
declined from around 60 percent in 1966 to less than 6 percent in 1977. 
As against this, first the share of credit provided by the Agricultural 
Development Bank increased, followed by that of the commercial Banks 
(after 1971-72); only after 1977 did the share of cooperative credit 
amongst the institutional sources increase once again - that is from
7.3 percent in 1978 to some 28 percent in 1981.
Data contained in Table 5.4 show another source of institutional 
credit - that is Taccavi loans. As was discussed in Chapter Four, the 
British Government in India, had established the tradition of providing 
state loans (commonly termed as Taccavi loans) to the peasants through 
the Department of Revenue Collection in order to enable them to 
purchase seed, farm tools and other farm accessories. After the 
division of the Punjab in 1947 the Taccavi loans remained an integral 
part of the Government's lending policy in the Pakistan Punjab as well 
as in the Indian Punjab. Taccavi loans in the Pakistan Punjab have 
however been restricted to the provision of funds for 'unforeseen 
calamities' and also to areas where other institutional sources have 
not been able to build a well-developed network. Although a recognised 
part of institutional farm credit, 'Taccavi loans' receive less 
attention from the peasants; funds provided by the Government as 
'Taccavi loans' are small in amount. Further, there is a practice of 
coercive recovery by the Department of Revenue Collection at a time
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when funds are most needed by the peasants. The share of Taccavi loans 
in institutional credit declined sharply after 1976, largely due to a 
greater reliance on the efficacy of the cooperative movement.
It is however worth mentioning the trend of loan disbursement by 
the sources of institutional farm credit. It may be noted from Table
5.4 that there has been an erratic supply of credit granted by 
Cooperatives in the Punjab.
There are two major reasons for this erratic provision of 
cooperative credit. First, up to the early 1960s, the Cooperatives 
enjoyed a monopoly as an institutional source of finance. They 
received many privileges from the Government both in regard to the 
supply of public funds, and also in meeting the costs of management and 
administering credit provisions. Nevertheless their performance was 
not commendable as many societies became more interested in lending 
public funds than in recovering the outstanding loans. This was 
inevitable as it was not the farmers' own funds which were at stake but 
public funds . In the mid 1960s the introduction of the 'green 
revolution' enhanced the demand for credit; improved farm inputs such 
as improved seed, chemical fertilizer and pesticides, which farmers had 
not used in the past, now came on the scene. The farmers' own working 
capital did not permit access to these inputs, as his consumption 
requirements were pressing, and he was barely able to maintain existing 
levels of production and consumption with the available working 
capital. The obvious alternative was to provide funds to farmers 
through Cooperatives. The Credit Inquiry Commission (1959) observed 
that the performance of the cooperative movement in general and credit 
societies in particular was unsatisfactory. The Commission recommended
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the establishing of the Agricultural development Bank with the purpose 
of enhancing the overall supply of credit from the institutional 
sources. It was expected that the entry of the Agricultural 
Development Bank into rural finance would provide an effective 
competition to societies. Nevertheless, many more credit societies did 
not do well in the 1960s, or in the first half of the 1970s.4 The 
Agricultural Inquiry Committee (1975) recorded that the cooperative 
credit movement in Pakistan, and in the Punjab in particular, was not 
capable of meeting the credit needs of farmers, primarily due to 
deficiencies inherent in its structure and organization.5 Earlier, 
however, the Government of Pakistan had become more committed to the 
cause of agriculture and preferred to disburse more loanable funds 
through the Agricultural Development Bank and the commercial Banks. 
The inherent deficiencies of Cooperatives and the preferential 
treatment assigned by the Government to the commercial Banks was one 
reason (among others) for the share of cooperative credit tending to 
decline further. In 1975 the share of cooperative credit fell abruptly 
to 8 percent as against 15.7 percent in 1974. And this was mainly due 
to a sudden increase in the share of commercial Banks in the business 
of rural lending, which rose from 31 percent in 1974 to some 51 percent
in 1975. At the same time, the share of the Agricultural development
Bank started to decline after 1973, so much so that it fell from some 
55 percent in 1973 to 19 percent in 1979.
Second, in view of the increased provision of credit by the
commercial Banks to larger farmers, it became necessary to provide
adequate funds to the small farmers. As late as the second half of the 
1970s attempts were made to revitalize and rehabilitate the movement,
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and agricultural credit societies were entrusted with the task of 
disbursing public funds, on a cost-free basis, to their members. As 
noted in Chapter Four, the measures taken by the Government in the late 
1970s resulted in increased provision of cooperative credit to the farm 
sector. Nevertheless, this does not imply that those who needed credit 
did really get it. The incentive of interest free loans to members of 
societies was a good step, but unfortunately it was misused partly 
because it was operated through incompetent functionaries of the
cooperative department, and partly through political pressure. 
Consequently the advantage that was visualized at the time of
conceiving this scheme was frustrated.6
The absolute importance of cooperative credit in the Punjab can 
be judged from both its contribution towards total credit needs and by 
its demographic coverage. From both points of view, the role of
cooperative credit societies can be shown to have been rather poor. We 
consider the former aspect first.
The estimated total credit needs of farmers in the Pakistan
Punjab have never been fully met from the available supply of 
institutional credit. The Agricultural Enquiry Committee (1953) found 
that non-institutional sources met the bulk of demand for credit by the 
farmers. The committee found that relatives and friends provided an 
average 64 percent of the credit supply in the province of the Punjab. 
Landlords accounted for 17 percent and shop-keepers for 3 percent. At 
the same time the committee observed that the commercial money-lenders 
accounted for 17 percent of the supply of credit in the province.7 The 
Committee on the Working of Cooperative Institutions (1964) reported 
that institutional sources accounted for only 9 percent of the total
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credit needs of farmers.® The Credit Inquiry Commission (1959) 
projected the minimum short-term production credit needs to about Rs 
614.8 million for the year 1969-70. The available supply of credit 
from institutional sources (including Cooperatives) was however only Rs 
171.69 million in 1969-70.9 The Fifth Five Year Plan estimated that 
the credit availability per cropped acre increased from Rs 4.75 in 
1970-71 to Rs 44 in 1977-78. It however projected that this would 
further increase to Rs 89 by 1982-83.10 But despite an increased 
volume of credit, a number of other studies^1 established that the 
provision of institutional credit was not sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the agricultural sector in view of the rising demand 
for improved agricultural equipment and farm inputs. The Sub-committee 
on Agriculture and Credit (1973) appointed by the Agricultural Advisory 
Council estimated that 53 percent of the total cash requirements in 
agriculture could be identified as agricultural credit n e e d s . ^  
According to this criterion, the total credit requirements for 1975-76 
were estimated at Rs 2140 million, whereas the total availability of 
institutional credit in the same year was Rs 1255 million in Pakistan.
It may thus seem, in the light of the above findings that the 
credit needs of the farm sector in Pakistan, as also in the Punjab, 
remained largely unmet from the institutional sources and that farmers 
tended to rely on non-institutional sources to fulfil their credit 
needs.
This argument obtains further support from the findings of the 
Rural Credit Survey (1974), which after surveying nearly 100,000 farm 
households in Pakistan recorded that only 9.7 percent of the total 
borrowings came from institutional sources. However, after the entry
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of commercial Banks into agricultural lending, the supply of credit 
from institutional sources increased considerably. Nevertheless, 
despite the enhanced provision of credit, the main dependence of 
farmers in the Punjab remains on non-institutional sources.13 in late 
1985 the Agricultural Census Organization of Pakistan conducted another 
survey covering all the four provinces of Pakistan. The survey 
recorded that 27 percent of all the rural households including the farm 
and non-farm households had some recourse to institutional credit. For 
the farm households this proportion was 30 percent for under 0.5 
hectare category, whereas it was 44 percent for the 60 hectares and 
above category. On a provincial basis, the survey revealed that 34 
percent of the under 0.5 hectare category in the Punjab had recourse to 
institutional credit, as against 65 percent of the total farm 
households in the Punjab.1^ This shows that access to credit was 
generally higher amongst large sized farm holdings. These findings 
support the earlier view that insufficient credit was available from 
institutional sources and that farmers depended more on non- 
institutional sources to fulfil their credit needs.
It may be recorded that some observers1  ^ suggest that the ratio 
of credit to the total output flow in agriculture should be 25 percent. 
Nonetheless, it is not easy to estimate credit needs precisely. They 
are a complex entity and depend on (among other factors) the degree of 
commercial activity of agriculture, the cash-flow relationships 
particular to individual enterprises etc. However, calculated on the 
basis of the above formula, the results are summarized in Table 5.5. 
It may be noted that agricultural GNP in the Punjab was Rs 4483. 50 
million in 1972 and Rs 17586.50 million in 1981. Total institutional
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credit disbursed in these two years was Rs 128.00 million and Rs 
4027.93 million respectively. The ratio of institutional credit in 
agricultural GNP came to 3 percent and 23 percent respectively; the 
ratio of cooperative credit to agricultural GNP stayed at only 0.8 
percent in 1972 and 6.4 percent in 1981. These results establish that 
despite considerable injections of rural credit by the institutional 
sources (including Cooperatives) in agriculture in the 1970s its 
quantum in terms of total credit requirements in agriculture remained 
less than 'estimated credit needs'.
The role of the cooperative credit movement in the Punjab may be 
evaluated in terms of extent of participation in, and support of
members of the credit societies. It can however be pointed out at the 
outset that the performance of societies in this respect has generally 
remained less than satisfactory.
Data on the working of agricultural credit societies in the
Punjab are presented in Figs. 5.3 through 5.9 (also see Tables 5.6
through 5.10). As noted earlier, the number of credit societies in the 
Punjab increased at a higher rate as compared with the non-credit
societies. The number of credit societies increased at the rate of 
approximately 1 percent a year during 1960 through 1976. There was a 
significant increase in the formation of credit societies after 1976, 
as the number of societies increased from 17165 in 1977 to 37920 in 
1980, roughly at the rate of 32 percent a year. This trend continued 
in the subsequent period, though the rate of establishing societies 
fell to 3.4 percent a year between 1981 and 1984. (see Table 5.6) Thus 
the experience of the late 1970s is atypical and needs explanation. As 
noted earlier, the Government of the Punjab introduced the interest-
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free lending policy in 1978, and used the cooperative movement as a 
vehicle to funnel interest-free credit into the farm sector. Many more 
credit societies in the Punjab were established under the directive of 
the Government. New societies were generally formed by the 
departmental officials without giving any regard to the principles of 
cooperation. Many societies were established overnight just to impress 
the superiors up the line with the successful implementation of the 
Government directive. As such, a policy of expansion rather than 
consolidation was pursued by the department from 1977 through 1980.^
The role of the cooperative movement obviously did not depend 
only on the formation of new societies, but also on the average size of 
membership and its long-term changes. In this respect two important 
features may be pointed out. Firstly the average size of membership 
per society remained small - only 41 in the Punjab. Secondly the 
annual rate of expansion in membership for the period, 1977 through 
1980 was lower than in the formation of new societies. The exception 
to this pattern was the period 1960 through 1976, when the rate of 
expansion in membership was 3 percent a year, as against the formation
of societies which roughly increased at a rate of just over 1 percent
during the same period. The important implication of the discrepancies 
in the rate of formation of societies and enrolment of members, 
especially in the late 1970s meant that per capita administrative and 
maintenance expenditure must be increasing over time.
_ As has been noted earlier in Chapter Four, the Government of the 
Punjab made many attempts to establish large-sized viable primary units 
at the base level of the movement, but these attempts generally
witnessed lesser success. The underlying trend shown by the data
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reveal that societies generally remained small-sized. There are two 
reasons for such a pattern. First, the credit societies did not 
provide sufficient credit; the farming population found it unattractive 
to join the movement. Second, the attempts made by the department to 
promote the movement were too insignificant to persuade prospective 
members in rural areas to join the societies. In this regard a number 
of studies document the failure of the movement to enrol large numbers 
of the farming population in the Punjab. The Cooperative Inquiry 
Committee Report (1955) recorded that only eight percent of the farm 
population was embraced by the movement.17 Waheed recorded that the 
effective coverage of farming community by the movement in the Punjab 
was around 15 percent in 1984.18 The Rural Credit Survey of Pakistan 
(1975) concluded that only 4 percent of the rural households in 
Pakistan were enrolled in the movement.19 Data on the households 
reporting membership of Cooperatives by type of households are given in 
Table 5.7. It may be seen from the table that only 1 percent of 
households in the smallest size of farm category reported cooperative 
membership but this proportion increased to 13 percent in the largest 
size of farm category of 60 hectares and above. The cooperative 
societies, according to the survey are common in the Punjab, yet only 6 
percent of the total farm households reported membership. Only 1 
percent of the farm households in other three provinces (NWFP, Sind,. 
Baluchistan) reported membership of cooperative societies. The 
relatively higher figure of 6 percent of all farms in the Punjab was 
due to the fact that 21 percent of the 60 hectares and above farm size 
category households in the Punjab had reported membership of the 
cooperative societies.20
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These statistics would imply that the movement in the Punjab was 
largely centred within bigger farm households. It may be that they 
controlled the management of societies and they might have imposed 
restrictions on the entry of new members (with small holdings), 
primarily to make use of Cooperatives provisions to themselves. This 
argument obtains support from the available evidence^ which suggests 
that many societies in the Punjab did not accept their obligations to 
admit anyone who, in return for its benefits, would undertake in good 
faith the duties which membership implied. Many credit societies 
simply did not enrol new members, as the management of these societies 
restricted entry in order to obtain economic advantages for themselves 
and for the existing members.
Despite the increase in the number of societies, many 
Cooperatives in the Punjab were regarded as economically non-viable in 
the classification of societies by the department. The credit 
societies were categorised by the department into four audit classes 
and the audit classification was supposed to reflect their business 
performance. Class 'A' Cooperatives were considered sound and viable 
financial units while class 'D1 were comprised of those units which 
were in bad financial shape and had little chance of survival. In
between 'A' and 'D' were 'B' and 'C' classes. 'B' was a class which
was not as sound as 'A' but was considered nonetheless viable. The
only difference between 'A' and 'B1 was that the former managed its 
affairs without calling for outside assistance, service or advice,
while the latter had to depend for audit service and for expert advice 
on the Department of Cooperation. 'C' class credit societies were 
neither sound nor viable units on the day of classification but were
281
capable of promotion to 'B' class if they were able to improve their 
affairs, recover overdue loans and build up adequate reserves. If the 
necessary corrective measures were not taken, these Cooperatives were 
relegated to the ' D' class which meant inoperative and liquidating 
societies. In addition, there were many societies which were not 
classified at all and were 1 unclassed1. In addition, many societies 
were actually in the process of liquidation. The classification as 
described above proceeded from sound and viable to poor and 
disintegrated units of Cooperatives in a descending order.22
It may be noted that the criterion chosen by the department for 
the classification of societies was deficient in certain respects. The 
criterion covered only a very simple aspect of business performance and 
excluded many other aspects such as the number of years a society had 
been formed, size of a society, repayment rate, involvement of large or 
small farmers in cooperative affairs and so on. The departmental staff 
encountered a difficulty in this regard as the societies did not 
maintain any data on the above aspects; most members and management 
committees were illiterate and hardly knew the importance of 
maintaining proper records. However, despite these limitations, the 
criterion was employed by the department to evaluate business 
performance of societies.
According to the Department during the year 1970 about 21 percent 
of the cooperative credit societies were relatively successful ('A1 
and *BV) while some 79 percent were unsuccessful. In subsequent years 
the number of non-viable societies in the Punjab was on the increase. 
It was estimated in 1976 that out of the total 12757 societies, 4 
percent of societies fell in the 'A' category, 19 percent in 'B', 60
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percent in fC' and some 3 percent in 'D' category. The percentage of 
societies unclassified or under liquidation in 1976 came to 4 percent 
and 7 percent respectively. Thus only 23 percent of societies were 
viable and fell in 'A' and !B' categories as against 64 percent in 'C1 
and 'D' categories. It has to be concluded that the cooperative 
movement as a whole in the Punjab could scarcely be described as 
economically viable, at least in the year 1976. (see Fig.5.4; also see 
Table 5.8)
It is difficult to take these figures as reliable. Quite apart 
from the extreme simplicity of the criterion, its application entailed 
taking a very short-run view so a society could be placed in a 
particular category as a result of chance variation in its performance. 
Despite such difficulties, the criterion was supposed to be a useful 
guide for the evaluation of business performance of societies in the 
Punjab.
The Department of Cooperation abandoned the classification of 
societies into these categories after 1977. Critics22 suggest that 
this was done deliberately to conceal the true picture of the working 
of the cooperative credit movement. It has been alleged that the 
number of bogus and non-viable societies had increased. The Report of 
the National Commission on Agriculture (1988) recorded that out of 
45,000 agricultural Cooperatives in Pakistan, as much as 50 percent 
were dormant, and of the remaining, probably only 5 percent were 
genuine, viable and active undertakings.2^ According to a study 
conducted by the Centre for Administrative Research and Development 
studies in the Punjab, out of 34543 societies as many as 50 percent 
were found to be inactive undertakings in 1984.2  ^ These findings are
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consistent with the conclusion that, after the introduction of the 
interest-free lending policy in 1977, the number of 'bogus' and 'non- 
viable' societies was on the increase. This further reflects that 
neither the management nor the general membership in societies was 
committed to cooperative principles. The plausible conclusion is that 
the only object of establishing a society and becoming its member was 
to take advantage of the provision of interest free credit - as we 
shall see, even to the extent of indulging in forgery.
Another way of gauging the spread of the cooperative idea, to 
measure the extent to which farmers began to participate in the 
Cooperatives, is to examine the composition of working capital 
available to societies. It has already been pointed out that 
agricultural credit societies obtained their working capital from the 
following sources (a) share capital paid up by the members (b) a 
reserve fund created out of the profit (c) deposits from the members 
and loans from (d) Central Cooperative Banks/Punjab Cooperative Bank 
(e) non-members (f) Government (g) other sources. Funds from the first 
three sources formed the owned and those from the last four formed the 
borrowed capital of societies.
Relevant statistics on the sources and composition of working 
capital are presented in Fig.5.5 (also see Table 5.9).
As noted earlier, total working capital available to credit 
societies increased from Rs 46.51 million in 1960 to Rs 164.82 million 
.in 1976. There was a significant increase in the working capital 
available to the credit movement after 1976; although after reaching a 
peak in 1981, a sharp decline in working capital became evident in 
1982. The working capital in societies was largely derived from the
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borrowings (that is loans and deposits held) rather than the share 
capital and reserve funds. It may be noted that during the period 1947 
through 1976, the percentage share of borrowed funds (loans and
deposits held) of societies ranged between 42 and 69 percent. Credit 
societies borrowed between 79 and 93 percent during the years 1977 
through 1984.
The above statistics imply that after the introduction of the
interest free lending policy of the Government in 1978, working capital 
in societies increased primarily on account of borrowings (loans and 
deposits held) rather than the share capital, reserves and/or deposits 
from the members.
As stated earlier, three important sources of working capital - 
that is share capital, reserve funds and member's deposits formed the 
'owned capital' of societies. In the absence of any relevant 
statistics available separately for members deposits it is difficult to 
comment precisely on exact contribution of 'owned capital' to the
working capital in credit societies in the Punjab. However some idea
can be had of the relative contributions made by the share capital and 
the reserve funds to the total working capital of societies.
Share capital was first introduced in 1918 though this meant a 
deviation from the original Raiffeisen principle. It was normally of 
small value Rs 10-15 each - payable in half yearly or yearly 
instalments. Presently the share capital of a society consists of 
shares of Rs 10 each and a member is expected to purchase a minimum of 
10 shares over a period of 10 years. The by-laws of societies do not 
allow distribution of profit to shareholders for a minimum of 10 years; 
afterwards a cooperative can repay the share capital, and also the
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profit earned by the society to its shareholders.
The underlying hope in introducing share capital was that this 
would not only encourage thrift among the members, but also increase 
the societies' financial strength and by reducing their dependence on 
outside capital, should make possible lower interest rates to members. 
From the statistics presented in Fig. 5.5 (also see Table 5.9) it seems 
that this expectation was not fulfilled as share capital never 
accounted for more than 23 percent of the working capital throughout 
the period 1947-84. A careful perusal of the data contained in Table 
5.9 would nonetheless show that despite a steady increase in the share 
capital, its percent share of the working capital tended to decline 
between 1977-81. At the same time, there was an increase in the loans 
and deposits held by the societies. As a matter of fact, an increase 
in the working capital of societies (especially after 1977) was 
accounted more by borrowed funds, rather than the share capital and 
reserves.
Many field studies undertaken in the Punjab^ established that 
cooperative credit societies did not adhere to the model by-laws 
regarding receipt of share capital from members. Khan (1971) found 
that the share capital in societies did not correspond to the number of 
members and shares held per member. He further recorded that the usual 
method of purchasing shares by members was out of the borrowed funds 
and with the passage of time it became a norm among the societies to 
deduct 10 percent of the loan amount every.time it was sanctioned to a 
member till the total deductions summed up to a maximum Rs 100.00 per 
borrower. This practice was justified by the management committees as 
compulsory savings. The mechanism at work, however, deprived the
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members of understanding through action the philosophy behind the 
contribution of share capital. The fact that they became members did 
not in any way mean either sacrifice on their part or acceptance of any 
responsibility whatsoever. Mostly the members did not protest against 
the deductions as they got the loaned funds without any effort and took 
it as easy money. Moreover, most of the borrowers understood these 
deductions were something like 'loan fees'.27
The Reserve fund which normally constituted the largest single 
component of the owned capital of societies was created by the 
accumulation of a certain portion of the annual net profits and 
entrance fee. Presently the Reserve fund in a society should be 
maintained according to section 39(2) of the Cooperative Societies Act 
(1925). The Cooperative Societies Act requires that 25 percent of the 
net profit earned by a society is transferred to the statutory reserve 
funds. After a period of 10 years a cooperative is at liberty to 
maintain any other reserves.2® Data on the profit earned by societies 
in the Punjab were not available; it is difficult to say if at any time
such a condition was fulfilled by societies. It was however found in a
study undertaken in the Punjab in 19732^ that 53 percent of the sample 
'A' and 47 percent of the 'B' class societies did maintain statutory 
reserves. However the statutory reserve funds accounted for 8 and 11 
percent of the working capital in 'A' and 'B' class credit societies. 
So it appears that the societies in the Punjab had not earned adequate
profit in the past and they also failed to maintain adequate statutory
reserves. The data presented in Table 5.9 show that the share of 
reserve funds as a percent of working capital ranged between 11 and 25 
percent during 1960-70. There was a further decline after 1978 such
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that the reserve fund as a percent of working capital stayed at 2.2 in 
1981.
As noted earlier data on members' deposits were not available 
from departmental sources. However a number of studies undertaken in 
the Punjab proved that the making of deposits was rarely emphasized by 
credit societies. This is mainly because the societies were not seen 
as attracting deposits, particularly from the rural areas where they 
lacked not only the required infrastructure (such as office space, 
secure facilities) but also the necessary expertise. In addition, 
competition from commercial Banks with their relatively sound financial 
base made Cooperatives less attractive to depositors.30
It may thus be concluded that despite considerable expansion of 
the credit movement, especially after 1978, the qualitative aspects of 
the societies had been neglected both by the members and the 
departmental staff. The cooperative movement had become a hand-maiden 
of the Government. There was no adherence by the members to the 
principles of cooperation. The mobilization of owned funds remained 
far less and the major thrust of the movement was on borrowed funds 
received mainly from the Government through the Cooperative Banking 
system.
Another way at assessing the performance of credit societies was 
to evaluate their lending business. As stated earlier, the share of 
cooperative credit in the institutional sources of finance remained 
less than 30 percent after the introduction of interest-free lending 
policy in 1978; however loans advanced by cooperative credit societies 
in the Pakistan Punjab remained far less than total credit demanded in 
the farm sector. Nevertheless, the total loans advanced by societies
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increased from Rs 53.6 million in 1947 to Rs 90.49 million in 1977. 
Thereafter there was a quantum increase in loans advanced by societies, 
which increased from Rs 259.27 million in 1978 to Rs 8830.0 million in 
1981. (see Table 5.6) However, despite this cooperative credit, as 
already noted, as a share of total institutional lending remained less 
than 30 percent by 1981.
Relevant statistics on the lending business of societies are 
presented in Fig. 5.3 (also see Table 5.6). It may be seen that the 
ratio of repayment of loans advanced was not at all bad especially 
during 1947-69. It tended to stay fairly high. However there were six 
years - that is 1970-76, in which the ratio dropped to less than 0.4; 
in contrast there were again six years - (1977-82), when the ratio of 
repayment exceeded 0.9. The overall average repayment to loan ratio 
for 1960-84 stayed at roughly 0.76. And this was not at all that bad. 
Nevertheless, it is important to underline the cause for low recovery 
especially for the period 1970-76. A sudden drop in recovery of 
cooperative loans in 1970 may be attributed to two factors. First 
prior to 1969, the present Punjab formed an integral unit of the
province of 'West Pakistan'. And as noted earlier in Chapter Four 'one 
unit' was dissolved in 1969, and the old administrative set-up in
Punjab was revived. It is probable that the administrative adjustments
would have made it difficult for the department to assign proper
attention to the supervision of the movement and this factor resulted 
in a sudden fall in the recovery of loans. Second, war started between 
India and Pakistan in 1971, and the war front covered almost 90 percent 
of the geographic area adjoining the boundary between the two Punjabs. 
Many of the rural population were affected and this must have
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influenced the movement, which found it more difficult to recover loans 
from members. The third factor was the involvement of commercial Banks 
in the business of rural lending in 1972. As noted earlier, the 
relative share of cooperative credit in the institutional sources 
declined considerably after 1972, primarily due to a shift in the 
lending policy of the Government which become more committed to the 
progress of the commercial Banks. It is possible that the lesser 
attention assigned by the Government to the movement in the first half 
in the 1970s was another contributory factor in the fall of recovery of 
loan from members. We shall turn to the later period (i.e. 1978
onward) later.
Primary agricultural credit societies in the Punjab were 
entrusted to provide credit to their members to meet their credit needs 
and in particular to fulfil credit requirements for specifically 
productive purposes. In addition, societies were expected to provide 
loans to non-cultivators to enable them to improve their economic 
conditions by making "productive use" of credit. Prior to 1978, loans 
advanced to cultivators were primarily made to enable them to purchase 
minor farm implements, improved farm inputs (improved seed, fertilizer, 
pesticides etc.). In addition, credit was provided to the cultivator 
members and non-cultivators for other 'non-specified' purposes.31
Prior to 1978, credit to cultivators was advanced on the basis of 
maximum credit limit (MCL). The maximum credit limit prescribed for 
the farmers for the irrigated and non-irrigated areas was fixed at Rs 
1 ,000 and Rs 600 respectively. The credit limit had no relevance to 
either the needs of the farmer or to his repayment capacity. Similarly 
the MCL of a society was fixed by the central cooperative banks
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irrespective of the need of the credit society. The channel of 
receiving loan proposals was so indirect and subject to abuse that loan 
proposals could not be made in the way the farmers would have desired. 
The whole procedure of lending was controlled and it led to both 
inadequate loan amounts and number of loans per cooperative.32 And
this was inevitable under the circumstances as available working 
capital, both with the Cooperative Banking system as well as the 
societies, was insufficient.
Relevant statistics on the average loan advanced to a member in a 
society, are presented in Table 5.10. It can be seen that between 1947 
and 1976, loanable amounts did not match with the maximum credit limit 
(MCL) prescribed for the farmers for the irrigated and non-irrigated 
areas. These statistics confirm that cooperative credit was 
insufficient; the societies became unable to meet the conditions set 
out by the department in terms of maximum credit limit. It may thus 
seem that the normal credit needs of a member farmer and the loan he 
was able to get from his society were significantly out of balance. In 
a survey in 1952, the credit requirements for cultivators amounted to 
Rs 1300/per family and about Rs 800/per family cultivator for the upper 
and lower social strata respectively. In 1955-56, the average loan 
advanced by the cooperative society was only Rs 54.33 Thus not only 
was cooperative credit inadequate in aggregate terms, it was also 
inadequate at the level of the individual borrowers.
, As discussed earlier it was after 1978 that credit societies were 
able to advance loans of up to Rs 6000 per farmer member for the 
purchase of improved farm inputs. This amount was sufficient when 
judged from the point of view of the 'cash requirements' for the
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purchase of improved farm inputs (improved seed, fertilizer, pesticides 
etc.). Nevertheless, after 1978 the loan granted by a society to a 
member, on average did not correspond to the stipulated amount of Rs 
6000 (see Table 5.10). In fact the loan granted per member throughout 
the years 1978-84 remained far less in amount than that allowed to a 
member.
The data on the number of loan beneficiaries of the credit 
societies were not available from departmental sources. If it was 
assumed that member farmers in a society actually received the maximum 
loan amount prescribed then the number of loan beneficiaries could only 
have been between 4 and 15 percent of the total membership during the 
years 1947-77. Between 1977 and 1984 the situation did not change 
much, as only about 11 percent of the total membership could have been 
provided with the maximum prescribed amount of loanable funds from the 
societies (see Table 5.6). Of course, this assumption is too simplistic 
but it does place the amounts loaned in perspective. The membership of 
societies increased throughout 1947-84 and it is logical to expect that 
the members in fact received loans of a lesser share of the maximum 
credit limit.
The performance of credit societies can also be judged from 
information on the available working capital per member. It may be 
noted from the statistics contained in Table 5.10 that average working 
capital per member ranged between Rs 117 and Rs 277 during the period 
1960-77. There was an increase in the average working capital 
available per member, especially after 1978; nonetheless the amounts do 
not suggest that the societies were in a position to lend anything like 
the prescribed maximum credit limit throughout the period 1978-84 and
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even before. Moreover, the major reliance of members was on 
borrowings, confirming that the societies in the Punjab operated just 
as a pay office on behalf of the Government, and not as the original 
ideology would suggest as a 'cooperative institution' according to true 
letter and spirit.
Despite an increase in the provision of working capital per 
member, the 'real' value of working capital declined over time (see 
Table 5.10). This shows that not only did the funds available per 
member remain small but in terms of 'real value' the loaned amounts 
declined in subsequent years. It is probable that members failed to 
make effective and productive use of these loans primarily because they 
were insignificant in amount.
Data presented in Table 5.10 further show that loans advanced per 
member were generally small in amount compared with the available 
working capital per member. This suggests that the societies were also 
underlending. Nonetheless it is possible that the societies retained a 
certain amount of working capital in the form of 'indivisible reserve 
funds' to meet 'unforeseen' contingencies.
To summarize, then, individual loans were insignificant in amount 
and in aggregate were financed by borrowing from the Government rather 
than by collective use of local funds. Thus it seems likely that loans 
were not used for productive investments by the member farmers, but 
rather added to their 'unproductive indebtedness'. In this regard, it 
may be noted that inquiries were conducted in the Punjab in 1951 and 
1957. According to the 1951 study, about 36 percent of the families 
surveyed were in debt, the average debt being Rs 414. Of the amount 28 
percent was incurred for 'domestic purposes'. In 1957, 55 percent of
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the surveyed families were found to be in debt. Of the average debt of 
Rs 452, about 34 percent was for the same purpose. The 1951 survey 
showed 'social ceremonies' as accounting for another 16 percent of 
debt; in the later study, the cost of weddings alone was responsible 
for nearly 8 percent.34 The CSO survey of agricultural credit in the 
early 1960s35 indicated that 45 percent of cultivators were in debt to 
the extent on average of Rs 598. Loans were used mostly for household 
expenditure (45 percent).
In the 1960s the societies were advancing loans to member farmers 
for short- term (up to one year), and medium-term (one to five years) 
purposes, loans being provided in cash. Loans for short-term purposes 
included funds for the purchase of seeds and chemical fertilizers. 
Loans for medium-term purposes included the funds for the purchase of 
livestock (milch animals), storage facilities, farm tools and 
implements and minor land improvements. The CSO survey referred to 
above further revealed that of the total average cash loan of Rs 598, 
45 percent of the amount was used for the livestock. Other uses were 
land improvements (6 percent); the construction of storage facilities 
(5.6 percent), the purchase of seeds (5.2 percent), fertilizers (1.1 
percent) and farm tools and implements (0.8 percent). It was concluded 
that only 64 percent of the loaned amount was put to productive uses as 
against the 36 percent of the loan that was used for household 
expenditure.
As noted earlier, the insufficiency of credit from institutional 
sources compelled the cultivators to borrow in addition from non- 
institutional sources to meet their credit requirements, thereby 
increasing indebtedness in the farm sector. The Pakistan Rural Credit
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Survey (1985) has estimated the total amount of outstanding debt from 
the institutional and non-institutional sources by type of households, 
and these data are presented in Table 5.11. Averages based on these 
data show that the average total debt (irrespective of source) per 
indebted household for the overall farm households category was Rs 
12010. For the institutional sources it was Rs 31246 and for those 
indebted to non-institutional sources it was Rs 8360. For the smallest 
size of farm category corresponding figures per indebted household were 
Rs 9510, Rs 17578 and Rs 9079 for the total debt, debt from the 
institutional sources and debt from the non-institutional sources 
respectively. The corresponding figures for the largest size of farm 
category of 60 hectares and above were RS 109,885. Rs 100,752 and Rs 
67132 for the average total debt, the average institutional debt and 
the average non-institutional debt.36 The data presented above pertain 
to the total amount of debt net of repayments made and due by the 
households on the day of the survey.
A better idea of the relative share of outstanding debt from the 
institutional and non-institutional sources is further presented in the 
Table 5.11. These data establish that farm indebtedness was a severe 
problem and that indebtedness was of an acute nature in cases where the 
borrowers had received loans from institutional sources. It seems that 
the intensity of farmers' indebtedness to the institutional sources had 
only been possible because their operations have been generally 
underwritten. The rural indebtedness is thus only one side of the 
coin; in addition the institutions are indebted to the Government. And 
this has wider implications in terms of the Government's obligations to 
many developed countries and international donor agencies.
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Let us now examine repayments of loans from cooperative members. 
The recovery of loans from members in societies was generally found 
satisfactory for the period 1947-69, and 1977-84. It was only during 
1970-76 that the recovery of loans from members in societies declined 
to a low level. Reasons for poor recovery of loans from members in 
societies have been noted, and it may now be relevant to identify the 
factors leading to a generally higher recovery of loan from cooperative 
members.
The higher recovery of loans by societies during 1947-69, was 
(among other factors) the result of strict adherence by the department 
to the administrative discipline of societies. Many defaulting members 
in societies were expelled and their debts recovered as arrears of land 
revenue. A factor of some importance is that the Cooperatives enjoyed 
more or less a monopoly in the provision of farm credit as far as the 
institutional sources of finance were concerned. At the time of 
enrolment in societies a member was aware that in case of loan default 
he would be expelled from cooperative membership and therefore his only 
source of credit would be the money-lender. Since the money-lender 
charged a much higher rate of interest on his loans compared with those 
of the cooperative society, the members of societies in general 
refrained from loan default due to the fear of expulsion from the 
society and further reliance on money-lenders.
As has already been noted the war with India, and dissolution of 
the ’one unit' were two plausible factors for the fall in recovery 
rates during 1970-77. In addition, the increased supply of credit from 
institutional sources in the Punjab's agriculture was associated with 
relatively liberalized lending policies of the credit institutions.
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The farmer member of a society, even if he was committed to the 
administrative discipline of the society, found it easier to default in 
respect of the cooperative loans due to the availability of alternative 
sources of institutional finance. Many cooperative societies in the 
1970s found it hard to compete with other formal sources of finance. 
The members, in general, showed less interest in cooperative affairs. 
Those who enjoyed control in societies received an undue share of 
cooperative loans and they were the main loan defaulters.37
As stated earlier, the Government of the Punjab introduced the 
incentive of interest-free loans provided through the Cooperatives in 
1978. This incentive of the Government resulted in better recovery of 
loans advanced by societies due to two reasons. First, the quantum of 
loan granted to a loan recipient was raised by 50 to 60 times the 
existing level, and loans were granted in kind (mainly in the form of 
improved seed, chemical fertilizers and pesticides). It is possible 
that the productivity at the farm level went up, due to the increased 
use of these improved farm inputs and this, in turn enabled the farmer 
to pay back to his society (This is reconsidered in Chapter Seven). 
Second, the grant of interest-free loan proved helpful in creating a 
realization on the part of farmers that it was necessary to repay loans 
in time so as to enjoy the privilege of this facility in the future as 
well.
Contrary to the above argument, critics-^ suggest that funds 
meant for disbursement of. loans in the form of improved seed, chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides were actually diverted towards short-term 
interest bearing investments. And, through smart forgery new loans 
created in fictitious names were adjusted against the 'old' loans.
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Further, through this practice members in societies, besides making big 
illegal earnings, were able to show high recovery rates.
The proponents of the cooperative movement39 however contend that 
the movement should be evaluated in relation to different criteria from 
those applied to a regular business because a cooperative is not 
supposed to be a commercial business venture or a profit making 
enterprise. Its objectives are largely distributional. It is a system 
of providing .welfare to the poorer cultivating and non-cultivating 
farming groups and of providing them with an opportunity to improve 
their own economic position through taking advantage of subsidized 
loans. Of course, concessional lending cannot be profitable in a 
commercial sense.
When judged from the point of view of distributing welfare to the 
poorer farmers, the objectives of the movement have largely remained 
unfulfilled. As noted, the amount of credit advanced to the average 
member was insignificant and it is therefore possible that the funds 
provided had no considerable impact on farm productivity. It may be 
that the farmer members were instead tempted to divert loans to non­
productive use. In point of fact the purposes to which members put 
their loans were often not those for which the credit societies had 
advanced the loan. It was therefore easy to note the danger of abuse 
of the loan for purposes other than production in such a situation. In 
a study of a village in the Punjab,^0 Khan discovered that loans put to 
productive use made up only 33 percent of the total loans issued. He 
observed that the credit society was not a blessing to the village 
since the cheap credit provided was used for 'non-productive' purposes 
thereby merely increasing farm indebtedness.
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Past experience suggests that concessional lending to members was 
a disincentive insofar as optimal productive use of cooperative credit 
was concerned. Wherever Cooperatives provided cheap loans, they failed 
to run a sound administrative organization or to transfer welfare to 
the poorer members. The reasons for this were simple. The cooperative 
societies were left free to decide on membership and mode of operation. 
As a consequence, the large farmers and politically strong farming 
groups dominated the Cooperatives and annexed Government funds for 
their own purposes.41 v
Evidence from the Punjab has established that better-off farmer 
members in societies dominated the management committees and the bulk 
of cooperative credit was channelled to them. The small farmers, for 
whom the system was primarily designed, remained by and large outside 
the fold of cooperative lending. Khan & Bhatti (1973) concluded that 
in the sampled societies 31 percent of the total loans were obtained by 
members of the management committee, who constituted only 15 percent of 
the total members. They further recorded that the average amount 
borrowed by a member of the management committee was about 115 percent 
more than that granted to an ordinary member.42
The large farmers and the committee members were the major loan 
beneficiaries and invariably they were the major loan defaulters. It 
was revealed in one study that 86 percent of the committee members (as 
well as the large farmers) in societies were loan defaulters as against 
37 percent ordinary members. Moreover, the committee members received 
preference in the grant of loans.43
The successful operations of Cooperatives and the quality of its 
management ultimately depended on the alertness of its members and the
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pressure they could exert on the committee of management to conduct 
cooperative affairs efficiently. This in turn, called for awareness 
amongst member of their rights and obligations and the responsiveness 
and competence of the managing committee. In short, the success of 
Cooperatives depended on the necessity of inculcating amongst members 
and the management the ideals and goals of cooperation.
It may be noted that in the earlier years of the inception of the 
movement in Europe, cooperation needed to disseminate its ideas and 
aspirations widely to the public who were not well informed about this 
novel form of organization. Hence a considerable emphasis was placed 
on the education of both members and the public at large as potential 
members. The continued importance ascribed to education over one 
hundred years later is a recognition by the International Cooperative 
Alliance (ICA) of the limited understanding and popular misconception 
still held by many persons as to the nature and operation of 
Cooperatives.44
The ICA Report of 1966 recognized in a more specific sense the 
need to educate both members and officials in the running of the 
Cooperatives as both a business and a democratic organization. The 
available evidence from the P u n j a b ^  on the subject generates little 
confidence as to the successful attainment of this objective. The 
standard of management, particularly among the base level societies, if 
assessed in terms of educational qualification and the opportunities 
for continued management training, has frequently remained poor. At 
the secondary/apex level the resources available for Cooperatives to 
influence or make representations at Governmental or international 
level are also extremely limited. While the ICA Report calls for
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"necessary responsibility" of the movement to educate people in the
ideas and practices of cooperation, it can be argued that this 
responsibility has not been accepted by the movement in any real sense 
in the Punjab.
The task of imparting the necessary education and training to 
members and management in societies has been entrusted to the 
Department of Cooperation and the Punjab Cooperative Union. The
Department of Cooperation, in particular fulfils this role through its
field staff (cooperative extension workers). The cooperative extension 
worker is responsible for the organization, promotion and development 
of the movement at the base level. The extension worker is expected to 
organize a cooperative group, develop group leadership, supervise its 
functions and provide guidance to the management of societies. He is 
expected to inspect a society from time to time and undertake coercive 
measures and impose penalties wherever necessary and permissible under 
law. In this way the cooperative extension worker combines in his 
person the authority of the Government function and the traditional 
responsibility of extension agent.
The cooperative extension workers in the Punjab are trained in 
the elementary concepts of cooperation at the Punjab Cooperative 
Training College located at Faisalabad (Punjab).The training of
extension workers has been shown to leave much to be desired. 
Supposedly trained extension workers are not capable of imparting the 
requisite education to the management committee of societies. In 
addition, this responsibility has also not been taken up properly by 
the cooperative training college.^6
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The extension worker is generally low paid with very few 
facilities provided by the department in terms of transportation, daily 
allowance, etc.; he is expected, on the other hand, to undertake a 
gigantic task. As a consequence few extension workers in the Punjab 
have performed their role satisfactorily. And this is reflected in 
terms of poor maintenance of cooperative records, lack of awareness and 
ignorance of the members and management committees of societies in 
respect of the principles of cooperation, rights of cooperative 
membership together with responsibilities.^7 It may however be argued 
that this was to have been expected given that the Cooperatives had 
been used as an instrument of the Government to channel cost-free 
credit for subsidizing agriculture; the ideals of cooperation would 
scarcely be relevant.
The sheer lack of sufficient numbers of trained and qualified 
staff to administer Cooperatives is another problem. It has been the 
practice to assign to the departmental official (usually a sub­
inspector) the responsibility of supervising about 50 cooperative 
societies. As stated earlier, the starting pay of the worker is low 
and provide no incentive for the creation of a well qualified staff. 
The opinion of Hough on the subject holds good even to-date: he stated 
in 1959 that:
"There has been fewer failures due to over-direction 
than have been due to too slack a guiding rein for 
new societies or those with a low credit rating. The 
inadequacy of the education of officers and members 
of societies in cooperative principles; failure to 
insist on practices in conformity with these; 
incompetent or slack supervision; too infrequent 
audit, and lack of follow-up on audit findings; the 
inaptitude of members; the inadequacy of credit 
available; failure to detect in time malpractices of 
committee members in the mis-appropriation or misuse
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of funds; and the want of expert guidance for 
societies or other types of credit are major causes 
of failure, rather than the over-strictness now held 
up to reprobation".48
The Punjab Cooperative Union is similarly engaged in the task of 
imparting the necessary education and training in cooperative 
practices. The Union performs this task by publishing leaflets, 
organizing seminars and arranging conferences. In addition, the Union 
performs the task with the assistance of its own instructors, who 
organize courses of short duration (3 to 5 days) for the members of 
management committees of primary societies on a voluntary basis. In 
practice, however, members education has not been developed 
sufficiently to produce any impact on operational aspects of
Cooperatives.49
An important task which the Department of Cooperation in the 
Punjab is expected to undertake is the regular audit and inspection of 
Cooperatives. At the primary level this task has again been entrusted 
to the cooperative sub-inspector, who himself is not closely familiar 
with audit work. As a result, the task of audit is either not 
undertaken at all, or not effectively performed. Field studies5  ^
undertaken in the Pakistan Punjab have established that a large number 
of societies remain unaudited. And this in part is attributed to the 
shortage of trained and experienced staff of the Department. Moreover 
management committees in societies were found to be failing to maintain 
proper records as the members themselves are often incompetent and 
often unable to record correct entries. This practice has often made 
it more difficult to undertake the audit task effectively.51
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As noted before, the sub-inspector and the field extension worker 
are low paid and do not have requisite facilities. This again makes it 
difficult for them to visit the societies regularly. In many instances 
the departmental staff visit societies only once a year.
The success of cooperative credit societies in the Punjab 
depended to a greater extent on the ability and sincerity of their 
management committee members. The management committee of a society is 
comprised of a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and two 
executive members. The ordinary members of a society annually elect 
the members of the management committee. The management committee in 
turn performs routine work, decides on loans and ensures recovery of 
credit from members. In short, management undertakes as many functions 
for the promotion and development of Cooperatives as are assigned to it 
by members in a society. In addition, it ensures that there is 
effective participation of members in cooperative affairs and in the 
decision-making process.
In the light of research studies^ undertaken in the Punjab it 
was found that important decisions in cooperatives were generally taken 
by a group leader (a person who enjoyed leadership quality within the 
social structure of the village by his being better off, outspoken or a 
member of the village welfare committee) who was sometimes a president, 
vice-president, treasurer or secretary. Mostly the opinion of the 
group leader determined the final decision. Important aspects of 
organisation such as regular elections of the members of the management 
committee were ignored. Once the management committee had been 
elected, no meetings of the committee were held and decisions were 
taken without the participation of the ordinary members. Important
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aspects of management viz., better education of the members of the 
management committee in the principles and philosophy of cooperation 
and strict adherence to the inspection and audit of the societies by 
the Department of Cooperation were ignored. The affairs of societies 
were, by and large, controlled by better-off farmers who owned large 
holdings and enjoyed prestigious positions in the village committees 
(such as members of the union council, basic democracy, Chairman of 
'Ushr' and 'Zakat' Councils) constituted for the welfare of villagers. 
The multiple role performed in the village community granted the 
members of the cooperative's management committee enough hold over the 
society in order to manipulate decisions in their own favour without 
having any regard for the opinion of ordinary members or respect for 
the statutory by-laws of Cooperatives framed by the Department of 
Cooperation.
In short, performance of Cooperatives in regard to adherence to 
democratic procedures in many of the Cooperatives has remained rather 
poor. The criticism of Cooperatives in this respect should in fairness 
be somewhat moderated. Observers have often noted difficulties of 
ensuring democratic organization and frequent divergence of practice 
from expectations. Nonetheless, a cooperative must be judged against 
its ambitions as codified in its by-laws and rules of business. The 
evidence leads to the conclusion that the practice of popular and 
democratic control was only nominal, and in practice, the principle of 
'one .member, one vote' was not adhered to while taking decisions 
concerning the cooperative's operations.
It is important to outline briefly the role of the Department of 
Cooperation in the administration of the cooperative credit movement in
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the Punjab. As noted in Chapter Four, the movement in India was 
conceived and used as a Government sponsored activity. It thus 
required that a separate Department of Cooperation be established to 
supervise the movement, and to encourage and regulate the working of 
societies. A Department of Cooperation was thus established in the 
Punj ab.
Presently, the Department of Cooperation in the Punjab is headed 
by a Registrar, who is the administering authority and controls the 
working of the movement. The department is responsible for the 
registration, supervision, audit, inspection and liquidation of all 
types of societies in the province. In addition, the department 
undertakes the task of promoting the cause of the movement.
The close supervision of the movement has been entrusted to the 
cooperative department, and the staff of the department is expected to 
nurture Cooperatives in their infancy. The official staff is required 
to develop the societies such that they become independent in their 
day- to- day operations. Nevertheless cooperative bureaucracy has 
established its stronghold on the cooperative institutions, 
jeopardising their autonomy. In practice, the cooperative field staff 
virtually directly manage the affairs of many societies, and disregard 
their development and promotional role. The statutory obligation of 
"audit" has been totally ignored. No concrete measures are taken to 
train the management of societies to enable them to administer their 
affairs by themselves. The societies for their day-to-day operations 
have thus been made entirely dependent on the cooperative field staff. 
And the Cooperatives have not been able to grow as an autonomous 'self-
help' institution.53
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Given too much official control, the implications for the 
movement were rather adverse. There was an undesirable gulf between 
the educated and the illiterate. It would be natural to expect that 
cooperative officials would be out of touch with the members of primary 
societies. Often the members in societies lamented the official red
tape which caused delay in the sanctioning of loans. Sometimes the
complaint was made that gifts and special services were required to 
execute credit transactions by the cooperative inspectors. It has been 
observed that highly-placed officials when visiting villages are often 
attended by a retinue of petty officials who overawe the simple village 
folk. All of this has tended to reinforce a poor image of the 
officials in the minds of the cooperators. The cooperative officials 
and workers do not serve, listen, teach and cooperate; rather they
dominate and control. This has created a gulf which separates them 
from the most important single group in the cooperative set-up i.e.,
the members.54
5.II Effectiveness of Cooperatives as a Tool of Development
The reports of the official Government inquiries^5 and appraisals 
by independent researchers^ indicate that Cooperatives have not 
achieved the development goals set for them by economic planners. Even 
although Cooperatives are sponsored by the Government, their activities 
have little effect on the existing patterns and trends of economic
activity and their performance has little relevance to the wider
context of social and economic change and the general strategy of
development. The design and functioning of Cooperatives have
relatively little to do with major economic problems in rural areas
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such as marginalization of small farmers and unemployment among 
landless agricultural labourers; moreover, only a small proportion of 
the farming population has been effected by the Cooperatives.
In assessing the impact of Cooperatives, there arises a problem 
of identifying the changes for which the cooperatives themselves have 
been responsible, rather than results of other quite different factors. 
For example, the influence of money-lenders in some communities in the 
Punjab waned when Cooperatives were established, but the primary reason 
was the migration of professional money-lenders to India.
Similarly, there arises the problem of the relation between 
idealised objectives and actual performance. A considerable gap has 
always existed between the aims and the performance of Cooperatives. 
Indeed the impact of Cooperatives bears little relation to the goals 
stated in either the charter of Cooperatives or the official plans of 
the Government. This could be regarded as the failure of the movement. 
However, when performance is compared with what prevailed before the 
Cooperatives were introduced, the cooperatives seem to have produced 
some positive results.
The following assessment of the performance of Cooperatives in 
the Punjab is made in relation to the following objectives:
1. Self-reliance
2. Agricultural innovation and productivity
3. Social impact and structural change
The cooperative movement has been described as a "movement that 
builds men and communities and gives to small people a dignity and a 
significance". Thus according to a Government policy declaration in 
1962, it was stated that:
310
"Political democracy cannot succeed unless it is 
accompanied by a successful economic democracy. The 
present Government is convinced that the cooperative 
movement which represents a system of economic 
democracy has great potential as an instrument of 
national advancement and has, therefore, decided to 
give its full support and assistance to the 
organization and development of cooperative societies 
in all fields of economic activity.58
The continued support of the Government for the cooperative 
movement in the Punjab was based on the assumption that the rural 
population in the province needs essential services to improve their 
economic status. It was held that long-run economic development with 
appropriate social change was only possible if Government involvement 
in terms of provision of capital funds, as well as administration of 
rural cooperatives, was ensured. While this policy affected the ideal 
of democracy and autonomy within cooperative operations, it was 
recognised that, without Governmental financial support and 
consequently some degree of Government control, cooperatives would have 
not become properly established. As has been established earlier, the 
credit societies have been virtually sponsored by the Government with 
the specific aim of channelling credit to members: their origin and 
their functions must therefore be seen as aspects of Government
policy.59
This dependency on the Government for the establishment and 
support of Cooperatives has created a dilemma for the self-reliance of 
the movement. The Cooperatives are so dependent on state assistance 
that it is unlikely that they could survive without Government support. 
The dilemma of Government involvement and cooperative independence 
cannot be easily resolved because recommendations have been and are 
often made in the official plans for an even closer association of the
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Cooperatives with the Government.
The cooperative movement has not been able to replace the 
traditional dependency system (e.g. patronal system) by self-reliance 
and community initiative achieved through cooperative action. In this 
regard the dilemma confronting the movement is that Cooperatives are 
established in rural areas generally characterized by dependency 
relations and are unable to replace this dependency by self-reliance. 
The dependency relations became more pronounced but in another form 
under the cooperative, wherein the state has become a new patron.
Credit was advanced by the cooperative movement to attempt 
innovations that could lead to increased productivity. But it has been 
established that insufficient credit was provided. It was further
noted that, except in certain years, loan repayments were generally 
inadequate. The entire issue of agricultural credit as a means of 
increasing production in the Punjab has however been a thorny problem. 
While the Government has remained liberal in providing subsidized 
agricultural credit, the primary societies nevertheless often have had 
at their disposal only limited supplies of credit because of their 
failure to follow prescribed conditions, their inability to generate 
enough capital of their own or to recover loans. The evidence has 
established that much of the credit advanced by Cooperatives was not 
used for productive purposes. Although the record of repayment has not 
been bad in recent years, those who must need credit were often refused 
a loan facilities.
Even productivity considerations in Cooperatives posed a dilemma. 
While some cooperative members (generally members of the management and 
other better-off farmers in societies) took undue advantage of
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cooperative credit and other services, the others were not able to do 
so - the result - a gulf between the better-off and the ordinary 
members to the access of cooperative services - leading to greater 
economic inequalities; a practice contrary to the cooperative ideals.
In addition, the social benefits of Cooperatives were slower to 
emerge and less evident than the economic benefits, although the latter 
were by no means a common feature. Actual achievements in regard to 
greater socio-economic equalization, structural change and relief of 
mass poverty fell far short of the announced goals of the policy 
makers.
Rural communities in the Punjab are characterized by an uneven 
distribution of wealth and status among the inhabitants. Evidence has 
proved that there was unequal distribution of the benefits of rural 
Cooperatives within such communities. These who were already in more 
fortunate positions took advantage of the cooperative services; the 
disadvantaged of the community benefited less or not at all. While in 
principle the introduction of a cooperative in a highly structured 
community means the establishment of a new institution aimed at 
restructuring and promoting equality, evidence has established that 
Cooperatives were not effective in bringing about structural change in 
the communities. The impact of the community structure upon the 
Cooperatives was stronger than the impact of the cooperative upon the 
community structure.
The effectiveness, and viability of a cooperative as an 
institution depended to a greater extent on the relative homogeneity of 
its members or at least on the absence of sharp class and caste 
barriers in the community from which the membership was drawn. The
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evidence has established that these essential components were missing 
from the organizational framework of the Cooperatives. In the Punjab 
communities, where Cooperatives were established, existence of divisive 
forces, group barriers and divergent interests of members were a common 
feature. There was an absence of democracy and equality within 
cooperatives. Heterogeneity of cooperative membership was well 
pronounced but the leaders in societies were generally major land 
owners, traders and even money-lenders (sometimes combining all these 
roles). The large landowners rented out land and hired labour; their 
tenants and labourers were drawn from the village poor. The poor were 
often indebted to the rich. These economically weaker individuals were 
incapable of participating on an equal footing with those on whom they 
were already deeply dependent. The fact that the poor frequently 
belonged to inferior castes complicated the situation.
In brief, the introduction of the cooperative movement to a 
social system that is structured along hierarchical lines or controlled 
by particular interests will not necessarily bring about much reform or 
democratization to the prevailing system. The rural communities in the 
province were not already characterized by communal solidarity, 
although such solidarity has tended to be assumed by policy-makers.
In summary, the cooperative movement played a variable role in 
increasing economic productivity in rural areas, with an average 
economic impact that was not very significant, and only a marginal role 
in implementing social and structural change, in spite of the ambitious 
goals often assigned to them.
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5.Ill Factors Determining the limited success of Cooperatives in the 
Pakistan Punjab
The discussion of the working of Cooperatives in the Punjab 
suggests that many factors have contributed to the impasse confronting 
the movement, especially at its primary level. The factors that have 
determined the limited success of Cooperatives may be grouped into 
'external' and 'internal' factors.
The foremost among the 'external' factors is the character of the 
uneducated and faction-ridden leadership. In an environment of apathy 
and ignorance it was inevitable that the primary impulse for 
cooperative organization would have arisen, not spontaneously from 
below, but from the act of a Government anxious to improve the 
conditions of farm people by emancipating them from the clutches of 
money-lenders. A Department of Cooperation was established to serve 
this role, headed by a Registrar invested with wide powers of 
supervision, control and arbitration over the movement. The efficiency 
of the departmental structure has inevitably depended on the qualities 
of the man at the top. Any lack of care in selection, or failure to 
train the men once selected, or lack of continuity of tenure weaken the 
capacity for effective leadership. While senior officials became 
bureaucrats, the field staff remained poorly qualified for the task of 
educating the membership in cooperative ideals and practices. In 
effect, the officials responsible for the movement have been unable to 
provide the right degree of guidance. Where too much guidance has been 
given, there has been no sense of participation on the part of the 
membership; where too little has been given the people may have merely 
participated in failure.
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Cooperatives are primarily a distinctive type of business 
concern. They can never produce results if the required skill and 
talent in business management is not available. Through lack of 
managerial competence even viable organizations will not prove 
productive beyond a certain degree. Provisions of the necessary 
managerial input required an up-to-date programme of cooperative 
education and training. The casual treatment meted out to cooperatives 
by Government policy and also in the press and media created an 
attitude of apathy amongst cooperative workers. Cooperation is a 
complex phenomenon, and it is not merely bringing together 10 or more 
persons. The real problem of the cooperative functionary starts after 
the cooperative has been registered. This is where the movement is 
suffering miserably. Setting targets in terms of numbers of societies 
creates an impression that after a cooperative has been registered the 
task of the department's functionary is over. The creation of the 
cooperative is meaningless unless it produces a significant impact on 
the economy of members involved in the organization. Members' 
requirements are to be fulfilled and further information needs to be 
obtained regarding the priorities among their requirements. Business 
skills, training, education and management are the instruments through 
which this object can be achieved. It is these institutional 
arrangements for the training and education of Cooperatives which have 
generally been lacking from the movement.
At the apex level of the movement, the Punjab Cooperative Bank 
has just functioned as a pay office. All credit operations, from the 
sanctioning of borrowing limits and preparation of loan application 
through to the release of funds by the Cooperative Bank, have virtually
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been handled by the cooperative officials. The staff of the department 
is often scared of questioning the justification of the demand, the 
genuineness of the documents and other procedural requirements. A 
financing Bank, except with the prior permission of the Registrar, 
cannot have access to the society or its records for ensuring/checking 
the proper utilization of funds. Thus there is a complete absence of 
the Banker-customer relationship between the financing Cooperative Bank 
and the borrowing cooperative societies. The Punjab Cooperative Bank 
is just an on-looker in the whole situation.
At the primary level, the major cause of the limited success of 
Cooperatives has been the lack of popular participation in it. From 
the beginning, the movement has been the creation of the Government 
rather than the result of people's demands. It has been devoid of 
local initiative, leadership, finance and management. With little 
financial stake in its success, farmers have not assisted in its 
development. They have treated it more like a public dole and the more 
powerful farmers have benefited disproportionately. It has been a 
classic case of good intentions being subverted by inappropriate 
methods of operation. Government control of Cooperatives has robbed 
the cooperative ideology of its very essence. As such the movement has 
failed to mobilize resources of its own, as there is no practice of 
thrift and collection of deposits.
The introduction of the policy of interest-free loans to 
subsistence farmers seems to have failed, as according to one 
estimate^1 the bulk (about 70 percent) of interest-free credit of 
nearly Rs 2000 million was utilized by bigger farmers who have got 
their "pocket societies" registered with the department. This could
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have been expected as the natural outcome of an interest-free lending 
policy. The Rochdale principle of charging market prices for 
cooperative services and distributing profit to members later would 
have probably worked better; it would have ensured efficient use of 
social resources and through the distribution of profit, provided 
concessional or subsidized lending for member borrowers. The flaw with 
the policy of interest-free loans was that it was not strictly directed 
toward a target group - that is the small farmers, and supervised 
closely to achieve that objective. It could have been anticipated that
in the absence of any close supervision, the big farmers would have
found it attractive to join societies by illegal methods. And this is 
what has happened in the Punjab's Cooperatives.
The continuing barrier to the development of primary societies 
has also been the result of the strong primordial and ethnic 
relationships within the villages. In this environment, cooperative 
structures became a victim of local, ethnic, feudal or social
conflicts. The state intervention in the present system has not 
produced any considerable positive impact.
In short, what we find in Cooperatives in the Punjab is the fact 
that most members of societies lacked knowledge of the basics of
cooperation. Illiteracy was one factor, but at the same time serious 
attempts were not made to teach the peasants the rights and 
responsibilities of membership. Members did not subscribe to share 
capital. In addition they did not bring their savings to societies. 
They looked upon societies as a Government agency aimed at providing 
interest-free credit.
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The inadequacies of operational aspects of Cooperatives were 
associated with shortcomings in their management, disbursement of loan 
and its recovery. The management affairs were manned by incompetent 
persons, with little training and education in cooperation. In many 
instances, ordinary members did not take an active part in cooperative 
affairs. And this resulted in the control of management by a few 
powerful persons.
Even the basic principles of any viable organization were not 
maintained; accounts were not properly maintained and the repayment of 
loans not insisted upon.
The failure of societies was also seen in terms of poor coverage 
of farm population, and also in inadequate mobilization of 'owned 
funds'. The restrictions imposed by the existing members and the 
management on the entry of new members was another obstacle in the 
development of the movement.
The working capital was inadequate. Inadequacy apart, working 
capital was not tailored to farmers needs. The interest-free provision 
of credit by the societies was either misutilized or misdirected by the 
members. And this practice resulted in operational losses, corruption 
and sub-optimal allocation of Cooperatives resources, mainly channelled 
to them by the Government.
5.IV Conclusions
The cooperative movement in the Pakistan Punjab has served 
primarily as an instrument of Government policy. The bulk of the 
finance available to the movement came from the Government, and has 
made cooperatives an extension of the Government's welfare and
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expenditure policy rather than making them worthwhile, self-sustaining 
institutions in their own right.
The movement has brought little benefit to the mass of poor 
inhabitants in the Punjab's villages. Cooperatives have not served as 
agents of change and development for the vast number of subsistence 
farmers. The better-off rural inhabitants have taken undue advantage 
of cooperative provisions: the Government-supported credit (and limited 
technical guidance) channelled through the movement.
In point of fact the majority of small farmers have been excluded 
from cooperative membership due mainly for castes and ethnic reasons. 
Many cooperatives are in the control of rural elites, most amongst whom 
are better off large farmers. This is one (among others) major reason 
that cooperatives successfully benefited the better-off; to the extent 
of their success, however they have tended to increase income 
differentials within the community since poorer inhabitants gained 
little or no advantage.
The Punjab's Cooperatives have been assumed to be community wide 
in their membership, however the existing structure in the community 
has tended to be reproduced within cooperatives. Those who are better- 
off control the management and in turn influence the nature and 
distribution of cooperative benefits. Tenants, share-croppers or farm 
labourers have been excluded from membership. Small farmers who are 
cooperative members often fail to qualify for cooperative loans due to 
one or other reason propounded by the management of societies. And 
they in turn must continue to turn to non-institutional credit sources. 
Corruption and abuse of position by the management, and by the leaders 
in the cooperatives, is the major factor why benefits have not flown to
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poorer members.
The structural, organizational and operational deficiencies as 
were evident in the movement in the united Punjab, were inherited by 
the movement in the Pakistan Punjab and they in turn have affected 
cooperative performance badly. Excessive Government control, lack of 
owned funds, reliance on borrowings, insufficient training and
education of cooperators for instance are some of the characteristic
features of the movement in the Pakistan Punjab.
The next chapter looks into the problems, set-backs and
achievements of Cooperatives as an instrument of development in the
Indian Punjab.
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the failure of many agricultural credit societies in the Punjab. 
Also see Inaytullah (1972); Khan, D.A. (1982); Khan, M.A. (1971); 
Khan, M.A. et al (1973); Lowdermilk (1964);
57. See for instance Chaudhry, H.A. & Rizwani, A.R. (1970) pp71-72.
58. See Haque, Z. (1968), pp137-138.
59. See Chaudhry, H.A. & Rizwani, A.R. (1970) Chapter 3; also see 
Inayatullah (1972); Chapter VI.
60. Ibid.
61. See Government of Pakistan Report of the National Commission on 
Agriculture (1988) p401.
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Table 5.2 Loans Advanced and Recovered by the Punjab 
Cooperative Bank in the Pakistan Punjab
(Rs million)
Year Loans advanced Loans recovered
1970 165.13 84.48
1971 159.00 105.40
1972 119.50 70.10
1973 122.60 18.20
1974 123.60 25.00
1975 129.60 22.30
1976 166.80 —
1977 90.40 89.10
1978 259.20 253.00
1979 491.70 487.30
1980 883.00 874.00
Source: a) Government of the Punjab; Annual Reports on the
working of Cooperative Societies in the Punjab 
(various issues)
b) Farooq Haroon (1986).
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Table 5.3 Primary Agricultural credit and non-credit societies 
in the Pakistan Punjab
(Rs million)
Year No. of Societies Membership Working Capital 
(Rs million)
Credit
societies
Non­
credit
societies
Credit
societies
Non­
credit
societies
Credit Non­
societies credit 
soc.
1950 8598 1588 246000 86000 30.10 8.00
1955 9255 2900 282000 158000 28.50 17.10
1960 10822 4312 396000 228000 46.51 43.20
1961 11499 5458 430000 288000 54.32 60.40
1962 11853 5578 458000 291000 62.11 48.20
1963 11882 5551 425000 284000 67.73 47.00
1964 11960 5587 492000 292000 71 .51 50.00
1965 12121 5488 512000 291000 75.09 44.00
1966 12186 5451 527000 290000 76.72 45.70
1967 12116 5535 522000 305000 62.52 50.70
1968 12151 5401 528000 297000 73.00 53.80
1969 12178 5303 532000 293000 74.66 59.80
1970 12652 4651 591294 233000 98.53 29.90
1971 12600 4648 593059 231000 90.14 31 .60
1972 12491 5607 592713 337000 86.90 71 .70
1973 12792 6214 624640 352000 131.36 96.40
1974 12774 4120 628924 217000 136.45 33.40
1975 12658 - 633674 - 143.76 -
1976 12757 - 642066 - 164.82 -
1977 17165 - 865000 ■ - 239.63 -
1978 20997 1241 926000 120000 341.05 77.01
1979 30548 1232 1006000 120000 537.26 78.72
1980 37920 1216 1683000 119000 633.99 89.12
Source: Government of the Punjab; Annual Reports on the working of
Cooperative Societies in the Punjab (various issues)
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Table 5.4 Agricultural Loans Advanced by the Institutional 
Sector in the Pakistan Punjab
(Rs million)
Year Coopera­
tives
Taccavi
loans
Agri. Devel- 
ment Bank
Commercial
Banks
Total
1948 53.68 2.70 56.38
(95.2) (4.7) -
1950 82.88 1 .40 - - 84.28
(98.3) (1.67) -
1955 31 .78 2.60 - - 34.38
(92.4) (7.5) -
1960 69.52 5.60 - - 75.12
(92.5) (7.4) -
1966 78.39 3.80 48.3 - 130.49
(60.0) (2.9) (37.1)
1970 99.29 3.70 77.3 - 173.27
(53.2) (2.1) (44.6)
1972 39.08 8.92 80.0 - 128.00
(30.5) (6.9) (62.5)
1973 42.02 10.23 169.09 85.70 307.04
(13.6) (3.3) (55.0) (28.0)
1974 143.72 67.50 415.57 286.40 913.19
(15.7) (7.3) (45.5) (31.3)
1975 81 .54 12.13 396.31 520.90 1010.88
(8.0) (1.2) (39.2) (51.5)
1976 91.84 25.67 532.86 608.10 1458.46
(6.3) (1.7) (36.5) (55.4)
1977 95.45 13.14 638.77 970.10 1717.46
(5.5) (0.76) (37.1) (56.4)
1978 138.04 9.00 430.53 1290.92 1868.49
(7.3) (0.48) (23.0) (69.0)
1979 413.78 11 .96 416.93 1381.11 2223.78
(18.6) (0.54) (18.7) (62.1)
1980 708.64 8.22 711.55 1587.40 3015.79
(23.5) (0.27) (23.5) (52.6)
1981 1126.25 8.30 1066.61 1826.77 4027.93
(27.9) (0.21) (26.4) (45.3)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percent of total institutional
loan disbursed in a year.
Source: a) Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan (1975)
b) Punjab Development Statistics (1986)
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Table 5.5 Supply of and Demand for Institutional Agricultural 
Credit in the Pakistan Punjab
(Rs million)
Year Contribution of 
Agri. Sector to 
GDP at current 
factor cost
Credit 
require­
ments (25% 
of Col.2)
Supply of 
Agri. credit 
through 
institutional 
sources
%age of credit 
supply to the 
credit require­
ments
1 2 3 4 5
1972 17,934 4,483.50 128.00 3
1973 21,907 5,476.75 307.04 6
1974 28,084 7,021.00 913.19 13
1975 33,533 8,383.25 1,010.88 12
1976 38,338 9,584.50 1,458.46 15
1977 43,832 10,958.00 1,717.46 16
1978 50,315 12,578.00 1,868.49 15
1979 53,936 13,484.00 2,223.78 16
1980 62,504 15,626.00 3,015.79 19 ■
1981 70,346 17,586.50 4,027.93 23
Source: a) Pakistan Economic Survey 1985-86 (1986)
b) Punjab Development Statistics (1986)
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Table 5.7 Households Reporting Membership of Cooperative 
Societies by type of Household
Type of Household Total
Reporting Membership of 
Cooperative Societies
Number Percent 
of Total
All Households 9,245,493 231,538 2.5
Non-Farm Households 4,086,066 20,342 *
Farm Households - Total 5,159,427 211,196 4
Under 0.5 Hectares 484,277 6,859 1
0.5 to under 1.0 ha. 582,987 8,508 1
1.0 to under 2.0 ha. 886,750 22,177 3
2.0 to under 3.0 ha. 919,295 25,891 3
3.0 to under 5.0 ha. 1,083,284 41,231 4
5.0 to under 10.0 ha. 769,556 60,439 8
10.0 to under 20.0 ha. 307,339 30,080 10
20.0 to under 60.0 ha. 108,345 13,769 13
60.0 and above 17,594 2,242 13
* Percentage less than 0.5
Source: Pakistan Rural Credit Survey (1985)
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Table 5.9 Working capital in Primary Agricultural credit societies in 
the Pakistan Punjab (Rs million)
Year Total
working
capital
'Real Value' 
of working 
capital
Share
capital
Reserve
funds
Deposits 
and loans 
held
GDP
deflator 
1959 = 
100
1947 34.78 - 7.70 11.22 15.85 -
1954 24.74 - 3.84 10.45 10.44 -
1959 40.95 40.95 6.26 11.98 22.70 100.00
1960 46.51 44.73 7.17 11.64 22.70 103.97
1961 54.32 53.10 8.15 12.29 33.86 102.29
1962 62.11 60.71 9.65 13.14 39.32 102.16
1963 67.73 63.03 11 .28 13.57 42.87 107.44
1964 71 .51 63.76 12.39 14.35 44.76 112.15
1965 75.09 65.13 14.01 15.23 45.84 115.29
1966 76.72 60.91 14.57 16.07 46.08 125.95
1967 62.52 48.16 14.03 14.47 34.01 129.80
1968 73.00 56.60 14.44 17.22 41 .33 128.96
1969 74.66 55.76 14.76 16.81 43.10 133.88
1970 98.53 70.26 19.13 20.58 45.05 140.23
1971 90.14 60.58 19.14 21 .14 38.33 148.78
1972 86.90 50.41 19.37 22.07 45.67 172.37
1973 131.36 61 .48 21 .33 22.05 45.67 213.64
1974 136.45 52.24 22.06 25.45 73.36 261.18
1975 143.76 49.10 22.78 24.27 87.85 292.75
1976 164.82 50.87 23.69 26.55 99.60 323.97
1977 239.63 67.86 33.04 26.37 90.49 353.08
1978 341.05 91.54 45.39 25.04 259.27 372.54
1979 537.26 130.52 61 .22 25.59 491.73 411.61
1980 633.99 138.98 44.97 26.13 883.00 456.15
1981 2252.96 452.76 119.33 50.55 575.91 477.60
1982 - 1165.18 220.98 159.79 59.31 621.15 527.27
1983 2760.16 477.68 128.00 75.94 752.86 577.82
1984 987.91 161.56 100.56 88.24 799.15 611.47
Source: Government of the Punjab; Annual Reports on the working of
cooperative societies in the Punjab (various issues)
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Table 5.10 Data on the Primary Agricultural Credit Societies
in the Pakistan Punjab (Average per member) (in Rupees)
Year Working
capital
Share
capital
Reserve
funds
Loan
advances
'Real'
working
capital
1947 106.68 23.61 34.41 164.67 -
1954 98.96 15.36 42.47 45.79 -
1959 116.33 17.78 42.48 70.00 116.33
1960 117.44 18.10 29.39 80.98 112.95
1961 126.32 18.95 28.58 80.76 123.48
1962 135.61 21 .06 28.68 78.02 132.55
1963 159.36 26.54 31 .89 92.82 148.30
1964 145.34 25.18 29.16 77.80 129.59
1965 146.66 27.36 29.74 66.76 127.20
1966 145.57 27.64 30.49 78.94 115.57
1967 119.77 26.87 27.72 75.43 92.26
1968 138.25 27.34 32.61 79.22 107.19
1969 140.33 27.74 31 .59 82.80 104.81
1970 166.71 32.36 34.82 69.74 118.88
1971 152.00 32.27 35.64 51 .61 102.15
1972 146.79 32.71 37.28 71 .58 85.15
1973 210.51 34.18 35.33 147.96 98.52
1974 217.27 35.12 40.52 108.24 83.18
1975 227.10 35.98 38.34 126.19 77.56
1976 256.72 36.90 41.35 138.22 79.23
1977 277.02 38.19 30.48 119.30 78.45
1978 368.30 49.01 27.04 104.61 98.85
1979 534.05 60.85 25.43 531.02 140.95
1980 376.70 26.72 15.52 524.65 138.15
1981 1872.78 99.19 42.01 935.01 376.35
1982 826.95 113.40 41 .89 958.98 156.83
1983 1862.45 86.36 51 .24 835.79 322.32
1984 623.68 63.48 55.70 666.48 101.99
Source: Compiled from Tables 5.6 & 5.9
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Table 5.11 Households Reporting and Total Amount of Outstanding Debt
from Institutional and Non-Institutional Sources by type of 
household
No. of households in thousands 
Amounts in million Rupees
Type of Household* All House­
holds
House­
holds
number
Total Credit 
Amount Percent
All households 9,245 4,475 25,757 X
Non-Farm households 4, 086 697 4,404 X
Farm households Total 5,159 1,778 21,353 100.0
Under 0.5 hectares 484 145 1,379 6.5
0.5 to under 1.0 ha . 583 189 1,428 6.7
1.0 to under 2.0 ha. 887 257 1,720 8.0
2.0 to under 3.0 ha. 919 295 1,921 9.0
3.0 to under 5.0 ha. 1,083 399 3,320 15.6
5.0 to under 10.0 ha. 70 308 4,231 19.8
10.0 to under 20.0 ha. 307 128 3,957 18.5
20.0 to under 60.0 ha. 108 49 2,471 11.6
60.0 and above 18 8 921 4.3
Households
Number
Institutional
Amount
Credit
Percent
All households 271 8,240 X
Non-Farm households 19 366 X
Farm households Total 252 7,874 100.0
Under 0.5 hectares 5 86 1.1
0.5 to under 1.0 ha. 8 81 1.0
1.0 to under 2.0 ha. 18 259 3.3
'2.0 to under 3.0 ha. 28 349 4.4
3.0 to under 5.0 ha. 46 808 10.4
5.0 to under 10.0 ha. 63 1,746 22.2
10.0 to under 20.0 ha. 51 2,259 28.7
20.0 to under 60.0 ha. 26 174 22.2
60.0 and above 5 539 6.8
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Table 5.11 (cont.)
Non-Institutional Credit
Households Amount Percent
Number
All households 2,297 17,517 X
Non-Farm households 184 4,038 X
Farm households Total 1,612 13,479 100.0
Under 0.5 hectares 142 1,293 9.6
0.5 to under 1.0 ha. 183 1,347 10.0
1.0 to under 2.0 ha. 246 1,461 10.8
2.0 to under 3.0 ha. 274 1,572 11 .7
3.0 to under 5.0 ha. 365 2,512 18.6
5.0 to under 10.0 ha. 266 2,485 12.6
10.0 to under 20.0 ha. 98 1,698 12.6
20.0 to under 60.0 ha. 33 725 5.4
60.0 and above 6 382 2.8
* As estimated from the Rural Credit survey sample
x Not applicable
Source: Pakistan Rural Credit Survey (1985)
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CHAPTER 6
COOPERATIVES AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDIAN PUNJAB
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the performance of. 
cooperatives in the Indian Punjab in a manner comparable to that of the 
preceding chapter dealing with the Pakistan Punjab. The chapter is 
organized into four sections. Section I deals with the organizational 
and operational aspects of cooperatives, in particular the agricultural 
cooperative credit societies. Section II adjudges the performance of 
cooperatives as an instrument of development. Section III covers 
important problems faced by the cooperative movement, and finally 
section IV summarizes the major issues flagged in the chapter.
6.1 Organizational and operational aspects of cooperatives
The manner of the evolution of the cooperative movement in the 
Indian Punjab, as discussed in detail in Chapter Four, suggests that 
the performance of cooperatives, either as autonomous 'self-help' 
organizations and also as a vehicle to serve the government's 
developmental objectives, was much less than satisfactory. This 
limited success, indeed failure, of the movement to achieve certain 
assigned goals was attributed to many complex factors. The operational 
inefficiency of the cooperative movement, especially the cooperative 
credit system, was attributed to, amongst other factors, its structural 
weaknesses, inadequate progress in the reorganization of cooperatives 
into viable units, the lack of focus on qualitative improvement in 
working procedures; problems in the rate of recovery of loans, 
mobilization of deposits, lack of skill and managerial competence of
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the members of management committees, bureaucratization of cooperatives 
and so on. It was held that the movement in the Indian Punjab was 
largely under the control of the government, and as such was used by 
the government to serve its developmental objectives. It was concluded 
that from either perspective cooperatives failed to bring any 
significant improvements in the socio-economic status of its members or 
to introduce changes in their circumstances.
In the light of the above conclusions, it is necessary to analyse
in more detail the organizational and operational aspects of
cooperatives in the Indian Punjab. It will be argued that deficiencies 
inherent in the structure and organization of cooperatives were major 
factors that stood in the way of any operational success. And this in 
turn was the major reason for the limited effectiveness of cooperatives 
as an instrument of development.
The structural aspects of the cooperative movement have been
discussed earlier in Chapter Four. It is important to note that there 
are two separate cooperative structures for the provision of short,
medium and long-term cooperative credit in the Indian Punjab. In that 
respect the structure of the movement in the Indian Punjab contrasts 
with that in the Pakistan Punjab. The Pakistan Punjab has a two-tier 
cooperative structure, with the Punjab Cooperative Bank at the apex 
level, and the primary societies at the base level, and this structure 
is different in the sense that the movement dispenses only seasonal 
loans (short-term credit); no medium-term or long-term credit is 
provided by the movement in the Pakistan Punjab.
The three types of credit, namely short-term, medium-term and 
long-term are provided in the Indian Punjab by two agencies; a) Primary
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agricultural credit societies,(helped and guided by other supporting 
institutions) which supply short and medium-term credit; and b) the 
Land Development or Land Mortgage banks (with their own connected 
organizations) which provide long-term finance.
In the provision of short and medium-term credit, the 
organizational structure in the Indian Punjab consists of three 
agencies: the first consists of the primary agricultural credit
societies which operate at the village level and form the base of the 
credit structure. The federations of these societies, the central 
cooperative banks, form the second tier of the movement and their area 
of operation is usually confined to a district. At the topmost level 
are the federated central cooperative banks forming an apex cooperative 
bank, which serves the financial needs of the cooperative movement in 
the state.
Given that the role of long-term cooperative credit differs from 
that of either short or medium-term credit, a separate organization 
called the Land Development Banks (formerly Land Mortgage banks) was
established in the 1920s. Structurally, it has two tiers. The upper
tier is the State Land Development Bank and the Primary Land 
Development Banks form the lower tier. The financing of the
cooperators is done by the State Land Development Bank through the 
Primary Land Development Banks or their branches.
At the apex level of the cooperative credit structure (providing 
short and medium-term credit) in the Indian Punjab is the Punjab 
Cooperative Bank. All central cooperative banks in the state are
federated with the Punjab Cooperative Bank. The Punjab Cooperative 
Bank mobilizes and deploys financial resources amongst various sectors
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of the movement. The finances provided by the Reserve Bank of India 
and the government of Punjab to the Punjab Cooperative Bank ultimately 
flow to the members of village-level societies in the state.
The Punjab Cooperative Bank in the Indian Punjab has not been 
able to build a sufficient base of its own working capital. The owned 
funds of the bank formed only 9 percent of its working capital in 1980. 
The Punjab Cooperative Bank relied to a major extent on borrowed.funds 
to conduct its business. The bank also faced problems in its lending 
operations. Despite a significant increase in loan advances, loans 
outstanding have shown an increasing trend, forming some 34 percent of 
total advances in 1980. The Punjab Cooperative Bank has faced a severe 
problem in recovering these outstanding loans from the central 
Cooperative Banks throughout the period 1966-80 (see Fig.6.1; also see 
Table 6.1).
There has been noted a tendency on the part of the Punjab 
Cooperative Bank to divert a significant proportion of its funds to the 
non-agricultural sector in order to spread the increased cost of its 
deposits and other operational expenses, and to earn large profits. It 
has indeed become a problem to induce the bank to commit its funds to 
rural lending. But at the same time it may be unreasonable to expect 
the bank to lend its high-interest-bearing deposits at much lower. rates 
and so involve it in loss and impair its viability. While the Reserve 
Bank of India, as a matter of policy, allowed the Punjab Cooperative 
Bank. to lend to institutions outside the cooperative fold, such a 
situation has raised an important question: whether as a result of the
need to deploy costly deposits in correspondingly more profitable 
avenues of lending, the Punjab Cooperative Bank is tending to move away
341
FIG 6.1 DATA ON PUNJAB COOPERATIVE BANK IN 
THE INDIAN PUNJAB
LOG SCALE
10000
1000
M
0
100
1966 1968 1 1976 1978 1980
1
WORK.CAP.
3
-B- LNS ADV.
1 WORKING CAPITAL 2 OWNED FUNDS 3 LOANS ADVANCED
4 LOANS RECOVERED 5 LOANS OUTSTANDING
Note: The d iagram  serves an illustrative purpose only; the tim e intervals  
are not equal.
OWN.FDS
LNS.RC.
DEPOSITS
LNS OTG.
342
from the development role expected of it in the rural sector.1
At the secondary level of the movement central Cooperative Banks 
have been established.2 As discussed earlier in Chapter Four, the 
essential function of a central cooperative bank is to act as a channel 
between primary societies and the Punjab Cooperative Bank. Besides 
providing credit to primary societies, the central Cooperative Banks 
act as a balancing mechanism for transferring the funds of surplus 
societies to those in deficit.
The central Cooperative Banks, like the Punjab Cooperative Bank, 
have not been able to mobilize enough of their own working capital. 
The owned funds of these banks formed only 14 percent of their total 
working capital in 1980 and the major dependence of the banks was on 
borrowing from the Punjab Cooperative Bank.
The deposits in the central cooperatives have increased 
significantly in recent years. Between 1966 and 1980, total deposits 
in the central cooperative banks increased by about 1074 percent. 
Deposits formed some 47 percent of the working capital in 1980. The 
spurt in deposits has been largely due to concerted and sustained 
efforts made by the central cooperative banks in the wake of the 
Reserve Bank of India's scheme for linking its re-finance assistance to 
the deposit mobilisation efforts of the bank. In this regard an extra 
half percent interest offered by banks (over and above the ceiling 
rates of interest applicable to commercial banks) as allowed by the 
Reserve Bank of India has encouraged mobilisation of deposits.
The loans advanced by central Cooperative Banks have increased 
from Rs 273.18 million in 1966 by some 1232 percent in 1980. However, 
a major problem with the central Cooperative Banks has been the steady
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growth in outstanding loans. Outstanding loans formed some 49 percent 
of the total advances in 1980. In addition, the overdue loans have 
averaged some 32 percent of outstanding loans for the period 1966-80. 
(see Fig.6.2; also see Table 6.2)
Despite the fact that loans advanced by central Cooperative Banks 
have increased, studies of the utilization of loans have revealed that 
lending in several cases has not been preceded by proper appraisal of 
the economic viability of investment programmes and there has not been 
any verification of the end use of the loan by the banks. Similarly 
there was no arrangement for post-disbursement follow-ups, and the 
borrowers have tended to divert a good part of loans for purposes other 
than those specified in their applications.
Against the background of rising overdue loans and consequent 
deterioration in the financial position of many central Cooperative 
Banks, a programme of rehabilitation was introduced in 1971. The 
programme envisaged investigation of overdue loans with a view to 
identifying irrecoverable debts and ascertaining the reasons for 
overdues. The implementation of the rehabilitation programme was not 
uniformly satisfactory, as evidenced by the deterioration of recovery 
performance. Many central Cooperative Banks did not draw up the 
necessary annual plans covering all aspects of the rehabilitation 
programme. Some central Cooperative Banks did not create 
rehabilitation cells as recommended by the concerned authority. 
Similarly, investigation of overdues on a rigourous basis at the level 
of the primary agricultural credit societies was not completed by the 
banks; as a result, the funds released by the government were not fully 
utilized by these banks. Again, certain measures essential to
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complement the rehabilitation programme, such as revitalization of 
primary agricultural credit societies, selection of certain high- 
performance societies for intensive development, strengthening and 
improving the arrangements for supervision over field staff and 
mobilization of resources were not seriously taken up.
We now turn to the provision of long-term credit. Formerly known 
as Land Mortgage banks and now Land Development Banks, these 
institutions generally consist of primary Land Development Banks and 
the Punjab Land Development Bank.3 The primary banks at the base of 
the long-term credit structure in the Indian Punjab deal directly with 
the peasants, while the Punjab Land Development Bank performs the 
functions of financing the primary Land Development Banks and provides 
a link between the primary banks and other sources of finance in the 
state. However, where primary banks do not exist, the Punjab Land 
Development Bank provides finance directly to the peasants or through 
its branches.
These banks provide credit for the purchase of agricultural 
equipment, improvement of land, redemption of past debts and the 
recovery of mortgaged land. Long-term loans are granted for a period 
of 5 to 20 years or even more. As the name of these banks indicates, 
loans are granted against the security of land. The amount of the 
loans is usually related to the value of land mortgaged or the land 
revenue levied on these lands. Repayment is made either by equal 
instalments of the principal, with interest being calculated every year 
on the amount outstanding, or by equated annual instalments of the 
principal and interest together.
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The working capital of the Punjab Land Development Bank has been 
built largely of borrowing from the government of the Punjab and the 
Reserve Bank of India. Owned funds of the Punjab Land Development Bank 
formed only some 8 percent of the working capital of the bank in 1980. 
The loans advanced by the Punjab Land Development Bank to the primary 
Land Development Banks have increased but again the major problem is 
the recovery of loans from the primary banks. Total loans advanced by 
the Punjab Land Development Bank to the primary banks amounted to Rs 
360.15 million in 1980. As against this, loans outstanding at the 
Punjab Land Development Bank amounted to Rs 1081.04 million in 1980. 
(see Fig.6.3; also see Table 6.3)
At the primary level there were 44 Land Development Banks with 
about 0.29 million farmers on their rolls. Owned capital of these 
banks accounted for 12 percent of the working capital in 1980. Loans 
advanced by these banks increased from Rs 16.45 million in 1966 by some 
1644 percent in 1980, but the recovery of loans from members has 
remained quite low. The operational efficiency and organizational 
competence of many banks has left much to be desired. Testimony to 
this is the rising overdues in primary banks. These increased from Rs 
0.01 million in 1966 to Rs 44.9 million in 1960. Overdues as a 
percentage of outstanding loans formed some 42 percent in 1980. (see 
Fig. 6.4; also see Table 6.4)
From the point of view of purposes for which loans were made, 
minor irrigation schemes have accounted for the major part of the total 
lending of these banks, followed by farm mechanization and land 
improvement. Loans granted to artisans and landless labourers were 
generally negligible. Evidently the main thrust of the lending of
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these banks has been to finance land-based activities. Although these 
banks are also empowered to lend for non-land-based activities, which 
would be of direct benefit to the rural poor, in practice this has not 
been taken up in a big way, due presumably to lack of expertise and 
technical know-how available to the banks.
The major problem of the long-term cooperative credit structure 
was that in a number of cases investment credit dispensed by the Punjab 
Land Development Bank was not productively deployed, hence the rising 
trend in overdue loans, rendering several primary Land Development 
Banks either eligible for only restricted lending or ineligible to 
undertake any fresh lending programmes. Moreover, a sizeable 
proportion of loans overdue in these banks stemmed from either non­
utilization or misapplication of the loan advanced.
Several other factors have contributed to the rising trend of 
overdues. Amongst them are included laxity in post-credit follow-up 
and monitoring of end use; lack of technical guidance to the loanees, 
natural calamities and wilful default. Further, little attention was 
paid to ensuring that the borrowers reaped the full benefit of their 
investment on completion of the project through the application of the 
needed production credit. Since Land Development Banks did not furnish 
a list of their borrowers to the primary agricultural credit societies 
within their jurisdiction, long-term loanees were not normally assured 
of the complementary production credit support as a matter of course. 
The absence of any effective operational link between the primary Land 
Development banks/branches of the Punjab Land Development Banks and the 
short-term credit wing gave rise to the inability of the cooperative 
credit system to assess the credit-worthiness and credit servicing
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capacity of its clients in a comprehensive manner.
The most disquieting feature of the Cooperative Banking system in 
the Indian Punjab is that in recent years it has been subjected to a 
excessive degree of politicization. The form in which politicisation 
has manifested itself is the ad hoc suspension of elected boards of 
management of Cooperative Banks by the government by exercising the 
power conferred on it under the State Cooperative Societies Act, and 
the appointment of government officials to manage the affairs of the 
Cooperative Banks. But although supported by statutes suspensions have 
generally been resorted to without any compelling and convincing 
reasons. The boards of Cooperative Banks were superseded and their 
management was placed in the hands of departmental officials in order 
to weed out vested interests from cooperatives; to bring about 
uniformity in elections to the committee and to disqualify defaulters 
from holding office on the managing committee. While such measures 
were nominally targetted at 'improving' the management of the banks the 
general consequence of such policies was the frequent transfer of some 
of the departmental incumbents, leading to lack of continuity in 
leadership, control and guidance from the top.^
Primary societies usually epitomize the vitality and service 
potential of the cooperative movement. In the Indian Punjab they may 
be again classified into credit and non-credit societies, with the 
former providing the mainstay of the movement. Relevant statistics on 
the working of primary agricultural societies (credit and non-credit) 
are presented in Fig.6.5 (also see Table 6.5) The data presented refer 
to the period, 1966-80. (Data for the earlier period were not 
available for the non-credit societies).
351
In 1966 the total number of primary agricultural societies 
(credit and non-credit societies) in Punjab came to 12389, with 11064 
classified as agricultural credit and only 1325 as agricultural non­
credit societies. This number fell to 12344 in 1977 with 10942 as 
agricultural credit and only 1402 as agricultural non-credit 
societies. So by 1977 some 88 percent of the primary societies in 
Punjab were agricultural credit societies and only about 12 percent 
were agricultural non-credit societies. Thereafter there was a sharp 
decline in the number of agricultural credit societies in the Punjab. 
Thus out of a total 5662 primary agricultural societies some 75 percent 
societies were agricultural credit societies, as against 1396 non­
credit societies in 1980. Despite sharp reductions in the number of 
agricultural credit societies in the late 1970s the movement remained 
centred in the sphere of credit. The absense of growth in the 
formation of new credit (indeed there were fewer at the end than at the 
beginning of the period due to the drop in 1978) or non-credit 
societies differs significantly from the results established in the 
Pakistan Punjab where the rate of formation of credit societies after 
1978 was significant . The rapid growth there was attributed to the 
government policy entrusting the movement with the role to channel 
interest free credit to the agricultural sector. Thus many new credit 
societies in the Pakistan Punjab were established after 1978.
Data presented in Fig.6.5 show that the two categories (credit 
and non-credit) had 1,784,000 and 100,985 members representing some 94 
percent and 6 percent of the total membership respectively in 1980. 
During the period 1967-80 the membership of credit societies increased 
roughly at the average rate of 3 percent, as against the non-credit
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societies which grew at the average rate of 2 percent. These statistics 
suggest that the rural population in the Indian Punjab was attracted
more towards the ’services' offered by agricultural credit societies.
Moreover, average size of membership, of an agricultural credit society 
was 418 as against 72 in the non-credit society in 1980 so the 
agricultural credit societies in the Indian Punjab were generally
larger than those in the Pakistan Punjab. Fig. 6.5 also shows that a 
significant increase in the working capital available to the credit 
societies took place through the period 1966-80, primarily from 
borrowing, rather than from owned funds (also see Fig.6.6). Data on 
the sources of working capital in non-credit societies were not
available, but it seems likely that non-credit societies, like credit 
societies, relied primarily on borrowed funds in order to run their 
businesses. The working capital of the credit societies increased at 
an annual rate of 14 percent as against 6 percent in the case of the 
non-credit societies during the period 1976-80.
The cooperative movement in the Indian Punjab, like that in the 
Pakistan Punjab, remained centred in the sphere of agricultural credit. 
And this was in line with the policy of the government in the Indian 
Punjab which after the independence of India in 1947 had assigned more 
importance to agricultural credit in general and cooperatively provided 
credit in particular.
It is against this background that we now turn to look at the 
working of the agricultural credit societies in detail.
The performance of agricultural credit societies in the Indian 
Punjab may be studied through an examination of the following aspects:
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(a) the relative importance of credit cooperatives among
institutional sources of finance
(b) the importance of cooperative credit in relation to total 'credit
needs' of farmers
(c) the extent of local participation in, and support for
agricultural credit societies and
(d) the welfare effects of cooperative credit distribution.
The relative importance of cooperative credit among the
institutional sources of rural credit may partly be judged from the 
data contained in Table 6.6. The data given in the table excludes 
supply of credit by commercial banks. Ordinary commercial banks have 
advanced agricultural credit, but according to some observers,  ^ they 
were not a dominant source of institutional credit in the Indian Punjab
at least up to the first half of the 1970s. Similarly data on 'Taccavi
loans' were not available after 1974.
Data given in table 6.6 show that the supply of institutional 
credit (Primary agricultural credit societies, Land Development Banks 
and Taccavi loans) were enhanced considerably between 1960 through 
1974, and a major share of the supply of institutional credit came from 
the agricultural credit societies. The supply of rural credit was 
augmented through Land Development Banks and Taccavi loans as well.
It will be recalled that Taccavi loans are emergency loans for 
short-term purposes; they go up in periods of droughts and go down to
negligible levels in periods of bumper harvests. Therefore, for the
purposes of private investment in agriculture, loans from Land 
Development Banks and primary agricultural credit societies are more
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relevant. It was estimated that in 1970-71, 51 percent of long-term 
loans were advanced for the installation of tubewells.
It is difficult to comment on the relative contributions made by 
the various institutional sources of farm finance in the Indian Punjab. 
Nor it is possible to comment on the changes that have been taking 
place in the business of rural lending, especially in the provision of 
institutional credit in recent years since it has not been possible to 
have access to the relevant data. An idea of the relative position of 
cooperative credit among the institutional sources of rural credit can 
be had from the overall position for the country, data for which are 
shown in Table 6.7. The share of cooperative credit in total 
institutional credit in India declined from 75 percent in 1975 to 57 
percent in 1980, whereas the share of commercial banks increased 
steadily during this period from 20 percent in 1975, to 34 percent in 
1980. Cooperatives, on the other hand, continued to dominate the 
short-term credit scene, although their share of short-term credit 
declined from 84 per cent in 1974-75 to 70 percent in 1979-80. So 
despite the entry of commercial banks into the financing of agriculture 
in the early 1970s, the relative importance of cooperative credit did 
not undergo any significant change and credit societies continued to 
disburse the major share of the total institutional credit provided to 
the agricultural sector.6
A study carried out in 1972 in the IADP district of the Ludhiana 
district (Punjab)7 showed a broadly similar situatioii on the relative 
distribution of loans from different sources. An examination of a 
sample of 1526 farmers and the sources of their loans is shown in Table 
6.8. Cooperatives met 63 percent of the total volume of credit
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borrowed by the sample farmers. The nationalized banks provided 
another 18 percent, thus 81 percent of total credit was provided by the 
institutional agencies. Money-lenders, friends and relatives provided 
the remaining 19 percent. This is a long way indeed from the barely 3 
percent contributed by the cooperatives in 1961. The study further 
established that cooperatives had succeeded in loosening and 
practically removing the grip of money-lenders on farmers' livelihood 
in the Punjab. Chaudhri and Dasgupta (1985) found that for the Indian 
Punjab as a whole, farmers in the largest size group obtained on 
average nearly 90 percent of their credit from the government and 
cooperative agencies whereas the farmers in the smallest size group 
obtained about 70 percent of their credit from these sources. The 
traditional source, namely the village money-lender, was insignificant 
for the largest farm size group although it still contributed about 20 
percent of all borrowing by small farmers. The actual rate of interest 
paid by farmers in different size groups was not known; however the 
rate of interest charged by the state and cooperative sources varied 
between 7 and 9 percent, while the rate of interest charged by the 
money-lenders varied between 18 and 100 percent. Chaudhri and Dasgupta 
observed that small farmers in all probability were able to obtain 
credit from state and cooperative sources for their agricultural 
production needs but, in addition had to depend on the money-lenders 
for consumption credit. They however concluded that information about 
the credit needs of farmers in different farm size groups was not known 
nor was it possible to comment on the extent to which these needs were 
met by the state and cooperative sources.8 (see Table 6.9)
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These findings show that despite an increase in the provision of 
farm credit by the commercial banks, in recent years, cooperative 
credit forms a significant part of institutional credit in India, as 
also in the Indian Punjab. In contrast to the Pakistan Punjab, where 
the government has been committed to dispense agricultural credit 
through the commercial banks and the agricultural development bank, the 
government in India has generally relied on the efficiency of the 
cooperative movement. It may be noted however that even after the 
introduction of the interest-free lending policy of the government and 
despite the quantum increase in cooperative credit which occurred after 
1978, the share of cooperative credit in the Pakistan Punjab stayed 
less than 30 percent in the late 1970s. Thus the cooperative movement 
in the Indian Punjab has not only been entrusted with the task of 
advancing short-term, medium-term and long-term credit, but in terms of 
the supply of institutional credit, it seems to have done fairly well, 
compared with the cooperative credit movement in the Pakistan Punjab.
The absolute importance of cooperative credit in the Indian 
Punjab can be judged from both its contribution toward total credit 
needs and by its demographic coverage. From both points of view the 
role of agricultural credit societies in the Indian Punjab has been 
rather significant. Let us consider the first aspect first.
It was estimated by the Rural Credit Survey Committee (1954) that 
institutional agencies met only 7 percent of the farmers' credit needs 
of which cooperatives contributed 3 percent. By 1961-62, the All India 
Rural Debt and Investment Survey found that cooperatives provided 16 
percent of farmers' credit needs, while all institutional agencies as a 
whole were responsible for 19 percent. By 1968-69, the National Credit
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Council estimated that institutional finance was responsible for 
meeting 39 percent of the needs of the farm sector, and in this, the 
share of cooperatives was as much as 33 percent.9
Even the target for disbursement of loans for 1979 (the last year 
of the Fifth-Five Year Plan) was set at Rs 1300 crores for short-term 
credit, against the estimated need for credit of Rs 3000 crores. With 
the Nationalized Commercial Banks providing an additional Rs 400 
crores, the institutional finance met 56 percent of the total credit 
needs of the farm sector. Nonetheless there was still a gulf between 
the supply and demand for credit, which was filled by the non- 
institutional sector.
Table 6.12 contains data on the availability and demand for 
cooperative credit (short and medium term) in the Indian Punjab. It 
may be noted that at no time after 1967 were cooperatives able to 
fulfil the total short and medium-term production credit needs of their 
member farmers, though they provided a major share of the institutional 
credit (also see Fig. 6.8). A study undertaken by the Economic and 
Statistical Organization of the Government of the Punjab in 1971^1 
revealed that of the total loans demanded by the sampled beneficiaries, 
the highest proportion (39.8%) was provided by the agricultural credit 
societies, followed in rank order by friends and relatives (37.8%) 
money-lenders (22.0%) and the Taccavi loans (0.4%). It was established 
that the available quantum of institutional credit fell short of the 
total demand for credit, but there was a significant shift in the 
provision of credit from the non-institutional sources to cooperative 
credit over the passage of time.
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It may thus be noted that both in terms of the supply of 
institutional credit and also in meeting farmers credit needs, the two 
Punjabs show considerable similarities. Institutional credit (including 
cooperative credit) has generally remained insufficient in the two 
Punjabs to fulfil production and consumption credit needs of farmers 
and peasants continue to rely on non-institutional sources to meet the 
balance of their credit requirements.
The statistics on the working of agricultural credit societies in 
the Indian Punjab are partially presented in Fig. 6.6 (also see Table 
6.10). It can be seen that the number of societies has grown from 
13144 in 1956 to 19981 in 1964, at a growth rate of approximately 5.5 
percent a year. Nonetheless a significant decline in the formation of 
new societies took place between 1967 and 1977, so that the average 
growth rate remained negative for the whole period, 1967-1977. 
Further, it may be noted that there was a sharp decline in the number 
of credit societies after 1977, and the total number of credit 
societies declined from 10942 in 1977 to some 4266 in 1980. This 
contrasts with the Pakistan Punjab where we have noted that the rate of 
establishing new societies, especially between 1977-80 was not only 
positive, but very significant (the average rate of growth for the 
period, 1977-80 was about 32 percent). Let us examine the Indian case 
in detail.
The relatively slow growth of societies in the Indian Punjab was 
the result of attempts which were made by the government of India to 
revitalize the societies through structural reorganization and 
rationalization of their operations. These structural reforms were 
directed towards determining the optimum size and nature of functions
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of the society so as to make them economically viable and managerially 
efficient. The official policy regarding size of a society 
crystallized around the mid 1960s. At the conference of the State 
Ministers for Cooperation held in 1964 it was decided that in order to 
satisfy minimum criteria of viability (such as the ability to appoint a 
full-time paid secretary to set up a regular office, to contribute to 
reserves and to pay dividends) area-wise standards for the quantum of 
business necessary for a society should be worked out and a plan should 
be drafted for programmes of reorganization through amalgamation of 
non-viable units and liquidation of defunct ones. Reorganization on 
this basis was expected to be completed by 1966-67, resulting in a 
reduction of the total number of societies to 0.12 million. However, 
even at the end of 1967-68, the number of such societies remained at 
0.17 million in India. In 1973, the working group on cooperation for 
the Fifth Five Year Plan recommended that a primary agricultural 
society should be treated as viable only when it reached a minimum 
short-term agricultural credit business of Rs 0.2 million. Again at 
the meeting of the Registrars of cooperative societies convened by the 
Reserve Bank of India in 1976, it was decided that for the purpose of 
determining viability, a normal cropped area of 2000 hectares should be 
considered adequate to provide a minimum short-term credit potential of 
Rs 0.2 million. Further in order to remove the existing lacunae in the 
legal procedures which was responsible to some extent for the delay in 
implementing the reorganization programme, it was proposed to amend the 
state Cooperative Societies Acts to provide for compulsory amalgamation 
of societies.^
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As a result of the efforts of the government of India to 
reorganize the movement, the number of agricultural credit societies in 
the Punjab was brought down to 10923 in 1969 as against 19981 in 1964. 
Further reorganization of the movement at the state level in the Indian 
Punjab resulted in a sharp decline in the number of societies from 
10942 in 1977 to 4259 in 1978. Indeed, a scheme for revitalizing the 
movement was started in 1977 and many defunct and non-viable societies 
were eliminated from the cooperative scene. Further, many small-sized 
primary units were merged and converted into large-sized primary 
societies to make the movement essentially viable.^
Here, then, arises a significant contrast between the evolution 
of the cooperative credit movement in the Indian Punjab and the 
Pakistan Punjab, during the latter half of the 1970s. While the Indian 
government followed a policy of consolidation as against expansion of 
the movement, the government in the Punjab (Pakistan) vigorously 
pursued a policy of expansion of agricultural credit societies after 
1977. Comparable data for the number of viable primary societies for 
the Indian Punjab were not available; it is thus difficult to comment 
on the relative success achieved by the cooperative credit movement in 
the Indian Punjab by following the policy of consolidation, when 
compared with that of the movement in the Pakistan Punjab. However, it 
has been established that the expansion of the cooperative credit 
movement in the Pakistan Punjab in terms of number of societies has 
resulted in an increase in the number of non-viable and 'bogus' 
societies, and the following Chapter provides some local evidence of 
this. As such, the policy of expansion, as against consolidation, has 
done more harm than good to the movement in the Pakistan Punjab.
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Another way of looking at the performance of the cooperative 
credit movement is to estimate the coverage of the rural population 
provided by the cooperatives. It was reported that by 1971 all 
villages in the Indian Punjab had been covered by the primary 
agricultural credit societies. In addition, the total membership in 
societies rose to about 1.48 million farmers, which accounted for 98 
percent of the farming households in the Indian Punjab.^ According to 
a further Survey carried out in 1980, a typical large-sized primary 
society covered 2 to 3 villages in the Indian P u n j a b . The 
cooperative credit movement had therefore made significant progress in 
terms of coverage of the rural population after 1947. In comparison 
the movement in the Pakistan Punjab was not able to cover more than 15 
percent of the farming population by 1981. In addition, it has 
generally been established that agricultural credit societies 
throughout Pakistan, and in the Punjab in particular, were established 
by the larger farmers, and the proportion of small farmers in the 
membership of societies remained far less.
There is enough evidence to show that primary agricultural credit 
societies in the Indian Punjab were in the control of cultivators, 
amongst whom most were generally the larger farmers. As such a 
considerable segment of the weaker sections of the rural community 
(including rural artisans, village craftsmen and agricultural 
labourers) remained outside the cooperative fold. It may however be 
argued that the societies in the Indian Punjab, as also in the Pakistan 
Punjab, were generally concerned with the provision of improved farm 
inputs, a matter of little relevance to the rural artisans, village 
craftsmen etc. Nonetheless the societies were still unable to enrol in
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their membership the small cultivating farmers. The All India Rural
Credit Review Committee Report (1969) remarked
"the comparative neglect of the small cultivators by 
cooperatives results from more factors than one. One 
of these is that the principle of open membership is 
not always effective as several cooperatives operate' 
as a closed shop for the benefit of one particular 
group or caste or faction. Secondly, the repaying 
capacity of the small cultivator is called into 
question and the loan often ruled out on this ground.
Thirdly, in the distribution of limited funds 
available, it is the small farmer who gets left out.
These are some of the factors which keep some 
restrictive practices alive in practice, even though 
on paper they are supposed to have ceased to 
exist".
The role of cooperative movement in the Indian Punjab did not 
only depend on the formation of new societies, but also on the average 
size of membership and its long-term changes. As noted, the 
cooperative credit movement in the Indian Punjab by 1971 had enrolled 
some 98 percent of the farming population. A further increase in 
membership of societies in subsequent years indicates that the movement 
had succeeded in enrolling almost 100 percent of the rural areas in the 
Punjab.
Let us consider the average size of membership in a society and 
its long-term changes. The average size of membership in a credit 
society remained small for the whole period 1955-64 at only 67; 
however, when compared with that of the average size of membership in a 
credit society in the Pakistan Punjab, it was at a fairly higher level. 
Nonetheless a significant increase in the average size of membership 
occurred in subsequent years. Between 1978-80, the average size of 
membership in a society was 410 in the Indian Punjab.
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The average annual rate of growth of membership was 13.8 percent 
for the whole period 1956-64; as against an average growth rate of 3.1 
percent for the years, 1967-80. It seems that a vigorous campaign was 
launched by societies to enrol as many new members as possible during 
the 1950s and in the first half of the 1960s. As noted earlier, when
98 percent of the farming population in the Punjab has been covered by
the credit societies up to 1971, the rate of enrolment in societies 
must increasingly fall in the subsequent years. Nonetheless the 
increase in the average size of membership in a society was the result 
of consequent reduction in the number of agricultural credit societies 
especially after 1977. The above findings establish that the 
agricultural credit societies in the Indian Punjab were large sized, as 
against the small sized primary societies in the Pakistan Punjab. 
Further, in terms of enrolment of new members, the societies in the 
Punjab (India) made significant progress when compared with that of the 
credit movement in the Pakistan Punjab. A probable implication of 
large sized primary unit in the Indian Punjab can be that the societies 
had economies of scale, better management, standardized routines etc.
In addition, it is possible that the per capita administrative and
maintenance expenditure of the department perhaps decreased over time. 
It is possible that the per capita availability of working capital, as 
also the per capital loan advances might be expected to have increased 
(we shall deal with these aspects later).
The primary agricultural credit societies in the Indian Punjab, 
like those of the credit societies in the Pakistan Punjab obtained 
their working capital from the usual sources: (a) share capital paid up 
by the members '(b) a Reserve Fund created out of the profits (c)
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deposits from the members and loans from (d) central Cooperative Banks 
and other sources. Funds from the first three sources formed the 
'owned funds', while the loan from central Cooperative Banks and other 
sources formed the borrowed capital of societies.
From Fig.6.6 (also see Table 6.10) we can further note (bearing 
in mind the log scale) that working capital of credit societies in the 
Indian Punjab was made up primarily of borrowed rather than owned funds 
(share capital, reserve funds and deposits). Although there was an 
increase in both categories, the latter as a percent of the working 
capital tended to decline after 1964. Moreover, there was a steady 
decline in the percent share of 'owned funds' in the working capital of 
societies after 1977, while the total working capital steadily 
increased. The credit societies in the Indian Punjab, even after their 
reorganization in the late 1970s, tended to depend more on borrowed 
funds rather than on the owned funds. A more or less similar pattern 
was noted in the credit societies in the Pakistan Punjab, where the 
credit societies showed a virtual total dependence on borrowing from 
the Punjab Cooperative Bank after 1977.
Many field studies undertaken in the Indian Punjab have 
established this characteristic reliance on borrowing rather upon owned 
funds to manage their business. A Survey of selected societies in the 
Indian Punjab undertaken by the Economic and Statistical Organization 
in 1976,17 established that owned funds in sample societies constituted 
only 23.5 percent of the working capital. An almost similar conclusion 
was obtained from a study undertaken by the Punjab Agricultural 
University, Ludhiana, in 1967.18 This revealed that borrowing remained 
a major source of the working capital of the societies.
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Many factors were responsible for this dependence of societies on 
borrowing from external sources.  ^9 Amongst the important factors were 
the negligence of members in failing to adhere to the by-laws 
pertaining to the purchase of share capital; a lack of will and 
persuasion of the management committee to inculcate habits of thrift 
and create the confidence among members and non-members necessary for 
attracting local deposits; lack of infra-structural facilities, viz. 
proper space for buildings and lock-fast facilities to keep the savings 
in safe custody. Above all, members' perceptions that credit societies 
were merely a means of access to government funds was another factor; 
members were fundamentally ignorant of the vital cooperative principle 
of self-reliance. Large amounts of funds were provided by the 
government on easy terms. In addition members found it unattractive to 
bring their savings to societies with the object of building sufficient 
owned capital of societies.20
The agricultural credit societies in the Indian Punjab, as in the 
Pakistan Punjab, were certainly expected to promote the spirit of 
thrift and mutual aid amongst their members. The principle of state 
partnership in the share capital and management of societies was 
however enunciated by the All Indian Rural Credit Survey (1954), and 
the policy was intended to boost the image and prestige of societies so 
that they could attract rural savings and build up their own financial 
strength through deposit mobilization. However, as noted, this 
objective remained largely unfulfilled and societies came to be 
perceived as mere lending agencies. Lack of interest shown by members 
in deposit mobilization was however the result of complex factors: 
unattractive interest rates offered to depositors; infrequent deposit
368
mobilization campaigns launched by the management committees of 
societies; a higher rate of illiteracy; absence of any traditional 
banking habit among the rural people; absence of proper infra-structure 
in terms of office and safe facilities, and so on.
Let us turn now to the major activity of cooperative credit 
societies in the Indian Punjab to advance loans for short and medium- 
term credit purposes. Loans were granted either in cash or in kind. 
However, loans in kind, (generally in the form of chemical fertilizers, 
crop pesticides and HYV seeds etc.) were generally more prevalent. 
Total loans advanced by cooperative credit societies showed a 
spectacular increase over the period 1947 to 1980. (see Fig.6.7; also 
see Table 6.11) Further data are presented in Fig. 6.8 (also see table 
6.12) which shows the distribution of cooperative loans according to 
purposes. Fig. 6.8 indicates that loans for short-term purposes 
occupied a significant part in the cooperatives’ total loan advances. A 
major share of short-term loans was allocated to the purchase of 
chemical fertilizers. Loans for medium-term purposes did not exceed 14 
percent in any year during the period 1966-80 and the relative share of 
medium-term loans in the total supply of cooperative credit tended to 
decline with the passage of time.
A Survey of utilization of cooperative loans for agricultural 
purposes in the Indian Punjab conducted in 197121 established that of 
the total loans advanced by the sampled credit societies a little over 
91 percent was for short-term purposes, and about 9 percent was granted 
for medium term purposes. The study observed that 'current 
agricultural purposes' which included purchase of seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides and use for other ancillary purposes was the most important
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category for which about 79 percent of the total short-term credit was 
provided. At the same time purchase of cattle was the most important 
purpose for which medium-term loans were advanced. Similarly the 
Survey of selected primary agricultural cooperative credit and service 
societies in the Indian Punjab in 197622 established that the major 
part of loans advanced by societies was normally granted in the form of 
crop loans. The Survey revealed that loans given for fertilizer 
constituted 84 percent of the short-term credit and loans for purchase 
of cattle/milch cattle accounted for about 6 percent of the total 
credit advanced.
The supply of cooperative credit for short-term purposes in the 
Punjab was increased during the 1960s and in subsequent years in order 
to provide peasant cultivators with improved farm inputs in order to 
raise farm production. The Indian Punjab was and is one of the most 
active states in promoting the use of a system which linked the supply 
of subsidized fertilizer, on credit, with an approved package of farm 
practices and HYV seed. The cooperatives were employed by the 
agriculture department as an integral part of the extension effort and 
as an instrument of government agricultural policy. The cooperatives 
played a key role in the state's programme for disseminating new farm 
technology, mainly the provision of chemical fertilizers to small 
farmers. A study of 22 primary credit societies undertaken in the 
Punjab during 197223 reviewed the expansion of short term cooperative 
credit, its extensive distribution over small-sized operational 
holdings and its productive use. The 22 societies distributed Rs 2.49
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million in 1972 in the following manner:
Holding size Percent share 
in loans
15 acres 9
7.5 —  15 acres 46
0 —  7.5 acres 29
Tenants and labourers : 17
The productive nature of the crop loans and their relationship 
with the 'green revolution' can be further seen as under.
(Rs. in lakhs)
Year Total Total Cron loans bv 22 selected societies
Cash loan Kind loans ( fertilizer, 
pesticides, etc.)
1966 2.86 1.83 1.83
1970 10.61 1.19 9.42
1972 14.29 2.21 12.08
The data presented above show that between 1966 and 1972, there 
was a shift from cash loans to loans in kind; the share of kind loans 
(viz fertilizers, pesticides etc.) increased significantly with the 
passage of time. This implies that in the 1970s the governments in 
both the Indian and Pakistan Punjabs followed a policy of encouraging
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loans in kind in order to ensure that the peasants made productive use 
of credit.
The loans by credit societies in the Indian Punjab were generally 
granted under 'cash credit1 system wherein the farmers were sanctioned 
a credit limit, operative for the crop season, to be drawn on as and 
when required and to be repaid as and when income accrued to the 
cultivator. It was noted that the 'cash credit' system did not work as 
intended and certain weaknesses became apparent in selected areas of
the Punjab.24
One study25 showed that the coverage of members under the scheme 
was very limited, ranging between 3 in one society and 224 in another; 
out of 2113 members in 46 primary agricultural credit societies who 
enjoyed cash credit limits for 1977-78, 1085 members had utilized their 
limits in full, but as many as 268 members had made no repayments at 
all into their accounts during the year. The study further revealed 
that the credit limits which were fixed for individual borrowers bore 
no relationship to the difference between the borrower's actual cash 
outflows and inflows. Moreover, the extent of ignorance about the 
purpose of the scheme was considerable, so that in the absence of pre­
operation briefings, transactions in the accounts were infrequent. In 
brief, the members operated their cash credit limits more or less as 
fixed loans, with one or two withdrawals unrelated to any particular 
seasonality of farm operations and without frequent credits into their 
accounts corresponding to inflows of funds. Furthermore, the lending 
procedures and policies were cumbersome and effectively debarred many 
more members from the 'cash-credit' facility offered by the societies. 
The cooperative credit was generally subsidized below market rates, and
374
in conjunction with crop plans, was the channel of access to farm 
inputs supplied by cooperatives. The general procedures of lending 
were further modified and under the subject 'crop loan system' a part 
of loan was disbursed in kind mainly in the form of fertilizers. This 
system presupposed the existence of satisfactory arrangements for 
procurement of fertilizers/seeds/pesticides in adequate quantities and 
of the types in demand and their distribution through a net-work of 
outlets conveniently situated from the cultivators' point of view. 
This in turn involved a measure of coordination with all concerned with 
the supplies, but such coordination was lacking in many cases. As a 
result, cooperatives were unable to provide timely and adequate 
supplies of fertilizers/seeds/pesticides. Further, it became the 
practice to insist on the borrowers obtaining fertilizers only from 
cooperatives, which naturally obliged them to use the type which 
happened to be available to them at the time of uplift. While such 
practices caused unnecessary delays in the provision of services, the 
system due to its rigid and strict procedures, discouraged members from 
using the services provided by societies.26 a s a result only a limited 
percentage of borrower members from societies actively used the lending 
facility.
The crop loans advanced by societies were secured against 
personal surety and/or a floating charge on land created by the 
borrower in favour of the lending institution. Owner-cultivators and 
registered tenants did not generally have problems in providing the 
type of security required of them for crop loans, but in the case of an 
oral lessee or share-cropper whose interests in his cultivated holdings 
were unidentifiable, the rules for security for loans required a)
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solvent sureties from those who were owners of land or were registered 
tenants; b) provision of a collateral tangible security in the form of 
gold or silver ornaments, sufficient to cover the loan, c) in the 
absence of the above the loan was granted only in kind, up to an 
aggregate value of not more than Rs 500 against the surety of another 
member provided the guarantor was acceptable to the managing committee 
of the society.
It may be observed, in the light of the above rules, that the 
ceiling of Rs 500 in respect of an oral lessee/share cropper was too 
low to meet his credit needs when an increase in input cost was taken 
into account.27
The statistics on recovery of loans from members of societies are 
presented in Figs. 6.7 and 6.8 (also see Tables 6.11 and 6.12). The 
ratio of repayments to loan advances appear satisfactory remaining 
fairly high during 1966-80. But behind this, as can be seen from 
Fig.6.7 (also see Table 6.11) the outstanding loans of societies showed 
a significant increase. Furthermore, the percentage of overdue loans 
within the total outstanding loans reached as high as 59 percent 
between 1947-80. (See Note 1 regarding the distinction between overdue 
and outstanding loans). These are very revealing statistics and show 
that the credit societies in the Indian Punjab, compared with the 
Pakistan Punjab faced a major problem in recovering loans from their 
m e m b e r s . A  study undertaken at the Agricultural University, 
Ludhiana^ confirmed the prevalence of mounting overdues in the sampled 
societies in the Indian Punjab. It was found in this study that the 
percentage of overdues to loans outstanding in societies varied between 
20 and 123 percent in selected districts in the Punjab.
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Many factors contributed to mounting overdues in the Punjab's 
cooperatives. The research studies undertaken in the Punjab^ revealed 
that lack of will and discipline among cultivators to repay, and the 
unhelpful attitude of the government in not creating a favourable 
climate for recovery, were the primary factors responsible for mounting 
overdues. In addition, failure to adhere to prescribed lending 
procedures, defective lending policies including untimely loan 
disbursement, under-financing/over-financing and unrealistic scheduling 
of loan repayment; neglect of/or absence of effort for marketing 
arrangements and linkage of credit recovery with sale of produce; 
ineffective supervision, mis-application of loans; apathy and 
indifference of management of societies to taking coercive measures for 
recovery; unforeseen natural calamities such as drought, floods etc., 
were some of the contributory factors leading to overdues in societies. 
These problems in the recovery of loans continued to impose limits on 
the success of the cooperative movement in the Indian Punjab throughout 
the period under reference. Poor recovery performance not only impeded 
the progress of societies, on account of their prima-facie 
ineligibility to draw fresh finance from their financing banks when 
their overdues exceeded a specified percentage of demand (which was 
generally 50 percent), but also the defaults of primary societies to 
the central Cooperative Banks impaired the latter's capacity to draw 
funds from higher financing agencies, particularly the Reserve Bank of 
India, as Central Cooperatives Banks whose overdues exceeded 60 percent 
of the demand were not normally eligible for re-finance from the 
Reserve bank. Thus the overdues in societies resulted in the choking 
of credit channels. The reasons for poor recovery of loans have been
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given but it needs to be stressed that accumulation of arrears in 
members' dues was generally due to wilful default and irregular 
lending, slackness in supervision, indifference to recovery efforts, 
inaction against defaulters and bans on, as well as interference in, 
recovery work of primary agricultural credit societies by the 
governments.31
It had also become a common feature particularly at the time of 
elections, for politicians of most hues to indulge in adverse 
propaganda concerning the obligation to repay cooperative dues. Even 
more disheartening was the tendency of the government to stall recovery 
of cooperative loans by staging the recovery proceedings launched 
against defaulters. At times the governments have been reported as
exempting whole classes of defaulters from payment of their dues to
primary agricultural credit societies and paying the said amount to the 
institutions direct from the exchequer.32
Let us now examine the per capita availability of working capital
and its relationship with the owned funds (share capital and deposits 
and reserve funds) per member. Relevant statistics are presented in 
Fig.6.9 (also see Table 6.13). It can be seen that the average working 
capital per member tended to increase, but the increase was not due to 
increased owned funds, and was instead the result of additional 
borrowed funds. An increase in the share capital per member and the 
deposits per member was also not associated with the increase in the 
average loan advances to a member. This again implies that the 
increase in working capital per member during the period 1947-80, was 
not on account of mobilizing owned funds. In short, the extent of 
local participation in cooperative affairs was low, and the general
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expectation of the members was that they would receive credit mainly 
channelled from the government without contribution on their part. 
They did not buy shares or keep their savings in societies. A similar 
characteristic has been noted in credit societies in the Pakistan 
Punjab.
As noted earlier in Chapter Five, the proponents of the 
cooperative movement in the Indian Punjab, just as in the Pakistan 
Punjab, contend that the movement should be evaluated in relation to 
different criteria from those applied to a regular business, because a 
cooperative is not essentially a commercial business venture or a 
profit-making enterprise. Its objectives are largely distributional. 
It is a system of providing welfare to the poorer cultivating and non­
cultivating rural groups and providing them with an opportunity to 
improve their own economic position through cheap loans.33
The welfare objectives of the movement in the Indian Punjab have 
largely remained unfulfilled. It has already been noted that a 
considerable part of the weaker sections of the rural community
including rural artisans, village craftsman and agricultural labourers 
were outside the cooperative fold. Even members from underprivileged 
sections of the rural community were debarred from borrowing from the 
societies. Restrictive practices in the matter of financing the weaker 
sections of the membership were prevalent despite the Reserve Bank's 
stipulations that not less than 20 percent of the short-term
agricultural loans issued to primary credit societies by central
Cooperative Banks should go to finance small farmers and weaker 
sections of the community, and that at least 60 percent of
disbursements should go towards meeting the investment credit needs of
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the weaker sections. Many factors have prevented the weaker sections 
borrowing from a society. Amongst the more important reasons are: 
inadequate and untimely disbursement of loans; non-availability of 
consumption credit; inconformity of lending procedures with needs; 
risks involved in borrowing; the lack of programmes specifically 
tailored for these groups, and structural inability of the society to
lend.34
Cooperatives, viewed as welfare organizations for the economic 
betterment of small farmers, were generally unsuccessful because the 
larger farmers and the politically strong groups dominated the 
societies and utilized the services for their own purpose. Myrdal has 
observed
"credit cooperatives have become mainly the preserves 
of the upper strata in the villages including the 
money-lenders, who often acquire their funds from 
them ... The Public expenditures involved [in 
Government sponsorship of cooperative credit 
societies] might accurately be viewed as a subsidy to 
the upper strata in the Indian villages: the peasant 
landlords, privileged tenants and a few smaller 
peasant proprietors".35
Myrdal's opinion on the status of credit cooperatives is endorsed 
by the National Council of Applied Economic Research in its S u r v e y 3 6  of 
3 0 0 0  Indian farmers wherein it was established that cooperative credit 
was indiscriminately granted to the privileged class.
The statistics (NCAER Data) relating to the distribution of 
cooperative credit by size of farm holding are depicted in Table 6.14. 
Cooperative credit went largely to better-off farmers. 46 percent of 
cooperative credit was disbursed to large farmers (defined here as 
those owning more than 4 hectares of land) who formed only 29 percent
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of cooperatives borrowing clients, while 54 percent was disbursed among 
the remaining 71 percent of their clients (small farmers).
While the findings of the National Council of Applied Economic 
Research reveal an inequitable allocation of cooperative resources 
amongst different categories of farmers, the statistics pertaining to 
the borrower members in societies showed that only a limited number of 
members in societies received credit from societies. It was estimated 
that only 34 percent of the total membership in societies were 
borrowing members. At the same time, 31 percent of the members from 
the weaker sections obtained loans from societies in 1977-78. This 
means that some 66 percent of members in general and 69 percent of 
members from the weaker section were excluded from the lending 
activities of societies. Although these statistics are silent on the 
distribution of loans according to size of holdings, the Rural Credit 
Follow-Up Survey (1961)37 concluded that the cooperative system was 
massively biased against the small farmers. Many field studies have 
corroborated the extensive class bias in the supply of credit. A study 
conducted in the Broach District (Gujrat) in 1972^ 8 reported that 
cooperative coverage was over 50 percent for farmers above 4 hectares, 
but as low as 7 percent for farms under 2 hectares. Furthermore, over 
75 percent of all loans went to farmers with holdings above 4 hectares 
and the value of loan per acre increased with farm size. Singh, Kumar 
and Sheri Ram's study in Muradabad District^ (UP) reported that 
.farmers with holdings under 2 hectares bought 84 percent of their 
fertilizer on the market, preferring not to deal with the cooperatives 
for the bulk of their supplies. One can do no better than to quote the 
NCAER study;
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"The cooperatives channelled more of their funds to 
the larger than to the small sized categories of 
farmers, particularly in the HYV areas. This could 
be attributed primarily to two factors. In the first 
place, a relatively small portion of the class of 
small farmers has as yet been enrolled as members of 
credit cooperatives compared with the larger 
categories of farmers. Our study brings out that 
only 16.16 percent of the households belonging to the
smallest category were members of cooperative
societies. The corresponding percentage of farmers 
in the three other classes, in ascending order of 
size were 24.2, 41.3 and 31.9 percent respectively.
Secondly, the lower capital base of the smaller
farmers meant that the volume of institutional credit 
available to them was also relatively small".40
While loans granted by societies went largely to the better-off 
members in societies, in many cases credit obtained by members was 
diverted to non-productive purposes. A study undertaken by the 
Economic and Statistical Organization in the Punjab found in 1971 
that about 23 percent of the loan recipients diverted loans to purposes 
which were not originally stated in their request for a loan. It was 
further found that amount of loan diversion varied between 16.1 percent 
in holding size of 15 acres and above farm holdings and 37.7 percent in 
the holding size of less than 5 acres. On the whole, the number of 
loan divertors and amount of loan diversion was comparatively greater 
among small size holdings than among the large farmers. Moreover it 
was found that 27.3 percent of the loan funds borrowed for short term 
purposes and 55.5 percent of loan granted for medium-term uses were 
diverted to non-productive purposes.
The reasons stated by the members for loan diversion were urgency 
of repayment of old debts, consumption and other household needs, 
purchase of minor farm implements, redemption of land, purchase of 
shares and other pressing needs.42
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The inequitable distribution of cooperative services amongst 
members (to the disadvantage of weak members) arose because the 
management responsible for the affairs of societies was composed 
relatively better-off farmers and other influential non-farming members 
and they were biased against the small farmers in the provision of 
cooperative loans. The Rural Credit Survey (1954) and the All India 
Rural Credit Review Committee Report (1969) and various other studies 
have established that the management affairs in societies were 
controlled by influential members and the big landlords, who generally 
were least interested in the welfare of the weaker members. They were 
only interested in improving their own economic status by taking 
maximum advantage of cheap credit channelled by societies towards 
themselves.43
So not only was the credit insufficient, but its allocation was 
determined by the members of the management committee in a way that 
resulted in only the better-off members (and the management itself) 
obtaining the advantage of cheap credit. These findings are in 
conformity with the results established in respect of credit societies 
in the Pakistan Punjab. It was established in Chapter Five that many 
members of management committees of societies took undue advantage of 
the interest-free loans by forgery or other illegal means. It may thus 
seem that the cheap credit provided by the governments in the two 
Punjabs was primarily annexed by large farmers. Chaudhri and Dasgupta 
have established that in the Indian Punjab the large farmers benefited 
from the cheap cooperative credit with average nominal rates of 
interest of about 9-10 percent, in a situation where the inflation rate 
was about 10 percent, much more than the small farmers.44
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As has been noted in Chapter Five, the success of cooperatives 
depends not only on the quality of their management, as also on the 
alertness of their members and the pressure they can exert on the 
committee of management to conduct cooperative affairs efficiently. 
This in turn calls for an awareness amongst members of their rights and 
obligations, as well as the responsiveness and competence of management 
committees. The bulk of cooperative membership in the Indian Punjab 
like that in the Pakistan Punjab were ignorant of their 
responsibilities. At the same time office bearers did not acquire the 
requisite skill and facilities required for exercising proper control. 
The management committee members were not adequately aware of the 
methods required to run a cooperative on business-like lines.
The Punjab cooperative union in the Indian Punjab was responsible 
for imparting the necessary education and training to prospective 
cooperators. The union performed this role by publishing material on 
cooperation and by organizing courses for members of management 
committees. This was done with the assistance of cooperative education 
instructors who provided training to the management committee members 
and ordinary members on a voluntary basis. The attendance at these 
courses was also voluntary. It was noted that in relation to total 
membership of the primary societies in the state, members education was 
not extensively organized at the local level as to have any significant 
impact on the working of the societies. Continued mounting overdues 
are conclusive evidence of this failure. The programmes for improving 
effective coverage for increased lending and for functional 
diversification could only achieve the desired results if members, 
existing and prospective, were adequately enlightened as to their
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obligations and office bearers made to realize their 
responsibilities.^5
The management affairs of cooperative credit societies in the 
Indian Punjab were generally undertaken by a committee of members 
elected from amongst the general body of the societies. The general 
body of the society delegated powers to the elected members (Management 
Committee) to perform one or more of such functions; to formulate 
policies and programmes to develop business of societies; implement 
various schemes for the welfare of members, as approved by the General 
Body; appoint, control, promote, demote, suspend or dismiss staff; 
maintain up-to-date accounts; a register of members and other official 
records; arrange for collection of funds; advance loans, check their 
use and ensure their effective recovery. The managing committee is 
comprised of five members, but usually a president, secretary and the 
treasurer look after the management affairs in societies.
The Department of Cooperation, Government of the Indian Punjab 
supervises overall working of societies and ensures that affairs in 
societies are dealt with in accordance with the bye-laws and statues of 
cooperative credit societies Act. The department deputes an inspector 
and/or sub-inspector to visit societies, who has to cover an area of 20 
to 30 villages to audit and inspect cooperatives and to provide 
necessary help and guidance to members of the management committee to 
ensure proper functioning of societies.
The research findings from the Indian Punjab have established 
that cooperative credit societies were by and large controlled by 
people who enjoyed higher social status in their villages and belonged 
to upper castes. Most of the managing committee members enjoyed a
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better economic position in terms of landholdings. Most amongst them 
were illiterate. Leadership of credit societies in the state remained 
in the hands of persons who commanded influence amongst fellow members 
for a variety of reasons. The study undertaken by Sidhu and Sidhu 
(1984)46 yielded very interesting results. They concluded that the 
proportion of relatively large sized farmers in the management 
committees of successful credit societies in the Indian Punjab 
typically was some 33 percent whereas in the case of unsuccessful 
societies it was around 60 percent. This could be taken to mean that 
the greater presence of large farmers in the management committees of 
societies determined their failure!
The same study established that between 28 and 42 percent of 
members of the management committee of successful and unsuccessful 
societies respectively were also the members of other committees 
constituted by the government for the welfare of villagers, and by 
virtue of their better positions in the village were able to take undue 
advantage of credit facilities.
The control of societies by the better off rural elites/large 
farmers undermined the democratic spirit in the decision making 
process. Many cooperatives were criticised for their only nominal 
adherence to democratic practices in cooperative operations. This was 
particularly true since cooperatives in the Indian Punjab were 
characterised by their big-farmer bias and domination by vested 
interests. While the model by-laws of societies framed by the Reserve 
Bank of India and commended to the Punjab government provided that the 
policies and programmes of the societies should be decided with the 
consent and participation of all members on a democratic basis, such
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guide-lines were often ignored. Thus all decisions pertaining to the 
operation of societies were taken by the few influential members of the 
management committees of the societies, without having any regard to 
members views on the subject.^7
The need for prompt and systematic audit of cooperatives cannot 
be over-emphasized, but that generates the need for an agency which can 
undertake this task and ensure the quality of the audit. The 
Department of Cooperatives in the state has been entrusted with the 
task of audit of societies. However the existing machinery for the 
audit of societies was short of well-trained and experienced staff. As 
a result there was generally considerable delay in the audit of 
societies and many societies were left unaudited for even two years or 
more.
A Survey undertaken by the Economic and Statistical Organization 
in Punjab in 19764® found that inspection of sampled societies was very 
infrequent at the levels of Assistant Registrar and Deputy Registrar, 
whereas typically an inspector actually handled from 24 to 33 societies 
annually during the period under study. Ideally the number handleld by 
the inspector should have been longer. Lack of proper inspection 
resulted in reduced performance of various functions of societies 
particularly in the recovery of outstanding loans from members. Out of 
42 societies, only 18 were audited by the staff of the cooperative 
department at the time of Survey.
The laxity shown by the departmental staff in the audit and 
inspection of societies was in part attributed to lack of proper 
knowledge of the concerned staff, the absence of proper facilities such 
as transportation and the large area of operation under the control of
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one person. At the same time, mismanagement of the record books and 
entry of wrong figures in registers made proper audit extremely 
difficult for the staff concerned.
6.II Effectiveness of Cooperatives as an Instrument of Development
The introduction of the cooperative movement to the Indian Punjab 
was conceived as one of the important instruments for the economic, 
social and cultural development of the peasants. The cooperatives were 
consciously established to improve the socio-economic conditions of the 
poorer members of society by encouraging their spirit of initiative, 
increasing their personal and national capital resources by the 
encouragement of thrift, by eliminating usury through the sound use of 
credit and contributing an increased measure of democratic control of 
economic activity and of equitable distribution of cooperative 
services.
The above objectives of the movement are very broad; in their
limited references to the cooperative credit system the official policy
statements have stressed a specific role for cooperatives as agents of
rural development. In this regard it is pertinent to quote from the
CRAFICARD report which observed:
"Our objective is to support integrated rural 
development with the necessary credit from the 
institutional sector. It is the national policy that 
while striving for this objective, the approach 
should be to ensure growth with social justice. This 
means that credit should be sufficiently wide-spread 
as to cover the. poorer sections of the population.
These sections have so far not got a fair deal in the 
matter of credit. Often, they have not been 
considered a reasonable risk for institutional 
credit, despite the exhortation of the All India 
Rural Credit Survey Committee, 1954 (AIRCS) more than 
two decades ago, that the cooperative system should
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accept the concept of credit worthy purposes. In 
recent years, modern technology has shown that many 
families earlier considered credit risks can be 
effectively brought into the pool of credit worthy 
families through a judicious use of credit for 
improvement".^9
Although the emphasis of various committees has been laid on 
development-oriented lending, the experience in the Indian Punjab 
suggests that cooperatives and other credit agencies have nonetheless 
demonstrated certain basic shortcomings viz, an emphasis on the credit 
worthiness of borrowers instead of credit-worthiness of purposes for 
which loans are required; ad hoc or fragmented lending to individuals 
without a project or area-based approach to lending; an absence of a 
much-needed bias in favour of small farmers and other weaker groups 
whose need for credit is greater and more urgent. The cooperatives, 
which had an earlier start in the provision of credit, have tended to 
go the way of private commercial banks with the result that social 
priority purposes, needy groups of borrowers and backward areas have 
been neglected. The lending operations of cooperatives, like those of 
the commercial banks, have tended by and large to become only money- 
lending, lacking satisfactory organizational, procedural and 
operational arrangements for planned and systematic dovetailing with 
the overall national development policies and objectives.50
In assessing the role of the cooperative movement in terms of the 
economic and social development of the peasants, we pose two questions. 
First, how important were cooperatives to the spread of credit and the 
use of improved farm inputs? Second, how equitable was the 
distribution of cooperative services? Our general conclusions can be 
briefly stated at the out-set. First, the local institutional
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structure in the Indian Punjab had little impact on the spread of 
credit and other improved farm inputs. Second, cooperatives were 
highly inequitable in respect of their intended objective of delivering 
credit to the smaller farmer. The following analysis is based on 
sufficient evidence to establish that cooperatives were controlled by 
elites, and that the actual performance of the institution is 
consistent with a class-bias explanation.
In this regard, the report of the All India Rural Credit Review
Committee (1969) observed
"there are a number of instances in which small 
cultivators are denied credit even when the amount is 
within their repaying capacity. A variety of factors 
account for this. The most important of these is the 
traditionally conservative approach of the 
influential and better-off sections of cultivators 
who dominate the cooperative and run it as a closed 
shop. Prejudice and indifference towards the small 
man - sometimes based on caste or other sociological 
factors - also account for this attitude of 
exclusiveness".52
The exclusiveness towards the poor sections in respect of 
cooperatives' provisions is not the only cause of inefficient working 
of the cooperatives, but the structural deficiencies in the institution 
of cooperatives have set limits to the successful implementation of the 
policies of credit and input provision to the under-privileged sections 
of the farming community.
Before proceeding further we pose two more questions. First, 
were cooperatives in the Indian Punjab capable of running their affairs 
independently without any direct government involvement? Second, did 
cooperatives have any significant impact on structural transformation 
of the community wherein they (the cooperatives) were established? As
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to the first question, cooperatives have continued to rely crucially on 
government's financial aid as well as on the administrative support; 
Punjab's cooperatives are rural institutions which permit collective 
action by the more progressive farmers and which mediate between these 
farmers and the government. From the perspective of the government, 
the cooperatives permit the administration to influence or regulate 
farmers' behaviour by non-market mechanisms. The advantage of this 
device is that it permits the administration to target benefits and 
regulatory policy on that group of farmers, large or small, who 
contribute most to the government's development goals. Although the 
mechanism at work seems to have been partly successful in accomplishing 
the government's purposes, this policy has resulted in the violation of 
the ideals of complete autonomy and democracy within cooperative 
operations. The issue of government involvement and cooperative 
independence is, however, debatable, since one can argue that without 
government patronage and financial support, it would be unlikely for 
the movement to survive in the state.53
As to the second question, the impact of cooperatives on 
structural change within the communities in which they operate, 
achievements in respect of greater socio-economic equalization and 
relief of mass poverty have fallen far short of the goals set out in 
the policy statements of the government. However, politicisation of 
the cooperative movement in the Indian Punjab has produced a group of 
aspiring local politicians who have used cooperatives to further their 
political careers. These politicians are able to gain political 
support by servicing farmers needs for inputs, credit and for pressure 
to be put on the government. The combined effect of the subsidized
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credit which the cooperatives have provided and the political brokerage 
role played by the cooperative leadership in the face of onerous 
government regulations is probably enough to explain farmers’ continued 
support for the cooperative system in the state.54
Let us now turn to assess the general impact of cooperatives on 
the development of the agricultural sector in the Indian Punjab, 
compared with the Pakistan Punjab. This role of cooperatives can be 
studied by analysing the performance of the cooperative credit movement 
in the spread of improved farm technology (eg improved seed, chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides etc.). The new farm technology evolved in 
the 1960s was generally technically appropriate to the farming 
conditions in the two Punjabs. Nevertheless it is difficult to 
conclude that the cooperatives made any significant contribution to its 
initial spread. According to some observers the key constraints on the 
spread of improved technology did not appear to be institutional. 
Firstly it has been argued that the spread of new seeds and the 
concomitant increase in chemical fertilizer use were associated 
primarily with the availability of good irrigation systems in the two 
Punjabs. Secondly, as could be anticipated profitability appeared to 
be an important factor in the adoption of new technology in the two 
Punjabs. However, profitability may not have been seriously influenced 
by cooperatives in the green revolution wheat areas in both the 
Punjabs. Higher market price levels, fertilizer imports and 
distribution policies, rural electrification and regulated markets were 
some of the other major factors influencing profitability, not the 
cooperatives. In the Indian Punjab, price levels were indeed 
substantially influenced by the procurement activities of the
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cooperatives, undertaken on behalf of the government which virtually 
monopolized the wholesale grain trade within the state. The 
procurement prices were revised upward to a considerable extent in the 
face of rising production costs and increasing requirements for larger 
public services in both the Punjabs, but the cooperatives were only 
acting as government procurement agents, and only stabilized grain 
prices for the farmers in the Indian Punjab. This function became 
particularly significant in the 1970s as gluts appeared in the state 
market constricted by restrictions on grain export on government 
account. Between 1967-68 and 1971-72, for example, government 
procurement of wheat (on both national and state account) ranged 
between 30 and 50 percent of total production. In the 1960s, however, 
free market prices were generally higher than those received from the 
cooperatives in the Indian Punjab. Moreover, the government's ability 
to procure was less a result of the price incentives offered the farmer 
than of the physical restrictions on grain movement outside the Punjab.
The two Punjabs have been active in promoting the use of a system 
which linked the supply of subsidized fertilizer on credit with an 
approved pack of farm practices and seed. Cooperatives in both the 
Indian Punjab and Pakistan Punjab were employed by their respective 
Agriculture Departments as an integral part of the general extension 
effort and as an instrument of government agricultural policy. The 
cooperative institutions were thus assigned a key role in the programme 
for disseminating new technology in both the Punjabs. However, a 
number of studies undertaken in the Indian Punjab indicate little 
difference in terms of profit, cropping patterns or input use between 
those who obtained credit and fertilizer from cooperatives and those
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who depended directly on the markets. A study by Khalon and Sankayan5^ 
has established that in the area of study the system of fertilizer had 
no effect on production whatsoever at the farmers level. This result 
had an important implication that the cooperative societies and private 
agencies supplied the same fertilizers to the farmers which did not 
differ with respect to quality, weightment, adequacy and timely 
availability, all taken together. Almost similar findings were reported 
regarding the use of the technical package of inputs. It might be 
expected that the technical services provided might have given an 
advantage to cooperative members. It appears, however, that the 
package was not the most profitable combination of inputs and was 
commonly ignored by the farmers. Indeed, with the exception of highly 
favoured areas in both the regions technical advice was often poor and 
ignored by farmers.56
Thus, although cooperatives played a major role in fertilizer 
distribution in both the Punjabs at least during the mid 1960s and in 
subsequent years, it was probably not the local distribution system 
that affected the access of farmers to inputs, but the allocation of 
fertilizer within the federal system of both India and Pakistan. It 
was this which created localized conditions of plenty and scarcity. 
Thus the farmers were more likely to have difficulty getting fertilizer 
in areas in both India and Pakistan which had low priority in national 
allocations than in major hybrid wheat growing areas in both the 
Punjabs which were assured of ample supplies.
The spread of hybrid wheat and/or chemical fertilizer use 
depended much more on the new technology of irrigation. Thus public or 
private investment in water control was an important factor in the
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spread of new varieties and use of chemical fertilizer. The fertilizer 
use in both the Punjabs increased in areas which already had the 
highest usage before the green revolution - reflecting previous rural 
investment and commercialization. In both the Punjabs, however, access 
to irrigation water was widespread by the mid 1960s and rural families 
with higher incomes were very aware of the need to make the transition 
to their new technology.
The widespread access to irrigation water in the Pakistan Punjab 
was the result of an enhanced supply of water from an effective canal 
network system and improved 'On-Farm Water Management Programme' 
undertaken by the Department of Agriculture and the Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA) throughout the country. In addition, 
heavy public investment in the installation of tubewells and subsidy 
granted to farmers for the installation of private tubewells were some 
of the other factors for enhancing supplies of irrigation water. In 
the Indian Punjab, on the other hand, widespread access to irrigation 
water was attributed to the lending activities of rural institutions, 
particularly the Land Development Banks. Randhawa pointed out that 
from its inception in 1958, the Punjab State Land Development Bank made 
increasingly significant contributions to the financing of tubewell 
installation. In 1965-66, the level of lending for tubewells was only 
Rs 5.4 million. By 1970-71 total annual lending for tubewells was Rs 
95.18 million.57 Additional loans funds for tubewells were provided 
during the period from the Agricultural Re-finance Corporation.
Thus during the key years i.e., 1965-69, when new varieties were 
becoming established, public lending for tubewells represented the 
major share of the cost of installed wells in the Indian Punjab, and
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private credit for tubewells expanded only in the mid 1960s when 
lending was competitive and credit was in ample supply. This situation 
helped to establish new varieties by improving water control on the 
farm, and it also helped the smaller farmer who benefited from an 
improved supply of credit at lower rates.
In short, the role played by the cooperatives in the spread of 
the use of seed of high yielding varieties and chemical fertilizers was 
of some significance in both the Punjabs. But the expansion of 
intermediate-term credit and its intimate relationship with tubewell 
installation for increased supplies of water was the major factor for 
the success of green revolution technology in the Indian Punjab.
Even if it is assumed that the cooperatives were not the critical 
factor in explaining the initial spread of green revolution in the mid 
1960s, it is still possible, as the critics suggest,58 that they 
contributed to the inequitable pattern of the benefits of growth in 
both the Indian Punjab and the Pakistan Punjab. It may well be the 
case that cooperatives in both the Punjabs were the major factor 
inhibiting the delivery of benefits to the poor member farmers. We 
have argued that access to the components of new technology (eg 
chemical fertilizers) for members of societies was highly skewed in 
favour of large and better-off farmers, and that the operation of and 
decision-making in societies was very much influenced by better-off 
members who enjoyed control of cooperative operations. Several studies 
undertaken in both the Punjabs^ point to the dominance of better-off 
members in the management affairs of societies and the conclusion that 
they misappropriated cooperative services themselves. Cooperative 
credit was subsidized below the market prices, and thus an incentive
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existed for the politically more influential farmers to gain control in 
societies in order to receive a major share of subsidized credit. The 
original purpose of cooperatives in both the Punjabs was not only to 
supply production credit to meet the needs of members, but also to 
serve as a welfare agency for the under-privileged sections of the 
village community. Credit was certainly provided, but, cooperatives as 
a means to bring about socio-economic equalization failed more or less 
in both the Punjabs.
The cooperatives supposedly specialized in production credit but 
they were incapable of devising means of eliminating non-productive use 
of cooperative credit. The provision of loans under 'crop loan system' 
and 'loan in kind', were generally not successful in preventing the 
abuse of credit in either of the Punjabs. A number of field studies 
undertaken in India and Pakistan^ confirm that loans borrowed by 
members in societies were diverted to non-productive purposes.
We may thus conclude in the light of the available evidence that 
cooperatives in both the Punjabs have had an uncorrectable bias against 
the small farmers. The inequitable distribution of cooperative credit 
was the result of elite control, cooperatives' lending programmes and 
inefficiency of societies in the form of failure to adhere strictly to 
lending and recovery procedures.
6 .Ill A Summary of the Major Problems of Cooperatives
As has been noted earlier the working of cooperatives in both the 
Indian Punjab, and the Pakistan Punjab was inhibited by structural and 
operational deficiencies in the cooperative system inherited from the 
colonialist regime traced earlier in chapter 4. Some of the major
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problems in this regard are now summarized.
Non-institutional credit has predominated in the rural credit 
market in the two Punjabs, though in the Indian Punjab there has 
generally been a greater tendency to give emphasis to the provision of 
institutional credit. Cooperative credit has however received 
significant attention from the governments in the two Punjabs in recent 
years. Despite extensive provision of cooperative credit the coverage 
attained by the credit movement has generally remained small in the 
Pakistan Punjab. In contrast, the movement in the Indian Punjab has 
embraced almost 100 percent of the farming population in its 
membership. Though it is difficult to establish if the movement has in 
fact been able to benefit all the membership in societies in the Indian 
Punjab. However without the volume of credit available to the movement 
in the two Punjabs, the number of loan beneficiaries provided with 
adequate credit would have been much smaller. Where there is 
insufficient provision of cooperative credit (as well as other 
institutional credit), members have continued to rely on non- 
institutional sources.
There are significant differences in the cooperative structure in 
the two Punjabs. As against the three-tier Indian cooperative 
structure, there is a two tier cooperative structure in the Pakistan 
Punjab. Again, the movement in the Indian Punjab has dispensed short, 
medium and long term credit. While in the Pakistan Punjab the movement 
has undertaken the role of disbursing seasonal agricultural loans in 
'kind'. Furthermore, there is a separate cooperative structure for the 
distribution of long-term cooperative credit in the Indian Punjab.
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At the secondary level of the movement, central cooperative banks 
have been established in the Indian Punjab, while the central 
Cooperative Banks have ceased to work in the Pakistan Punjab, after 
1976. The absence of central cooperative banks in the Pakistan Punjab 
makes it very difficult for the primary agricultural credit societies 
to maintain a close working relationship with the apex cooperative 
bank, while the Punjab Cooperative Bank in the Pakistan Punjab has 
found it very difficult to supervise the end use of credit advanced by 
it to the primary societies.
At the base level most of the primary societies in the Pakistan 
Punjab were of a small-size compared with large-sized primary 
cooperatives in the Indian Punjab. In both Punjabs these societies 
have dispensed short-term seasonal credit, but the credit societies in 
the Indian Punjab have also advanced medium-term credit, although 
loanable funds are generally inadequate. The credit societies in the 
Pakistan Punjab disburse only seasonal loans in kind (eg fertilizer, 
improved seed and pesticides). The credit societies in the Indian 
Punjab on the other hand have advanced a major share of short-term 
loans in the form of chemical fertilizers.
There has been considerable emphasis placed on the rehabilitation 
of the credit movement in both Punjabs, especially during the latter 
half of the 1970s. A considerable increase in the formation of new 
societies in the Pakistan Punjab took place after 1978. In comparison, 
the number of societies in the Indian Punjab has declined significantly 
following the implementation of the rehabilitation measures. Most 
credit societies in the Pakistan Punjab were found to be non-viable and 
bogus undertakings. It is however not known if the primary units in
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the Indian Punjab operated as viable large units after the 
reorganization of the credit movement in the late 1970s.
The owned funds of credit societies in the two Punjabs generally 
remained limited; deposits were small or negligible and borrowings from 
the Cooperative Banks formed the main source of working capital of the 
societies. Similarly amounts loaned to individual members remained 
small in relation to their credit needs. The security requirements, 
especially in the Indian Punjab, were unduly restrictive and lending 
procedures were generally cumbersome. The proportion of borrowing 
members generally remained small, when judged from the viewpoint of the 
maximum credit limit in the Pakistan Punjab. Average loans granted to 
members from the credit societies in the Indian Punjab also remained 
small in amount. Most loans granted by societies in the two Punjabs 
went to the better-off large farmers who generally controlled 
cooperative affairs in the two Punjabs.
The end use of cooperative loans was not closely supervised, and 
many loans granted by societies were reported to have diverted to 
consumption purposes and/or 'unspecified' 'non productive' uses. 
Medium-term loans granted by societies in the Indian Punjab, as also 
the provision of long-term cooperative credit remained inadequate. The 
problem, again was the misutilization and diversion of these loanable 
funds.
The provision of cooperative credit in both Punjabs was not 
supported in an integrated manner, by advice or improved know-how, 
supply of needed agricultural requisites and arrangements for the 
marketing of crops.
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The volume of overdue loans and the proportion they formed of the 
loan outstanding at the primary, secondary and apex levels tended to 
increase throughout the whole period, 1947-80 in the Indian Punjab. On 
the other hand, recovery of loans from members in societies in the 
Pakistan Punjab was made effective following the introduction of cost- 
free lending policy of the government in the late 1970s. The 
experience of the Pakistan Punjab in the late 1970s, in terms of loan 
disbursement and its recovery from the members, was quite different 
when compared with that of the Indian Punjab.
Owing to limited range of activities, and relatively small 
turnover of business, the credit societies did not employ trained or 
experienced managers to run their affairs. Often the societies in the 
two Punjabs depended on the honorary services provided by the better- 
off rural elites/large farmers, who in turn enjoyed complete control of 
societies. They did not necessarily acquire training and experience to 
manage cooperative affairs. Consequently many of the societies in both 
Punjabs were not managed effectively. Another associated problem with 
the managerial affairs in societies was that the management committees 
often restricted the entry of new members in order to take an undue 
advantage of the services provided by societies for themselves and for 
the existing members by illegal means. Most members of societies did 
not participate in the decision-making process of societies. In 
addition representation was not granted to the weaker members in 
cooperative's management affairs.
The Department of Cooperation in both Punjabs was generally 
incapable of undertaking their statutory functions satisfactorily. 
Lack of supervision, infrequent audit and inspection, but extensive
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control of the movement were the distinguishing features of the 
departments in both Punjabs. In addition the staff concerned with the 
promotion and supervision of the movement at the base level has been 
inadequate, often low-paid and generally incompetent to take up the 
gigantic task. The non-governmental organizations such as the Punjab 
Cooperative Unions in the two Punjabs, entrusted with the role of 
imparting training to the members of societies and to also promote the 
cause of the movement, have been found to be incapable of performing 
their task satisfactorily, primarily due to shortage of adequate staff 
and requisite financial resources.
At the secondary and apex level of the financial structure, the 
cooperative movement leaves much to be desired. The central 
cooperative banks have been incapable of mobilizing their own funds and 
are largely dependent on the apex cooperative bank in the Indian 
Punjab. They reflect weaknesses viz unsatisfactory management, 
increase in overdue loans and financial losses. And these weaknesses 
at times have been aggravated by weaknesses at the apex cooperative 
banks.
Three major points concerning the apex cooperative banks in both 
Punjabs may be noted. Firstly, the role of these banks in the 
financing of cooperatives is quite significant. However, for 
fulfilling their financing operations, these banks depend on government 
funds, normally released by the countries' central banks to both 
Punjabs. Secondly, the percentage of overdue loans in these apex banks 
has sharply increased over the years. In the Pakistan Punjab, however 
the percentage of outstanding loans declined considerably after 1978 
mainly due to effective repayment of loans from primary societies.
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Thirdly, a large part of the funds released by the apex cooperative 
banks has been provided for financing seasonal crop production credit 
needs. The demand for medium term loans has increased, but the funds 
made available to the societies, by the apex cooperative bank in the 
Indian Punjab have not been sufficient to meet the medium-term credit 
needs of their members.
The general role of cooperatives in the spread of improved farm 
inputs to the smaller farmer members in societies in the two Punjabs 
has been limited. The cooperatives are biased against the subsistence 
farmers, as societies are in the control of better-off farmer members, 
who in turn discriminate in the provision of credit and other improved 
farm inputs to the small farmers. The fact that as a result many large 
farmers have access to seed, fertilizer, credit and also to irrigation 
water could then wrongly be interpreted as the employment of a 
technology inapplicable to small farmers. Critics on the other hand 
suggest that there has not been much significant difference in the 
output per unit area of cooperative members, compared with the non­
members, particularly in areas which have wider access to improved farm 
inputs with an assured supply of irrigation water. The Land 
Development Banks in the Indian Punjab have shown some good progress in 
the financing of tubewell installation. An enhanced supply of water in 
many areas in the Indian Punjab has been attributed to the generous 
grants made by the bank for the installation of tubewells, which in 
turn has increased the supply of irrigation water, and this to a 
greater extent has facilitated an effective use of improved seed and 
fertilizers provided by the credit societies.
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In short, we may note that despite many shortcomings inherent in 
the structure and organization of cooperatives in the two Punjabs, the 
credit movement in the two Punjabs has made some progress in terms of 
enrolment of membership, as also in the provision of credit. The 
policy of interest-free lending introduced by the Pakistan Punjab in 
the late 1970s and adopted by the societies is worth mentioning in this 
regard. This policy has resulted in almost 100 percent recovery of 
loans from members in societies. This is significantly different from 
the experience of the cooperative credit movement in the Indian Punjab. 
As such, there has been an essential difference in the evolution of the 
cooperative credit movement in the two Punjabs, after the mid 1970s. 
The experience of cooperative credit societies in lending cost-free 
credit and making 100 percent recovery from members possible would 
perhaps find no comparison with the cooperative credit movement in the 
Indian Punjab as also with the experience of credit movements in many 
other developing countries of the world.
A case study was undertaken by the author to evaluate the
performance of cooperative credit societies in a selected region in the 
Pakistan Punjab, following the adoption of the cost-free lending policy 
of the government. The findings of the case study are reported in the 
following Chapter.
6.IV Conclusions
Both in conception and practice cooperatives in the Indian Punjab 
as in the Pakistan Punjab have been an important component of the
government's development policy. The model was conceived as a
'multipurpose unit' aimed at serving its members by supplying credit,
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improved farm inputs, storage facilities, marketing assistance etc. In 
practice, however the major function has remained the provision of
credit and the improved farm inputs. As the bulk of resources have 
been supplied by the government, cooperatives are as much an agent of 
government administration, as a voluntary organization.
Cooperatives have been in an ambiguous position. They have been 
expected to promote the interests of small farmers and other weaker
segments of rural society. The potency of cooperatives of poor farmers 
to assert group interests has remained limited, due to the strength of 
political-cum landholding/commercial groups inside the membership and 
inability of local cooperative officials to stand up to them when the 
government is indifferent. Further as a community institution 
entrusted with a role to promote welfare of members in a village, 
cooperatives have achieved little success.
Even from the narrow perspective of their role as a vehicle for 
channelling government funds cooperatives have been more active in 
distributing loans than in collecting them when due. The local elites 
who control societies have appropriated funds, supplied by the
government, with no intention of repaying and making the society work.
The cooperatives have not undertaken the promotional task which 
the development administration desired them to accept as part of their 
service to the community. These activities required them to expand 
membership and encourage the extension of credit to all sections of the 
rural community. However little information and resources have 
trickled down to the poor farmers, though richer farmers were
progressive in seeking their own advantages.
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The cooperatives form not only a part of governments' development 
efforts, but undoubtedly because of this they are an integral part of 
the pattern of local level politics. And what we have in the Punjab 
cooperatives are rural institutions which permit collective action by 
the more progressive farmers and which mediate between these farmers 
and the government. From the perspective of the government, the 
cooperatives permit the administration to influence or regulate farmers 
behaviour by non-market mechanisms. The advantage of this device is 
that it permits the administration to target benefits and regulatory 
policy on that group of farmers, large or small, who contribute most to 
governments development goals - those who adopt improved technology. 
Nevertheless, cooperatives seem to have been less successful in 
accomplishing the governments' stated purposes, as the strategy has 
produced dissemination of benefits generally only to the most 
privileged sections of the rural society.
We now examine the results of a case study undertaken to evaluate 
the performance of credit societies in a region in the Pakistan Punjab.
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Notes to Chapter 6
1. It may be noted that loans advanced by three-tier and two-tier 
cooperative structures in the Indian Punjab are classified as 
short-term (up to one year), medium-term (one to five years) and 
long-term (exceeding five years) for most defined specified 
productive purposes. The repayment schedule depends on the 
purpose for which a loan has been advanced. For instance, assume 
that a loan granted for short-term purposes shall be repaid by a 
member at the end of the year, or after the harvest of the crop. 
Then, if the loan is not repaid within the appointed period, the 
loan due to a member stands 'outstanding' against him until the 
new loan for the next year (or crop season) is issued; thereafter 
the 'old loan', if still not repaid, is classified as an 'overdue 
loan'. In reality the borrower is permitted an additional period 
of time in which to repay, thereby altering the relationship 
between outstanding and overdue loans. The particular period of 
time allowed to a society and the other cooperative institutions 
(e.g. Central Cooperative Banks, Punjab Cooperative Bank, Primary 
Land Development Banks and the State Land Development Bank) in 
which to ensure repayment of the loan is actually specified, but 
information on this was not available. Thus it is not a 
straightforward matter to relate short-term repayment to long­
term accumulation of overdues. For the working of the Punjab 
Cooperative Bank see for instance Gill, M.S. (1983), chapter 5; 
also see Reserve Bank of India CRAFICARD Report (1981). Punjab 
Cooperative Union, Achievements of the Punjabs Cooperatives at a 
Glance through statistical data (1982), p12.
2. For the working of Central Cooperative Banks see Gill, M.S.
(1983) chapters 5 & 6; Reserve Bank of India CRAFICARD Report
(1981); For the statistical data on the Bank's working see Punjab 
Cooperative Union, Achievement of Punjabs Cooperatives (1982) 
pp13-15; Rao, M.K. (1976) pp207-21.
3. For the working of Punjab Land Development Banks see Singh, N.
(1982); chapters 3 & 4; Rao, M.K. (1976) pp207-21 ; Singh, B.
(1982) pp13-18.
4. See Singh, N. (1982) pp71-73; Randhawa, M.S. (1984) pp16-23.
5. See for instance Chaudhri and Dasgupta (1985) pp56-57.
6. See Reserve Bank of India CRAFICARD Report (1981), chapter 2.
7. See Singh, G. (1972) pp27-33.
8. See Chaudhri & Dasgupta (1985) pp99-102.
9. See Gill, M.S. (1983) pp157-59.
10. See Reserve Bank of India CRAFICARD Report (1981) pp40-41.
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11. See Economic and Statistical organization Report on the Survey of 
utilization of cooperative loan (1971); p4 (summary of findings).
12. See Reserve Bank of India CRAFICARD Report (1981), pp45-47.
13. See Sidhu, J.S. and Sidhu, D.S. (1984) pp382-91.
14. See Chaudhri & Dasgupta (1985) pp56-57; also see Punjab
Cooperative Union Achievements of Punjab Cooperatives (1982) p5.
15. See Sidhu, J.S. (1980) pp39-43.
16. See Reserve Bank of India All India Rural Credit Review Committee 
Report (1969) p174.
17. See Economic and Statistical organization (1976) p23.
18. See Singh, G. (1967) p38.
19. See Economic and Statistical organization (1971) pp5-7; Economic
and Statistical organization (1976) pp27-28 (summary); Reserve 
Bank of India Rural Credit Follow up Survey (1961) pp235-42.
20. See Reserve Bank of India CRAFICARD Report (1981) pp101-5.
21. See Economic and Statistical organization (1971) p16.
22. See Economic and Statistical organisation (1976) p26.
23. See Singh, G. (1972) pp51-69.
24. See Sidhu, J.S. & Sidhu, D.S. (1984) pp382-91; also see Singh, I.
(1982) p5-8.
25. See Gill, M.S. (1983) pp89-91.
26. See Sidhu, J.S. (1980); Singh, B. (1982).
27. See Sidhu, J.S. & Sidhu, D.S. (1984) pp383-91; also see Singh, B.
(1982).
28. Many more studies undertaken in the Indian Punjab established 
that recovery of loans from members in societies remained poor. 
See for instance Singh, B. (1982); Sidhu, J.S. (1980); Sidhu, 
J.S. & Sidhu, D.S. (1984); Singh, G. (1967); also see Gill, M.S.
(1983) chapters 3 & 4.
29. See Sidhu, J.S. (1980) pp78-81.
30. See for instance Sidhu, J.S. (1980); Singh, B. (1982), Singh, G. 
(1967); also see Economic and Statistical organization (1971); 
Economic and statistical organization (1976).
31. See Gill, M.S. (1983); chapters 5 & 6.
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32. See Singh, B. (1982) Chapter 3.
33. See for instance Reserve Bank of India CRAFICARD Report (1981);
Reserve Bank of India All India Rural Credit Survey (1954);
Agarwal, A.N. (1981); Reserve Bank of India All India Rural
Credit Review Committee Report (1969); also see Lambert, P.
(1963).
34. See Gill, M.S. (1983) chapters 5 & 6.
35. See Myrdal, G. (1968) p1338.
36. See National Council for Applied Economic Research, credit
requirements for agriculture (1974).
37. See Reserve Bank of India Rural credit follow-up Survey (1961) 
pp239-40.
38. See National Council of Applied Economic Research (1974); p100.
39. See National Council of Applied Economic Research (1972) pp32-35.
40. See National Council for Applied Economic Research (1974) p33.
41. See Economic and Statistical organization (1971) pp4-5 (summary 
of findings).
42. Ibid, p5.
43. See Reserve Bank of India Rural Credit Survey (1954); Reserve
Bank of India All India Rural Credit Review Committee Report
(1969); Reserve Bank of India Rural Credit Follow-up Survey
(1961) pp237-38; Reserve Bank of India CRAFICARD Report (1981)
pp291-230; also see Gill, M.S. (1983) chapters 6 & 7.
44. See Chaudhri & Dasgupta (1985) pp56-57.
45. See Economic and Statistical organization (1971) pp4-6 (summary);
Economic and Statistical organization (1976) pp25-28 (summary).
46. See Sidhu, J.S. & Sidhu, D.S. (1984) pp383-91.
47. See for instance Economic and Statistical organization (1971)
pp3-4 (summary); Reserve Bank of India All India Rural Credit
Review Committee Report (1969) pp573; Singh, J. (1982) pp113-14.
48. See Economic and Statistical organization (1976), p27.
49. See Reserve Bank of India CRAFICARD Report (1981) p10.
50. See Gill, M.S. (1983) chapters 5 & 6.
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56. The major problem in this respect rested with the staff of the
Department of Agriculture Extension in the two Punjabs. The 
field staff did not have the acquired requisite training. In 
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Table 43.
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Table 6.5 Working of the Primary Agricultural credit and Non-credit
Societies in the Indian Punjab
No. of Societies Membership Working Capital 
(Rs million)
Years
Credit
societies
Non
credit
societies
Credit
societies
Non
credit
societies
Credit Non 
societies credit- 
soci­
eties
1966 11064 1325 1282000 76555 368.30 18.26
1967 10954 1369 1349000 78037 476.12 18.63
1968 10931 1359 1407000 79009 612.37 20.02
1969 10923 1363 1446000 81000 727.21 21 .58
1970 10932 1363 1464000 80940 765.03 22.52
1971 10931 1368 1482000 83275 831.91 24.20
1972 10935 1372 1528000 84771 927.34 25.41
1973 10932 1395 1559000 86563 941.71 24.97
1974 10938 1396 1596000 88661 1033.56 27.27
1975 10936 1400 1623000 90861 1094.21 31 .56
1976 10937 1401 1660000 93756 1182.01 30.74
1977 1 0942 1402 1682000 95634 1310.52 33.72
1978 4259 1394 1718000 96484 1436.14 37.65
1979 4271 1395 1754000 98697 •1871.57 40.68
1980 4266 1396 1784000 100985 2312.43 39.35
Source: Punjab Cooperative Union (1982)
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Table 6.6 Institutional credit supply by sources in the Indian Punjab
(In Million Rupees)
LDB * PACS ** Taccavi *** Total
1960-61
1965-66 17.5 275.5
118.0
107.3 400.3
-
1966-67 16.5 248.9 47.8 313.2
1967-68 50.5 329.5 24.9 404.9
1968-69 153.0 578.1 5.1 716.2
1969-70 178.9 528.1 7.7 714.7
1970-71 195.7 572.7 43.5 811 .9
1971-72 - - - -
1972-73 - 620.0 - -
1973-74 - 590.0 - -
Notes: * Land Development Bank
** Primary Agricultural Credit Societies 
*** Taccavi loans are state loans disbursed through 
the Revenue Department in the Punjab.
Ordinary commercial banks also advance agricultural credit in the 
Punjab but they are not dominant sources and data for them are 
not available.
PACS loans in the Punjab do not include the long-term loans 
advanced by these cooperative societies.
Source: Chaudhri & Dasgupta (1985).
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Table 6.8 Distribution of Credit (from all sources) amongst Different 
Holding Groups in the Indian Punjab
(In Rupees)
Holding size 
(in acres)
Total credit 
per acre from 
all sources
Total credit 
from
Cooperatives
Cooperative 
credit as per­
centage of 
total credit
0— 5 275.09 170.45 61.96
5.1— 10 188.90 119.67 63.35
10.1— 15 181.24 116.66 64.37
15.1— 20 154.99 110.41 71 .24
20.1— 25 94.43 57.11 60.48
25 and above 218.73 121.82 55.69
Total average: 179.54 112.72 62.78
Source: Gurdip Singh (1972)
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Table 6.10 Data on the Working of Primary Agricultural Credit 
Societies in the Indian Punjab
Years No. O f  
Societies
Membership 
(in ’000')
Share
capital
Rs
million
Deposits 
Rs million
Owned
funds
Rs
million
Working
capital
Rs
million
1947 8419 317 8.76 10.56 31.20 34.31
1950 7157 311 8.89 12.28 28.68 34.44
1955 12359 572 10.53 17.39 42.52 83.88
1956 13144 676 22.59 20.36 59.50 122.00
1957 14344 804 30.09 23.90 73.14 129.86
1958 16823 928 36.28 28.81 74.35 151.74
1959 17107 1128 42.17 35.16 82.38 185.72
1960 18448 1298 48.07 43.21 101.78 210.86
1961 19019 1427 54.99 51 .45 118.33 249.56
1962 19389 1556 62.06 58.41 133.24 283.35
1963 19801 1674 70.17 70.84 155.24 335.16
1964 19981 1812 78.65 85.24 179.73 387.90
1966 11064 1282 66.65 90.65 107.42 368.30
1967 10954 1349 76.54 111.38 123.14 476.12
1968 10931 1407 92.41 141.64 146.47 612.37
1969 10923 1446 102.06 145.20 106.80 727.21
1970 10932 1464 112.00 178.68 185.63 765.03
1971 10931 1482 123.03 203.47 208.55 831.91
1972 10935 1528 136.91 204.99 229.76 927.34
1973 10932 1559 147.17 209.60 252.51 941.71
1974 10938 1596 161.98 226.76 276.91 1033.56
1975 10936 1623 124.53 233.88 304.02 1094.21
1976 10937 1660 189.57 232.07 330.68 1182.01
1977 10942 1682 201.39 235.85 405.32 1310.52
1978 4259 1718 253.72 252.86 419.28 1436.14
1979 4271 1754 307.92 246.33 492.15 1871.57
1980 4266 1784 351.74 236.32 564.60 2312.43
Source: Punjab Cooperative Union (1982)
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Table 6.11 Lending Business of Primary Agricultural Cooperative 
Credit Societies in the Indian Punjab
(Rs Million)
Year Loans
advanced
Loans
outstanding
Loans
overdue
%age of overdues 
to outstandings
1947 4.58 16.98 5.38 31.68
1950 14.80 22.02 4.48 20.34
1955 42.73 23.32 13.97 59.90
1956 56.56 77.54 17.93 23.12
1957 78.93 99.20 23.98 24.17
1958 86.40 116.28 29.95 25.75
1959 112.93 142.83 37.31 26.12
1960 117.60 161.61 41 .62 25.75
1961 149.77 192.35 44.27 23.01
1962 154.36 215.76 56.24 26.06
1963 187.04 255.96 59.88 23.39
1964 215.00 292.06 64.35 22.03
1966 248.86 301.57 54.11 14.60
1967 329.48 339.53 64.96 19.10
1968 619.66 427.94 115.27 26.90
1969 528.14 510.47 199.69 39.00
1970 572.65 519.73 221.35 44.50
1971 613.91 569.13 284.91 47.20
1972 620.22 641.43 361.84 56.00
1973 590.19 635.00 374.57 59.00
1974 781.79 675.40 396.96 58.00
1975 749.75 675.41 399.09 59.00
1976 767.56 757.83 468.55 65.00
1977 873.16 728.74 422.49 58.00
1978 1241.64 761.62 426.30 67.00
1979 1981.16 1102.87 530.95 58.00
1980 1992.06 1462.58 503.33 34.00
Source: a)
b)
Gurbachan Singh (1967) 
Punjab Cooperative Union (1982)
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Table 6.13 Working of the Primary Agricultural credit societies
in the Indian Punjab
(Average per Member)
Years Working
capital
(Rupees)
Loan
advances
(Rupees)
Share
capital
(Rupees)
Deposits
(Rupees)
Owned
funds
(Rupees)
1947 108.23 14.44 27.63 33.31 98.42
1950 110.73 47.58 28.58 39.48 92.21
1955 146.64 74.70 18.40 30.40 74.33
1956 180.47 83.66 33.41 30.11 88.16
1957 161.51 98.17 37.42 29.72 90.97
1958 163.51 93.10 39.09 31 .04 80.11
1959 164.64 100.11 37.38 31 .17 73.03
1960 131.95 90.60 37.03 33.28 78.41
1961 174.88 104.95 38.53 36.05 82.92
1962 182.10 99.20 39.88 37.53 85.62
1963 200.21 111 .73 41 .91 42.31 92.73
1964 214.07 118.65 43.40 47.04 99.18
1966 287.28 194.11 51 .90 70.70 83.79
1967 352.94 244.24 56.73 82.56 91 .28
1968 435.23 440.41 65.67 100.66 104.10
1969 502.91 365.24 70.58 100.41 7.3.85
1970 522.56 391 .15 76.50 122.04 126.79
1971 561.34 414.24 83.01 137.29 140.72
1972 606.89 405.90 89.60 134.15 150.36
1973 604.04 378.56 94.40 134.44 161.96
1974 647.59 489.84 101.49 142.08 173.50
1975 647.18 461.95 76.72 137.94 187.31
1976 712.05 462.38 114.19 139.80 199.20
1977 779.14 519.12 119.73 140.21 240.97
1978 835.93 722.72 147.68 147.18 244.05
1979 1067.02 1129.50 175.55 140.43 280.58
1980 . 1296.20 1116.62 197.16 132.46 316.47
Source: Compiled from Tables 6.10 and 6.11
Table 6.14 Percentage Distribution of Loans by Size of 
Holding in India.
Source
Size of Holding
A
Small
B A
Large
B
Government 62.9 90.0 37.1 10.0
Cooperatives 53.6 71 .3 46.4 28.7
Commercial Banks 36.2 58.2 63.8 41 .8
Money-lenders 70.5 87.7 29.5 13.3
Friends and relatives 25.4 72.0 74.6 28.0
Total: 55.0 81 .3 45.0 18.7
Note: Column A refers to the percentage of total credit disbursed 
by the relevant source.
Column B refers to the percentage which the small farmer 
group forms of the total clientele of the relevant source.
Small farmers are defined as those owning less than 
4 hectares of land.
Source: National Council of Applied Economic Research (1974).
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CHAPTER 7
COOPERATIVES AND DEVELOPMENT - A CASE STUDY OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
SOCIETIES IN A SELECTED REGION IN THE PAKISTAN PUNJAB
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse in detail the
performance of agricultural credit societies in a representative area 
of Pakistan's Punjab. The chapter is divided into six sections.
Section I delineates the need for such a case study of the agricultural 
credit societies. The general setting of the representative area 
(Markaz) is given. In addition the method employed for conducting a 
census survey is described. The substantial problems encountered in 
conducting field work are also dealt with in this section. Section II 
is concerned with the general assessment of the cooperatives'
performance in the representative area. This section is based on the 
information available from the official records of the societies.
Section III deals in particular with the analysis of the impact of
lending 'in kind' on agricultural productivity of the members of the
societies. Data used in this section are generated from interviewing
sampled members of the societies in the Markaz. Section IV assembles 
information in support of the claim that significant irregularities
occurred in the operation of the interest-free lending scheme 
implemented by the societies in the Markaz. Section V adjudges the 
relevance of the Raiffeisen principles in evaluating the cooperatives' 
performance in the Markaz. Finally section VI summarizes the principal 
issues flagged in the chapter.
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7.I The General setting
As noted earlier in Chapters Four and Five, a policy for the 
provision of interest-free loans to farmers owning 12£ acres of land or 
less was announced by the government of Pakistan's Punjab in 1978. 
Under this scheme interest-free production loans of up to RS 6000 per 
borrower per year, subject to a limit of RS 500 per acre, were able to 
be granted by the cooperatives. These loans were granted in 'kind': a
credit note was issued by the Punjab Cooperative Bank to the society 
which was then produced to the input supplier for stocks of chemical 
fertilizers, improved seed, crop pesticides and crop sprayers. The 
limit was raised from RS 500 to Rs 800 per acre in 1985, and up to a 
maximum of Rs 10,000 per borrower per year. It has been claimed by the 
government that most of the farming population (owning 12£ acres or 
less) benefited from the interest-free lending policy of. the societies. 
The claim is based on the facts that the quantum of loans granted by 
the agricultural credit societies in Pakistan's Punjab increased from 
Rs 125.92 million in 1978 to Rs 1 105.57 million in 1984, with an 
average recovery of 93 percent from the societies for the said period. 
Critics 1 on the other hand have argued that the supply of interest-free 
loans by the societies in the Punjab was diverted to non-agricultural 
short-term interest-bearing investments. It has been alleged that
members with outstanding loans could, by misrepresentation and the use 
of fictitious names, obtain new loans to which they were not entitled. 
Moreover through this practice, besides members making substantial 
illegal earnings, Societies were able to show high recovery rates. In 
addition, as was reported earlier in Chapter Five interest-free loans 
provided by the societies in the Punjab generally did not reach the
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targeted group (i.e. the small farmers). Indeed, many new societies 
were established overnight by departmental officials to make the 
interest-free lending scheme of the government appear to be a 
successful policy. This practice, critics suggested, resulted in the 
formation of many 'Bogus societies', 'one-man societies', and, 'Family 
societies' at the primary level of the movement. The general consensus 
moved in the direction of the view that the interest-free lending 
policy did more harm than good in terms of the developmental objectives 
of the movement in Pakistan's Punjab.2
In view of the above allegations it was considered worthwhile 
undertaking a case study of the working of the agricultural credit 
societies in a representative area of Pakistan's Punjab with the 
following objectives:
(a) to assess the general performance of agricultural credit 
societies.
(b) to analyse the impact of lending 'in kind' on agricultural 
productivity.
(c) to test the claim that irregularities in the operation of the 
interest-free lending scheme were significant.
The limitations involved in terms of finance and time obliged the 
author to confine the scope of the present research to one 'Markaz' in 
the Pakistan Punjab; hence the choice of Thikriwala Markaz, reportedly 
the area of the highest concentration of successful cooperatives in the 
Punjab, for a census of cooperatives, using a sample survey of their 
members.
The Thikriwala Markaz^, as classified by the Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development, comprises 38 villages in the
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territorial limits of 11 union councils of the Punjab. The Markaz is 
located on the metalled road between Faisalabad and Jhang districts at 
a distance of about fifteen miles from Faisalabad. Thikriwala Markaz 
is located in a district of the Punjab which is well known not only all 
over Pakistan, but even in the outside world, for having a history of 
record agricultural production and for earning the reputation of being 
the 'granary of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent' long before 
independence. The assured supply of irrigation water, long hours of 
sunshine, and fertile lands have made the area very suitable for the 
production of wheat, sugar cane, maize and many other cash crops.
The Markaz is characterized by a farm structure containing a 
significantly high proportion of small farmers. It was estimated that 
of the total 19212 farm households in the area, 90 percent were small 
farmers' households with holding sizes of 1 2 j  acres or less, whereas 
the remainder (10 percent) owned holdings exceeding 12£ acres and were 
categorized as large farmers.^ Given the productivity of land, the 
smaller farms in the Markaz, however, represent considerable commercial 
activity in financial terms.
The Thikriwala Markaz is thickly populated with a total 
population of 123,000.5 However, the average size of holdings being 
small, a large number of people from the area are employed in one form 
or the other in Faisalabad district. As a consequence there is a 
labour shortage at the time of sowing and harvesting of crops. This is 
linked to the necessity and demand for mechanised cultivation in the 
region.
Infra-structural facilities in Thikriwala Markaz are well- 
developed. There exists one intermediate college, six high schools,
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two middle schools for boys and three middle and three industrial 
schools for girls. The other facilities provided by the government to 
the residents in the Markaz include, amongst others, one hospital and 
two dispensaries for the residents and animal health.care respectively. 
Thus the social environment is suitable for village level institution's 
to facilitate the process of development in the Markaz.
Institutional agricultural credit in the Markaz is provided by 
the cooperatives, the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, and 
the commercial banks operating in the area. Medium and long-term loans 
are provided by the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan and 
interest-free crop production loans (short-term credit) are granted by 
the commercial banks and the agricultural credit societies.
7.1.1 Procedure and Method for Undertaking a Census Survey
The Thikriwala Markaz was selected as the research area for 
reasons of both convenience and merit. First, as already noted, the 
villages in the Markaz are located at a distance of fifteen miles from 
Faisalabad and were accessible by the researcher who was stationed at 
Faisalabad during the course of undertaking the present fieldwork. 
Moreover, of some relevance was the general opinion of the cooperative 
promoters (the staff of the Department of Cooperation) that the 
Thikriwala is the area in Pakistan's Punjab that contained the highest 
concentration of successful and effective cooperative organizations. 
There were 35 societies in the Markaz registered with the Department of 
Cooperation. According to the departmental officials the reported 
societies covered all the villages of the Markaz and all the societies 
were actively involved in the provision of interest-free loans to their
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member farmers in accordance with the government's directive.
The second reason was that after the introduction of the 
interest-free lending policy of the government virtually no research 
had been undertaken on the performance of the cooperatives in the 
Thikriwala Markaz. There was a dearth of information on the changes 
introduced into the organization, as well as on the impact of 
cooperative lending on the members' economy as a result of the 
provision of interest-free credit, 'in kind'.
Having decided to undertake research in the area a census survey 
of the reported 35 societies was envisaged. The departmental officials 
were requested to provide a list of the location and addresses of the 
registered societies together with the names and addresses of their 
operators. The requisite information was provided and attempts were 
made to visit registered societies. However only 29 societies out of a 
total 35 reported societies were traced. No evidence was found of the 
remaining 6 societies. It seemed that this could be evidence of 
deliberate irregularities and that the six societies registered with 
the department were probably 'bogus' entries.
Data necessary for the general assessment of the performance of 
the 29 cooperatives was contained in the official records maintained by 
the individual societies. The accuracy of such data was testified to 
by the appropriate departmental official (the cooperative inspector 
concerned with the supervision of the working of societies in the 
Markaz). Given the limited range of the data recorded by the societies 
it was decided to generate further necessary information by 
interviewing a sample of members of the 29 societies.
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Two sets of data were to be generated. First, the data available 
from the official records of the societies related to the types of 
members, sources and composition of working capital, lending business 
of the societies, frequency of audit and inspections etc. These data 
were extracted from the official records of each of the 29 societies. 
Second, the data required for analysing the impact of interest-free 
lending 'in kind1 on agricultural productivity of members farms were 
not available from the official records and were instead to be obtained 
through interviews from the sampled members. A questionnaire was 
prepared in the light of the stated research objectives. A list of the 
names and addresses of the total members in the 29 societies in the 
Markaz was obtained from the cooperative inspector. According to the 
information made available, there were 925 members in the 29 societies 
in the Markaz. It was decided to draw a 25 percent random sampled from 
the total membership of the cooperatives and this on an average came to 
around 10 members per society, making a total of 231 members in 29 
societies. Further, in order to serve as a control group for 
evaluation purposes, it was decided to include in the research frame 
non-members from the villages from which the members in societies were 
drawn. The total number of non-members was kept to half of the sampled 
member respondents (i.e. 116 non-members) in the societies.
As noted in Chapter Five, widespread irregularities in the 
operation of cooperatives had been reported in a number of studies 
undertaken in the Punjab. It was decided to test this claim in the 
sampled societies in the Markaz, hence the third objective of 
undertaking the present research: to establish the extent of
irregularities in the provision of interest free loans to the members
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farmers by the societies. It was anticipated that this information 
would be obtained by interviewing the members, management committee 
members and the inspector. In addition, information available from 
these sources could be compared with the official records of the 
societies.
As noted, out of the total 925 members in the societies, a 25
percent sampled (231 members) was drawn. However it became very clear
from the outset that it was impossible to adhere to the 25 percent 
sample. Two major problems were encountered. Firstly, the list of 
registered members included individuals who could not be located at 
their given addresses. In addition some registered members were known 
to no-one in the environs of the villages. Among the members actually 
available, many refused to reply to the questions asked. The operators 
of the societies were requested to present at least some reasonable 
number of their respective membership. This request was not properly 
acceded to either. Secondly, the cooperative inspector was not
supportive of our research endeavour, and was unable to help us find 
the requisite number of member respondents from the 29 societies. 
Despite the fact that these two limitations proved a major hurdle in 
our attempt to undertake the present research, ultimately we were able 
to locate 75 members from the 29 societies. Nonetheless among them
some 40 percent (30 members) were concentrated in only two societies.
The rest of the members were spread over the rest of the societies.
In point of fact, our preliminary discussions with the operators 
of the societies and the cooperative inspector raised suspicions about 
the probable widespread prevalence of irregularities in the operations 
of the societies. The suspicions were strengthened given the
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proportion of the requisite number of sampled members from the 29 
societies who were unavailable one way or another for interview. 
Ironically, however, this provided significant evidence relevant to the 
third objective but at the cost of placing serious limitations on the 
use a census survey to obtain evidence relevant to the first and second 
objectives. But evaluation of the performance of the societies was not 
possible by any other means. Despite the limitations, therefore, it 
was decided to proceed with the census survey of the 29 societies and 
interview the 75 members and 37 non-members on various aspects of 
cooperation outlined earlier.
The results of the findings of the fieldwork are presented in the 
following sections.
7.II Assessment of the general performance of Agricultural
credit societies
As noted, there were a total 29 agricultural credit societies in 
the 38 villages of the Thikriwala Marakz, and according to their 
reported activities, these societies were providing interest-free loans 
'in kind1 (mainly supplies of chemical fertilizer and improved seed) to 
their member farmers. A society on average served 1.3 villages in the 
Markaz, but in relation to the total farm households, the total 
membership in the societies was very small (see Table 7.1). On the 
assumption that one farm household was represented by one member in a 
society, the total registered membership in the 29 societies 
represented 925 households out of a total of 19212 in the Markaz. This 
would mean that only some 5 percent of the total farm households in the 
Markaz were enrolled in the membership of the societies. These 
findings are consistent with the results reported in Chapter Five where
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it was noted that the cooperatives in the Pakistan Punjab embraced only 
some six percent of the total farm population in the province. To the 
extent that the figure of 925 is inflated by fictitious names, or 
individuals who are no longer members, then the coverage of households 
is accordingly less.
The primary agricultural credit societies in the Markaz, like 
those in the whole province, were expected to enrol small farmers 
(owning 12£ acres or less). However the large farmers were not 
debarred from membership of the societies. The rationale behind the 
reorganization of the credit movement that started in 1978 was 
nonetheless that the small farmers had not so far received much benefit 
from cooperative provision, especially of credit, which generally was 
taken by the large farmer members in the societies. The interest-free 
loans 'in kind' were specifically targeted at the small farmers. A 
vigorous campaign was started by the Department of Cooperation in the 
Punjab to enrol small farmers in the membership of the societies. (It 
may be noted however that the large farmers, though allowed membership, 
were not eligible for the provision of 'interest-free credit' provided 
by the societies. They could only receive 'credit in kind' by paying 
the usual interest rates which varied between 9 and 11 percent during 
1978 through 1986).
Data compiled on the general profile of cooperative members from 
the official records of 29 societies are presented in Table 7.1. Some 
89 percent of the members owned 12 \  acres or less as against 11 percent 
of the members who owned more than 12£ acres. In terms of membership 
the small farmers were fairly represented and in that respect the 
sampled societies had apparently conformed to the departmental
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instructions.
Table 7.1 further shows that some 65 percent of the total 
membership were illiterate as against 35 percent literate members. 
These statistics stand comparison with the literacy rate in Pakistan, 
which is generally below 25 percent. A significantly higher percent of 
literate members in the societies, especially from the rural areas, 
would imply that the farmer members in societies were likely to be 
aware of the range of potential benefits to be realised from 
cooperation. In contrast, the illiterate members were conceivably 
recruited by the departmental staff and/or became members of societies 
as a result of the inducement of interest-free credit.
As noted in Chapter Five, the primary agricultural credit 
societies in the Punjab obtained their working capital from (a) share 
capital paid-up by the members; (b) a reserve fund created out of the
profit; (c) deposits from the members and (d) a loan from the Punjab
Cooperative Bank. The sampled societies were no different.
Data on the sources and composition of the working capital in the 
sampled 29 societies are given in Table 7.2. The working capital of 
these societies was dominated by borrowed funds, rather than by owned 
funds (share capital, reserve funds and the members deposits). Owned 
funds formed only some 4 percent of the total working capital. These 
are revealing statistics. The lack of commitment of local funds
suggests that the extent of local participation in and members' support 
for their societies was insignificant. Let us analyse the data in 
respect of the components of the working capital.
As noted in Chapter Five, the subscription of share capital was 
made a requirement of the movement in the hope that this would
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encourage thrift among members, and increase the societies' financial 
strength by reducing their dependence on outside capital. This would 
help to make possible the provision of funds at relatively low interest 
rates to members. According to the present by-laws, the share capital 
of a society should consist of shares of Rs 10 each and a member in a 
society is expected to purchase a minimum of 10 shares over a period of 
10 years. The by-laws of societies do not allow distribution of profit 
on shares for a minimum of 10 years; afterwards a cooperative must 
repay the share capital, as also the profit earned by the society, to 
its shareholders.
The 29 sampled societies had a life of less than ten years after 
their reorganization in 1978 and as such none of these societies had 
reached the point at which it was required by law to repay the share 
capital, and the profit earned upon shares, to their members. 
Nonetheless, it was evident from the official records that there was 
hardly a single society wherein the stipulated requirements for the 
purchase of share capital by the members had been fulfilled. In total 
only 15 percent of the total membership in the sampled societies, had 
fulfilled the statutory requirements of purchasing the requisite number 
of shares. As such share capital formed only 2.5 percent of the total 
working capital in the sampled societies. These findings are supported 
by the earlier studies reported in Chapter Five wherein it was 
established that the share capital as a percent of the total working 
capital in the Punjab's cooperatives was low and that the societies had 
normally tended to depend more on the borrowed funds.
The reserve fund in a society is created by the allocation of 25 
percent of the net profit earned by a society. The sampled 29
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societies did indeed earn profit in the form of commission received by 
them on the purchase of chemical fertilizers. Nonetheless the no 
allocation of profit, as required under the by-laws, into the reserve 
funds was found consistent with the requirements. In point of fact the 
figures in the official records of the societies were inconsistent. A 
careful analysis of the data pointed to the conclusion that the 
operators of the societies were confused about maintaining proper 
accounts. They were interested only in the receipt of interest free 
loans from the Punjab Cooperative Bank and in the repayment of the loan 
to the Bank at the appointed time, and not in the establishment of a 
revolving fund to permit the growth in credit provision by the 
societies.
In addition deposits in the sampled societies formed only some 
1.5 percent of the total working capital. Two points must be noted in 
this regard. Firstly, the societies were not seen as viable deposit- 
takers, either from the members or non-members, as they had not 
acquired any suitable office space, locker facilities and competent 
staff to manage deposited savings. Secondly, availability of branches 
of the commercial banks in the area had made it easier and more 
convenient for the members to keep their savings in relatively sounder 
financial institutions.
The sampled societies in the Markaz, as in the Punjab as a whole,
had not adhered strictly to the principles of cooperation. The
mobilization of local funds remained minimal and the major thrust of 
the sampled cooperatives was on borrowed funds received mainly from the 
government and channelled primarily by the Punjab Cooperative Bank.
Such practice on the part of societies made these societies a hand­
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maiden of the government, in stark contrast with the self-sustaining, 
autonomous self-help institutions cooperatives were considered to be. 
And this was the natural outcome of the interest-free lending scheme; 
members' own funds were not forthcoming as the cheap public funds were 
readily available to them through the cooperatives.
As noted, the main object of the provision of the interest-free 
'credit in kind' was to enable the members to make use of improved farm 
inputs (improved seed and chemical fertilizer), thereby increasing 
productivity at their farms. According to the rules a small-farmer 
member could receive a loan up to Rs 10,000 without paying any 
interest, for two crop seasons. However the actual maximum credit 
limit of a member depended on his crop production credit requirements 
per season. These varied from one season to another.
The sampled societies had maintained official records of the 
provision of interest-free credit to individual members. However, the 
credit recorded as having been provided to a member did not in practice 
always coincide with the actual amount received by the member. (This 
point shall be elaborated in section IV, wherein it shall be 
established that significant irregularities in the working of the 
sampled societies were being perpetrated).
If it is assumed that member farmers owning 12£ acres or less 
(i.e. 825 members) actually received the maximum loan amount prescribed 
(i.e. Rs 10,000) allowed a member, then the number of actual loan 
beneficiaries would be 351, which means that some 42 percent of the 
membership in the societies could have been provided with the maximum 
prescribed amount of loanable funds from the societies (see Table 7.2). 
Of course, this assumption is too simplistic, but it does place the
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amount loaned in perspective.
Another way of looking at the lending business of the societies 
was to assume that all the members (only the small farmers) in the 
sampled societies had received the same lesser amount than was actually 
set as a maximum credit limit. When judged from this viewpoint, the 
average amount of working capital provided per member was Rs 4256. 
This amount, though only some 42 percent of the prescribed credit 
limit, was nonetheless much more per member than the average over 
Pakistan's Punjab as a whole. This does suggest that the working 
capital available to a member in a society in this Markaz was 
substantial and that the loan recipients would be able to make 
effective and productive use of the cooperatives' provisions (this 
point shall be elaborated on in section IV).
The data contained in Table 7.2 showing the small percentage of
self-financed working capital can be interpreted in another way. Since 
there was no dependence on their own revolving fund and merely a 
dependence on externally sourced funds, there was no real commitment to 
operating the societies according to the principles of cooperation; 
members were only interested in the receipt of interest-free credit 
provided by the government and in repayment of these loans to the
societies at appointed times.
The sampled societies advanced interest-free credit in kind to 
their small farmer members for two crop seasons i.e. 'Rabi crops'
(crops sown in October/November and harvested in May/June of the 
following year) and 'Kharif crops' (i.e. the crops sown in April/May 
and harvested in November/December). According to the rules, a member 
farmer in a society was obliged to repay his loan to his society in
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cash within a period of two months after the harvest of the current 
crop. Thus loans received by a member for 'Rabi' crops had to be 
repaid to his society sometime in July/August of the next year. 
Similarly a loan granted for 'Kharif' crop had to be repaid in 
January/February of the following year. This in effect meant that for 
approximately eight months of the year the cultivator is carrying two 
loans, and for the periods of roughly two months duration 
(February/March and August/September) he is carrying one. A new loan 
would only be issued to a member for a particular crop season given 
satisfactory recovery of the loan from him during the preceding years. 
That is, the Rabi (or Kharif) crop of the preceding calendar year. The 
rules framed by the department for the recovery of loans further 
stipulated that the defaulting member is expelled and the recovery of 
the loan from him ensured as arrears of land revenue.6
According to the official records, all the 29 sampled societies 
had repaid the loans to the Punjab Cooperative Bank at the appointed 
time. The cooperative inspector in the Markaz (and the official
records) testified that 100 percent recovery of loans from the
societies in the Markaz was ensured. This was indeed a great 
achievement of the cooperative movement as also of the Department. The 
inspector attributed 100 percent recovery of the loans from societies 
to the successful implementation of the interest-free lending scheme by 
the department (the reasons for 100 percent recovery of the loans from 
the sampled societies to the Punjab Cooperative Bank shall be dealt 
with in section IV).
The organizational aspects of the sampled societies are now
considered. As noted in Chapter Five the day-to-day working of the
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Punjab's cooperatives depended to a greater extent on the ability and 
sincerity of their management committee members. The ordinary members 
of a society should annually elect the members of the management 
committee to undertake as many functions for the promotion and 
development of cooperatives as are assigned to it by members in a 
society. The structure is intended to ensure that there is effective 
participation of members in cooperative affairs and in the decision­
making process.
The management committees of the societies in the Markaz 
conformed outwardly to the desired pattern. Since the small farmers 
formed the targeted group, it could be expected that a major section of 
the small farmers would be represented in the management committees of 
the societies. As noted earlier, some 89 percent of the total members 
in the sampled societies were small farmers. Nonetheless the official 
records showed that only 17 percent of the operators (usually committee 
office bearers) of the societies in the Markaz were actually small 
farmers. The others in ranking order were businessmen (33 percent) 
large farmers (32 percent), influential and better-off persons (10 
percent) and government servants (8 percent) (also see Table 7.3). 
These statistics show that far from the small farmers being in control 
of the societies, they were in the control of either large farmers, 
non-agriculturists (i.e. businessmen) and/or influential rural elites.
Although the by-laws of the societies debarred non-cultivators 
from becoming members of societies, a good number of operators were 
nonetheless found to be non-cultivators. This was a clear violation of 
the statutory requirement. In addition, the presence of a large number 
of large farmers, and influential rural elites as main operators of the
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sampled societies implied that they too were interested in (illegally) 
obtaining interest-free credit (the nature and extent of irregularities 
in the sampled societies shall be dealt with later).
According to the rules the elections to the various positions of 
the management committee of a society should be held every year. Data 
extracted from the official records of the sampled societies showed 
that in fact elections to the various offices of the management 
committees were rarely held and existing members continued to enjoy 
their positions for many years. In some 55 percent of the sampled 
societies the same persons acted as presidents of their respective 
societies for up to four years without seeking approval of the members 
through the ballot box. The situation for the other positions on the 
management committees in the sampled societies was not substantially 
different (see Table 7.4).
As noted earlier, the operators and the committee members were 
influential persons and they enjoyed a relatively higher social status 
in relation to other members. A principal reason for the perpetuation 
of the term of office of office bearers once elected was that the 
cooperative inspector was opposed to any change in membership of the 
management committees. The inspector argued that the existing 
borrowers were under certain moral obligations to the present members 
of the management committee, which was collectively responsible for the 
grant of a loan. Consequently if the members of the management 
committee changed every year, the moral pressure for the repayment of 
loans by cooperative members would be reduced. While it might have 
some justification the inspector's argument seriously undermined the 
democratic character of the societies. That apart, the justification
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provided by the inspector for the perpetuation of the same management 
committees for a longer time period possibly concealed the true 
explanation. It is probable that interest-free loans provided by the 
societies were misutilised and/or misdirected to non-agricultural uses 
by the management committees in an understanding with the cooperative 
inspector, who then shared the advantage embodied in the interest-free 
lending scheme (this point is elaborated in section IV).
The data compiled from the official records of the societies 
revealed that most members of the management committees were literate. 
Thus out of the 29 presidents in the sampled societies, only 10 percent 
were classified illiterate. Amongst others the illiterate committee 
members in a ranking order were executive members (30 percent), 
treasurers (15 percent), vice presidents (15 percent). None of the 
secretaries in the sampled societies, according to official records was 
illiterate (see Table 7.5). In addition, most members of the 
management committees had fulfilled their personal requirement to 
purchase share capital. Thus of all the members in the management 
committees of the sampled 29 societies almost 85 percent of presidents, 
80 percent of vice-presidents, 75 percent of secretaries, 85 percent of 
treasurers and 80 percent of executive members had purchased the 
requisite number of ten shares, (see Table 7.6).
Most members of the management committees, then, were literate 
and had adhered to the minimal necessary requirements laid down in the 
by-laws of the societies. Moreover, most members of the management 
committees performed the duties relating to the day-to-day working of 
the societies on a voluntary basis. The official records maintained by 
the societies revealed that there was only one society among the 29
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sampled societies which paid a nominal honorarium to its secretary for 
record-keeping and other day-to-day tasks.
As noted earlier in chapter five, the department of cooperation 
in the Punjab is expected to undertake regular audit and inspection of 
cooperatives. At the primary level this task is entrusted to the 
cooperative inspector (or sub-inspector) who is expected to be 
competent in audit work. Normally, at least one or two audits and 
inspections at the primary level of the movement should be undertaken 
annually by the cooperative inspector or sub-inspector. In addition it 
is expected that the superior official (i.e. the Assistant Registrar) 
of the department visit the primary societies to confirm that the 
working of societies was as required under the departmental rules.
The audit and inspection of societies is necessary because 
societies are generally managed by persons who have no formal training 
in the principles of cooperation. Investigation of the sampled 
societies revealed that neither did the department of cooperation 
undertake an adequate number of audits, nor did the responsible staff 
visit the area to inspect the operation of these societies. The 
official records of the societies revealed that the average number of 
audits was 0.25 per society per annum. In many instances the records 
showed that societies were not audited at all. In addition the number 
of visits by the Assistant Registrar to the area were extremely 
limited. Half of the sampled societies remained unaudited by the 
departmental officials, especially during the three years preceding the 
survey (also see Table 7.7).
The Punjab Cooperative Union is charged with the task of 
providing the necessary education and training in the principles of
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cooperation for the members of the primary societies by organising 
courses of short duration ( 3 - 5  days) with its own instructors and 
also with the assistance of the cooperative inspector. The staff of 
the union organise courses at the Markaz level and members of the
societies, together with the management committees, are expected to 
attend, although the attendance nonetheless is voluntary. Information 
from the sampled societies revealed that at no time during the five 
years preceding the survey had such courses had been organised, so the 
members had no opportunity to learn the principles and basic concepts 
of cooperation.
The foregoing general discussion of the performance of the
sampled societies, based on their official records, has established 
that their activity of providing interest-free credit was effectively 
controlled by literate non-agriculturalists and large farmers. The 
quantities of working capital made available per member were 
significant and had the potential to increase agricultural productivity 
significantly. It is now appropriate to assess the extent to which 
this potential was realised.
7.Ill Impact of Interest free Lending 'in kind' on agricultural
Productivity
As noted in section I, out of a nominal total of 925 members in
the 29 societies only 75 members distributed unevenly among the
societies were ultimately available for interview. This precluded 
achievement of statistical representativeness intended at the outset of 
the study. However, the time and financial constraints within which 
the research had to be conducted did not permit the sampled frame to be 
reconstructed, for example by focussing exclusively on societies which
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could be described as genuine. Ironically the sampling problem arose 
because of the extent of irregularities in the constitution and 
operation of a large member of 'societies'. In other words the 
deficiencies of the data in terms of the first two objectives of the 
study were a form of evidence relevant to the third objective - an 
interaction which was not fully anticipated at the outset. To provide 
this limited sample with a roughly comparable control group 37 non­
members were interviewed. These were from the same villages in which 
the sampled member farmers in societies were located.
A brief note on the views of the members and non-members on 
general features of cooperation may be in order before analysing the 
impact of provision of interest-free credit on members' agricultural 
productivity. Data contained in Table 7.8 show that most of the 
members (100 percent) had joined the societies to obtain interest-free 
loans in kind with the ultimate purpose of using these funds for 
increasing agricultural production at their farms. 98 percent also 
responded that they believed in farmers working together. This result 
is by no means surprising, since informal 'cooperation' or sharing in 
agriculture activities is a general feature of the rural social 
structure. It cannot therefore be taken as a commitment to formal 
cooperative memberships. The other reasons as stated by the members in 
ranking order were that procurement of credit through alternative 
channels was too time consuming (84 percent); were motivated to 
membership by the departmental staff (75 percent), were persuaded by 
the existing members to join (25 percent); and that the neighbours, 
friends and relatives were members (15 percent). The contrast between 
these low figures and the 98 percent commitment to 'working together'
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shows the extremely limited local interest in recruitment to the formal 
cooperative structure. In short, then, it can be concluded that the 
main object of joining a society was to receive interest-free credit to 
increase agricultural production.
The non-members, on the other hand, claimed that they did/could 
not join the societies because the cooperative inspector never asked 
them to join, suggesting some selectivity on the part of the inspector. 
This view was held by almost 49 percent of the non-members. In 
addition, other reasons stated by the non-members for not joining the 
societies were that they were not aware of the existence of a society 
in the village (46 percent), they were refused entry by the vested 
interests (38 percent), they were engaged in activities that did not 
leave them enough time to think of joining the societies (19 percent); 
they were afraid that they might owe debt to a society in case of non­
payment (8 percent), (also see Table 7.9)
On balance, then, the answers do not contribute to a picture of 
thrusting and dynamic cooperative development, with enthusiastic public 
projection of its benefits. The contrary impression is created of a 
selective and exclusive club, with narrowly focussed benefits.
The members and non-members were also compared in relation to 
their access to credit, from both institutional and non-institutional 
sources. As noted earlier in Chapter Five, credit available from 
institutional sources in the Punjab was generally limited. Moreover 
the provision of cooperative credit was extremely limited, such that 
even members of societies had to turn to the non-institutional sources 
to fulfil their crop production credit needs.
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The data on the sources of credit and availability of loans from 
these respective sources are given in Table 7.10. Loans (in addition 
to these in kind) were mainly used for the purchase of improved farm 
inputs, and other agricultural purposes. Significantly the data show 
that the cooperatives met only 31 percent of the total credit 
requirements of their members for crop production purposes. Although 
cooperatives met 82 percent of the credit requirements for fertilizer 
and 60 percent for improved seeds, the cooperatives did not provide any 
'cash funds' for other 'productive uses'. As such some 69 percent of 
the total cash requirements of the sampled 75 member farmers for crop 
production purposes were met from other sources (institutional as well 
as non-institutional sources); overall the institutional sources met 
only 63 percent of the total credit needed by the sampled member 
farmers for crop production purposes. Thus the cooperative members had 
to meet some 37 percent of their crop production credit needs from non- 
institutional sources. Thus not only was the provision of cooperative 
credit insufficient, but also when total availability of institutional 
credit was taken into account, the loans received by members fell well 
short of their estimated credit needs for growing crops. Similarly it 
may be noted from the table that non-members had also relied on both 
institutional (other than cooperative) and non-institutional sources to 
fulfil their crop production credit needs. Given that members' and 
non-members' dependence on credit sources is so similar, except for 
members' particular use of the cooperative, some initial doubts have to 
be raised regarding the hypothesis that the particular provision of 
interest-free cooperative credit 'in kind' to the members would have 
significantly improved their farm productivity when compared with that
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of the non-members. Moreover, the fact that the even provision of 
chemical fertilizers and improved seeds by cooperatives to members fell 
significantly short of their own requirements, warns against a 
simplistic acceptance of the argument that the mere provision of credit 
in kind by the societies would significantly influence members' 
agricultural productivity.
Of course, an increase in agricultural productivity is not just 
dependent on the application of chemical fertilizers in required 
amounts and in sowing improved seed. Other complementary factors such 
as improved technical know-how, better farm management practices, 
regular and timely irrigation of the crops may well be required to 
affect agricultural production. Despite this, it was nonetheless 
considered useful to compare fertiliser application rates and yields of 
major crops between members and non-members, and then to link this with 
data on differences in gross farming incomes. (The relevant data are 
presented in Tables 7.11 through 7.13). It may be seen from Table 7.11 
that cooperative members applied a relatively higher amount of 
phosphatic fertilizer compared to non-members. There were two possible 
reasons for this difference. Firstly, although both groups were 
generally aware of the potential benefits to be obtained from applying 
chemical fertilizers, members may have used more as a result of the 
relatively lower prices they had to pay. Non-members were obliged 
either to buy from registered dealers at the controlled price, or to 
pay an additional premium by buying from other informal sources. 
However, since cooperatives obtained supplies at a discount, members 
were offered a financial advantage. This could then form an incentive 
to use more phosphatic fertilizers. In contrast, members' application
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rates for nitrogenous fertilizer were lower than those of non-members. 
Assuming these differences to be significant it may be merely the 
consequence of the supply policy of the cooperatives (providing more of 
the phosphatic type and less of the nitrogenous in line with agronomic 
recommendations) or of indivisibilities in provision (cooperatives 
provide fertilizer only by the entire sackful; avoiding excess supply 
might lead to lower application). On the other hand, given greater 
general reliance on nitrogenous fertilizer in the farming community and 
the existence of considerable price premium in the black market,
members' low application rates could well be evidence of diversion of 
cooperative supplies into the black market for cash to be used for 
other production or consumption purposes.
The sampled members were asked to comment on the quality of
services provided by the societies. They were asked questions about 
the amount and quality of fertilizer supplied by cooperatives, its
sufficiency at the appropriate times and about fertilizer prices.
Replies are given in Table 7.14. Members were generally satisfied with 
the availability of fertilizers ahead of sowing time. Moreover, they 
regarded the quality of fertilizer supplied by cooperatives was 
comparable with that obtained from any other source. However, a good 
number of cooperative members seemed dis-satisfied with the amount of 
fertilizer provided to them by cooperative management. They complained 
that the price charged by a cooperative for fertilizer was rather still 
higher; nonetheless the price in the black.market and that charged by 
the registered dealers from the non-members was considerably higher 
than that charged by cooperatives.
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The Department of Cooperation had allocated part of the funds for 
the supply of improved wheat seed to the member farmers of the sampled 
societies. Only ten out of the twenty-nine societies were providing 
this facility. The management in the rest of the 19 sampled 
cooperatives complained that despite repeated requests to the officials 
of the department, improved seed was not provided. The recipients of 
improved seed in the ten sampled societies were not confident in the 
quality of the seed provided by the cooperatives, and a good number of 
members complained about the non-availability of seed when it was 
required. Most of the members were not sure whether the price charged 
by cooperatives was higher or lower compared to other sources. The 
limited extent of their knowledge may suggest that the prospect of 
interest-free loans for the purchase of seed had greater attraction 
than any other aspect of the situation so they did not feel the need 
to make any queries in this regard (see Table 7.15).
The sampled members in cooperatives were further asked questions 
as to the general features of cooperation. (see Table 7.16) Most of 
the respondents were aware of the prospective advantages to be gained 
in associating with the cooperatives. Nonetheless, they believed that 
a cooperative was an organization which catered for the needs of 
relatively large farmers. A good number of respondents appreciated the 
procedure for loan advances and its recovery. Many of the members 
complained of malfunctioning due to mismanagement of the societies by 
their respective operators.
In point of fact many of the respondents advocated expansion of 
the scope of cooperatives. They were of the opinion that the societies 
should provide cash credit, supply the diesel oil and also market
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members' farm produce. Almost 100 percent of the members were of the 
view that credit should be granted in cash and not in kind; 65 percent 
wanted to extend the jurisdiction of cooperatives to the supply of farm 
inputs other than fertilizers, which included the supply of minor farm 
implements. Many of the respondents wanted an increased flow of 
technical knowledge and guidance from their societies in order to bring 
about an increase in agricultural production.
As noted earlier, the credit provided by the interest-free loans 
could, from a particular perspective, be regarded as adequate in amount 
for crop production needs. Accordingly the prospect for significant 
improvement in yields was present, on the assumption that fertilizer 
provided by the scheme was actually used, and neither diverted for sale 
in the black market nor merely substituted for what otherwise would 
have been purchased.
However, Table 7.12 shows that the average yields per acre of 
major crops did not differ significantly as between members and non­
members. It might have been anticipated that yields of members' crops 
would have been higher compared with those of non-members, the cheaper 
credit encouraging more intensive use. The similarity of their yields 
robs the interest-free credit scheme of a principal justification and 
raises questions about the basis of its popularity amongst members, and 
suspicions that this was due to the opportunities for abuse which the 
system afforded. (This point shall- be elaborated later).
The popular logic in favour of loans 'in kind' was not only that 
agricultural productivity would be increased, but also that this would 
have the consequence of higher incomes for members. Given that 
productivity was apparently not improved this link became suspect.
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Data presented in Table 7.13 confirm the absence of significant 
differences in farming incomes between members and non-members. 
However the data also show that most of the members were not full time 
farmers and/or they had devoted more attention to their non-farming 
activities in order to supplement their farm incomes. These findings 
were consistent with our earlier observations; according to the 
official records, 41 percent of the total members of the management 
committees in the sampled societies were non-agriculturists, including 
businessmen and government servants. All this suggests that they had 
joined the societies solely to obtain interest-free credit provided by 
the government (rather than out of any enthusiasm for cooperation) and 
the credit received by them was either used to free their own funds for
non-agricultural uses or indeed diverted directly to that end in
contravention of the rules.
The apparent absence of substantial agricultural productivity or 
income gains by members from the credit scheme can be interpreted at 
worst as evidence of widespread irregularities inherent in the 
operation of the interest-free lending scheme. It is to this
particular aspect of the case study to which we turn in the next
section.
7.IV Extent of Irregularities in the operation of the interest
free lending scheme
This section is based on a thorough re-examination of the 
official records, the responses to the survey of members and detailed 
conversations with the members of the management committees of the 
sampled societies.
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As already noted, out of 35 societies officially reported to be 
in operation only 29 cooperatives were found to exist in the 38 
villages of the Markaz. Six societies, though registered with the 
department, did not exist at all. These were evidently bogus entries 
in the register. Given the procedure for registration, this implies 
that the cooperative inspector together with other influential members 
in the Markaz had managed to register 'pocket' societies in fictitious 
names, and they in turn were illegally diverting the cooperatives' 
provisions to themselves.
A brief note on the procedure for the registration of a 
cooperative in the Punjab is required, as a bench mark for 
identification of irregularities. According to the prescribed 
procedure, at least 10 farm households should be willing to join 
together to try to solve their economic (agriculturally related) 
problems on the basis of a 'self-help' approach, before applying for 
the registration of a society to the department. Once the prospective 
members state their willingness to buy shares in a society amounting to 
a total of Rs 100, and are ready to pay the membership fee (Rs 50), 
they are provided with an application form by the department. The 
completed form together with the prescribed fee and Rs 100 worth of 
shares are submitted to the department for departmental consideration. 
Prior to the processing of the application by the department, the 
cooperative inspector or sub-inspector visits the location (the 
village) and calls a meeting of the persons intending establishing a 
society. This meeting is generally held at a common place so that 
other households from the village can participate. The inspector is 
supposed to collect information about the members and the accuracy of
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entries regarding members’ farm holdings at this meeting. Assuming the 
inspector's report is satisfactory, the Assistant Registrar of the area 
concerned registers a society. This primary society is then 
automatically affiliated with the Punjab Cooperative Bank for the 
purpose of obtaining interest-free credit.7
The amount of credit advanced to a primary society by the Punjab 
Cooperative Bank depends on the maximum credit limit (MCL) of a 
society. The MCL of a cooperative is determined by adding up the MCLs 
of its individual members. The MCL of a member is intended to be based 
on his crop production credit requirements. However, in practice this 
is an informal procedure involving the discretion of members of the 
management committee. The maximum credit allowed a member is Rs 10,000 
for a farm of 12.5 acres for two crop seasons in a year. The 
production credit needs of members differ from one season to the other 
and therefore so do their MCLs. Once the MCL of a society is fixed, 
the society can apply for a loan up to its MCL from the Punjab 
Cooperative B a n k . 8 Theoretically the procedure is so simplified that 
the representative of a cooperative can get its loan sanctioned within 
a very short time. Thereafter the documentation serves as a credit 
note to be given to state-appointed dealers in exchange for improved 
seed, chemical fertilizers, crop pesticides and crop sprayers. The 
cooperative then advances loans to its individual members as per its 
stipulated rules.
-Despite the prescribed lending procedures and the procedures for 
the registration of a society, widespread irregularities in both the 
organization of sampled societies and their operations were noted 
during the fieldwork. The irregularities may be classified into three
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groups:
(a) organizational irregularities
(b) operational irregularities
(c) managerial irregularities
These aspects together with related issues are discussed below,
(a) Organizational Irregularities
These irregularities were evident partly as a result of the 
laxity shown by the cooperative inspector in his adherence to the 
prescribed procedures for the registration of a society. Indeed it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the cooperative inspector had 
some complicity in the irregularities. The author was able to identify 
a number of the irregularities in the working of the societies.
Accordingly the sampled societies were grouped into five 
categories on the basis of their organizational patterns.
(1) 'One-man' Societies
These societies were officially registered, but in practice they 
were under the control of a single operator who had managed to enter 
fictitious names of supposed member farmers in the official records of 
the societies. Generally, it seemed that this was done with the 
knowledge of the cooperative inspector. In effect the single operator 
and the cooperative inspector were diverting the cooperatives 
provisions to themselves.
(2) Family societies
These societies were operated either by the members of one 
'family group' or by their close relations. These societies were 
classified 'family societies' only when (a) they had two or more 
members in their respective committee of management from one family and
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(b) their members were in practice cultivating the same farm. When 
members of a society came from the same family, but managed separate 
farms, a society was not treated as a 'family society'. While there 
were no legal impediments to related persons operating as a 
cooperative, the intention of the institution of corporation was to 
bring together members from different families, so achieving a new 
social cohesion.
(3) Bogus societies
These societies were categorised as 'bogus societies' when their 
operators did not present any of the official records to the author 
despite repeated requests. These societies were known in the village 
to no-one. The so-called operators of these societies seemed to have 
had established these societies with the connivance of the cooperative 
inspector.
(4) Non-genuine societies
These societies provided services to member farmers who having 
joined the societies, proceeded to obtain credit either through 'under­
reporting' or 'over-reporting' their farm holdings. The management of 
these societies became a party to these deceptions. The members of 
these societies were able to receive an undue share of cooperatives 
provisions. Nonetheless some of the sampled members of these societies 
complained about the misconduct of these societies by their own 
committee members.
(5) Genuine societies
These societies were registered by the department according to 
the prescribed procedure. The size of holdings of the sampled members 
in these societies and the amount of the loan received by them from
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their societies were found correct when checked from the official 
records. Furthermore member of these societies did not register any 
complaint against the members of the management committees.
The distribution of the sampled societies according to these 
categories is shown in Table 7.17. Of the total 29 societies some 46 
percent were 'one-man societies'. The other societies in ranking order 
were family societies (20 percent), bogus societies (17 percent), non- 
genuine societies (11 percent) and the genuine societies (6 percent).
There was thus only a very remote hope that the interest-free 
credit provided by these societies had actually reached the targeted 
group (the small farmers). The extent of irregularities in the 
formation of societies in the Markaz was in line with the studies 
reported in Chapter Five: these had concluded that most of the primary 
societies in Pakistan, as also in the Punjab, were bogus undertakings, 
largely established by local vested interests. If we were to use the 
proportions found in the fieldwork to estimate the number of different 
categories of societies in the province, then out of a 17271 active 
societies in the Punjab the number of the genuine societies would be 
only 1036 as against 7945 one-man societies, 3454 family societies, 
2937 bogus societies and 1899 non-genuine societies in the year 1982. 
Furthermore, as noted earlier in Chapter Five, these findings were not 
inconsistent with the studies undertaken by the centre for 
Administrative Research and Development9 in the Punjab wherein it was 
reported that only 50 percent of the societies in the Punjab were 
barely viable undertakings of a total 34543 societies in 1982.
These widespread irregularities in the formation of societies in 
the Markaz would not have been possible if the cooperative inspector
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and the other departmental officials had strictly adhered to the rules. 
However, management committee members were themselves by and large 
dishonest and concealed the facts before applying for registration of 
societies to the department. Nonetheless they succeeded in obtaining 
interest-free loans 'in kind' from the department. Given that most of 
these societies were found to be non-viable/bogus undertakings, any 
chances of their smooth operational performance seemed slim.
b) Operational Irregularities
Despite these organizational shortcomings, an attempt was made to 
analyse the operation of the societies, especially to assess their 
performance in providing 'loan in kind' to the small farmers. The 75 
sampled members were interviewed with the object of estimating the 
magnitude of pre-emption of cooperative credit by the influential 
member-farmers. The categories of loan recipients in the sampled 
societies were identified and the distribution of cooperative loans to 
genuine cases was estimated.
The loan categories were classified as:
(1) Bogus Loans
These loans were shown either against the names of fictitious 
members or in the names of actual or family members, but the recipients 
did not acknowledge receipt of the loan.
(2) Family loans
Loans were judged as 'Family Loans', when they were shown against 
the names of one family member (or his close relative) in the record of 
a society. Such loans were defined as 'family loans' only when the 
recipients operated one family farm jointly.
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(3) Actual Loans
These were loans not in the preceding categories which were found 
in the official records and were confirmed by their recipients as 
current entries.
(3i) Loans with Area over-reported
These loans were obtained by small farmers, whose land holdings 
did not exceed 12^ acres. However they had obtained more than the 
amount of loan to which they were entitled by deliberately reporting 
that they had more land than they possessed.
(3ii) Loans with Area under-reported
These loans were obtained by large farmers by under-reporting 
their operational holdings in the official records.
(3iii) Genuine loans
These were the loans in relation to which the amount reported in 
the official records were confirmed by the relevant members.
As noted already the by-laws of the societies did not debar large 
farmers (owners of land above 12^ acres) from becoming members of the 
societies. Nonetheless they were not eligible for the receipt of 
interest-free loans. Instead, they were required to pay some 9-11 
percent interest per annum on the services provided by the societies. 
In practice, large farmers (amongst whom most where operators or 
committee members) had devised means to by-pass these rules and through 
illegal means managed to receive interest-free credit provided by the 
societies.
The above classification was supported by the available data. 
Data collected from the members and checked from the cooperatives 
record showed that of the 75 supposedly small farmers (owners of land
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not exceeding 12£ acres), only 76 percent actually were small farmers. 
Of the rest, 19 percent were large farmers, and 4 percent as landless 
members. (see Table 7.18) In addition, as noted earlier, only 17 
percent (5 out of 29) of the operators of societies were small farmers.
The flow of cooperative credit to the sampled members was 
nonetheless worked out in order to find out the extent to which 
interest-free loans had actually reached the small farmers. According 
to the official records 75 loans were actually granted to the sampled 
members. However it was found that 74 percent of the loans were 
recorded against names of sampled members who did not admit to the 
receipt of any loan from their respective societies. These were thus 
the bogus loans. The rest of the loans (26 percent) were reportedly 
distributed as 'actual loans' and 'family loans'. (see Table 7.19) 
Further data are presented in Table 7.20. It can be seen that of the 
26 percent of the reported loan actually received (actual and family 
loans), loans with area over reported and loans with area under­
reported were 11 percent and 4 percent respectively. Loans below 
reported amount stayed at 7 percent. In fact, the genuine loans, 
actually received by the members and coinciding with the records, 
formed only 5 percent of the total loans,
c) Managerial Irregularities
As noted the irregularities in the operations of the societies 
were widespread. Firstly irregularities were noted in terms of 
unconstitutional formation of the societies. As most of these 
societies were established (or reorganized) on the recommendation of 
the cooperative inspector, it is likely that the inspector himself was 
a party to the whole process that resulted in the formation of non-
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genuine societies. This argument has some support from our earlier 
observations made in Chapter Five; therein it was noted that the 
inspector is generally low paid, he has neither enough resources, nor 
any chances for further promotions to higher positions. The inspector 
himself may have been tempted to persuade influential vested interests 
in the villages of the Markaz to join with him in an operation such 
that government funds originally envisaged for agricultural development 
could either be put into non-productive uses or to developmental 
purposes outwith the sphere of agriculture. Secondly, it was likely 
that the committee members, especially the main operators, were 
themselves the main culprits. They were clever and literate enough to 
by-pass the rules. They managed to seek support from other rural folk 
who collaborated with them and managed to get the societies registered 
with the department. The prevalence of family societies and non-genuine 
societies in the Markaz may in part be attributed to the tactics that 
were pursued by the operators of these societies successfully seeking 
registration of their societies. Thirdly, as noted some of the 
operators of the societies were themselves government servants. These 
persons were in a position to influence the opinion of the inspector, 
who in turn, in good faith relied on genuineness of the information 
provided to him by these government servants. As such the 
irregularities noted may then be attributed to the laxity shown by the 
cooperative inspector in not strictly adhering to the rules and also in 
violating the departmental instructions in registering the societies.
In short, although an enormous amount of credit was granted by 
the societies according to the available data credit did not reach the 
targeted group. It is evident that the impact of the interest-free
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loans could not have been as significant as advocated by many experts 
on agricultural development in the Punjab. It seems entirely plausible 
that substantial funds provided by the societies were in fact diverted 
by the management committee members to themselves, and to some 
influential and vocal members. These loans, in turn were invested in 
non-agricultural short-term interest earning activities. In point of 
fact, the repayment period of interest-free loans was stretched 
reasonably over a period of some 11-12 months, the interest-free loans 
placed at the disposal of the operators of societies amounted to 
additional capital, which was available to them for a year without any 
fear of the departmental staff as repayment of the capital to the 
society was required only after a year. No interest payment was 
involved, and neither was there any supervision or check on the end use 
of cooperative credit. After a year the operators (especially of 
Bogus, Non-genuine and Family societies) paid back their societies the 
principal in order that they could then have a claim for priority for a 
new loan to be issued. This practice suggests that funds meant for 
agricultural development were invested in non-agricultural commercial, 
undertakings which brought additional incomes to the cooperatives' 
operators and other vested interests. It is conceivable, of course, 
that a part of the additional incomes so generated may have been 
invested in agriculture in an indirect manner.
7. V The Relevance of Raiffeisen Principles
The original intention of the fieldwork was to assess the 
performance of the cooperatives in relation to the 'Raiffeisen 
Principles' which were established earlier in the study (Chapter 3).
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Given the extent of irregularities which came to light during the 
fieldwork it can be anticipated that the comparison of performance with 
these Principles will leave the cooperatives in an unfavourable light. 
Nonetheless, the comparison is worthwhile since it reveals the 
fundamental weaknesses of the intended scheme and not just the 
particular ways in which it was illegally exploited.
It will be recalled that the Raiffeisen Principles were
1. Restricted area of operation.
2. Joint and unlimited liability of members.
3. Provision of loan only for profitable approved purposes.
4. Equality of status of members and democratic control.
5. Honorary services for managing cooperatives affairs.
6. Establishing of organizational and financial structures at the
secondary and apex levels.
7. Mobilization of members' resources.
8. Distribution of Cooperatives' Profits into a Reserve fund.
9. Repayment of loans out of the profit earned by members and
10. Good conduct and discipline of members.
(1) Restricted area of operation
The credit societies in the Markaz were each established at the 
village level, nominally satisfying this principle. Nonetheless the 
size of a society generally remained too small in relation to the total 
number of farm households in a village. The members of these societies 
certainly came from the same village; but the group so constituted was 
not found to be cohesive. Although Raiffeisen did not debar any member 
of the rural community from membership of his societies, he nonetheless
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considered that the group (i.e. a cooperative) so constituted would be 
able to exercise the necessary mutual pressure on all members to make 
the organization viable. In practice what was found in the Markaz were 
primary societies, mainly established by the departmental staff, but 
invariably under the control of large farmers, who manipulated them to 
serve their own interests and who did not let the organization serve 
the objects of cooperation in their true letter and spirit. Implicit 
in this principle, then, is a minimum membership to achieve the 
necessary self-disciplinary objective.
(2) Joint and Unlimited liability
The sampled societies in the Markaz were certainly constituted on 
the principle of unlimited liability and thus conformed at least 
nominally to the Raiffeisen ideal. It will be recalled that the 
intention of this feature of the Raiffeisen cooperative was to maintain 
discipline in respect of repayment of loans granted on personal surety 
rather than specific collateral. The virtual 100 percent loan recovery 
rate achieved in the Markaz would appear to endorse this principle. 
However in fact it was not the pressure exerted by extending the 
members' liability which disciplined repayment in this particular 
situation. Since the cooperative was in effect merely channelling 
government funds (rather than employing funds belonging to the 
membership) liability to one another was minimal. The high repayment 
rate can be explained merely by the fact that entitlement for a further 
loan depended on repayment of the preceding loan. And since these 
loans were an attractive opportunity the obligation of repayment was 
accepted. Thus it can be seen that the significance of this principle
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is contingent on the working capital originating largely within the 
cooperative.
(3) Provision of loan only for profitable Approved Purposes
This principle sought to ensure that borrowers would be able to 
improve their standards of living and be able to repay their debts.
As noted earlier, although loans in kind provided by the 
societies were intended to increase agricultural productivity, in 
practice this objective was not fulfilled as a result of widespread 
irregularities in the working of the societies. The evidence points to 
the fact that loans received by members were used for purposes other 
than agricultural production. Nonetheless, members did apparently 
repay their loans, possibly out of non-agricultural earnings. Whether 
these were substantially increased through use of the loans is 
uncertain; at the very least they may have replaced other borrowings 
and thus reduced interest charges.
(4) Equality of status and democratic control
Raiffeisen believed that all members must have equality of status 
irrespective of their being rich or poor or coming from any particular 
faction, caste or group. He sought to ensure that affairs of the 
society were managed on a democratic basis by following the principle 
of 'one man, one vote'.
In practice, members in the sampled societies in the Markaz did 
not generally have equality of status. The better-off invariably 
controlled cooperatives affairs. The principle of democratic control 
was not adhered to by the sampled societies. Accordingly it can be
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said that this principle was generally violated.
(5) Honorary services for managing cooperatives affairs
The operators and the members of the management committee members 
did perform the day-to-day operations of the sampled societies on an 
honorary basis. However, this should not be taken to imply that the 
operators had conformed to the interest of the Raiffeisen principle. 
Most members of the management committees were performing the services 
albeit on an honorary basis, in a way that channelled resources to 
themselves and/or to a few other members leaving the ordinary members 
with no access to services at all.
(6) Organizational and Financial structures at the secondary
and Apex level
The primary societies were affiliated with the Punjab Cooperative 
Bank. In addition, they were required to conform to the rules framed 
by the department. In point of fact, the movement in the Punjab has a 
well developed structure at the apex level. The financial needs of the 
sampled societies and other primary units are duly catered for by the 
Punjab Cooperative Bank. The organizational structures (Department of 
Cooperation and the Punjab Cooperative Union) are also well placed.
However, it could be said that the spirit of the original 
principle was associated with the notion that the primary societies 
would be actively raising working capital and that the secondary and 
apex structures would complement and support their activity.. In this 
case it was the dependence on funds from central government which gave 
the higher levels a prominent role.
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(7) Mobilization of members resources
As against Raiffeisen's societies, the sampled societies in the 
Markaz did not generate funds from their own sources. Amongst many 
other reasons, the factor of major importance was that most of the 
working capital of the societies was provided by the government in the 
form of interest-free credit. The members were supposed to buy shares 
and bring their savings to the societies. They did not conform to 
these essential requirements. It was public money which was put at 
stake; cooperatives were not looked upon as a self-help institution.
(8) Distribution of Cooperative Profit into a reserve fund
The sampled societies as a matter of fact, were required to 
transfer a part of their profit (25 percent) into the reserve funds. 
Nonetheless this requirement was not strictly adhered to by the 
management in the respective societies in the Markaz. Given that 
societies bought fertilizer at a discount which was not entirely passed 
on to members the possibility of profit existed. However, it was not 
evident from the records of the societies that such reserves as existed 
had been created by retention of part of these profits, nor that the 
principle was being currently upheld.
(9) Repayment of loan out of the profit earned bv the members
This principle, in accord with the objectives of the sponsors of 
this particular lending scheme, was not respected by the members of the 
societies in its true letter and spirit. It has already been argued 
that loans provided by these societies were actually diverted to non- 
agricultural uses, or put into short-term interest bearing commercial
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undertakings. In this way further incomes were generated. As such the 
loans were repaid, but the actual purposes of loan and the intention of 
the sponsors of the interest-free loans in kind were seldom fulfilled.
(10) Good conduct and discipline of members
Raiffeisen believed that good conduct of the member of the
management and ordinary members in the affairs of the societies would 
bring success to the societies. The sampled societies did not come up
to this expectation. It has been established that most of these
societies were non-viable and bogus undertakings. The members of the 
management committees were the main violators of cooperatives’ 
discipline. Nothing better could be expected of the ordinary members.
7 .VI Conclusions
The sampled cooperatives in this representative area of the 
Pakistan Punjab (Thikriwala Markaz) were primarily used as a government 
vehicle to distribute interest-free loans in kind intended to increase 
agricultural production. The cooperatives had no other functions
besides providing loans 'in kind' and even this function was not 
adequately performed partly as a result of abuse of the scheme by the 
cooperative's operators and the cooperative inspector who by various 
illegal means channelled most of the public funds to themselves or to 
the influential and other vested interests in the Markaz.
-The sponsors of the interest-free lending scheme were confident 
that through the societies' intimate contact with the villagers, they 
would create an atmosphere wherein not only the members but also non­
members as well would benefit from the government's agricultural
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development programmes. However, most primary societies lacked the 
organizational set up to assume the role of providing public funds to 
the vast majority of the farming population. The origins of the 
failure of these societies are to be found in too ambitious a plan of 
the government to promote agricultural development through hastily 
organized primary units; lack of adherence by the departmental staff to 
the requisite administrative discipline required for the registration 
of the societies; infrequent audit and inspection of the societies, 
absence of comprehensive follow-up by the departmental staff in respect 
of the end use of credit; lack of proper education and training of the 
management committee members by the department and/or the Punjab 
Cooperative union; inadequate mobilization of members resources, too 
much reliance by the government on the sincerity and ability of the 
cooperative inspector to supervise the cooperatives' operations.
The commitment of an enormous amount of credit by the government 
to this scheme should have entailed the creation of a viable 
institutional framework to ensure that the loans provided were actually 
utilized by the members for increasing agricultural production. This 
would have avoided the subsequent squandering of much-needed resources 
for agricultural development. This framework was not created; nor was 
the need to do so even recognised. The basic problem was the 
presumption that merely by injecting free credit into n nominally 
cooperative structure agricultural development would automatically 
occur. The preceding section demonstrated the extent to. which the 
Raiffeisen principles were breached by these societies: in effect there 
was no spontaneous support for true self-help societies. That being 
the case the alternative should have been to tailor the organizations
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into a practical institutional device suitable for promoting the cause 
of agricultural development, not just by making loans available but 
also by imparting the requisite technical know-how. It has to be 
concluded that the reorganization of credit provision in 1978 did not 
serve the objective of agricultural development through cooperation.- 
It amounted to a waste of public funds, an outcome that might have been 
anticipated if more thought had been given to institutional structures 
in general, and to the demanding principles of cooperation in 
particular.
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Notes to Chapter 7
1. See for instance Khan, D.A. (1982) pp128-29; Government of
Pakistan Report of the National Commission on Agriculture (1988) 
Chapter 23.
2. See Government of Pakistan Report of the National Commission on 
Agriculture (1988) pp401-402.
3. A 'Markaz' is an administrative area covering some 30-40 
villages. See Chaudhry, M.H. (1976) pp1-15.
4. Ibid pp21-22; The data were updated up to the year 1987 from the 
official records of the Markaz maintained by the Government of 
the Punjab, Department of the Local Governments.
5. Ibid.
6. See for instance Haroon, F. (1986) pp7-8.
7. See Waheed, A. (1985) Chapter 1. It may be noted that the
prescribed procedure is seldom adhered to strictly by the 
departmental officials.
8. See Waheed, A. (1985) Chapter 1; An explanation to the 
determining of the Maximum Credit Limit (MCL) was made by the 
officials of the Department of Cooperation.
9. See Centre for Administrative Research and Development (1984)
pp29-33.
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Table 7.8 Factors Influencing the Sampled Members to 
Join the sampled cooperatives
Influencing factors Total members: 7 5
Number Percentage of the 
total members
1 . Wanted higher return 
for farm business 75 100
2. Belief in farmers 
working together 73 98
3. Persuasion and influence 
of an existing member 19 25
4. Motivation of the 
departmental staff 56 75
5. Alternatives to 
cooperative credit are 
too time consuming 63 84
6. Neighbours, friends and 
relatives belonged 11 15
Source: Author's Field Work
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Table 7.9 Reasons stated by the sampled Non-members for not 
joining the cooperatives
Total Non-Members 
interviewed: 37
Reasons Numbers Percentage of 
total
1 . Not aware of the existence of 
a cooperative in the village 17 46
2. Refused entry by vested interests 
in the cooperative 14 38
3. Fear of bad debt 3 8
4. Cooperative Inspectors did 
not ask to join 18 49
5. Engaged in other businesses 
and cannot find time to 
participate in cooperative 
affairs effectively 7 19
Source: Author's Field Work
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Table 7.12 Average Yield per Acre of Major Crops of the sampled 
Cooperative Members and the sampled Non-Members.
(in Kgs./Acre)
Crops Member farms Non-member farms
Average yield Average yield
Wheat 948 956
Cotton 740 716
Sugarcane 17272 17532
Source: Author's Field Work.
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Table 7.13 Gross Income of the sampled Members and the sampled 
Non-Members
(Amount in Rupees)
Source of Income
Annual Aver acre 
Members
Income oer Household 
Non-Members
Income from farm enterprise 45731 46051
(79) (90)
Income from non-farming
activities 12349 4981
(21) (10)
Total income 58080 51032
(100) (100)
Figures in parentheses indicate percentage share to the total income 
from the relevant sources.
Source: Author's Field Work.
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Table 7.14 Views of the sampled Cooperative Members on the Provision 
of Fertilizer from Cooperatives
(Views of 75 members)
Questions Agree
Resoonse of the 
Disagree
Members 
Not sure
1. Cooperative ensures supplies
ahead of sowing time 70 5 -
(93) (7)
2. Marketing expenses are 
minimized as fertilizer is
supplied at members door 35 10 30
steps (47) (13) (40)
3. Fertilizer available from
the cooperative is cheaper 17 39 19
than from other sources (23) (52) (25)
4. Cooperative fulfils all 71 4 _
fertilizer needs (95) (5)
5. Weight of the fertilizer
is the same as written on 29 3 43
the bag (39) (4) (57)
6. The quality of fertilizer 
supplied by cooperative
can be compared with the 
fertilizer obtained from 71 4
any other source (95) (5)
Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total respondents. 
Source: Author's Field Work.
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Table 7.15 Members' Views on the Provision of Wheat Seed by the 
Cooperatives
(Views of 40 members)
Response of the Members
Questions: Agree Disagree Not sure
1. The quality of wheat seed 
supplied by the cooperative 
is better than obtained from 
any other sources
8
(20)
2
(5)
30
(75)
2. Adequate quantity of seed 
is supplied as and when 
needed
21
(52)
19
(48)
-
3. The price charged by the 
cooperative is lesser than 
of any other source
13
(33)
5
(12)
22
(55)
Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total respondents. 
Source: Author's Field Work.
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Table 7.16 Members1 Views on the General Aspects of Cooperation
(Views of 75 members)
Questions:
Response of the Members 
Agree Disagree Not sure
1. Farmers must cooperatate if
they have to improve their 52
social and economic status (69)
2. Belonging to a cooperative 17
means loss of independence (23)
3. The only reason to join 
cooperative is to receive 72
interest-free loan (96)
4. Cooperative is for more 59
progressive farmers (79)
5. Cooperative ensures timely 
provision of goods and 63
services (84)
6. Cooperative has simple
procedure for loan advances 53
and its recovery (71)
7. Cooperative management
protects interests of 25
weaker members
8. Decisions in a cooperative 
are taken on democratic 
basis
12
8
(1 1 )
55
(73)
3
(4)
15
(2 0 )
7
(9)
14
(19)
42
31
15
(20)
3
(4)
1
(1 )
‘5
(7)
8
(10)
32
Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total respondents. 
Source: Author's Field Work.
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Cooperative ideas were imported from Europe into the Indian sub­
continent from the beginning of the 20th century. Their importation 
posed inevitable problems of transfer and assimilation of an alien 
cultural complex. Treating the period to the present as one of trial 
and error in cultural transfer and grafting on of an alien institution 
the results achieved at the local level in the Pun jabs - from both a 
social and an economic standpoint - have on the whole not been very 
satisfactory, to judge from the findings of the present research. The 
question has to be faced, therefore, as to the wisdom of continuing 
along the same lines as in the past. It may be that more promising 
solutions to the problems of achieving development lie elsewhere. On 
the other hand, the possibility should surely be explored of creating 
new and more dynamic forms of cooperatives, better suited to local 
conditions and better able to mobilize the peasants effectively. After 
all, the present research has not demonstrated the inappropriateness of. 
cooperative ideals; it has established, however that these are 
unattainable unless existing cooperative policies are consonant with 
these ideals and genuinely directed towards the benefit of rural 
populations.
Prior to presenting the conclusions and policy implications of 
the present study a note on the limitations of the research may be in 
order.
It could be said, with some justification, that the research has 
been both too general and too particular. On the one hand the
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interpretation and analysis of available documentation (academic 
literature, government reports and statistical data spanning some 70-80 
years) can do no more than present a generalised picture of the role 
and achievements of cooperation in the Punjab. By its nature it can 
say little about the detailed performance of the institution of 
cooperation at the village level, even although that is the matter for 
concern. On the other, the case study, focusing on detailed village- 
level performance, is open to the charge of unrepresentativeness - that 
is, it may say little of relevance to the general picture. Indeed, it 
could be said that, since so few genuine cooperatives were found to 
exist, the case study is scarcely an indicator of general cooperative 
performance. This dilemma could only be resolved by a much more 
extensive and detailed village-level study, in relation to which the 
present study could be regarded as a provisional pilot study. In the 
absence of a wider survey the tension must remain, and care has to be 
taken in formulating the conclusion of the present research.
8.1 Summary of the Main Findings
First, the survival and success of cooperatives is contingent on 
the spontaneous commitment of members to the principles which 
distinguish this particular institution from other structures of 
economic activity. Of course rural communities have to be introduced 
to the possibility of cooperative forms of organization: cooperative 
ideas and possibilities have to be diffused and in that respect 
government involvement may be necessary. However, much of the 
criticism of cooperative performance in the Punjab can be attributed to 
the fact that the cooperatives were virtually imposed from above on the
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local communities. The respective governments, in great haste for 
economic and/or political success, generated large numbers of 
cooperatives to carry out what may be bluntly called half-baked 
development policies. Membership of such cooperatives was to all 
intents and purposes arranged by a form of official bribery: rural
folk were enticed into membership by promises of government hand-outs. 
It is hardly surprising that these spurious cooperatives mostly 
collapsed, with great damage to the reputation of the cooperative 
movement as a whole. Adequate credit was not granted, loans were 
generally not fully recovered and there was endless recrimination.
Second, the Punjab cooperatives largely failed to tap and display 
indigenous rural capital. This is a complex issue; in principle a 
cooperative could harness capital which already exists or modify saving 
motives to generate new capital - or indeed both. But the mere 
formation of a group of persons into a cooperative does not necessarily 
itself create the resources to obtain capital items. A group of 
farmers forming a cooperative may collectively produce on a sufficient 
scale to justify employment of their own tractor, for instance, but 
they still may not have access to sufficient funds to buy one. In line 
with the movement's historical antecedents it was generally assumed 
that the cooperatives could be self-financing; therein, modest 
individual capitals could be pooled to greater collective effect. But 
due to the nature and extent of the poverty of the vast majority of 
rural folk in the subsistence setting in the Punjabs this was not 
possible. Cooperatives did not flourish spontaneously in large numbers 
due to a kind of economic anaemia. Being uniformly impoverished and 
lacking capital from their own sources, they had to rely to an
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excessive degree on borrowings from the government via the 
cooperatives' banking systems. Nonetheless despite doing so 
cooperatives failed to provide the requisite services to all their 
members, services which in principle should have been financed out of 
their own pooled resources: they lost the support of their poorer
members as a consequence. The redistributional objective of the 
cooperative ideals was not attained. While it is true that cooperatives 
should be economically self-sufficient, this does not of course mean 
that they must raise all their working capital from their own members' 
resources. There is nothing irrational or discreditable about 
borrowing, provided the debt can be properly serviced and ultimately 
repaid - which in turn requires the funds to be put to good use. In 
practice, cooperatives were established without any rational commercial 
objectives in the mind of their sponsors. As a consequence
cooperatives proved ineffective in terms of any economic criterion.
Third, a common cause of cooperative failure was that the people 
themselves did not understand what they were doing. The ordinary
members knew little or nothing about the way the cooperative was 
supposed to work, or about their own rights and responsibilities as 
members. The management committees failed to supervise cooperative
affairs effectively. They did not maintain proper records. Nobody 
seemed to know how to place orders for requirements; how to run a
business. Even the simplest village cooperative calls for a 
significant measure of managerial skills. The complex businesses of 
the secondary and apex cooperatives called for far more sophisticated 
management. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that management was 
almost always deficient - not necessarily to the degree of being
495
fatally so but at least to the extent that it caused the standards of 
performance to be below what they could have been.
Fourth, the cooperatives in the Punjab exhibited irregularities 
to an extent which precluded the quality of mutual trust and dependence 
on each other which was a characteristic of the cooperative ideal. 
Dishonesty is a problem in almost all human organizations. The fact 
has to be faced, however, that cooperatives in the Punjab were 
particularly susceptible to it in most aspects of their operations. 
The opportunity for dishonesty was considerable. The members were 
uneducated, often illiterate. They did not fully understand the 
importance of the cooperative to them; they were unaware of the 
potential benefits from cooperation. Unfortunately too often, 
cooperation did not mean "unity is strength" to the cooperators, but 
"what belongs to everybody, belongs to nobody". Comparatively large 
sums of money were handled by people whose own incomes were not at 
stake: public funds were channelled into private pockets, especially 
where there was little risk of being found out. Where there were 
suspicions of dishonest practices it was difficult to substantiate 
them. Widespread small-scale pilfering and embezzlement were relatively 
easy to cover up, especially when the cooperatives' records were not 
properly kept or audited.
Fifth, the fundamentally democratic nature of cooperatives was 
conspicuous by its absence. More often than not cooperatives were 
dominated by the few wealthy or influential people who directed the 
affairs of cooperatives to serve their own interest, rather than the 
interest of the membership as a whole. This was primarily because the 
inegalitarian structures of the local communities tended to be
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reproduced in the cooperatives as well, contrary to the cooperatives 
ideal of the strong helping the weak. Loans from cooperatives were 
often given by the management to a few prominent members, leaving the 
mass of the poorer members with nothing. They continued to rely on 
non-institutional sources which were generally much more flexible about- 
the repayment of principal as long as the money-lenders continued to 
receive high interest rates.
The conclusion that cooperatives in the Punjab did not provide 
much benefit to the masses of poor people is supported by evidence from 
quite diverse sources. It is an expected conclusion when we take into 
account the nature of local communities and how cooperatives operate in 
them. Indeed, the early cooperative movements in England never 
succeeded in reaching down to the lowest levels of the working class 
and mainly appealed to the better-off sections of the working class, 
until there was a substantial rise in wages for the main body of 
industrial workers after the middle of the 19th century. There is 
almost a parallel situation in the Punjab, where the majority of the 
rural folk live at or below subsistence levels: there is a comparative 
neglect of the small cultivators by the cooperatives, the much larger 
share of cooperatives resources going to the bigger cultivators. There 
is thus a situation in which the fruits of development continue to be 
denied to large sections of the rural community. This does raise an 
important general issue, however: are cooperatives an appropriate
institution where people are uniformly poor (and so there are 
essentially no resources to pool) and where there is not already a 
strong development process underway (e.g. expanding urban markets for 
agricultural produce)? Are there external pre-requisites for
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cooperative success?
Sixth, cooperatives in the Punjab depend crucially on government 
support and are far from self-reliant. Self-reliance is a prominent 
objective of national policy. The development of cooperative self- 
reliance is generally seen as a contribution to national self-reliance 
efforts. Despite the proclaimed goal, however, government involvement 
and assistance was considered a necessary condition for the promotion 
of cooperatives from the very day of the introduction of the movement 
in the united Punjab and its subsequent developments in the Indian and 
Pakistan Punjabs. While both in the Indian and Pakistan Punjabs one of 
the arguments for encouraging the promotion of cooperatives was that 
for development to occur, the traditional dependency system must be 
replaced by self-reliance and community initiative, to be achieved 
through cooperative action. In practice, the introduction of 
cooperatives in any case did not replace dependency by self-reliance 
but perpetuated dependency in another form through the cooperative. In 
effect it involved the substitution of a new dependency system in which 
the government became a new patron.
Seventh, the supposed causal connection between credit provision 
and the promotion of rural economic development remains suspect. It 
was expected that cooperative credit would provide farmers with an 
effective cheaper alternative to local sources (non-institutional 
credit market), or to the other institutional sources. By putting this 
to good use cooperatives would fulfil an important function of 
promoting agricultural development. Interest rates in the informal 
credit market would then be lowered and factor prices generally 
corrected. As against these expected hopes, much of the credit
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advanced by cooperatives was insufficient in extent to cover even part 
of the 'production' requirements, and to make matters worse credit 
advanced by the cooperatives was not put to productive agricultural 
uses by the members: Moreover, the record of repayment was generally
bad. The cooperatives did have mixed but not particularly significant 
achievements in terms of the diffusion of agricultural innovation and 
the promotion of higher productivity on their members farms. There was 
certainly insufficient evidence to conclude that the cooperatives 
provision of credit was either superior to other institutional means of 
promoting innovation and agridultural productivity.
The intended benefits of cooperatives are not all economic. 
However the social benefits from cooperation were less evident than the 
economic benefits; and the latter were by no means a common feature. 
Achievements in regard to socio-economic equalization, structural 
change and relief of mass poverty fell far short of the announced goals 
of the policy makers. The injection of cooperatives into local social 
systems that were structured along hierarchical lines or controlled by 
particular vested interests did not bring much reform or 
democratization to those systems: the rural setting was not
characterized by communal solidarity.
Eighth, the findings of the case study undertaken in the 
representative area of the Pakistan Punjab established that most of the 
sampled cooperatives in the region had been established irregularly. 
At the root of that problem was the particular government policy of 
providing interest-free credit in kind which was found to be especially 
advantageous by influential and better-off members of the community, 
who kept the advantages of it to themselves. Ironically these
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advantages may have contributed to development outside of agriculture. 
Certainly the poorer farmers derived very little benefit.
Ninth and finally, it is ironic that having essentially imposed
cooperatives on the community, the weaknesses of cooperatives in the
Punjab should be attributable to inadequate supervision by government' 
agencies. Ideally, the cooperative movement should provide its own
supervision, partly from the elected committees, and partly from the
apex organizations (the cooperative union, and the Department of
Cooperation) which should provide audit, inspection and guidance
services. In practice, however the management committees were not
sufficiently knowledgeable, and the support and the supervision 
provided to the cooperatives by the apex cooperatives were inadequate. 
The apex was in fact, part of the system itself, and suffering from the 
same problems. Apex and secondary organisations were almost always
under-financed or under-staffed. The major responsibility then fell on 
the cooperative departments. Almost without exception, they had 
inadequate staff and funds, and this was one (among many others) main
cause of the limited success of cooperatives. The governments
encouraged cooperatives to spring up in large numbers in what were
adverse circumstances but then failed to provide adequate supervision. 
The audit work was either inadequate or not undertaken at all.
Cooperatives handled large sums of credit without as much as a 
financial inspection. It is hardly surprising that there were 
widespread failures.
8 .II Conclusions
The assessment of performance of an institutional structure is
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fraught with difficulty, primarily due to the complex of factors 
involved. It is by no means a straightforward matter to identify 
causes of inadequacies of performance when social, political and 
economic considerations are woven together. The fact that the 
institution in question is not the product of purely local forces but 
has instead been transplanted from a quite different time and place 
adds a further dimension of complexity. Failure could be attributed to 
rejection of the cultural transplant due to incompatibility, or to its 
association with the colonial past. Alternatively it could be due to 
the absence of necessary preconditions linked to opportunities for 
development and their perception by participants. But equally it could 
be attributed to government manipulation of the institution, to serve a 
particular and conceivably ill-suited objective given the circumstances 
prevailing in agricultural input and output markets in 20th century 
Punjabs. It is certainly evident that there is something fundamentally 
wrong with the way the cooperative system - in particular the credit 
cooperatives-operates, given the social objective of reaching the 
masses of the poor farmers. Either the credit system itself needs to 
be changed (by the provision of more extensive long-range support 
through arrangements to meet specific and well-identified problems of 
small farmers, who have inadequate collateral by insurance schemes 
against inability to repay loans because of weather or market 
conditions or the failure of new technology); or else the objectives 
should be changed so as to reduce emphasis on social goals of 
redistribution or relief of mass poverty and leave these goals to other 
kinds of programmes. The research findings suggest that the whole 
problem of incentives and facilities offered by cooperatives need to be
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reviewed.
Cooperatives can be a channel for delivering major technological 
innovations to their members such as improved seed, fertilizer, 
pesticides) but only when they have a clear mandate from and loyalty of. 
their member participants; when mutual trust is widespread and the 
cooperative leaders exercise an accountable form of authority at 
regular meetings. The social solidarity of members is thus crucial. 
Introduction of the novel institution of cooperation can prove a 
success only when the community members are mobilized to use 
traditional social and political institutions to deal with local 
problems, if any, and then engage in a cooperative group to undertake 
other developmental tasks.
Cooperatives will not prove successful in the communities where 
class and caste structures are inegalitarian; cooperatives in effect 
become the preserve of the middle and upper class and their 
effectiveness in the community remains slight. As such cooperatives 
will bring success only when they are introduced into communities which 
have more flexible socio-economic structures and from which a 
relatively homogeneous group (in terms of their personal commitment to 
cooperation and to the socio-economic changes which constitute 
development) can be drawn into the cooperatives' membership. This 
would seem to be a principal pre-requisite for institutional change to 
occur and cooperatives to be enabled to create a cohesive group 
oriented to local socio-economic improvements.
To be effective, however, cooperatives also need to have strong 
links with outside agencies, such as the secondary and apex 
cooperatives, and the Department of Cooperation. In spite of the risks
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of being interpreted as imposing an alien structure on local 
communities there is still a necessity for the government to play an 
active role in promoting the idea of cooperation. Unless the outside 
agencies ensure the training of the local leaders, assist the 
cooperators in adopting new technology, provide sufficient credit and 
other requisites, audit cooperative accounts regularly and discipline 
those responsible for defaults and irregularities, there is no point in
expecting any success from any type of a cooperative.
The difficulty of successfully equalizing or extending access to 
resources and means of production to the poorer members is an important 
issue that has emerged from the present research. Arguably, however, 
the problem is primarily a matter of the need for basic land reforms 
which should be enacted and enforced by the government. To blame 
cooperatives for failing to resolve what they are not designed to 
tackle is hardly appropriate. It can readily be argued that the more 
prosperous and large farmers will always be in a better position to 
make use of the services of cooperatives under the above conditions, 
and this in turn would continue to accentuate the income gap between 
themselves and the small farmers.
The failure of cooperatives can easily be attributed to the
absence of conditions necessary for their success. Despite the risks 
of this line of argument it has to be said that some of the failures 
have little to do with the structures and functions of cooperatives as 
such. The areas in which external factors have contributed to the
failure of cooperatives are: inequality in land ownership, illiteracy, 
corruption, dishonesty, political instability. The influence of these 
or other factors on cooperatives failures cannot be overlooked.
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Cooperatives are frequently considered to be an effective tool 
for the structural change which is a basic pre-condition for the 
attainment of social and economic justice. The research suggests that 
this is too ambitious an expectation. It is too much to expect
cooperatives (being essentially local institutions) to bring about such
fundamental changes themselves. These changes are of a highly 
political and sensitive nature, materially involving policy
considerations at the national level. The cooperative movement can 
only emphasise the education of members with the objective of 
developing social awareness so that they may, in addition to 
participating more effectively in the immediate affairs of their 
cooperatives, take a keener interest in the wider socio-political 
problems as a whole.
Despite the fact that there is generally a widespread 
misappropriation of cooperatives' funds due to the dishonesty of the 
cooperative office-holders, it is vain to expect cooperatives rapidly 
to change the people's morals. Human nature has not changed much in 
the past and there is little ground for expecting to discover any 
radical mechanism through which morals will be transformed at once. In 
part the matter is one of disparities of social and economic powers, as 
well as the abuse of that power. These cannot be remedied in the short 
run. Indeed, the whole history of Europe show that it was only through 
the attainment of successful economic growth that greater equality of 
distribution and social equality was achieved. Yet there is
opportunity for an institution to embody checks and balances to 
restrain illegal behaviour, and in that respect there is clearly room 
for improvement.
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In view of all of the above there may be little point in 
launching crash programmes for the expansion of cooperatives. There is 
a need for adequate provision for cooperative education and training, 
especially to inculcate in the minds of the cooperators the awareness 
of the rights and responsibilities towards cooperative in addition to 
the managerial skills. The likelihood of success or failure of a 
cooperative will thus be influenced by the attitudes of the cooperators 
and the structural aspects of the whole programme, including the 
secondary and the apex cooperative organizations.
Perhaps the most fundamental issue is whether or not the 
performance of the cooperatives, for all that it has been shown to be 
inadequate, has been better than might have been achieved by some 
alternative institutional arrangement: for example, an agency organized 
and administered wholly by the government to provide the same services 
or functions that cooperatives usually provide. An alternative system 
could involve peasants being treated separately and individually by 
relevant government departments. Yet another might involve delivery of 
services by a private agency. Then the basic issue to be considered by 
the policy makers is whether better results are more likely to be 
obtained by treating peasants individually or by grouping them into an 
organization, whether it be a cooperative or some other institution.
A radical alternative to the reform of the existing cooperative 
institutions would be a policy seeking to evolve wholly new kinds of 
local organizations - 'units of rural action1 that could more 
effectively stimulate peasant participation and in particular more 
effectively involve the poorer members of the local community. To 
provide low-income farmers with the services and resources essential
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for their work and well-being will need profound social structural 
transformation. There are several structural factors identified by the 
present research that limit the development of any new organizational 
approach. The first in this respect is the weight of the vested 
interests, including the domination of larger farmers in cooperatives 
affairs: the result of the present patterns of the ownership of land
and trade practices. The second factor concerns certain features of 
class and caste systems that prevent the full participation of 
subordinate groups in cooperatives. The third factor is the quality of 
control exercised by the government and the politicians in respect of 
the movement. Even in the best intended programmes of development, 
control from outside can appear locally as a new form of alien 
domination, discouraging participation. If large numbers of poor 
peasants and landless rural workers are to be mobilized for development 
using their own and external resources, they must be shown that the 
benefits accrue to them and not to the privileged groups in their 
localities or surroundings.
To sum up, the research has identified a pressing need for a 
serious review of cooperative policy. The research has established 
that cooperatives failure has been less a demonstration of the 
irrelevance of cooperative principles to the pursuit of development, 
and more a clear indication that the annexation of the cooperative 
concept to serve misguided and insensitive government policies creates 
organizations which are cooperatives in name only. Such a review 
should consider possible specific adjustments to cooperative methods 
and procedures to meet some of the individual problems the research has 
identified. It could in addition consider the possibility of
506
converting existing credit-only cooperatives to multi-purpose 
cooperatives, to place the creation and employment of credit in a more 
integrated commercial setting. Finally it could also examine the 
possibilities and comparative advantages of alternative institutional 
arrangements to promote socio-economic development in the rural areas.
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